Exclusivity of RSA 170-C Guardianships Post-TPR: DCYF Appointment Bars Third-Party Guardianship Petitions Under RSA 463

Case: In re Guardianship of K.C., 2025 N.H. 22 (N.H. May 29, 2025) (per curiam)

Court: Supreme Court of New Hampshire

Result: Affirmed. The appointment of DCYF as guardian under RSA chapter 170-C precludes a third party from petitioning for guardianship under RSA chapter 463 while post-permanency efforts toward adoption are ongoing.

Introduction

This appeal required the New Hampshire Supreme Court to resolve a recurring and consequential intersection in child protection practice: can a private party use the general guardianship statute (RSA chapter 463) to replace or join the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) as a child’s guardian after parental rights have been terminated and DCYF has been appointed guardian under the termination statute (RSA chapter 170-C)?

The petitioner, J.B., a prior caregiver to K.C., sought guardianship under RSA chapter 463 after the trial court terminated K.C.’s parents’ rights and appointed DCYF as guardian under RSA 170-C:11, II, with a permanency plan of adoption set in the underlying abuse-and-neglect proceeding under RSA chapter 169-C. The Circuit Court dismissed her petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the RSA 170-C guardianship is exclusive in this posture, and that permitting a concurrent or replacement guardianship under RSA 463 would contravene the statutes’ plain language and undermine the Legislature’s goal of expediting permanency for children.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that when parental rights have been terminated and DCYF has been appointed as the child’s guardian pursuant to RSA 170-C:11, II, a third-party guardianship petition under RSA chapter 463 cannot proceed. RSA chapter 170-C mandates appointment of the Department of Health and Human Services or “another authorized agency” as guardian upon termination; it does not contemplate removal of that guardian, appointment of a co-guardian, or substitution with an individual under RSA 463. Moreover, allowing a parallel guardianship proceeding would risk delaying the child’s permanency plan—here, adoption—contrary to statutory objectives in RSA chapter 169-C and precedent emphasizing prompt permanency. The Court distinguished prior authority allowing a guardianship to coexist with an award of legal custody, explaining that in K.C.’s case DCYF holds both guardianship and legal custody. Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed the petition.

Key Holdings

• RSA 170-C:11, II requires that when parental rights are terminated, the court “shall” appoint the Department of Health and Human Services (DCYF) or another authorized agency as guardian and vest legal custody in that agency. The statute does not permit appointment of an additional guardian or removal of DCYF through RSA chapter 463.
• Because DCYF’s guardianship under RSA 170-C is exclusive while post-permanency efforts are underway, a third party cannot initiate or pursue a competing guardianship under RSA 463 in that period.
• Entertaining a separate RSA 463 guardianship petition in this context would undermine the Legislature’s objective of hastening permanency and risk delay to an adoption plan.
• In re Guardianship of B.C. (permitting a guardianship to coexist with an award of legal custody) does not apply when DCYF holds both guardianship and legal custody under RSA 170-C.

Factual and Procedural Background

• Following abuse-and-neglect proceedings under RSA chapter 169-C, the trial court terminated the parental rights of K.C.’s parents in 2020 under RSA chapter 170-C and, as required by RSA 170-C:11, II, appointed DCYF as K.C.’s guardian and vested legal custody in DCYF. The court set adoption as K.C.’s permanency plan.
• J.B. (the petitioner and former caregiver) had two prior placements of K.C. (2018–2019 and 2021–2022). DCYF later placed K.C. in a residential facility.
• In March 2023, J.B. filed a guardianship petition under RSA chapter 463. The trial court first concluded that RSA chapter 463’s removal provisions do not apply to a guardian appointed under RSA chapter 170-C, but allowed the petition to proceed. DCYF renewed its motion to dismiss, arguing that a chapter 463 proceeding cannot go forward while DCYF is the chapter 170-C guardian with an adoption plan. The court dismissed the petition, and J.B. appealed.

