Exigent Circumstances at Active Fire Scenes: New Jersey Supreme Court Endorses Totality-of-Circumstances Test for Warrantless Seizure of Evidence

I. Introduction

State v. Paul J. Caneiro, A-1-25 (Dec. 4, 2025), is a significant New Jersey Supreme Court decision at the intersection of criminal procedure, fire investigations, and digital evidence. The case addresses when police may seize evidence without a warrant at an active fire scene, particularly in a portion of a property that is not itself burning but is attached to a burning structure.

The defendant, Paul J. Caneiro, was indicted on multiple charges, including four counts of first-degree murder, first-degree felony murder, second-degree aggravated arson, and related offenses. The State’s theory is that Caneiro murdered his brother and his brother’s family, burned their house to conceal the crimes, and then set fire to his own residence as a diversion to suggest both families had been targeted by outsiders.

The specific dispute in this interlocutory appeal is narrower: whether police lawfully seized a digital video recorder (DVR) from an attached garage while the main house was still ablaze, but the garage fire itself had been extinguished. The DVR, which recorded the home’s surveillance cameras, allegedly shows Caneiro disconnecting the camera system just before setting his own home on fire. All parties agree that Caneiro later validly consented to a search of the DVR’s contents; only the warrantless seizure is at issue.

The trial court suppressed the DVR, finding that exigent circumstances did not justify its warrantless seizure. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Fasciale, reversed. The Court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner to address a genuine exigency that did not allow sufficient time to obtain a warrant.

In doing so, the Court:

Reaffirmed that no bright-line rule governs exigent circumstances, including in fire cases.
Applied and refined the multi-factor test from State v. Manning to an active fire scene with digital evidence at risk.
Clarified the limited relevance of Michigan v. Tyler and Michigan v. Clifford, two U.S. Supreme Court fire-investigation precedents.
Emphasized that exigency must be evaluated based on what officers knew at the time and the objective risks they faced, not a compartmentalized, hindsight analysis of specific parts of the structure.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Around 5:02 a.m. in November 2018, police and fire personnel responded to a report of smoke at Caneiro’s residence. When officers arrived, the house was “engulfed in flames.” A smaller fire was burning in the attached garage but was quickly extinguished. The main house, however, continued to burn intensely, with fire in the basement and the attic and flames near the gas meter. Firefighters were actively engaged in suppression operations, using hoses, chemicals, and power tools to ventilate the roof.

Sergeant Malone, a key witness whose testimony the trial court credited, observed strong indicators of arson around the garage area: a burnt plastic gas can that appeared to have been moved from a shed, wet boot prints between the shed and the house, burn marks on a vehicle, the smell of gasoline, multiple ignition points, and surveillance cameras mounted near the garage. He knew from a prior investigation that the home’s DVR would likely contain video footage of the relevant areas.

Defendant’s daughter told officers that the DVR was in the garage “up top to the left.” Roughly twenty minutes after Malone reached the scene, and approximately forty minutes after the first officers arrived, Officer Marino entered the attached garage and seized the DVR from atop a refrigerator on the interior wall adjoining the burning house. At that time, the garage itself was no longer on fire, but the main house fire remained active; suppression activities continued, and officers were concerned about the structural integrity of the home and the proximity to the gas meter. Firefighters were cutting holes in the roof, and water and chemicals were being deployed.

The trial court, focusing heavily on the garage as a distinct, now-stable area, held that exigent circumstances did not justify the seizure. It emphasized that the garage fire had been extinguished for about thirty minutes, that the garage roof was intact and structurally independent of the attic, and that officers acted in a careful, deliberate manner. The Appellate Division affirmed, giving deference to the trial court’s factual findings and agreeing with its legal analysis.

