Exclusive Texas Supreme Court Mandamus Jurisdiction Over the Governor and Attorney General in Public Information Act Disputes

I. Introduction

In Ken Paxton, in his Official Capacity as Attorney General of Texas, and Greg Abbott, in his Official Capacity as Governor of Texas v. American Oversight, No. 24-0162 (Tex. June 27, 2025), the Supreme Court of Texas confronted a recurring but foundational issue: which courts in Texas may issue writs of mandamus against the State’s highest executive officers.

The case arose in the specific context of the Texas Public Information Act (“PIA”), but the Court’s holding is much broader. The Court reaffirmed and applied its earlier decision in A & T Consultants, Inc. v. Sharp, 904 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1995), to hold that:

• District courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus against constitutional executive officers (such as the Governor and Attorney General), even in PIA cases; and
• Only the Texas Supreme Court may issue mandatory or compulsory writs, including mandamus and injunctions, against officers of the “Executive Department” of the State, by virtue of Texas Government Code § 22.002(c).

Because American Oversight had proceeded solely by petition for writ of mandamus in district court under Government Code § 552.321, the Court concluded the district court lacked jurisdiction and ordered dismissal, without reaching sovereign-immunity or merits questions.

At the same time, the Court emphasized that:

• Constitutional executive officers are not immune from all judicial enforcement under the PIA; and
• Other statutory enforcement mechanisms remain available, especially criminal penalties and civil actions brought through § 552.3215 with the participation of the Travis County District Attorney for state agencies.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Chief Justice Blacklock, writing for the Court, held that:

1. Under the Texas Constitution (art. V, § 8) district courts have broad original jurisdiction, but this jurisdiction is expressly limited where “other law” confers jurisdiction on another court. Government Code § 22.002(c) is such “other law.”
2. Section 22.002(c) of the Government Code gives the Texas Supreme Court exclusive authority to issue writs of mandamus, injunction, or other compulsory process against “officers of the executive departments of the government of this state” (which includes the Governor and Attorney General under Tex. Const. art. IV, § 1).
3. Because of § 22.002(c), district courts generally lack jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus against constitutional executive officers. That rule was squarely stated in A & T Consultants, Inc. v. Sharp in 1995.
4. The Legislature amended PIA § 552.321 in 1999 to add subsection (b), which provides that “[a] suit filed by a requestor under this section must be filed in a district court for the county in which the main offices of the governmental body are located.”
5. Section 552.321(b) is a mandatory venue provision, not a jurisdictional grant. It does not expressly or implicitly expand district-court jurisdiction to include mandamus actions against constitutional executive officers.
6. Because the PIA’s mandamus provision, § 552.321, authorizes only “suit for a writ of mandamus,” and because district courts lack power to grant mandamus relief against the Governor and Attorney General, the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over American Oversight’s petition.
7. Other remedies remain available to enforce the PIA against state-level agencies, including:
   • Criminal enforcement, notably under § 552.353; and
   • Civil enforcement via § 552.3215 (complaint to, and potential suit by, the Travis County District Attorney for state agencies, seeking declaratory or injunctive relief).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and directed the district court to dismiss the mandamus action for lack of jurisdiction.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Public Information Requests

In 2022, American Oversight, a nonprofit watchdog organization, submitted seven separate PIA requests: three to the Office of the Governor and four to the Office of the Attorney General (OAG).

Requests to the Governor’s Office

1. Non-governmental email addresses: Official communications involving any non-governmental email address attributed to the Governor.
2. Text messages: All text messages sent or received by the Governor regarding official business.
3. Communications with gun-rights groups: Emails between the Governor’s office and the NRA, Texas State Rifle Association, and similar organizations.

The Governor’s office:

• Identified responsive documents to Request 1, claimed exemptions (e.g., attorney–client privilege, pending litigation), and sought an Attorney General ruling under § 552.301; the OAG agreed the material was exempt.
• Produced around 100 pages of text messages responsive to Request 2, while withholding others; again, it requested and received an OAG ruling partially authorizing withholding and partially requiring disclosure.
• Reported no responsive information for Request 3.

Requests to the Attorney General’s Office

1. All emails sent by the Attorney General or his Solicitor General between January 6–8, 2021.
2. Official communications involving any non-governmental email address used by the Attorney General.
3. All text messages sent or received by the Attorney General regarding official business.
4. Emails between the OAG and the NRA, Texas State Rifle Association, and similar groups.