Analysis

1. Statutory Framework and the Court’s Legal Reasoning

• Text and structure of the statutes: RSA chapter 170-C (Termination of Parental Rights) and RSA chapter 463 (Guardianship of Minors and Estates) address different problems, live in different statutory titles (Public Safety and Welfare vs. Guardians and Conservators), and have different stated purposes (RSA 170-C:1 vs. RSA 463:1). The placement and purposes underscore legislative intent that they operate separately.
• Mandatory appointment under RSA 170-C: Upon finding grounds for termination, the court “shall terminate” the parent-child relationship and “shall” appoint DHHS/DCYF or another authorized agency “as guardian of the child’s person” and vest legal custody in that agency. RSA 170-C:11, II. The use of “shall” is mandatory and leaves no room for appointing an individual guardian in that order.
• No removal or co-guardian mechanism in RSA 170-C: Unlike RSA 463 (which contemplates joint and successor guardians and removal), RSA 170-C contains no provision for removing the appointed guardian or creating a co-guardianship. Reading RSA 463’s removal or co-guardian provisions into RSA 170-C would add language the Legislature did not include, contrary to standard canons of interpretation.
• Exclusive guardianship serves permanency goals: After TPR and 170-C appointment, oversight returns to the 169-C court for post-permanency review to ensure DCYF makes reasonable efforts to finalize the plan (RSA 169-C:24-c, II). Introducing a 463 guardianship proceeding would risk delaying the permanency plan (adoption) and conflict with legislative objectives to expedite permanency. See In re N.T., 175 N.H. 300, 309–10 (2022).
• Best interests under RSA 463 cannot be met “as a matter of law” here: The petitioner’s burden under RSA 463:8, III(a) is to show by a preponderance that a new guardianship is in the child’s best interests. The Court agreed with DCYF that, in this posture, creating an additional or replacement guardianship would impede permanency and therefore cannot satisfy the best-interests standard.
• Harmonization and avoiding absurd results: Interpreting the statutes together to effectuate overall purpose, the Court declined to allow two different guardianship regimes to operate simultaneously for the same child, which would be “unmanageable and fraught with the possibility of conflict.”

2. Precedents Cited and Their Role

• In re Guardianship of B.C., 174 N.H. 628 (2021): B.C. provides that a guardianship may coexist with an award of legal custody in some instances and reiterates de novo review of statutory interpretation. The Court distinguished B.C. because in K.C.’s case DCYF holds both guardianship and legal custody under RSA 170-C—leaving no space for a parallel 463 guardianship.
• Petition of N.H. DCYF, 170 N.H. 633 (2018): Recognizes DCYF’s role as guardian until permanency is finalized, supporting the exclusivity of the 170-C guardianship through the post-permanency stage.
• In re N.T., 175 N.H. 300 (2022): Emphasizes the Legislature’s objective to hasten resolution of abuse-and-neglect cases to achieve permanent placement in the child’s best interests. The Court invoked N.T. to reject parallel litigation that could delay adoption.
• In re D.O., 173 N.H. 48 (2020): The Court’s reminder that if the Legislature disagrees with judicial interpretation, it can amend the statute. Here, any mechanism to remove or replace a 170-C guardian must come from legislative action.
• Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321 (1993): Cited for the proposition that remaining arguments not affecting the outcome need not be further discussed.

3. Comparison: Guardianships Under RSA 170-C and RSA 463

RSA 170-C guardianship (post-TPR): Triggered by termination of parental rights. The court must appoint DCYF (or another authorized agency) as guardian and vest legal custody in that agency (RSA 170-C:11, II). The guardian under RSA 170-C has the “duty and authority to make important decisions” with permanent effects and to care for the child’s welfare. RSA 170-C:2, V; see also RSA 169-C:3, XIV. Post-permanency oversight occurs in the 169-C court (RSA 169-C:24-c).

RSA 463 guardianship (general minors’ guardianship): A broader, stand-alone framework to appoint a guardian of the person or estate of a minor in the minor’s best interests (RSA 463:1, 463:8), with definitions that include joint and successor guardians (RSA 463:2, IV), and statutory mechanisms for removal or substitution. It is not designed to supplant a 170-C guardianship in the wake of TPR.

Specific governs the general: The specific, mandatory post-TPR guardianship scheme in RSA 170-C controls over the general guardianship framework of RSA 463 in this context. Importing RSA 463’s flexibility into RSA 170-C would contradict the latter’s text and purpose.

4. Impact and Implications

• For caregivers (relatives, former foster placements, other “fit and willing” adults): You cannot use RSA 463 to displace DCYF as guardian or to establish a co-guardianship while DCYF serves as 170-C guardian and the 169-C court supervises permanency. Your viable paths are (i) working with DCYF toward adoption if aligned with the plan, or (ii) seeking appropriate participation or relief within the 169-C post-permanency proceedings, as permitted by law and the trial court’s discretion. Independent 463 petitions will be dismissed in this posture.
• For DCYF: The decision confirms DCYF’s exclusive guardianship authority post-TPR until permanency is finalized, while reinforcing DCYF’s duty to make reasonable efforts to execute the court-approved permanency plan. Oversight remains active in the 169-C court.
• For trial courts: The opinion supplies a clear threshold rule: dismiss 463 guardianship petitions that seek to replace or join DCYF during a 170-C guardianship following TPR where an adoption plan is in place. Keep permanency questions within the 169-C docket.
• For children: The rule minimizes fragmented decision-making and litigation-induced delay, aligning with statutory priorities for timely permanency.
• For the Legislature: If the policy preference is to allow substitution or co-guardianship in rare circumstances post-TPR, statutory amendments to RSA 170-C would be required to create explicit standards, procedures, and safeguards against delay.