The Supreme Court accepted the trial court’s factual findings, which were supported by body-worn camera footage and testimony, but disagreed with the legal conclusions drawn from those facts. Applying State v. Manning’s six non-exhaustive exigency factors, the Court held:

Seriousness of the crime (aggravated arson) weighed in the State’s favor.
Urgency of the situation heavily favored the State, given the ongoing fire, active suppression efforts, proximity to the gas meter, and location of the DVR on the wall adjoining the burning house.
Time to secure a warrant also favored the State, particularly at 5:30 a.m., when obtaining even a telephonic warrant could take around an hour or more and the conditions remained dynamic.
Threat of destruction of evidence or endangerment significantly favored the State because the DVR was at real risk from renewed flames or suppression efforts; other arson evidence was preserved via body cams rather than seized.
Information that the suspect was armed and posed imminent danger favored the defendant; at that point, police had not yet identified Caneiro as a suspect or learned of the earlier homicides.
Strength of probable cause relating to the DVR strongly favored the State due to the observed arson indicators and Malone’s knowledge of the camera system’s angles from a prior case.

Considering these factors together, the Court held that the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the officers reasonably believed there was no time to secure a warrant. The exigent circumstances exception applied, and the seizure of the DVR was constitutionally valid under both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution.

The Court also rejected the defendant’s reliance on the U.S. Supreme Court’s fire-search decisions in Michigan v. Tyler and Michigan v. Clifford, explaining that those cases concern post-fire, cause-and-origin investigations, not the criminal investigatory seizure of fragile evidence during an active fire. The Court expressly declined to create any per se rule for fire scenes; instead, it reaffirmed that exigent circumstances analysis is inherently fact-specific and must be grounded in the officer’s objective knowledge and the totality of the circumstances.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. State v. Manning (2020) – The Exigency Framework

State v. Manning, 240 N.J. 308 (2020), is the central precedent structuring the Court’s reasoning. Manning articulated a two-part test for the exigent circumstances exception:

The State must show the search or seizure was based on probable cause.
The State must prove that law enforcement acted in an objectively reasonable manner to meet an exigency that did not permit time to secure a warrant.

Manning then listed six non-exhaustive factors to guide courts in evaluating whether an objectively reasonable exigency existed:

Seriousness of the crime.
Urgency of the situation faced by officers.
Time needed to secure a warrant.
Threat of destruction or loss of evidence or danger to people without immediate action.
Information that the suspect is armed and poses imminent danger.
Strength or weakness of probable cause concerning the item searched or seized.

In Caneiro, the parties agreed the first prong—probable cause—was satisfied. The dispute centered on prong two: whether officers reasonably believed the situation was too urgent to await a warrant. The Supreme Court’s entire analysis is an application and refinement of Manning in the specific context of an active house fire with an attached, previously burning garage.

2. Other New Jersey Precedents on Standards and Warrantless Searches

State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249 (2015): Establishes that appellate courts defer to trial courts’ factual findings on suppression motions if supported by sufficient credible evidence, but review legal conclusions de novo. In Caneiro, the Supreme Court explicitly followed this approach—accepting the motion judge’s credibility assessments and factual findings, yet independently scrutinizing the legal application of Manning to those facts.
State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521 (2017): Confirms that legal interpretations, including the application of constitutional standards, receive no deference and are reviewed de novo. The Caneiro Court invoked this principle to justify re-evaluating the legal significance of the fire-scene facts.
State v. Smart, 253 N.J. 156 (2023); State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509 (2022); State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384 (2022): These cases reiterate core Fourth Amendment and New Jersey constitutional principles: warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively invalid; the State bears the burden, by a preponderance of the evidence, to show that an exception such as exigent circumstances applies. Caneiro sits firmly within this doctrinal line, applying it to the exigency at an active fire scene.
State v. DeLuca, 168 N.J. 626 (2001): Provides a classic New Jersey definition of exigent circumstances as situations that “preclude expenditure of the time necessary to obtain a warrant because of a probability that the suspect or the object of the search will disappear, or both.” The Caneiro Court adopts this formulation and applies it to the risk that the DVR would be physically destroyed by the fire or the suppression efforts.
State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409 (2015): Although primarily an automobile-search case, Witt is cited for empirical data about the time required to obtain telephonic warrants, showing that the process can take around an hour or more. This bolsters the Caneiro Court’s conclusion that officers could reasonably believe there was insufficient time to obtain a warrant in the midst of an actively burning structure at 5:30 a.m.
State v. O’Connor, 105 N.J. 399 (1987), and State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 (1984): These cases inform the Court’s evaluation of the seriousness of aggravated arson, which carries a presumption of incarceration. The gravity of the offense becomes one of the factors justifying rapid action.
State v. Hathaway, 222 N.J. 453 (2015): Emphasizes that exigency must be assessed based on what officers know at the time—not on hindsight. The Caneiro Court uses Hathaway to criticize the lower courts’ retrospective focus on structural distinctions (e.g., “garage versus main house”) and later-stabilized conditions.

