Expanding the “Position of Trust”: Pearson v. State Affirms Volunteer Fire-Service Officers as Authorities under 11 Del. C. § 761(e)(2)

Introduction

Pearson v. State, No. 268, 2024 (Del. June 24, 2025) is a unanimous en banc opinion of the Supreme Court of Delaware that clarifies and arguably broadens the definition of a “position of trust, authority or supervision” under Delaware’s child-protection statutes (11 Del. C. §§ 761, 778 & 778A). Deputy Chief Dwayne L. Pearson, a long-time volunteer fire officer, was convicted of multiple counts of sexual abuse, rape, and unlawful sexual contact involving a 15-year-old junior firefighter (M.M.). On appeal he advanced two principal grounds:

Insufficiency of the evidence that he occupied a “position of trust, authority or supervision” over the victim; and
As-applied vagueness of § 761(e) because, in his view, the statute does not clearly encompass volunteer fire-service relationships.

The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that subsection (e)(2) – which lists “a teacher, coach, counselor, advisor, mentor or any other person providing instruction or educational services … whether compensated or acting as a volunteer” – plainly covered Pearson’s role as an experienced deputy fire chief who actively provided training and mentorship to the junior member. The Court therefore found no need to reach the vagueness question or alternative reliance on subsection (e)(7).

Summary of the Judgment

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence: Viewing the trial record in the light most favorable to the State, a rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Pearson fell within § 761(e)(2). Pearson’s senior rank, overt offer of training, and the victim’s perception that she could “learn a lot from him” qualified him as a volunteer “mentor/advisor” providing educational services.

2. Constitutional Challenge: Because the conviction was sustainable under a specifically enumerated statutory category, the Court declined to address Pearson’s as-applied vagueness argument.

3. Disposition: The Superior Court’s denial of Pearson’s motion for judgment of acquittal was affirmed; the 35-year aggregate sentence stands.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Hopkins v. State, 293 A.3d 145 (Del. 2023) – Reaffirmed the de novo standard for reviewing denials of motions for judgment of acquittal and articulated the “any rational trier of fact” test.
Ways v. State, 199 A.3d 101 (Del. 2018) – Earlier source for the same sufficiency standard, confirming that all reasonable inferences favor the State on appeal.
Delaware Solid Waste Authority v. DNREC, 250 A.3d 94 (Del. 2021) – Restated the de novo approach to statutory interpretation and constitutional issues.
Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995) – Cited for the principle that an appellate court may affirm on any basis supported by the record even if not articulated below.

Notably, the Court did not rely on prior Delaware cases specifically addressing § 761(e). This vacuum underscores Pearson’s significance as the first authoritative application of subsection (e)(2) to volunteer emergency-service relationships.

Legal Reasoning

Textual Emphasis on Breadth.
Section 761(e) expressly states that “includes, but is not limited to” precedes each enumerated category. The Court nonetheless chose the narrower path: it located Pearson squarely within an express category (e)(2) and avoided the open-ended (e)(7) catch-all. This textual discipline both strengthened the sufficiency holding and insulated the statute from vagueness attack.
Role-Based Rather than Formal-Position Approach.
Pearson was not M.M.’s formal superior in the Mill Creek chain of command, but the Court looked to function – training, mentorship, guidance during joint operations – rather than organizational charts. The opinion thus reinforces a functional reading of authority relationships in child-protection contexts.
Objective and Subjective Evidence.
The Court blended objective indicators (Deputy Chief rank, 17 years’ experience, offers of instruction) with the child’s subjective perception (“woo, big man, big shot”). This dual lens comports with the purpose of § 761: to protect minors from those who, by virtue of their real or perceived authority, can exploit them.
Strategic Avoidance of Constitutional Ruling.
Following the canon of constitutional avoidance, the Court resolved the case on statutory grounds, rendering the as-applied vagueness argument moot.

Potential Impact

Fire and Emergency Services. Volunteer officers, instructors at fire academies, and even senior firefighters who “ride along” with juniors may now fall within § 761(e)(2) without a formal supervisory appointment. Departments should review mentorship programs, training protocols, and youth interactions accordingly.
Other Volunteer Organizations. The ruling signals that any volunteer-based youth program – e.g., Civil Air Patrol, Sea Cadets, scouting, athletic leagues – could create statutory “positions of trust” when experienced members provide instruction.
Criminal Procedure. Defendants challenging § 761 on vagueness grounds face a higher hurdle; Pearson confirms that courts will first seek an enumerated hook before engaging vagueness analysis.
Prosecutorial Guidance. Prosecutors may rely on Pearson to charge under § 778/778A without proving formal employment or supervisory titles, so long as evidence shows mentoring or instructional conduct.
Sentencing and Plea Bargaining. The length of Pearson’s 35-year sentence illustrates the substantial exposure defendants face when § 761 applies. Expect prosecutors to leverage Pearson in plea negotiations for similar factual scenarios.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Position of Trust, Authority or Supervision A statutory term describing people who, by virtue of status or relationship, have power over a child. Includes formal teachers/coaches as well as volunteers who instruct or mentor.
Subsection (e)(2) vs. (e)(7) (e)(2) lists specific “teacher/coach/mentor”-type roles; (e)(7) is a catch-all for “any other person” with regular direct contact who assumes responsibility for a child’s care or supervision.
Judgment of Acquittal (Crim. R. 29) A request made mid-trial or post-verdict asking the judge to set aside the jury’s finding because evidence is insufficient as a matter of law.
As-Applied Vagueness A constitutional doctrine asking whether a statute, even if generally clear, fails to give this defendant fair notice that his conduct was prohibited.
Level V Custody Delaware’s highest level of incarceration (prison). Levels IV, III, II and I involve decreasing restrictions (work release, probation, etc.).
En Banc The entire complement of justices (here, five) sitting together rather than a smaller panel.

Conclusion

Pearson v. State is now the leading Delaware authority on what constitutes a “position of trust, authority or supervision” when the adult is a volunteer providing instruction or training. By explicitly locating a volunteer deputy fire chief within § 761(e)(2)’s “teacher/coach/mentor” category, the Supreme Court narrows defendants’ ability to argue insufficiency and simultaneously broadens the protective reach of child-sexual-abuse statutes. Future cases involving informal mentorship, especially in volunteer or avocational settings, will almost certainly invoke Pearson as controlling precedent.

Key takeaways:

The definition of “position of trust” is functional and centers on actual mentoring or educational conduct, not merely formal titles.
Courts will avoid constitutional vagueness rulings where a conviction can rest on a clearly enumerated statutory category.
Organizations relying on volunteers must implement stronger safeguards and training about boundaries with minors in light of Pearson’s expansive reading of § 761(e)(2).