5. Unresolved Questions and Boundaries

• Duration of preclusion: The Court’s reasoning indicates the preclusion persists while DCYF remains the 170-C guardian and the 169-C post-permanency process is active. Once permanency is finalized and the abuse-and-neglect matter terminated, the landscape changes, but the opinion does not address that scenario.
• Different permanency plans: The case involved a permanency plan of adoption. If a court-set plan were guardianship with a “fit and willing” relative (RSA 169-C:24-b, II(a)(2)), relief would likely run through the 169-C proceeding, not a parallel RSA 463 petition. The opinion suggests, but does not decide, that 463 petitions are improper while 170-C guardianship is in effect regardless of the plan type.
• “Another authorized agency” as guardian: The exclusivity applies whether DCYF or another authorized agency is appointed under RSA 170-C:11, II; either way, RSA 463 petitions to add or substitute an individual guardian are foreclosed during the 170-C guardianship.
• Remedies for perceived harm: The opinion implies that complaints that DCYF is not serving a child’s best interests should be addressed in 169-C post-permanency hearings (e.g., motions regarding reasonable efforts or plan adjustments), not via a separate 463 proceeding.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Termination of Parental Rights (TPR): A court ends the legal parent-child relationship. After TPR, the state (DCYF) or an authorized agency must become the child’s guardian to shepherd the child to a permanent home.
• Guardian under RSA 170-C: A guardian appointed specifically because of TPR. DCYF (or another authorized agency) holds both guardianship and legal custody, making major decisions until a permanent placement (usually adoption) is finalized.
• Guardian under RSA 463: A general guardianship for a minor’s person or estate, available outside the TPR context. It allows for joint/successor guardians and removal procedures—flexibilities that do not apply to a 170-C guardian.
• Permanency plan: The court-approved plan for a child’s permanent living situation (e.g., adoption or guardianship with a relative). The 169-C court oversees DCYF’s reasonable efforts to finish the plan.
• Legal custody vs. guardianship: Legal custody concerns day-to-day authority and decision-making; guardianship is a more encompassing status. In 170-C cases, DCYF holds both, which is why adding a separate guardian under 463 would create conflict.

Practice Pointers

• Check posture first: Before filing under RSA 463, determine whether TPR has occurred and whether DCYF has been appointed guardian under RSA 170-C:11, II. If so, a 463 petition to replace or join DCYF is likely barred.
• Use the right forum: Raise concerns about placement or permanency through the 169-C post-permanency process (RSA 169-C:24-c), not a separate 463 case. Consider motions to participate or intervene only where permitted and strategically warranted.
• Align with the plan: If the permanency plan is adoption, align efforts with DCYF to pursue adoption rather than pursue a competing guardianship theory.
• Legislative advocacy: If stakeholders identify rare cases warranting guardian substitution post-TPR, seek amendments to RSA 170-C to define standards and procedures without undermining permanency timelines.

Conclusion

In re Guardianship of K.C. establishes a clear and administrable rule: while DCYF is serving as the court-appointed guardian under RSA 170-C following termination of parental rights, and the 169-C court is supervising a permanency plan (here, adoption), third parties cannot invoke RSA 463 to replace or join DCYF as guardian. The decision rests on statutory text, structural separation of the guardianship schemes, and the Legislature’s imperative to avoid delays in permanency. It channels disputes about a child’s best interests into the 169-C post-permanency forum and leaves any relaxation of exclusivity to legislative action. The holding brings welcome clarity to trial courts, agencies, and caregivers by keeping the path to permanency singular and swift.

Statutes and Cases Cited:

• RSA 170-C:1; RSA 170-C:2, V; RSA 170-C:11, II
• RSA 169-C:3, XIV; RSA 169-C:24-b, II(a)(1)-(2); RSA 169-C:24-c, II
• RSA 463:1; RSA 463:2, IV; RSA 463:5; RSA 463:8, III(a); RSA 463:12
• In re Guardianship of B.C., 174 N.H. 628 (2021)
• Petition of N.H. Div. for Children, Youth & Families, 170 N.H. 633 (2018)
• In re N.T., 175 N.H. 300 (2022)
• In re D.O., 173 N.H. 48 (2020)
• Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321 (1993)