3. Federal Precedents: Graham v. Connor, Michigan v. Tyler, and Michigan v. Clifford

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989): Although a use-of-force case, Graham stands for the broader rule that an officer’s subjective motivations are generally irrelevant to the constitutional analysis; the standard is objective reasonableness. In Caneiro, this principle undercuts the trial court’s reliance on the officers’ calm demeanor and deliberate manner as evidence against exigency.
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978): Tyler held that firefighters may enter a burning building without a warrant to extinguish the fire, remain for a “reasonable time” to determine the origin and cause, and seize evidence in plain view, all without a warrant. It cautions against the idea that the warrant requirement begins “with the dousing of the last flame.”

However, Tyler involved a post-extinguishment cause-and-origin investigation and seizure of evidence observed during efforts to combat the fire. In Caneiro, the New Jersey Supreme Court explains that Tyler is an “aid-driven” or community-caretaking application of exigency, not directly controlling where officers are engaged in a criminal investigatory seizure of fragile digital evidence during an ongoing fire.
Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984): Clifford limited Tyler by holding that, once a post-fire scene has been cleared, the fire extinguished, and the homeowner has taken steps to secure privacy (e.g., boarding windows, locking doors), further investigative entries generally require a warrant (administrative for cause-and-origin, criminal for evidence-gathering), unless new exigent circumstances arise.

In Caneiro, the Court distinguishes Clifford on multiple grounds:
- The fire in Caneiro’s main house was still burning; suppression was ongoing.
- Police and firefighters remained on scene; the home was not re-secured by the owner.
- The seizure occurred within forty minutes of officers’ arrival, not hours later.
- The State was not asking for a broad administrative-search exception, but invoking classic criminal exigency doctrine focused on preventing destruction of known evidence.
Thus, Clifford’s framework for post-fire re-entry is inapplicable to this kind of during-fire seizure.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Constitutional Baseline and Burden of Proof

The Court begins from a familiar starting point: under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable. The State bears the burden to prove that a recognized exception applies, and must do so by a preponderance of the evidence.

In this case, the State invoked the exigent circumstances exception. That exception applies when:

There is probable cause to believe that a place contains evidence of crime; and
There is an objectively reasonable basis to believe that the delay inherent in obtaining a warrant would create an unacceptable risk—such as destruction of evidence, escape of a suspect, or danger to life or safety.

Here, probable cause as to the DVR was conceded. Thus, the Court concentrated entirely on the second element: whether police acted in an objectively reasonable manner to respond to an exigency that did not permit time for a warrant.

2. The Manning Factors Applied

a. Seriousness of the Crime

The first Manning factor, “the seriousness of the crime under investigation,” plainly favored the State. Aggravated arson is a second-degree crime with a presumption of incarceration, reflecting its severity and inherent danger to life and property. In addition, although not yet known to officers at the time, the fire was allegedly part of a broader scheme involving multiple homicides, underscoring the weight of the State’s interests (though the Court properly evaluated exigency based only on what officers then knew).

b. Urgency of the Situation

The second factor—“the urgency of the situation faced by the officers”—is the linchpin of the Court’s decision and where the trial court’s analysis diverged the most from the Supreme Court’s.

