Introduction

Jay Folse v. G. Russell Rollyson and Mark A. Hunt, decided April 25, 2025 by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, addresses the question whether a purchaser of tax liens must invoke a writ of mandamus or may rely exclusively on the statutory scheme set out in West Virginia Code §11A-3-60 to compel issuance of tax deeds. Jay Folse, acting pro se, purchased delinquent tax liens on two Cabell County properties and sought to compel the Auditor’s Office to issue tax deeds after unsuccessful service of redemption notices. The Circuit Court dismissed Folse’s petition for failure to pursue mandamus. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted review, reversed, and remanded with instructions for further factual development.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ rulings and held that:

• The statutory provisions in WV Code §11A-3-60 create an exclusive petition process—often called a “Section 60 proceeding”—to compel both issuance of redemption notices and execution of tax deeds.
• A writ of mandamus is not available because the Legislature provided an adequate, speedy, and exclusive remedy by statute.
• Lemley v. Phillips (1933), which had allowed mandamus to cover both notice and deed in a single proceeding, was superseded by the 1941 statutory reorganization that placed both remedies in one chapter.
• The case must be remanded to the Circuit Court to resolve disputed factual issues—chiefly whether Folse fulfilled the notice requirements and whether respondents’ additional personal‐service policy conforms to statute and governing constitutional due‐process standards.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Doran v. Whyte (75 W. Va. 368, 1914) – Held Syllabus Point 2 that “a remedy given by statute, which is as speedy and equally as efficacious as mandamus, excludes the latter remedy.”
• State ex rel. Kucera v. City of Wheeling (153 W. Va. 538, 1969) – Restated the three‐part test for mandamus, including “absence of another adequate remedy.”
• Lemley v. Phillips (113 W. Va. 812, 1933) – Permitted mandamus to compel both notice and deed when no statutory remedy existed for the notice requirement. The Court in Folse explains that Lemley’s narrow exception was abrogated by the 1941 enactment of Chapter 11A, which consolidated notice and deed remedies in one statutory scheme.
• Sands v. Security Trust Co. (143 W. Va. 522, 1958) – “This Court will not pass on a nonjurisdictional question which has not been decided by the trial court in the first instance.”
• Harshbarger v. Gainer (184 W. Va. 656, 1991) – “Courts are not constituted for the purpose of making advisory decrees or resolving academic disputes.”

Legal Reasoning

The Court applied a de novo standard to the Intermediate Court of Appeals’ dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). The core holding is that once the Legislature has prescribed an adequate statutory procedure, mandamus is unavailable. The Court traced the evolution of the governing statutes:

1. In 1914, Doran rejected mandamus where a statutory remedy existed for compelling tax deeds.
2. In 1933, Lemley carved out an exception to cover notice and deed in one mandamus when notice statutes were silent.
3. In 1941, the Legislature repealed the old chapter, created Chapter 11A, and included both redemption‐notice and tax‐deed petition processes in §11A-3-60—thus providing an exclusive, unified remedy and eliminating the Lemley exception.

The Folse Court concluded that mandamus “does not lie to compel the deputy commissioner of delinquent and non-entered lands to execute a deed for land purchased at a delinquent tax sale” and that “the remedy provided by West Virginia Code §11A-3-60 (1995) is exclusive.”

Impact on Future Cases

• Clarifies that prospective tax‐lien purchasers must use the Section 60 petition—rather than mandamus—to compel both notices and deeds.
• Obliges trial courts to conduct fact‐finding on compliance with statutory notice requirements (timeliness, address diligence, fee deposits, personal service efforts, etc.).
• Limits recourse to writs of mandamus in tax‐sale contexts, reinforcing legislative intent to contain all procedures in Chapter 11A.
• Alerts practitioners to monitor any additional due‐process developments—such as those arising from federal decisions like O’Neal v. Rollyson—when advising clients on notice strategies.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Writ of Mandamus: A court order compelling a public official to perform a duty. It requires (1) a clear legal right, (2) a clear legal duty, and (3) no other adequate remedy.
• Statutory Remedy Exclusivity: When a statute provides a “speedy and equally efficacious” procedure, courts will not permit an alternate writ of mandamus.
• Section 60 Proceeding: Common shorthand for the two remedies in WV Code §11A-3-60—(a) compelling issuance of redemption notices, and (b) compelling execution of tax deeds.
• De Novo Review: An appellate standard that re-examines questions of law from scratch, without deference to the lower court.
• Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal: Tests whether the complaint, if its factual allegations are assumed true, states any legal claim on which relief may be granted.

Conclusion

Jay Folse v. Rollyson restores the primacy of the statutory petition process in WV Code §11A-3-60 for compelling issuance of tax‐sale notices and deeds. By overruling the lower courts’ mandates that litigants use mandamus, the Supreme Court of Appeals reaffirms that, once the Legislature crafts an adequate remedy, courts must follow that statutory path. The decision requires trial courts on remand to resolve disputed factual questions—notice attempts, address diligence, fee compliance—before ordering tax deeds. The holding brings clarity and uniformity to tax sale litigation in West Virginia and underscores the Legislature’s exclusive scheme for adjudicating these matters.