Experience-Based Premium Rates and Private Fee Awards: Eleventh Circuit Affirms Lodestar Flexibility and Rejects Excessive Fines Challenge in Sanctions-Fee Case

Introduction

In Spencer Sheehan v. Big Lots, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (non-precedential, not for publication) affirmed a $144,047 attorney’s fee award against attorney Spencer Sheehan and his client, following dismissal of a consumer mislabeling class action challenging Big Lots’ “Fresh Finds” Colombian coffee canister labeling. The case arises out of a repeat filing of substantially similar claims previously dismissed in Devey v. Big Lots, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 3d 205 (W.D.N.Y. 2022), and features serious concerns about counsel’s litigation conduct, including bad faith and failure to authenticate claimed laboratory testing.

The district court awarded fees under three overlapping grounds: Florida’s false advertising statute (Fla. Stat. § 817.41(6)), Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA) (Fla. Stat. § 501.2105(1)), and the court’s inherent authority to sanction bad faith litigation. On appeal, Sheehan challenged only the amount of the award—not the fee entitlement—arguing (1) the lodestar hours and rates were excessive and (2) the award violated the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. The Eleventh Circuit rejected both arguments.

This commentary examines the court’s reasoning, the precedents applied, and the broader implications for fee-shifting, sanctions, and the use of specialized, out-of-market defense counsel in consumer class actions—particularly where serial filings and bad faith are alleged.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s fee award of $144,047, holding that the lodestar hours (121.8 hours for the motion to dismiss and 60.6 hours for the fee motion) and the hourly rates ($625–$950) were reasonable under the circumstances.
The court approved the district court’s use of the Middle District of Florida as the relevant legal market while allowing higher-than-usual rates due to counsel’s specialized, efficiency-producing experience with the same opposing attorney and the identical product/claims previously litigated.
Objections based on duplication and block billing were rejected given the detailed time entries and the absence of unreasonable redundancy.
Sheehan forfeited his Excessive Fines Clause argument by not raising it in the district court; in any event, the argument fails because the award is payable to a private party, not the government.

Case Background and Key Issues

Big Lots sells a 24-ounce “Fresh Finds” Colombian medium-dark roast coffee product. The label states that the canister “makes up to 210 [six-ounce] servings” and provides brewing instructions for single, five, and ten servings. In Devey (W.D.N.Y.), the court dismissed essentially identical claims brought by Sheehan, finding that, viewed as a whole, the label was not misleading “as a matter of law” given the batch instructions and “up to” qualifier. The court in Devey also admonished Sheehan for misquoting label text and referenced his nationwide pattern of similar suits.

About a year later, Sheehan (with local counsel) refiled in the Middle District of Florida on behalf of a new plaintiff (Durant), again alleging the 210-servings representation was deceptive, and claiming that an “independent laboratory analysis” showed only 152 servings at single-serve instructions. The district court dismissed with prejudice, found the claims frivolous and pursued in bad faith, and, after a hearing, imposed fees against Sheehan and Durant pursuant to Florida statutes and inherent authority. The court also noted concerns about pro hac vice practices and found the “lab analysis” submission unauthenticated.

On appeal, Sheehan challenged only the amount of the fee award. The Eleventh Circuit’s role was therefore limited to assessing whether the district court abused its discretion in calculating the lodestar and whether the award violated the Eighth Amendment.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