The trial court heavily emphasized the status of the garage alone: the small garage fire had been extinguished roughly thirty minutes before the seizure; no smoke or visible flames remained in the garage; its roof was intact and structurally separate from the attic; and it was located at what the judge called the “farthest possible point from the remaining fire” in the main house. This led the court to conclude there was no urgent threat to the DVR.

The Supreme Court rejected this narrow framing. Citing Hathaway, the Court stressed that exigency must be assessed from the perspective of officers on the scene, based on what they reasonably knew and perceived at the time, and in light of all the circumstances, not by surgically isolating one room or structural segment.

Key facts informing the Court’s view of urgency included:

The house was described as “fully involved” or “engulfed in flames” upon arrival.
The fire had spread from the basement to the attic, filling the house with heavy smoke.
The flames were close to the gas meter, raising fears that the fire “could have spread at any moment” or “accelerated and engulfed more of the house.”
Firefighters were actively conducting suppression operations with hoses, chemicals, and power tools, including cutting holes in the roof—a process that could affect structural integrity and introduce water or debris into attached spaces.
The DVR was located on an interior garage wall that directly abutted the burning house, only tens of feet away from the active fire.
Defendant himself was concerned enough about the garage’s safety to re-enter and move his car out, fearing it might catch fire.

Against that backdrop, the Court deemed it objectively reasonable for officers to perceive a continuing, real risk that the garage—and with it the DVR—could quickly become compromised if the fire spread or if suppression activities caused damage or water intrusion. The fact that police appeared calm and methodical on body-camera footage cut the other way from the trial judge’s reasoning: under Graham v. Connor, demeanor is not a reliable guide to constitutional reasonableness, and trained officers are expected to act calmly even in dangerous scenarios.

Thus, the Court held that the urgency factor “weighs heavily” in favor of the State.

c. Time Required to Obtain a Warrant

The third factor concerns “the time it would have taken to secure a warrant.” The trial court concluded that nothing in the record showed that getting a warrant would have jeopardized the DVR or compromised safety. The Supreme Court disagreed.

Drawing on Witt and on practical experience, the Court noted that even a telephonic warrant generally takes around an hour or more. Here, the seizure occurred at approximately 5:37 a.m., during an ongoing emergency response. To obtain a warrant, officers would have had to:

Draft an affidavit or sworn statement.
Transmit it to a prosecutor for review.
Present it to a judge for approval.

Malone testified credibly that there was not sufficient time for this process while the fire was still active in both the basement and attic and while suppression efforts were underway, particularly with the fire near the gas meter and accelerants present near the garage area.

The Court emphasized that it is inherently difficult to predict with precision how long the warrant process will take in an emergency, especially in the early morning hours. What matters is whether officers reasonably believed there was insufficient time. Given the active fire and uncertain timeline for its containment, it was reasonable to conclude that waiting for a warrant created too much risk that the DVR would be destroyed or damaged.

Accordingly, the Court found this factor also favored the State.

d. Threat of Destruction of Evidence or Danger Without Immediate Action

The fourth factor—“the threat that evidence would be destroyed or lost or people would be endangered unless immediate action was taken”—was another strong point in the State’s favor.

The trial judge viewed Sergeant Malone’s testimony as driven by generalized concerns about fire, not by specific facts of this incident. The Supreme Court rejected that characterization. It highlighted that Malone’s concerns were tightly tied to what he observed:

The fire in the house remained active and unpredictable.
Flames were dangerously close to the gas meter.
Accelerants (e.g., gasoline) appeared to be present, increasing the risk of reignition or spread.
Firefighters were continuing suppression and ventilation operations, which could introduce water and physical damage to nearby areas—including the garage and its interior wall.
The DVR’s location, on the wall directly adjoining the burning structure, made it particularly susceptible to heat, smoke, water, or structural collapse.

