Exploiting a Power Imbalance: Eleventh Circuit Affirms Hobbs Act Convictions Without Explicit Threat or Proven Actual Power

Introduction

In United States v. Sharon Barnes Sutton, No. 23-10669 (11th Cir. Nov. 12, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction of a former DeKalb County, Georgia commissioner on two counts of Hobbs Act extortion by wrongful use of fear of economic loss (18 U.S.C. § 1951). The case arose from a high-dollar public works contract for the Snapfinger Creek Advanced Wastewater Treatment Plant Expansion Project (“Snapfinger Project”), where a subcontractor, Environmental Consortium, LLC, led by Reginald Veasley, stood to receive up to $1.8 million over four years under a prime contract awarded to Tetra Tech.

The government’s theory was not that Sutton used “color of official right,” but that she exploited Veasley’s reasonable fear of economic retaliation to obtain monthly cash payments. The jury convicted on the extortion counts and acquitted on a separate 18 U.S.C. § 666 bribery charge. On appeal, Sutton advanced four arguments:

• Insufficient evidence of extortion.
• The Hobbs Act is unconstitutionally vague as applied to her conduct.
• Exclusion of psychiatric expert evidence violated her right to present a complete defense.
• Limits on impeaching the key witness (Veasley) via grand jury testimony violated the Confrontation Clause.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Although unpublished and thus nonprecedential in the Eleventh Circuit, the opinion provides a clear, practical synthesis of Hobbs Act doctrine in public corruption settings: an explicit threat is unnecessary; exploitation of a reasonable fear of economic loss suffices; the feared loss may concern both existing and future business; and the defendant need not actually possess the power to inflict the threatened harm if the victim reasonably believes she does. The court also reinforces the Insanity Defense Reform Act’s boundaries on psychiatric evidence and clarifies standards for impeachment-by-omission via prior grand jury testimony.

Summary of the Opinion

The court (Judges Jill Pryor, Newsom, and Lagoa) affirmed on all four issues:

• Sufficiency of the evidence: There was ample circumstantial evidence to support that Sutton intended to exploit Veasley’s reasonable fear of economic retaliation relating to the Snapfinger Project, even absent any explicit threat. The jury could infer extortion from Sutton’s secretive $500/month demand, her position and committee roles, her statements about being someone Veasley “still got to deal with,” and the “incongruous power balance.”
• Vagueness: The Hobbs Act, as interpreted by longstanding circuit precedent to include fear of economic loss, provided fair notice; the scienter requirement further mitigates vagueness. The rule of lenity did not apply.
• Psychiatric evidence: Exclusion of expert testimony proffered to negate mens rea complied with the Insanity Defense Reform Act (18 U.S.C. § 17) and Eleventh Circuit case law: the proffer did not demonstrate a legally acceptable theory of lack of specific intent and risked jury confusion, and thus its exclusion did not violate the right to present a complete defense.
• Confrontation/Cross-examination limits: The district court properly prevented defense counsel from showing Veasley his grand jury transcript to impeach by omission because the specific detail (“a month”) was not something he had been asked and would “naturally” have included; even if limiting that method were error, it was harmless in light of corroborating audio evidence and the overall strength of the case. The Confrontation Clause was not violated.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

The opinion draws on Eleventh Circuit and sister-circuit authority to articulate four core pillars of Hobbs Act extortion by fear of economic loss:

• No explicit threat required; intent to exploit fear suffices:
  • United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1572 (11th Cir. 1984) – The defendant need not cause the fear; it suffices to intend to exploit it. Fear need not stem from an explicit threat.
  • United States v. Sander, 615 F.2d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 1980) (adopted by the Eleventh Circuit via Bonner) – “Subtle extortions” are covered; the government need only show circumstances making the victim’s fear reasonable.
  • United States v. Duhon, 565 F.2d 345, 352 (5th Cir. 1978) – Avoiding explicit demands does not save a defendant where the jury can infer intent to extort.
  • United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816, 820 (7th Cir. 1973) – A public officer can exploit a business owner’s fear of harm to business even if interactions appear cordial.
  • United States v. Flynt, 15 F.3d 1002, 1003–04 (11th Cir. 1994) – A jury could find extortion where a trucking company paid a distribution manager without explicit threats due to fear of losing business.
• Fear may concern future opportunities, not only current interests:
  • Haimowitz, 725 F.2d at 1567, 1572 – Payment extorted from someone seeking a license he did not yet have.
  • Flynt, 15 F.3d at 1004 – Fear of losing future business flows can support extortion.
  • First Circuit decisions: United States v. Cruzado-Laureano, 404 F.3d 470, 481 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Cruz-Arroyo, 461 F.3d 69, 74–75 (1st Cir. 2006) – Fear can include loss of business opportunities.
  • United States v. Robinson, 700 F.2d 205, 208–09 (5th Cir. 1983) – Threats affecting promised future contracts support conviction.
• Victim’s reasonable belief matters more than defendant’s actual power:
  • Robinson, 700 F.2d at 209 – The reasonable belief of potential harm is “more critical” than defendant’s actual power to control bidding.
  • United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 373 n.6 (8th Cir. 1976) – Actual ability need not be shown if the victim reasonably believes harm may result.
  • United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1328 (11th Cir. 1982) – Focus on whether circumstances rendered fear reasonable.
  • United States v. Rivera Rangel, 396 F.3d 476, 483–84 (1st Cir. 2005) – Victim’s fear is reasonable where defendant has access to/influence over decision-makers.
• Vagueness, scienter, and notice:
  • United States v. Wayerski, 624 F.3d 1342, 1347 (11th Cir. 2010) – De novo vagueness review standards.
  • Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000) – Due process vagueness framing.
  • Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 (1988) – Vagueness challenges judged as applied when no First Amendment concern.
  • United States v. Duran, 596 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) – Strong presumption of constitutionality; difficulty at margins does not invalidate statute.
  • United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) – Judicial gloss can provide fair notice.
  • Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 102 (1945) – Scienter lessens vagueness concerns.
  • Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991) – Rule of lenity is a last resort.
  • Bianchi v. United States, 219 F.2d 182, 189 (8th Cir. 1955) – “Fear” includes economic fear in the statute’s ordinary meaning.

On evidentiary issues, the court relies on:

• Psychiatric evidence under the IDRA (18 U.S.C. § 17):
  • United States v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051, 1061–67 (11th Cir. 1990) – Distinguishes inadmissible “diminished capacity/volitional control” evidence from potentially admissible evidence negating a specific intent element.
  • United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1987), and United States v. Gold, 661 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1987) – Foundational guidance on limiting psychiatric defenses post-IDRA.
  • Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 764, 779 (2006) – States may categorically limit psychiatric evidence to avoid juror confusion on mens rea; applied by the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Litzky, 18 F.4th 1296, 1305 (11th Cir. 2021).
  • United States v. Westcott, 83 F.3d 1354, 1357 (11th Cir. 1996) – Abuse of discretion standard on admissibility.
• Cross-examination limits and impeachment by omission:
  • United States v. Rushin, 844 F.3d 933, 938 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1295–98 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Garcia, 13 F.3d 1464, 1468–69 (11th Cir. 1994) – Standards for scope limits and Confrontation Clause analysis.
  • Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986); United States v. Lankford, 955 F.2d 1545, 1552 (11th Cir. 1992) – Harmless error factors for Confrontation Clause limitations.
  • Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 667 (1957); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239 (1980) – Prior omission can impeach only when the omitted fact is one that would “naturally” have been included.
  • United States v. Stock, 948 F.2d 1299, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Meserve, 271 F.3d 314, 320–21 (1st Cir. 2001) – “Natural to include” test applied to prior statements (including grand jury testimony).
  • United States v. Hands, 184 F.3d 1322, 1326–28 (11th Cir. 1999) – Relevance governs impeachment lines; cannot bootstrap irrelevance by impeaching answers to irrelevant questions.