The Attorney General’s office:

• Produced some documents for Requests 1 and 3 but sought to withhold others; its own internal PIA-ruling section (functionally segregated) confirmed that the remaining information could be withheld.
• Sought to withhold all information responsive to Request 2, and the ruling supported full withholding.
• Reported no responsive information for Request 4.

The Court noted, in a footnote, the structural oddity that when the OAG is both custodian of records and the decisionmaker under the PIA, it must “wear two hats,” with internal separation between the requesting and ruling divisions. The Court referenced Public Utility Commission v. Cofer, 754 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. 1988), but did not decide whether such internal separation can ever be truly independent in a constitutional sense.

B. The Lawsuit in District Court

Dissatisfied with the responses, American Oversight filed a petition for writ of mandamus in Travis County district court, naming the Governor and the Attorney General in their official capacities.

The petition invoked Government Code § 552.321(a), which allows:

“A requestor or the attorney general [to] file suit for a writ of mandamus compelling a governmental body to make information available for public inspection if the governmental body … refuses to supply public information….”

Subsection (b) of that statute provides that a suit by a requestor “must be filed in a district court for the county in which the main offices of the governmental body are located.”

The State (Governor and Attorney General) filed pleas to the jurisdiction arguing:

1. Sovereign immunity / failure to plead a viable PIA refusal: They contended that they had complied with PIA procedures, sought and followed AG rulings where required, and conducted “diligent and good faith” searches; therefore, American Oversight had not alleged a “refusal to supply public information” sufficient to waive immunity under § 552.321.
2. Lack of mandamus jurisdiction over executive officers: They later argued (in the court of appeals) that district courts cannot issue mandamus against constitutional executive officers due to Government Code § 22.002(c).

The district court denied the pleas, and the State took an interlocutory appeal under Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 51.014(a)(8).

C. The Court of Appeals’ Decision

The Third Court of Appeals in Austin affirmed. It reasoned:

• Section 552.321(b), by directing that suits “must be filed in a district court,” implicitly authorizes those district courts to issue mandamus relief against any “governmental body,” including those headed by constitutional executive officers.
• Section 22.002(c)’s general reservation of mandamus jurisdiction to the Supreme Court must give way to the more specific and later-enacted § 552.321(b) for PIA cases.
• American Oversight had stated a viable claim that the State “refuse[d] to supply public information,” which sufficed to overcome sovereign immunity at the pleading stage.

The State then sought (and obtained) review in the Supreme Court of Texas. Because subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, the Supreme Court addressed the § 22.002(c) issue even though it was not presented to the district court initially, relying on Texas Department of Transportation v. Self, 690 S.W.3d 12 (Tex. 2024).

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Historical and General Mandamus Authorities

• Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)
  Cited as the classic example of judicial mandamus against an executive official, framing the “age-old question” of judicial authority to compel executive action.
• Republic of Texas Constitution of 1836; Adoption of English Common Law
  The Court traced Texas mandamus practice to the Republic’s adoption of the common law of England (Act of Jan. 20, 1840; cited via Gammel’s compilation). Mandamus thereby brought with it its “old soil”—the traditional limitations and doctrines governing its use.
• Thomas Tapping, The Law and Practice of the High Prerogative Writ of Mandamus (1848)
  Quoted for historical grounding of mandamus going back at least to the 1600s, emphasizing its prerogative character.
• Bradley v. McCrabb, Dallam 504 (Tex. 1843)
  Early Texas case recognizing the requirement of no adequate legal remedy as part of mandamus doctrine imported from English common law.
• Yett v. Cook, 268 S.W. 715 (Tex. 1925)
  Reaffirmed that the writ of mandamus in Texas is construed in light of the common law.
• Lloyd v. Brinck, 35 Tex. 1 (1871)
  Described mandamus as proper where the duty is “simply ministerial and involves no judicial discretion,” and used primarily to compel performance by lower courts.
• Lewright v. Bell, 63 S.W. 623 (Tex. 1901)
  Stated that courts cannot, via mandamus, compel an officer to perform a duty that involves discretion.
• Seagraves v. Green, 288 S.W. 417 (Tex. Comm’n Op. 1926)
  Described mandamus as an order requiring a person or officer to do something he wrongfully declines to do; noted in “exceptional cases” it may have a restraining effect (essentially undoing or amending a previous act).
• In re Williams, 470 S.W.3d 819 (Tex. 2015)
  Provided a modern articulation of mandamus against public officials: may compel ministerial acts and correct clear abuse of discretion; defined “ministerial” duties as those where the law clearly and specifically spells out the duty with no room for discretion.

