Introduction

This case addresses whether a Kentucky circuit court has jurisdiction to prosecute an executor criminally for alleged financial misconduct connected to estate administration that is simultaneously the subject of probate proceedings in district court. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirms that circuit courts possess general criminal jurisdiction over felony prosecutions and that the existence of an ongoing probate matter does not divest the circuit court of authority to adjudicate felony charges arising from the same factual circumstances.

The appellant, James F. Dinwiddie, Jr., appearing pro se, sought extraordinary relief to halt a felony prosecution in Grayson Circuit Court for theft by failure to make required disposition of property of $10,000 or more, KRS 514.070. He argued that because his actions occurred while serving as executor and trustee in probate-related matters—overseen by district courts—the circuit court lacked jurisdiction. He requested a writ of prohibition declaring a lack of jurisdiction and a writ of mandamus ordering dismissal.

The appellee, Kenneth Harold Goff, II, appeared pro se. The Commonwealth of Kentucky, through the Attorney General’s Office, and Rick Hardin, the Commonwealth’s Attorney for the 46th Judicial Circuit, were real parties in interest.

At bottom, the Supreme Court rejects Dinwiddie’s thesis that probate status shields a fiduciary from criminal liability or channels all disputes exclusively to district court probate jurisdiction. The Court affirms the Court of Appeals’ denial of extraordinary relief and clarifies the distinction between a court’s general subject-matter jurisdiction and so-called “particular-case jurisdiction.”

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirms the Court of Appeals’ denial of writs of prohibition and mandamus. It holds that:

• Under Section 112(5) of the Kentucky Constitution, circuit courts possess original jurisdiction over all justiciable causes unless vested elsewhere, which includes general subject-matter jurisdiction over felony prosecutions. Accordingly, the Grayson Circuit Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the felony charge against Dinwiddie.
• The existence of probate proceedings in district court does not immunize an executor or trustee from criminal liability, nor does it divest circuit court of felony jurisdiction. Probate and criminal proceedings are legally distinct even if factually related, and they may proceed in parallel.
• Dinwiddie’s attempt to recast the dispute as one of “lack of jurisdiction over this particular case” fails. The record discloses no procedural defect in invoking the circuit court’s jurisdiction and no infirmity that would deprive the circuit court of authority to proceed on the indictment.
• Because the trial court is not acting outside its jurisdiction, the prerequisites for a first-class writ under Hoskins v. Maricle are unmet. The writs are therefore denied.

Analysis

Factual and Procedural Context

After his father’s death in 2012, Dinwiddie served as executor of the estate (Grayson District Court) and trustee of a sibling’s trust (Fayette District Court). The Fayette District Court removed him as trustee in May 2022 for breaches of trust, including conversion of approximately $130,000 in trust proceeds. The Grayson District Court soon removed him as executor for fiduciary violations, citing transfers of estate assets to his personal account (including roughly $7,600 and a later $74,000), which allegedly were quickly dissipated. In July 2023, a Grayson County grand jury indicted him for theft by failure to make required disposition of property of $10,000 or more in violation of KRS 514.070.

Dinwiddie petitioned the Court of Appeals for writs of prohibition and mandamus, asserting that only the district court presiding over probate had jurisdiction; he argued an executor’s malfeasance is exclusively civil and cannot be criminalized. The Court of Appeals denied relief. On further review, the Supreme Court affirms, holding that the circuit court has criminal jurisdiction over the felony case notwithstanding the probate matters.

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

• Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2004): Establishes the two classes of writs. First-class writs aim to halt lower courts acting outside their jurisdiction; second-class writs address erroneous actions within jurisdiction where no adequate remedy exists and irreparable injury would occur. Dinwiddie sought a first-class writ, framing the issue as jurisdictional.
• Commonwealth, Energy & Env’t Cabinet v. Shepherd, 366 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2012): Sets the standard of review in writ appeals: de novo review of legal rulings, clear-error review of factual findings, and abuse-of-discretion review of the ultimate grant/denial of relief. The Supreme Court applies that framework to affirm.
• Grange Mutual Insurance Co. v. Trude, 151 S.W.3d 803 (Ky. 2004) and Bender v. Eaton, 343 S.W.2d 799 (Ky. 1961): Emphasize the extraordinary nature of writs and the judiciary’s cautious approach to granting them. This underscores why Dinwiddie’s broad jurisdictional challenge faces a high bar.
• Anderson v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 117 (Ky. 2007) and Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575 (Ky. 2000): Define abuse of discretion (“arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles”). The Court finds no abuse here.
• Cox v. Braden, 266 S.W.3d 792 (Ky. 2008): Confirms that jurisdiction is grounded in constitutional and statutory grants; jurisdictional disputes are resolved as questions of law.
• Commonwealth v. Eckerle, 470 S.W.3d 712 (Ky. 2015); Nordike v. Nordike, 231 S.W.3d 733 (Ky. 2007); Spears v. Goodwine, 490 S.W.3d 347 (Ky. 2016): Elaborate the meaning of “subject-matter jurisdiction,” i.e., jurisdiction over “this kind of case,” not “this case.” The Court relies on these to reject Dinwiddie’s attempt to conflate probate subject-matter jurisdiction with criminal jurisdiction.
• Daugherty v. Telek, 366 S.W.3d 463 (Ky. 2012): States that a court with constitutional or statutory authority over the type of case identified in the pleadings has subject-matter jurisdiction; here, a felony prosecution lies squarely in circuit court.
• Commonwealth v. Steadman, 411 S.W.3d 717 (Ky. 2013), and Peeler v. Simcoe, 718 S.W.3d 589 (Ky. 2025): Clarify “particular-case jurisdiction” as distinct from general subject-matter jurisdiction, typically turning on compliance with statutory prerequisites. The Court finds no defect in the invocation of the circuit court’s authority in Dinwiddie’s case.
• Halvorsen v. Commonwealth, 671 S.W.3d 68 (Ky. 2023): Issues not briefed are deemed abandoned. The Court notes Dinwiddie abandoned other writ and declaratory claims.