Notably, the officers did not seize every piece of arson-related evidence. Instead, they relied on their body-worn cameras to document items like the gas can, boot prints, and burn patterns, and removed only the DVR—an item whose evidentiary value would be irretrievably lost if physically damaged or destroyed.

The Court concluded that an objectively reasonable officer, in these circumstances, would see a real and imminent threat to this specific piece of digital evidence if immediate action was not taken. The fourth factor thus weighed “heavily” in favor of the State.

e. Suspect Armedness and Immediate Danger

The fifth factor, “information that the suspect was armed and posed an imminent danger,” weighed in favor of the defendant. At the time of the seizure:

Officers had not yet identified Caneiro as a suspect in the fire.
They were unaware of the alleged earlier murders at his brother’s residence.
There was no indication that any suspect was armed or posed an ongoing threat to officers or the public at the scene.

The Court candidly acknowledged this factor cut against finding exigency—but also noted that it is only one factor in a flexible, totality-based inquiry, and here was outweighed by the gravity of the offense, the urgency of the fire conditions, the time required for a warrant, the specific risk to the DVR, and the strong probable cause connecting the DVR to the suspected arson.

f. Strength of Probable Cause Relating to the DVR

Finally, the sixth factor considers “the strength or weakness of the probable cause relating to the item to be searched or seized.” The Court found a robust showing of probable cause:

A burnt plastic gas can was discovered in the driveway, seemingly relocated from its usual place in an outdoor shed.
Wet boot prints led to and from the shed, suggesting someone moved the can shortly before the fire.
Officers observed burn marks on the hood of a car parked near the garage door.
They smelled gasoline near the garage, consistent with accelerant use.
Multiple ignition points were observed—classic indicators of arson.
Sergeant Malone had firsthand knowledge from a prior investigation that the home’s camera system captured the relevant area, making the DVR likely to contain crucial footage of any ignition activity or suspicious behavior near the garage and vehicle.

Together, these facts provided powerful probable cause to believe that the DVR contained evidence of aggravated arson. This strengthened the justification for invoking exigent circumstances to prevent its destruction.

3. The Totality of the Circumstances and Objective Reasonableness

After weighing all six Manning factors, the Court considered the circumstances holistically. It concluded that:

The crime under investigation was extremely serious.
The fire scene remained dynamic, dangerous, and unpredictable.
Securing a warrant would likely have taken at least an hour, during which the fire or suppression efforts could have destroyed the DVR.
The DVR was uniquely fragile and irreplaceable as a source of digital video evidence.
The officers had strong probable cause to believe the DVR contained evidence of arson.

Under these conditions, officers reasonably concluded that they could not safely wait to obtain a warrant before securing the DVR. The seizure was therefore justified by exigent circumstances under both the federal and state constitutions.

4. Distinguishing Michigan v. Tyler and Michigan v. Clifford

The defendant, supported by the ACLU, argued that Tyler and Clifford required a warrant in this scenario because police were engaged in evidence-gathering for a criminal investigation, as opposed to a mere cause-and-origin investigation for fire safety.

The Court responded by carefully distinguishing those cases:

Tyler permits warrantless entry to fight a fire and stay for a reasonable time afterward to investigate its origin and seize plain-view evidence. But Tyler dealt with post-extinguishment investigative activity, whereas in Caneiro, the main fire was still burning and suppression was ongoing when the DVR was seized. Moreover, Tyler focused on a community-caretaking rationale, not the criminal-evidence destruction concerns present here.
Clifford held that, once a fire is out, firefighters have left, and homeowners have reasserted privacy interests by securing the scene, further cause-and-origin searches require at least an administrative warrant. Clifford, however, involved a re-entry six hours after the fire, with the homeowners having taken steps to secure the property. In Caneiro, the seizure occurred during the initial emergency response, with no such re-securing and with the fire still active.

Importantly, the Court refused to adopt any broad fire-scene exception or special carve-out to the warrant requirement. Rather, it treated this as a straightforward exigent-circumstances case governed by Manning: the presence of an active fire and ongoing firefighting was one part of the totality, not a standalone rule.