B. Constitutional and Statutory Framework

• Texas Constitution art. V, § 8 (District Court jurisdiction)
  Confers on district courts “exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies,” except where other law confers jurisdiction on another court, tribunal, or body. It also authorizes district judges to issue writs necessary to enforce their jurisdiction.
• Texas Constitution art. V, §§ 3(a) & 5(c) (Supreme Court and Court of Criminal Appeals)
  § 3(a) allows the Supreme Court to issue writs, including mandamus, necessary to enforce its jurisdiction and authorizes the Legislature to confer original jurisdiction to issue mandamus and quo warranto, “except as against the Governor of the State.”
  § 5(c) gives the Court of Criminal Appeals mandamus power in criminal-law matters.
• Texas Constitution art. IV, § 1 (Executive Department)
  Defines the “Executive Department” as consisting of the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Comptroller, Commissioner of the General Land Office, and Attorney General (formerly also the Treasurer).
• Texas Constitution art. II, § 1 (Separation of powers)
  Enshrines the separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches and prohibits one branch from exercising powers properly attached to another.
• Government Code § 22.002(c)
  Central to the case. It provides that:

  “Only the supreme court has the authority to issue a writ of mandamus or injunction, or any other mandatory or compulsory writ or process, against any of the officers of the executive departments of the government of this state….”

  This makes the Supreme Court the exclusive forum for mandatory or compulsory writs against constitutional executive officers.
• Government Code § 24.011
  Authorizes district judges to grant various writs—including mandamus—necessary to enforce the court’s jurisdiction. The Court assumed, as the parties did, that district courts generally have mandamus power, and focused only on whether it extends to constitutional executive officers.
• Public Information Act – Government Code § 552.321
  Authorizes a “requestor or the attorney general” to “file suit for a writ of mandamus” compelling a “governmental body” to make information available if it refuses to request an AG decision when required or “refuses to supply public information.”
  Subsection (b) (added in 1999) states that “[a] suit filed by a requestor under this section must be filed in a district court for the county in which the main offices of the governmental body are located.”
• Public Information Act – Government Code § 552.3215
  Creates a separate enforcement mechanism via complaints to local prosecutors. If the governmental body is a state agency, the complaint is filed with the Travis County District Attorney, who can bring an action for declaratory or injunctive relief.
• Public Information Act – Government Code § 552.353
  Provides criminal penalties for officers (or agents) who, with criminal negligence, fail or refuse to give access to or permit copying of public information.

C. The Key Precedent: A & T Consultants, Inc. v. Sharp (1995)

Sharp is the linchpin of the Court’s reasoning. In that case:

• A PIA requestor sought mandamus under § 552.321 against the Comptroller, a constitutional executive officer.
• The Court held that because § 22.002(c) confers exclusive mandamus jurisdiction over executive officers on the Supreme Court, district courts lack jurisdiction to issue mandamus against such officers.
• The Court further held that in a PIA mandamus case involving a constitutional executive office, the proper respondent is the constitutional executive officer himself, not some amorphous “office.” Thus, by definition, § 22.002(c) was implicated.
• Critically, the Court said that any exception—i.e., any authorization of district court mandamus against executive officers—would require “express statutory authorization … naming district courts as the proper fora.”
• As an illustration of what such express authorization would look like, Sharp pointed to (then) § 552.353(b)(3), which specifically authorized “a petition for a declaratory judgment, a writ of mandamus, or both, against the attorney general in a Travis County district court….”

Thus, Sharp established two important rules:

1. District courts have no PIA-based mandamus jurisdiction over constitutional executive officers absent express statutory authorization; and
2. The Supreme Court generally has such mandamus jurisdiction (subject to separate constitutional limits regarding the Governor) by virtue of § 22.002(c).