Legal Reasoning

1) Sufficiency of the Evidence: Hobbs Act Extortion by Fear of Economic Loss

The court applied de novo review, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and drawing reasonable inferences for the government. It distilled three principal sufficiency challenges and rejected each:

• Intent to exploit fear, absent explicit threat: Sutton’s secretive $500 “a month” demand during a discussion about the Snapfinger Project, coupled with her status (Board member; member/Chair of Finance, Audit, and Budget Committee), and her comment “they still got to deal with me,” allowed the jury to infer intent to exploit Veasley’s fear that she could retaliate. The court emphasized the “incongruous power balance” between a commissioner and a subcontractor with a “life-changing” award on the line. That Sutton said Williams should collect on her behalf and expressed concern about being “caught” further supported the inference.
• Existing vs. future economic loss: The court rejected the premise that only fear of losing existing benefits is cognizable. Eleventh Circuit law recognizes fear of losing future business opportunities (Haimowitz; Flynt). In any event, evidence supported fear of both current and future contracts (Veasley knew renewal could be opposed and testified Sutton could “kill” both current and future work).
• Actual power vs. reasonable belief: Whether Sutton had unilateral power to cancel or whether Board dynamics required multiple votes or CEO involvement was not dispositive. The key is whether Veasley reasonably believed Sutton could cause him economic harm. Given Sutton’s role in recommending the contract, her committee leadership, the Board’s renewal authority, and her positioning of herself as someone Veasley had to “deal with,” the jury could find Veasley’s fear reasonable—even if Sutton lacked unilateral termination authority (Robinson; Brown; Kopituk; Rivera Rangel).

The court also brushed aside arguments that Sutton’s failure to act after Veasley stopped paying disproved exploitation: even “fake” or unconsummated threats can satisfy the Hobbs Act (Haimowitz; Quinn). And the fact that interactions were sometimes cordial does not negate fear (Hyde; DeMet).

2) Vagueness and the Rule of Lenity

The as-applied vagueness challenge failed because Eleventh Circuit precedent has long and clearly included fear of economic loss within Hobbs Act “fear.” That settled judicial gloss supplies fair notice (Lanier). The jury’s finding that Sutton “knowingly” extorted also mitigates any vagueness concern (Screws). Because the statute, as applied, was not ambiguous, the rule of lenity did not apply (Chapman).

3) Psychiatric Evidence Under the IDRA and Right to Present a Defense

The district court excluded the defense’s psychiatric expert (Dr. Kristine Lokken), proffered to negate mens rea by explaining medical issues affecting attention, visual organization, and planning. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed under the Insanity Defense Reform Act (18 U.S.C. § 17):

• Post-IDRA, “non-insanity” psychiatric evidence is inadmissible if it seeks exoneration or mitigation based on compulsion or impaired volitional control (Cameron; Pohlot). It may be admissible only if it genuinely negates a specific intent element, not merely the defendant’s awareness, motivation, or ability to reflect (Cameron at 1066 & n.30).
• The proffer failed to explain how the identified deficits, even if accepted, would negate the specific intent required for Hobbs Act extortion in 2014. That disconnect justified exclusion. Given inherent risks of juror confusion about mens rea, categorical limits are permissible (Clark; Litzky).
• Because the ruling adhered to those principles, it did not violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to present a complete defense (Crane; Trombetta).

4) Cross-Examination Limits and Impeachment by Omission

Defense counsel sought to impeach Veasley during trial with his grand jury testimony, arguing he omitted that Sutton mouthed “a month” when earlier asked “How did she make the request?” The district court allowed questioning about the omission but barred showing the transcript to the witness. The Eleventh Circuit found no abuse of discretion:

• An omission is probative for impeachment only if the omitted fact would “naturally” have been asserted in response to the earlier questions (Jenkins; Stock; Meserve). Because the grand jury did not ask Veasley about payment regularity, the omission of “a month” was not inherently inconsistent.
• Even assuming error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (Van Arsdall; Lankford). Sutton cross-examined Veasley about the omission; audio recordings corroborated the monthly payment understanding (Gov’t Exs. 13, 15); and the government’s case did not hinge solely on the “a month” phrasing.
• The Confrontation Clause was satisfied because the jury would not have received a significantly different impression of Veasley’s credibility had counsel been permitted to show the transcript (Garcia).