Legal Reasoning

First, the Court fixes the governing standard for first-class writs under Hoskins: the petitioner must show the lower court is acting outside its jurisdiction and lacks an adequate remedy. The Court then frames jurisdiction correctly as a legal question turning on the Kentucky Constitution and statutes.

Second, the Court reaffirms that circuit courts have general subject-matter jurisdiction over felony prosecutions under Section 112(5) of the Kentucky Constitution. A felony theft indictment under KRS 514.070 is prototypically within that jurisdiction.

Third, addressing Dinwiddie’s probate-centric argument, the Court explains that while district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over most probate matters (KRS 24A.120(2)), that grant does not preempt or displace the circuit court’s separate and independent criminal jurisdiction. The fact that the alleged misconduct occurred during estate administration does not convert a criminal theft charge into a probate matter, nor does it immunize an executor or trustee from criminal liability. The Court crisply states that probate and criminal proceedings, though factually linked, are “legally—and jurisdictionally—distinct and may proceed separately.”

Fourth, the Court dismantles Dinwiddie’s attempt to reframe the dispute as one of “jurisdiction over this particular case.” Relying on Steadman, Peeler, and Nordike, the Court highlights that alleged defects in the procedural invocation of jurisdiction concern “particular-case jurisdiction,” not the general subject-matter authority of the circuit court. The record discloses no procedural irregularity that would deprive the circuit court of power to proceed on the indictment (e.g., no statute-of-limitations bar, no failure to comply with a jurisdictional prerequisite, no venue defect raised as jurisdictional).

Finally, because the circuit court is neither proceeding outside its jurisdiction nor committing some jurisdictional error, the request for a first-class writ necessarily fails. The Court thus affirms the denial of writs of prohibition and mandamus without opining on the merits of the underlying criminal charge, which remain for the trial court.

Impact and Significance

Although designated “Not to be Published,” this opinion offers practical guidance on the interplay between probate proceedings and criminal prosecutions in Kentucky:

• Fiduciary misconduct can carry criminal exposure: Executors and trustees are not insulated from prosecution by virtue of their office. Allegations of conversion or misapplication of estate or trust assets may support charges under KRS 514.070.
• Parallel tracks are permissible: District court probate proceedings and circuit court criminal prosecutions can proceed simultaneously because they involve different subject matters and remedies (civil versus criminal), even if they arise from the same conduct.
• Writ relief is ill-suited for merits challenges: Arguments about the quality of the criminal investigation or sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence (as Dinwiddie attempted) are not grounds for a jurisdictional writ. Those contentions belong in ordinary pretrial motions and, if necessary, direct appeal.
• Clarifies “particular-case jurisdiction” boundaries: The decision reinforces that procedural invocation issues rarely deprive a circuit court of authority over felony indictments absent a true jurisdictional defect. This limits the viability of first-class writ petitions premised on case-specific procedural complaints.
• Coordination across forums: Practitioners should anticipate coordination issues between probate remedies (e.g., accountings, surcharges, removal) and criminal remedies (e.g., restitution). Courts and counsel may consider stays or tailored scheduling to avoid undue conflict, but jurisdictionally the tracks remain distinct.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Writ of prohibition: An extraordinary order from a higher court stopping a lower court from acting outside its jurisdiction.
• Writ of mandamus: An extraordinary order compelling a lower court or official to perform a clear legal duty.
• First-class writ (Hoskins): Available when a lower court is proceeding outside its jurisdiction and no other remedy suffices.
• Subject-matter jurisdiction: The power of a court to hear a category or “kind” of case. Kentucky circuit courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over felony prosecutions. District courts hold probate jurisdiction, but that does not encroach on circuit courts’ criminal jurisdiction.
• “Particular-case” jurisdiction: A subset concept relating to whether statutory prerequisites for a specific case were met (e.g., timely filing). Errors here typically do not negate the court’s general subject-matter authority.
• KRS 514.070 (Theft by failure to make required disposition of property): Targets situations where a person, often in a fiduciary or entrusted capacity, fails to dispose of property as required by law or agreement—potentially a felony if the value meets statutory thresholds.
• Probate jurisdiction (KRS 24A.120(2)): District courts handle probate matters (e.g., administration of estates, accountings, fiduciary removals) unless there is an adversary proceeding. This civil authority does not convert criminal conduct into a purely probate issue.
• Executor/Trustee fiduciary duties: A fiduciary must manage estate/trust assets solely for beneficiaries’ benefit. Breaches can prompt civil remedies (removal, surcharge) and, where facts warrant, criminal charges.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Kentucky’s decision in Dinwiddie confirms a straightforward but important jurisdictional principle: Kentucky circuit courts retain general subject-matter jurisdiction over felony prosecutions, including charges that arise from conduct occurring in the course of estate or trust administration. The existence of parallel probate proceedings does not preempt or displace criminal jurisdiction, nor does fiduciary status confer immunity from prosecution under KRS 514.070.

On the writ posture, the Court reiterates that extraordinary relief is a narrow remedy. Absent a genuine jurisdictional defect, disputes over the merits of the Commonwealth’s case or the quality of the investigation should be addressed through standard criminal procedure and, if necessary, direct appeal.

While unpublished and nonbinding, the opinion provides clear guidance: probate court proceedings and criminal prosecutions occupy distinct legal lanes. When alleged fiduciary misconduct crosses into criminal territory, the circuit court’s criminal jurisdiction is neither impaired nor displaced by concurrent probate supervision.