D. Other Modern Authorities on Interpretation

• Hall v. Hall, 584 U.S. 59 (2018)
  Quoted for the principle that when a common-law term (like “writ of mandamus”) is used in a statute, it carries its “old soil” with it—meaning existing doctrines and limitations unless the Legislature clearly provides otherwise.
• Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chicas, 593 S.W.3d 284 (Tex. 2019) and Morales v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 241 S.W.3d 514 (Tex. 2007)
  Cited to emphasize that venue provisions do not ordinarily implicate subject-matter jurisdiction.
• Malouf v. State ex rel. Ellis, 694 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. 2024)
  Invoked for the textualist method: applying the common, ordinary meaning of statutory text within its context.
• Texas Department of Transportation v. Self, 690 S.W.3d 12 (Tex. 2024)
  Reiterated that subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised for the first time on appeal.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Mandamus and the “Old Soil” of the Common Law

The Court began by underscoring that the Legislature chose a specific remedial vehicle in § 552.321: a “suit for a writ of mandamus.” It could have chosen more conventional remedies (e.g., declaratory judgment or injunction), as it did in § 552.3215. When the Legislature deliberately selects a historically loaded term like “writ of mandamus,” that term comes with the common law’s associated limits—jurisdictional, procedural, and substantive.

This framing is essential: because the PIA uses “writ of mandamus,” all existing Texas law governing which courts can issue mandamus against which officials is implicitly incorporated, absent a clear legislative directive to the contrary.

B. Constitutional and Statutory Allocation of Jurisdiction

1. General grant to district courts (Tex. Const. art. V, § 8).
   District courts have very broad original jurisdiction over “all actions, proceedings, and remedies,” including mandamus. But that jurisdiction is explicitly limited where “this Constitution or other law” confers jurisdiction on “some other court, tribunal, or administrative body.” Thus, ordinary legislative statutes can carve out specific areas (such as particular writs against particular officers) from district-court jurisdiction.
2. Exclusive mandamus jurisdiction over executive officers (Gov’t Code § 22.002(c)).
   Section 22.002(c) states that only the Supreme Court may issue mandamus, injunction, or other compulsory writs against officers of the Executive Department. The Court reaffirmed its earlier holding in Sharp that the Governor and Attorney General, as Art. IV executive officers, fall squarely within this category.
3. Resulting rule.
   Absent some overriding statute, district courts have no jurisdiction to issue mandamus against the Governor or Attorney General. The default PIA mandamus mechanism in § 552.321 must therefore be read against this backdrop.

C. Does § 552.321(b) Override § 22.002(c)?

American Oversight’s core argument was that the 1999 addition of § 552.321(b) to the PIA constituted the Legislature’s response to Sharp, effectively authorizing district courts to hear mandamus cases against all “governmental bodies,” including those headed by constitutional executive officers.

The Court rejected this argument on several grounds:

1. Textual silence on jurisdiction or executive officers.
   Section 552.321(b) says only that a “suit … must be filed in a district court for the county in which the main offices of the governmental body are located.” It:
   • Does not mention “jurisdiction,” “power,” “authority,” or “executive officers”; and
   • Looks like a routine venue provision, not a jurisdiction-shifting provision.
2. Characterization as a venue rule.
   The Court held that § 552.321(b) “reads as a garden-variety venue provision,” akin to many other statutes specifying the county and court in which an action “must be filed.” Such provisions do not typically expand or alter subject-matter jurisdiction.
3. Failure to satisfy Sharp’s “express authorization” requirement.
   Sharp said an exception to the Supreme Court’s exclusive mandamus jurisdiction would require “express statutory authorization … naming district courts as the proper fora” for actions against executive officers.
   Section 552.321(b):
   • Refers only to “governmental bod[ies],” not to “executive officers” or “officers of the Executive Department”;
   • Does not explicitly say that district courts may issue mandamus against the Governor or Attorney General; and
   • Therefore does not meet the “express authorization” standard.
   By contrast, the former § 552.353(b)(3) (pointed to in Sharp as the paradigm) explicitly authorized suit “against the attorney general in a Travis County district court,” naming both party and forum.
4. Alternative reading: limiting Supreme Court mandamus in PIA cases.
   The Court pointed out that if § 552.321(b) has any jurisdictional implication at all (a question it did not resolve), it could just as easily be read to limit PIA mandamus actions to district courts, thereby circumventing Sharp’s assumption that original mandamus could be sought in the Supreme Court against executive officers in PIA disputes.
   The Court expressly left open whether an original PIA-based mandamus action could still be filed in the Supreme Court in light of § 552.321(b)’s district-court venue requirement.
5. Canon against superfluity is not controlling here.
   American Oversight argued that if § 552.321(b) is not jurisdiction-altering, it is superfluous because pre-existing law already would have directed PIA suits to district courts.
   The Court responded that:
   • The provision serves a real function by clearly designating the initial forum in a context (mandamus) where original proceedings can be filed at multiple court levels.
   • Clarifying venue is not a “useless act”; the Legislature often “fills in” obvious rules to promote clarity.
   • The canon against superfluity cannot justify reading more into the text than its natural meaning supports.

