Expansion of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in Product Liability: Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp.

Expansion of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in Product Liability: Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp.

Introduction

The case of Wisniewski, Susan and Klock, Debra Wisniewski, Apellants, v. Johns-Manville Corp., decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on April 11, 1985, addresses pivotal issues in the realm of emotional distress claims arising from asbestos exposure. The appellants, comprised of the wife and children of individuals who succumbed to asbestos-related illnesses, sought damages from various asbestos manufacturers and suppliers. The core legal contest centered on whether the appellants could successfully assert claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress under Pennsylvania law, particularly in the context of product liability.

Summary of the Judgment

The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, aligning with established Pennsylvania precedents that require demonstrable physical injury directly linked to asbestos exposure. Conversely, the court reversed the dismissal of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, allowing it to proceed to the summary judgment phase. The majority recognized the nascent state of intentional infliction claims within Pennsylvania law but determined that the appellants had sufficiently articulated their case to warrant further judicial examination.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment extensively referenced Cathcart v. Keene Industrial Insulation, 324 Pa. Super. 123 (1984), which held that claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress require evidence of physical injury or medically identifiable effects. This precedent was pivotal in affirming the dismissal of the negligent infliction claim. Additionally, the court discussed Papieves v. Lawrence, 437 Pa. 373 (1970), a significant case where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized the validity of intentional infliction of emotional distress claims under extraordinary circumstances. The dissenting opinion further examined cases like FAIR v. NEGLEY, 257 Pa. Super. 50 (1978) and BEASLEY v. FREEDMAN, 256 Pa. Super. 208 (1978), which allowed such claims within special relationships, such as landlord-tenant dynamics.

Legal Reasoning

The majority emphasized the importance of applying Pennsylvania substantive law in diversity cases, as mandated by Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Given the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's limited guidance on intentional infliction claims in product liability contexts, the Third Circuit opted for a liberal interpretation of the appellants' pleadings, allowing the claim to proceed. The court acknowledged the extensive asbestos litigation crisis but maintained judicial prudence by deferring the expansion or restriction of liability to legislative bodies or higher state courts. The sentiment was clear: while the procedural posture did not merit dismissal at the pleading stage, substantive determinations should await a fuller factual development.

Impact

This judgment potentially broadens the scope for emotional distress claims in product liability cases, particularly those involving fear of future harm rather than immediate physical injury. By permitting the intentional infliction claim to advance, the decision opens the door for similar plaintiffs to seek redress based on psychological impacts stemming from product-related dangers. However, the acknowledgment of the unclear boundaries within Pennsylvania law suggests that future cases will heavily depend on the specific facts presented and the evolving judicial interpretations of "outrageous" conduct.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

This legal concept allows individuals to claim compensation for emotional suffering caused by another party's negligence, provided there is a direct link to a physical injury or a medically recognizable impact.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Unlike negligent claims, intentional infliction requires that the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous, purposefully or recklessly causing severe emotional trauma to the plaintiff.

Rule 12(b)(6)

A federal procedural rule that allows a court to dismiss a case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, based solely on the documents submitted without considering external evidence.

Zone of Danger

A legal doctrine permitting plaintiffs who are within the immediate vicinity of a defendant’s negligent act that poses a risk of physical harm to recover for emotional distress caused by the fear of imminent injury.

Conclusion

The Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp. decision marks a critical juncture in the intersection of product liability and emotional distress claims within Pennsylvania law. By allowing the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim to proceed, the Third Circuit acknowledged the evolving nature of tort law in addressing modern grievances related to product-induced fears. This case underscores the judiciary's role in navigating uncharted legal territories, balancing the need for redress against the potential for overwhelming litigation. As asbestos litigation continues to expand, this judgment may serve as a foundational reference for future cases grappling with similar claims, ultimately shaping the contours of emotional distress litigation in the context of hazardous products.

Case Details

Year: 1985
Court: United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Judge(s)

Ruggero John AldisertJoseph Francis Weis

Attorney(S)

Norman Perlberger, Mitchell S. Cohen, James R. Kahn, Blank, Rome, Comisky McCauley, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellants. Michael J. Plevyak, Andrew J. Trevelise, Malcolm Riley, West Chester, Pa., for appellee, Celotex Corp. Robert S. Forster, Jr., Krusen, Evans Byrne, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee, Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. Barbara Pennell, Joseph R. Thompson, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee, Eagle-Picher, Industries, Inc. Oliver C. Biddle, Ballard, Spahr, Andrews Ingersoll, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee, Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. James A. Young, Daniel J. Zucker, Obermayer, Rebmann, Maxwell Hippel, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee, Owens-Illinois, Inc. Howard M. Girsh, Steinberg Girsh, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee, Union Carbide Corp. Clayton H. Thomas, Jr., Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee, Abex Corp. Joseph H. Foster, White Williams, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee, Southern Textile Corp. Dudley Hughes, Detweiler, Hughes Kokonos, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee, Unarco Industries, Inc. Walter S. Jenkins, McWilliams Sweeney, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee, Maremont Corp. Audrey J. Becker, David E. Prewitt, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee, Porter Hayden Co. Perry S. Bechtle, LaBrum Doak, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee, Keene Corp. Charles W. Craven, Jo Fineman White, Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman Goggin, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellees, Johns-Manville Corp. and Johns-Manville Sales Corp. Alan Klein, Drinker, Biddle Reath, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellees, Uniroyal, Inc. and Georgia-Pacific Corp. Edward R. Paul, Nilon, Paul Mardinly, Media, Pa., for appellee, Lear Siegler, Inc. George J. Lavin, Jr., Liebert, Short, FitzPatrick Lavin, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee, General Motors Corp. G. Wayne Renneisen, George A. Amacker, Harvey, Pennington, Herting Renneisen, Ltd., Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee, Bendix Corp.

Comments