ACLU of Georgia v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423 (11th Cir. 1999): The appellate court used Barnes to frame the lodestar method and standards of review: - Reasonable hours × reasonable rate. - Abuse of discretion standard for overall award; clearly erroneous standard for hourly-rate fact finding. - “Relevant market” is generally the place where the case is filed, with a recognized, narrow exception for higher-rate counsel whose prior specialized experience yields efficiencies. The Eleventh Circuit squarely relied on this framework to uphold rates higher than typical local rates given counsel’s unique experience litigating against Sheehan on the same product and theory.
Norman v. Housing Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1988): Quoted for the definition of a reasonable hourly rate as the “prevailing market rate” for comparable services and skill in the relevant community. Here, the court accepted deviation from that baseline due to the narrow Barnes exception and the district court’s expert familiarity with local rates and this case’s extenuating circumstances.
Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 778 (11th Cir. 1994): Cited for the proposition that the district court is “itself an expert” on reasonable rates and can rely on its own knowledge and experience. The district court’s 50 years of experience as litigator and judge supported its rate and hour determinations.
Martin v. University of South Alabama, 911 F.2d 604 (11th Cir. 1990): Identified the “going rate” in the community as the most critical factor in rate reasonableness, again channeled through Barnes/Norman/Loranger to allow limited exceptions for specialized counsel.
Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985), and Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144 (11th Cir. 1993): Confirm that Florida follows the federal lodestar approach. This justified using the same lodestar methodology for both the Florida statutory fee bases and the court’s inherent-authority sanction award.
McMahan v. Toto, 311 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2002): Applied for the abuse-of-discretion standard governing fee amounts.
United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc): Forfeiture of issues not raised below; used to dispose of the Eighth Amendment argument which was not presented to the district court.
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) and Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989): The Excessive Fines Clause does not reach fee awards payable to private parties in civil litigation where the government is neither the prosecutor nor a beneficiary. The Eleventh Circuit relied on these to reject the constitutional challenge on the merits as well.
Yates v. Pinellas Hematology & Oncology, P.A., 21 F.4th 1288 (11th Cir. 2021): Reiterates that the Excessive Fines Clause applies only to payments imposed by and payable to the government. Reinforces the Austin/Browning-Ferris principle.
Spanakos v. Hawk Systems, Inc., 362 So. 3d 226 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023): Supports the notion that sufficiently detailed time entries can defeat block-billing objections; the district court’s finding of adequate specificity was affirmed.
Devey v. Big Lots, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 3d 205 (W.D.N.Y. 2022): Not binding in the Eleventh Circuit but pertinent context: dismissal of the same theory about the same product; the district court weighed Devey and Sheehan’s litigation history heavily in finding bad faith and imposing fees. On appeal, Devey’s presence mainly supported the reasonableness of hours and rates spent addressing repeat allegations and the propriety of specialized counsel.
DelMonico v. Traynor, 116 So. 3d 1205 (Fla. 2013) and Grippa v. Rubin, 133 F.4th 1186 (11th Cir. 2025): Cited below regarding absolute privilege for statements made in judicial filings—relevant to accusations of “defamatory” statements about the laboratory analysis. These authorities explain why no defamation claim lies in this context.

Legal Reasoning

1) Lodestar Hours

The court affirmed 182.4 total hours for two substantive tasks:

Motion to Dismiss and Reply (121.8 hours): The defense addressed multiple, discrete grounds, including the reasonable-consumer deception theory given “up to” qualifiers and batch-brewing instructions; Rule 9(b) pleading sufficiency; the economic loss rule; warranty notice; and futility of amendment.
Fee Motion and Reply (60.6 hours): The defense briefed entitlement under two Florida statutes and the court’s inherent authority; documented a national pattern of frivolous filings; and responded to due process and participation arguments, as well as issues concerning the authenticity of the purported lab report.

The appellate court found the hours reasonable in light of the lawsuit’s nationwide scope (amount in controversy exceeding $5 million), the breadth of issues, the need to address inaccurate and unsubstantiated assertions (including the “independent laboratory analysis”), and the need to present the history of similar suits to establish bad faith. The presence of multiple timekeepers did not, on this record, create unreasonable duplication; and the court endorsed associate-led drafting with partner/counsel oversight as efficient staffing.

2) Lodestar Rates and the “Relevant Market”

The Eleventh Circuit endorsed the district court’s:

Use of the Middle District of Florida as the “relevant legal market” rather than strictly limiting rates to the Ocala Division, while recognizing that Ocala rates are generally lower than Orlando/Tampa/Jacksonville. The court did not require division-specific rates where the magnitude and nature of a nationwide class action would reasonably drive a sophisticated defendant to retain counsel from the larger divisions or beyond.
Allowance of rates above typical local rates (approximately 25% higher) due to the narrow Barnes exception—where counsel’s specialized experience with “particular factual situations” can yield efficiencies warranting premium rates. Here, Davis Wright Tremaine had litigated multiple Sheehan mislabeling cases and had defended Big Lots on the same product in Devey.
Reliance on the district court’s experiential knowledge, supported by declarations: lead counsel’s explanation of qualifications and rates, an independent Florida fee expert’s opinion that (a) rates, though higher than common Orlando/Middle District rates, were reasonable for large-firm class action defense against a vexatious filer, and (b) hours were in line for motions of this complexity.
Consideration that Big Lots actually paid the billed rates—probative of reasonableness, especially where recovery of defense fees is not the “typical outcome” in consumer class actions.

3) Objections to Billing Practices

Duplication: No abuse of discretion in rejecting redundancy objections; multiple-attorney staffing is not inherently unreasonable where work is not duplicative.
Block Billing: The time entries were sufficiently detailed to allow reasonableness review; thus, block-billing objections failed.
Vagueness: Single-word objections violated local rule requirements to “detail the basis” for each contested entry; even if considered, the court found the entries adequate.
Voluntary Reductions: The defense excluded more than $25,000 in time for case management, unfiled motions (including a contemplated Rule 11 motion), certain strategy time and travel, local rules review, and all time for preparing the fee-amount application. These cuts supported the reasonableness of the final request.

4) Excessive Fines Clause

The Excessive Fines argument failed at two levels:

Forfeiture: Sheehan did not raise the constitutional issue when opposing the fee application in the district court, so it was not preserved for appeal.
Merits: The award is payable to a private litigant, not the government. Under Austin and Browning-Ferris, the Excessive Fines Clause aims to constrain governmental punitive power and does not extend to private fee-shifting or sanction awards where the government is not the payee.