Based on this reasoning, the Court held that § 552.321(b) did not displace § 22.002(c)’s reservation of exclusive mandamus jurisdiction over executive officers to the Supreme Court. Sharp remains good law, and district courts remain without power to grant PIA mandamus relief against the Governor or Attorney General.

D. The “Governmental Body” vs. Officer Distinction

American Oversight attempted to rely on the PIA’s use of “governmental body” in § 552.321(a), suggesting that:

• The statute authorizes mandamus against governmental bodies as such, not necessarily against individual executive officers; and
• Therefore, a suit nominally directed at a “governmental body” might evade § 22.002(c), which refers to “officers of the executive departments.”

The Court declined to reopen this question, emphasizing that Sharp already:

• Held that in PIA mandamus actions involving constitutional executive offices, the proper respondent is the constitutional executive officer, because he or she bears the legal duty under the PIA; and
• Concluded that PIA’s use of “governmental body” cannot circumvent § 22.002(c) by pretending that the officer and his office are legally distinct for mandamus purposes.

The Court described the theoretical distinction between an officer and the governmental body he heads as “complicated and interesting,” but unnecessary to resolve here, since Sharp answered the operative questions for PIA mandamus suits.

E. Response to Policy Concerns: Are Executive Officers Now Above the PIA?

American Oversight argued that if mandamus by private requestors cannot lie in district court against high-ranking executive officers, those officers could effectively avoid timely judicial enforcement of the PIA.

The Court rejected that concern as overstated, emphasizing:

1. Criminal enforcement remains robust.
   Section 552.353 punishes an officer (or agent) who, with criminal negligence, fails or refuses to give access to public information. This creates serious deterrence and enforcement potential.
2. Civil declaratory and injunctive relief through § 552.3215.
   For state agencies, complaints may be filed with the Travis County District Attorney. The DA then:
   • Investigates whether a PIA violation occurred;
   • Decides whether to bring suit for declaratory or injunctive relief; and
   • Must inform the complainant of these decisions in writing.
   Although this structure makes private enforcement contingent on prosecutorial agreement, the Court found that consistent with the statutory design.
3. Legislative policy choices control.
   The Court acknowledged that American Oversight’s interpretation would maximize private civil enforcement against executive officers, but stressed that courts are not tasked with maximizing remedy scope; their task is to apply the statute as written. The PIA’s requirement that it be “liberally construed” (§ 552.001(a)) does not authorize ignoring clear jurisdictional allocations like § 22.002(c).

F. Unresolved Constitutional Issue Regarding the Governor

The opinion notes, and Justice Young’s concurrence apparently explores in more detail, a deeper constitutional question: whether any court— including the Supreme Court—may constitutionally exercise original mandamus jurisdiction against the Governor in light of Tex. Const. art. V, § 3(a), which forbids the Legislature from conferring original mandamus jurisdiction on the Supreme Court “as against the Governor.”

Government Code § 22.002(a) and (c) include slightly different formulations concerning the Governor; and there is unsettled tension between the constitutional limitation and the statutory language. The majority expressly “set[s] aside” that constitutional question, assuming for purposes of this case that the statutory scheme is valid and focusing only on the separate issue of district-court jurisdiction.