Impact

Although unpublished, the decision is a strong, practical reminder for public corruption cases prosecuted under the Hobbs Act’s “fear of economic loss” theory:

• No explicit threat necessary: Prosecutors can prove extortion through circumstantial evidence showing exploitation of a reasonable fear created by context, power differentials, and coded or secretive requests. Public officials should assume that veiled or indirect solicitations can meet the Act’s standard.
• Future opportunities count: Fear of losing future business or renewals can suffice—even when the contract is already awarded and subject to future Board action (including auto-renewals).
• Actual power not required: The victim’s reasonable belief in the defendant’s ability to inflict economic harm can carry the day. This matters in multi-member government bodies or complex procurement chains where no one actor has unilateral authority.
• Charging choices post-McDonnell: While the opinion does not discuss McDonnell v. United States (2016), its focus on the “fear” prong (rather than “under color of official right”) reflects a viable path for public corruption prosecutions involving payment solicitations not easily pinned to a narrowed “official act” theory.
• Defense strategy on mental-state evidence: To admit psychiatric evidence post-IDRA, defense counsel must tightly link the proffer to negating an element of specific intent at the time of the offense—often a difficult showing. General cognitive deficits or volitional-control themes risk exclusion and do not establish a constitutional violation under Clark and Litzky.
• Impeachment by omission is limited: The “natural-to-include” test can bar use of prior statements to impeach by omission when earlier questions did not call for the now-highlighted detail. Counsel should build impeachment foundations showing why the detail would naturally have been included at the time.
• Harmless error and Confrontation: Even significant cross-examination limits can be harmless when independent recordings or other corroboration exist. Trial strategies should anticipate that audio/video evidence often blunts impeachment-based reversals on appeal.
• Public contracting and compliance: Vendors and subcontractors should document interactions with officials, escalate concerns promptly, and avoid off-channel or secretive arrangements. Agencies should reinforce training on ethics, conflicts, and reporting mechanisms.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. § 1951): Federal statute making it a crime to obtain property from someone, with their consent, induced by wrongful use of force, violence, or fear (including fear of economic loss), or under color of official right, in a way that affects commerce.
• “Fear of economic loss”: The victim’s reasonable concern that refusing a demand will lead to financial harm. It can be implicit and inferred from context; does not require a direct threat.
• Specific intent in extortion-by-fear: The government must show the defendant intended to exploit the victim’s fear to obtain property. The defendant need not have caused the fear or actually be able to inflict the harm feared.
• As-applied vagueness: The challenge asks whether a statute gave fair notice that the defendant’s specific conduct was prohibited. Longstanding judicial interpretations and a scienter requirement typically defeat such challenges.
• Insanity Defense Reform Act (18 U.S.C. § 17): Only a true insanity defense is recognized; “non-insanity” psychiatric evidence is tightly constrained. It may be used to negate a specific intent element only in rare, carefully articulated circumstances.
• Impeachment by omission: Using a witness’s prior statement that omitted a detail to attack credibility. It is probative only if that detail is one the witness naturally would have included in the earlier context (e.g., when directly asked).
• Harmless error (Confrontation Clause): Even if cross-examination limits were wrong, a conviction stands if the error did not influence the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt, considering corroboration and the case’s overall strength.

Conclusion

United States v. Sharon Barnes Sutton reinforces several durable Hobbs Act tenets in the Eleventh Circuit: extortion by fear of economic loss does not require an explicit threat; fear may center on future business opportunities as well as current benefits; and the victim’s reasonable belief in a public official’s retaliatory power is often decisive, even absent unilateral authority. The court’s rejection of an as-applied vagueness challenge underscores the stability of these principles, and its evidentiary rulings highlight the IDRA’s narrow avenue for psychiatric defenses and the limited utility of impeachment by omission absent the “natural-to-include” foundation.

For prosecutors, the case validates circumstantial approaches to proving extortion in public contracting contexts. For defense counsel, it flags the importance of tailoring psychiatric proffers to the specific intent element, building robust foundations for impeachment by omission, and anticipating that corroborating recordings can render confrontation-limitation claims harmless. For public officials and contractors, the opinion is a cautionary reminder: secretive solicitations exploiting the economic dependence of vendors—even without overt threats—can constitute federal extortion.