Impact and Significance

Affirmation of Experience-Based Premium Rates: This decision underscores that district courts may, in appropriate circumstances, approve rates above the usual local market rates when specialized experience with the precise product, opposing counsel, and litigation pattern promises efficiency and effectiveness—particularly in high-exposure, nationwide class actions.
District vs. Division Market: While the “relevant market” remains the district where the case is filed, the court’s analysis suggests flexibility not to cabin rates to the smallest division’s typical pricing where case magnitude and sophistication would naturally draw counsel from larger or more specialized markets.
Defending Against Serial, Frivolous Filings: The opinion validates robust fee recovery strategies—meticulous recordkeeping, expert declarations, voluntary billing cuts, and well-documented histories of the opposing counsel’s litigation conduct—to deter baseless repeat filings.
Private Fee Awards Are Not “Fines”: The Eighth Amendment is not a refuge from private fee-shifting or sanction awards, a point of recurring relevance where sanctioned litigants reframe fee awards as “punitive fines.”
Procedural Discipline Matters: Arguments not timely raised below (e.g., constitutional objections) will be forfeited. Additionally, unsupported assertions (such as unauthenticated “lab analyses”) can aggravate findings of bad faith and undermine credibility.
Florida Statutory Fee-Shifting: The district court relied on both FDUTPA (discretionary) and § 817.41(6) (mandatory to a “prevailing party”), in addition to inherent authority. While entitlement was not challenged on appeal, the combined use of statutory fee-shifting and inherent-power sanctions signals a strong toolkit for Florida defendants confronting meritless consumer fraud claims.
Professional Responsibility and Pro Hac Vice Compliance: Although not before the Eleventh Circuit on appeal, the district court’s concerns about systemic noncompliance with pro hac vice rules—and its referrals to bar authorities—are a cautionary note that fee litigation can expose broader practice issues.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Lodestar: A two-part calculation for attorney’s fees: (a) reasonable hours expended, multiplied by (b) a reasonable hourly rate. Courts may adjust in rare circumstances but generally adhere to this framework.
Relevant Legal Market: The geographic area used to determine prevailing rates—usually the district where the case is filed. Courts may allow higher rates from another market if specialized experience creates efficiencies that benefit the client.
Block Billing: Grouping multiple tasks into a single time entry. Not automatically improper if entries are detailed enough for the court to evaluate reasonableness.
Inherent Authority Sanctions: Courts can award fees as a sanction for bad faith litigation conduct independent of specific rules or statutes, but they must find bad faith and tailor the award to the misconduct.
FDUTPA and Florida False Advertising Statute: FDUTPA allows discretionary fee awards to a prevailing party; Florida’s false advertising statute mandates fees to a prevailing party. Together, they can provide substantial fee recovery pathways for defendants.
Rule 9(b): Federal rule requiring fraud-based claims to be pleaded with particularity—who, what, when, where, and how—beyond general notice pleading standards.
Excessive Fines Clause: A constitutional limit on punitive financial penalties imposed by the government; does not apply to fee awards payable to private parties in civil cases.
Pro Hac Vice: Permission for an out-of-state lawyer to appear in a specific case; repeated practice without proper admission can trigger sanctions and professional discipline.

Practical Takeaways

For Defendants: In cases against serial filers, retain counsel with proven, specific experience; document efficiencies; use experts to anchor rates and hours; voluntarily trim billing to strengthen reasonableness; and thoroughly substantiate bad faith where present.
For Plaintiffs’ Counsel: Do not recycle claims already rejected on indistinguishable facts without a materially new theory or evidence; authenticate factual assertions (especially “lab” claims) before filing; make timely, well-supported objections to fee applications; preserve constitutional arguments in the trial court; and comply scrupulously with pro hac vice and local practice rules.
For Courts: This decision supports measured flexibility in rate determinations when specialized experience with the same product, theory, and opposing counsel demonstrably improves efficiency and case management.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s affirmance in Sheehan v. Big Lots offers a clear, practical message on fee awards in the wake of frivolous consumer class actions. While adhering to established lodestar principles, the court endorsed modest upward rate adjustments where specialized experience yields efficiencies, accepted district-level market framing over division-specific rates in a high-stakes class action, and rejected perfunctory billing objections unsupported by detailed analysis. It also reaffirmed that the Excessive Fines Clause does not shield litigants from private fee awards and that failing to preserve arguments below is fatal on appeal.

Beyond its immediate effect, the decision is likely to influence fee litigation in consumer-protection suits, particularly those involving serial, bad-faith filings. Defendants who meticulously document their fee applications—grounded in local market knowledge, expert support, and voluntary reductions—stand on solid footing for full recovery. Plaintiffs’ counsel contemplating repeat filings after adverse rulings elsewhere should take note: not only are such cases at acute risk of dismissal, but the financial consequences for bad faith can be substantial and sustained on appeal.