VI. Simplifying the Key Concepts

A. What Is a Writ of Mandamus?

A writ of mandamus is a court order that commands a government official (or lower court) to do something the law requires but that the official is refusing to do. It is:

• Extraordinary – used only in special circumstances;
• Limited – usually available only when there is no adequate alternative remedy (like a regular lawsuit); and
• Directed at duties that are either:
  • Ministerial – the law leaves no choice about what must be done; or
  • Performed under discretion but in a way that amounts to a clear abuse of that discretion.

B. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction vs. Venue

• Subject-matter jurisdiction is a court’s power to hear a particular kind of case. If the court lacks it, any decision it makes is void. It cannot be created by consent, waiver, or agreement.
• Venue is about where within the court system a case should be filed (which county, which trial court, etc.). It is often flexible, and mistakes in venue can sometimes be corrected by transfer, unlike jurisdictional defects.

The key holding of this case is jurisdictional: district courts simply do not have the power (jurisdiction) to issue mandamus against the Governor or Attorney General. Section 552.321(b) is a venue rule that tells requestors where to file, but it does not enlarge district courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction.

C. “Constitutional Executive Officers” and “Officers of the Executive Department”

In Texas, the term “Executive Department” (Tex. Const. art. IV, § 1) refers specifically to:

• Governor
• Lieutenant Governor
• Secretary of State
• Comptroller
• Commissioner of the General Land Office
• Attorney General

These officials are sometimes called “constitutional executive officers” because their offices are created by the Constitution. They are distinct from:

• Appointed agency heads (e.g., commissioners of various boards); and
• Local officials (city councils, county commissioners, sheriffs, etc.).

Section 22.002(c) gives the Supreme Court exclusive mandamus power only as to this specific group. District courts remain fully empowered to issue mandamus against other state and local officials, subject to the usual mandamus standards.

D. Sovereign Immunity and PIA Remedies

“Sovereign immunity” generally protects the State and its officials from being sued unless the Legislature has clearly consented by statute. The PIA creates some limited waivers:

• § 552.321 – Mandamus suits by requestors. This allows a requestor to sue a “governmental body” for a writ of mandamus if the body “refuses to supply public information.” It functions as a narrow waiver of immunity for that kind of mandamus relief—but, after this decision, only in courts with proper mandamus jurisdiction (which excludes district courts as to constitutional executive officers).
• § 552.3215 – Declaratory and injunctive suits by public prosecutors. This allows county or district attorneys (and in some circumstances the Attorney General) to bring suits seeking declarations or injunctions against governmental bodies that violate the PIA.

In this case, the Supreme Court did not resolve the question whether American Oversight’s allegations were sufficient to show an actionable “refusal to supply public information.” It decided the case solely on jurisdictional grounds.

VII. Impact and Implications

A. Immediate Holding and Its Reach

The immediate holding is narrow but powerful:

• District courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over PIA mandamus actions targeting the Governor or Attorney General (and, by logical extension, other constitutional executive officers).
• Mandamus remedies in PIA disputes involving these officers are not available in district court unless and until the Legislature enacts express statutory authorization naming district courts as the fora for such actions, in terms analogous to the former § 552.353(b)(3).

By contrast:

• PIA mandamus suits against non-constitutional executive “governmental bodies” (e.g., most agencies, local governments) remain fully cognizable in district court under § 552.321.
• PIA disputes involving state-level executive branches may still be pursued via:
  • Criminal complaints seeking enforcement of § 552.353; and
  • Civil complaints under § 552.3215 to the Travis County DA, who can then bring declaratory or injunctive actions.

B. Consequences for Open-Government and Transparency Litigation

For organizations like American Oversight and other PIA requestors, this decision significantly shapes strategy when dealing with information requests directed to the Governor or Attorney General:

• Mandamus in district court is no longer a viable option against these officers. Attempts to use § 552.321(a) in district court will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
• The primary civil path now runs through § 552.3215, where:
  • The requestor files a complaint with the Travis County DA;
  • The DA retains prosecutorial discretion whether to file suit; and
  • Any resulting litigation will be in the DA’s name, not the private requestor’s, and may seek declaratory or injunctive relief.
• As a practical matter, enforcement becomes more dependent on the initiative and priorities of the local prosecutor—injecting a political and resource-driven dimension into PIA enforcement against constitutional executive officers.