C. Impact of the Decision

1. Impact on Police and Fire-Scene Practices

For law enforcement, Caneiro provides substantial guidance—without relaxing constitutional standards.

No Per Se Fire Rule, but Active Fires Are Highly Relevant. The Court explicitly disavows any per se rule that “fires automatically equal exigency.” However, when a fire is actively burning, especially with:
- Structural vulnerability,
- Accelerants present,
- Ongoing suppression efforts using water, chemicals, and power tools, and
- Known digital evidence positioned close to the active fire,
officers can reasonably conclude that certain items are at imminent risk of destruction and may be seized without waiting for a warrant.
Emphasis on Narrowly Tailored Seizures. The Court appears to endorse the officers’ selective approach: they left in place most physical evidence (documented via body-worn cameras) and seized only the item most uniquely susceptible to destruction and least amenable to alternative documentation—the DVR. This suggests that in exigent circumstances, officers should tailor warrantless actions to the minimum necessary to address the risk.
Digital Evidence at Fire Scenes. The reasoning clearly extends beyond DVRs to other sensitive digital devices (e.g., computers, phones, NVRs) located in or near active fire zones. When such devices are at real risk of being destroyed or rendered unreadable by heat, smoke, water, or collapse, and when probable cause ties them to criminal activity, Caneiro will be a powerful precedent supporting prompt seizure.
Body-Worn Cameras as a Preservation Tool. The opinion notes that officers used body-worn cameras to capture other potential arson evidence, which then did not need to be seized in the face of the fire. This underscores the evidentiary and constitutional value of body-worn cameras as a way to minimize intrusions while still preserving proof.

2. Impact on Defense Strategy and Suppression Litigation

For defense counsel, Caneiro delineates both limits and opportunities:

Hindsight Structural Distinctions Are Disfavored. The Court’s rejection of the trial judge’s focus on the “farthest possible point” and “structurally independent garage roof” signals that defendants will face an uphill battle arguing non-exigency based solely on retrospective, compartmentalized descriptions of the scene.
Objective Reasonableness and Record Development. The defense must now focus more sharply on what officers actually knew and could reasonably infer at the time, challenging the State’s claims about risks, timelines, and probable cause with concrete cross-examination and expert testimony where appropriate (e.g., fire behavior, structural risk, technological robustness of digital devices).
Use of Tyler/Clifford in New Jersey Is Narrow. Caneiro significantly narrows the circumstances in which Tyler and Clifford can be successfully invoked in New Jersey to challenge warrantless actions at a fire scene. Those federal cases remain potent for post-fire re-entry and administrative cause-and-origin investigations, but are less likely to control seizures during an actively unfolding fire emergency.

3. Impact on New Jersey Search-and-Seizure Jurisprudence

Jurisprudentially, Caneiro:

Reaffirms Alignment with Federal Fourth Amendment Standards. The Court explicitly relies on federal cases and treats Article I, Paragraph 7 as generally coextensive with the Fourth Amendment in this context. It does not announce any broader state constitutional protection here. Instead, it applies traditional exigency analysis using the Manning framework.
Clarifies the Role of Manning as the Governing Standard for Exigency. Manning’s six factors are now firmly embedded as the primary analytical tool in New Jersey for exigent circumstances cases, including in specialized settings like active fire scenes.
Stresses Totality and Context over Rigid Formulas. Caneiro strongly reiterates that exigency cannot be reduced to checklist formalism or bright-line rules (e.g., “no flames in a given room = no exigency there”). Objective reasonableness must be assessed in context, taking into account structural configuration, proximity, the behavior of fire, suppression tactics, and what officers reasonably feared at the time.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Search vs. Seizure

A search occurs when the government intrudes into a place or area where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, looking for evidence (e.g., opening a DVR and reviewing its contents).

A seizure occurs when the government takes possession of an item or meaningfully interferes with someone’s control over it (e.g., physically removing the DVR from the garage).