Whether and to what extent requestors may bring original mandamus proceedings in the Supreme Court directly under the PIA against constitutional executive officers remains uncertain; the Court expressly left that question open in light of § 552.321(b)’s directive that PIA mandamus suits by requestors “must be filed in a district court.”

C. Separation of Powers and Institutional Comity

The decision reflects an institutional caution about lower courts issuing compulsory writs against top executive officials. By centralizing such authority in the Supreme Court, § 22.002(c) and this decision:

• Limit potentially conflicting or inconsistent orders from multiple trial courts directed at statewide officers; and
• Ensure that any judicial compulsion of the Governor or Attorney General comes from the courts’ highest level, which is better situated to balance separation-of-powers concerns and statewide policy implications.

Justice Young’s concurrence (referenced but not quoted in detail) suggests that further constitutional questions remain about the very possibility of original mandamus against the Governor, even in the Supreme Court, under the terms of art. V, § 3(a). Future cases may need to resolve the tension between that constitutional limit and the text of § 22.002(c).

D. Legislative Drafting Lessons

The Court’s analysis provides a clear drafting roadmap:

• If the Legislature wishes to allow district courts to compel action by constitutional executive officers—whether under the PIA or another statute—it must:
  • Say so expressly in the statute;
  • Name both the officer(s) and the forum (district courts); and
  • Reconcile any such grant with § 22.002(c) and the Texas Constitution.
• Merely including such officers within a broad category like “governmental body,” without explicit mention of “executive officers” or express jurisdictional language, is inadequate to overcome § 22.002(c).

Thus, if the Legislature concludes that the current enforcement structure is too restrictive for PIA disputes involving the Governor or Attorney General, it will need to undertake targeted statutory (and possibly constitutional) revisions.

E. Practical Guidance for Practitioners

• For requestors (journalists, NGOs, citizens):
  • Do not file § 552.321 mandamus actions in district court against the Governor or Attorney General; they will be dismissed.
  • Consider filing:
    • Criminal complaints under § 552.353; and/or
    • Complaints under § 552.3215 to the Travis County DA (for state agencies), seeking DA-initiated civil litigation.
  • Monitor future precedent regarding original PIA mandamus in the Supreme Court; current law is unsettled.
• For state agencies headed by constitutional executive officers:
  • Compliance obligations under the PIA remain unchanged;
  • There is still meaningful risk of criminal prosecution and DA-led civil suits.
  • Agencies should continue to document “diligent and good faith” searches and compliance decisions.
• For local prosecutors (especially the Travis County DA):
  • This decision enhances your centrality in enforcing the PIA against state agencies and constitutional executive officers through § 552.3215.
  • Expect increased complaints from requestors who can no longer pursue direct mandamus in district court.
• For legislators and policy advocates:
  • Any expansion of direct civil remedies by private requestors against constitutional executive officers must be drafted explicitly and with close attention to the jurisdictional structure explained in this case.

VIII. Conclusion

Paxton & Abbott v. American Oversight firmly reaffirms a structural principle of Texas law: only the Supreme Court may issue mandatory or compulsory writs against the State’s constitutional executive officers, absent clear and express legislative authorization to the contrary. In the context of the Public Information Act, this means that:

• Section 552.321’s “suit for a writ of mandamus” remains limited by pre-existing mandamus jurisdiction rules;
• Section 552.321(b) is a venue provision, not a silent expansion of district-court jurisdiction; and
• District courts lack jurisdiction over mandamus actions against the Governor and Attorney General, even when those actions are premised on alleged PIA violations.

The decision does not place constitutional executive officers above the PIA. Instead, it channels enforcement through:

• Criminal penalties,
• DA-initiated civil actions under § 552.3215, and
• Potential (but not definitively resolved) original mandamus proceedings in the Supreme Court.

From a broader perspective, the case underscores the Court’s commitment to textualism and institutional design. The justices decline to stretch statutory language or judicial power in the name of policy goals, insisting that changes to the allocation of judicial authority over the State’s highest officials must come clearly and directly from the Legislature—and, where necessary, from constitutional amendment rather than judicial inference.

As a result, the case stands as a leading modern precedent on:

• The scope and limits of mandamus jurisdiction in Texas;
• The interplay between specialized statutory remedies and the background law of writ practice; and
• The careful balance between transparency enforcement and separation-of-powers constraints in suits involving the Governor and Attorney General.