Caneiro is about the seizure only. The later search of the DVR’s contents was conducted with the defendant’s valid consent and is not challenged.

2. Exigent Circumstances

“Exigent circumstances” is a legal term for emergencies where police can’t safely wait for a judge to issue a warrant because:

Evidence might be destroyed or lost,
Someone might escape, or
People might be seriously harmed or killed.

The law requires that:

Police have probable cause to believe evidence is at a particular place; and
The emergency is real and urgent enough that waiting for a warrant would be unreasonable in light of the risk.

3. Probable Cause

Probable cause is a common-sense standard. It means there are enough facts and circumstances to lead a reasonable person to believe that:

A crime has been, is being, or will be committed; and
Evidence of that crime will be found in a particular place or item (like a DVR).

It does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt; it just requires more than mere suspicion.

4. Objective vs. Subjective Reasonableness

Courts use an objective standard when evaluating police actions. That means:

They look at whether a reasonable officer in the same situation, knowing what the officers knew at the time, would have acted similarly.
They do not rely on officers’ personal beliefs, internal motivations, or how they looked (calm or panicked) in their body-camera videos.

This is why the trial court’s emphasis on the officers’ calm demeanor did not persuade the Supreme Court: trained officers are expected to remain composed even during emergencies. Calmness does not mean there was no true emergency.

5. Active Fire vs. Post-Fire Investigation

Tyler and Clifford deal mainly with post-fire situations:

Once the fire is out,
Firefighters have left, and
Homeowners may have re-secured their property (locking doors, boarding windows, etc.).

At that point, investigators often need a warrant to come back and do more searching, even if it’s just to find the fire’s cause.

Caneiro is different. Here, the fire was still burning in the main house, firefighters were still actively working, and the home had not been re-secured. Officials were not returning for a second, non-emergency visit; they were still in the middle of the initial emergency response. Under those conditions, the Court treated the seizure as an ordinary exigent-circumstances problem, not a Tyler/Clifford post-fire question.

6. Totality of the Circumstances

“Totality of the circumstances” means the court doesn’t just look at one or two facts in isolation. It looks at everything together:

Where the fire is,
How fast it is spreading,
What fire suppression is happening,
Where the evidence is located,
How likely that evidence is to be destroyed,
How long a warrant would reasonably take, and
How strong the link is between the item and the suspected crime.

Only after weighing all of this can a court decide if officers reasonably believed they had to act immediately without a warrant.

V. Conclusion

State v. Caneiro is an important clarification of New Jersey’s exigent circumstances doctrine as applied to active fire scenes and digital evidence.

The decision holds that:

There is no bright-line rule that a warrant is required merely because a particular room (such as a garage) is not currently on fire, or that exigency automatically ends when flames subside in a part of a structure.
Instead, courts must apply a fact-sensitive, totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, guided by Manning’s six factors, and evaluate what officers reasonably knew and feared at the time.
When an active fire is burning in part of a structure, suppression operations are ongoing, and digital evidence sits on the wall of an attached space directly next to the burning area, it can be objectively reasonable for officers to seize that evidence without a warrant to prevent its imminent destruction.
Tyler and Clifford, while still relevant to post-fire re-entry and administrative cause-and-origin investigations, do not bar warrantless seizures like this one during an ongoing emergency response.

Practically, Caneiro reassures first responders that they may seize uniquely vulnerable evidence—especially digital media—at an active fire scene when probable cause is strong and the risk of destruction is real, even if one segment of the property appears temporarily stable. At the same time, the decision insists that the State must still meet its burden under Manning: proving exigency by a preponderance of the evidence, grounded in objective facts rather than generalized fears or post hoc rationalizations.

In the broader landscape of search-and-seizure law, Caneiro reinforces New Jersey’s commitment to a nuanced, reality-based evaluation of police conduct, one that respects both the urgency of genuine emergencies and the enduring centrality of the warrant requirement in protecting individual privacy.