Exclusive Local 3% Adult-Use Marijuana Tax Authority Under Mo. Const. art. XIV, § 2: City in Incorporated Areas, County Only in Unincorporated Areas

1. Introduction

In 2022, Missouri voters adopted a constitutional amendment (codified at Mo. Const. art. XIV, § 2) legalizing non-medical (“adult use”) marijuana and creating a licensing, regulatory, and tax framework. Besides the general state sales tax and a 6% state marijuana tax, the amendment authorizes an additional local sales tax up to 3% if voters approve it.

This case arose after voters in both the City of Florissant (an incorporated city) and St. Louis County approved such a 3% tax. Robust Missouri Dispensary 3, LLC, operating a dispensary in Florissant, remitted the 3% tax to Florissant but not to St. Louis County. The Department of Revenue notified Robust it must also remit the county’s additional 3% tax—effectively a “double” local marijuana tax at the same retail point.

Robust sought declaratory and injunctive relief against St. Louis County and the Director of Revenue, arguing the constitution authorizes a county’s 3% tax only in unincorporated areas. St. Charles County intervened because it had adopted a similar county tax and sought a declaration supporting county-wide collection including incorporated municipalities.

The central legal issue: Whether a county qualifies as the “local government” authorized to impose the 3% adult-use marijuana sales tax when the dispensary is located inside an incorporated city within the county.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Missouri vacated the circuit court’s summary judgment for the counties and held that the amendment’s definition of “local government” is location-dependent and mutually exclusive:

• In an incorporated area: the “local government” is “a village, town, or city.”
• In an unincorporated area: the “local government” is “a county.”

Because Robust’s dispensary is located in Florissant (an incorporated city), Florissant is the only “local government” that may impose the additional 3% tax at that location. St. Louis County’s ordinance remains valid only as applied to unincorporated areas and cannot be enforced within incorporated cities, towns, and villages.

The Court also rejected the counties’ arguments that this reading would impair county public health regulation, holding that the “ordinances and regulations” language in § 2.5(3) is confined to marijuana-related ordinances enacted pursuant to Article XIV, § 2, leaving general county health and safety authority intact.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The majority opinion grounded its result in well-established Missouri doctrines of (a) summary judgment review and (b) constitutional/textual interpretation—especially the primacy of defined terms, contextual reading, and the avoidance of surplusage.

• Weeks v. St. Louis Cnty., 696 S.W.3d 333 (Mo. banc 2024)
  Cited for de novo summary judgment review and the rule that courts view the record in the light most favorable to the non-movant. It framed the posture: no factual disputes existed, so the outcome turned purely on constitutional meaning.
• Faatz v. Ashcroft, 685 S.W.3d 388 (Mo. banc 2024) and Pestka v. State, 493 S.W.3d 405 (Mo. banc 2016)
  These cases supply the interpretive baseline: constitutional language receives its plain, ordinary meaning, and every word must be given effect (no surplusage). The majority deployed these principles to treat the paired clauses “in the case of an incorporated area … and, in the case of an unincorporated area …” as purposeful, contrastive drafting.
• State ex rel. Hillman v. Beger, 566 S.W.3d 600 (Mo. banc 2019)
  Used to emphasize that when constitutional language is plain and unambiguous, courts do not resort to interpretive canons. This supported the majority’s refusal to adopt the counties’ broader, policy-driven reading.
• Lisle v. Meyer Elec. Co., 667 S.W.3d 100 (Mo. banc 2023)
  Stands for the rule that where a text defines a term, that definition controls. It was pivotal because “local government” is expressly defined in Article XIV, § 2.2(12), making this a defined-term case rather than an open-textured policy inquiry.
• Kehlenbrink v. Dir. of Revenue, 577 S.W.3d 798 (Mo. banc 2019)
  Cited for the contextual-reading rule: words cannot be read in isolation. The majority used it to defeat the counties’ argument that the conjunction “and” necessarily “merges” city and county authority in incorporated areas.
• State ex rel. Goldsworthy v. Kanatzar, 543 S.W.3d 582 (Mo. banc 2018)
  Invoked for the anti-surplusage proposition (no “idle verbiage”). The majority relied on this to argue the counties’ interpretation would erase the meaningful distinction created by the two “in the case of” clauses.
• State ex rel. Randolph County v. Walden, 206 S.W.2d 979 (Mo. banc 1947)
  The counties cited this for the proposition that “any” can mean “every.” The majority effectively cabined that idea by reiterating (via Kehlenbrink) that “any local government” must be read alongside the constitution’s definition of “local government,” which changes by location.
• State ex rel. Dep't of Health & Senior Servs. v. Slusher, 638 S.W.3d 496 (Mo. banc 2022)
  Cited again for the “every word has effect” principle; used to support reading “such political subdivision” as referring back to the defined “local government” and its boundaries (i.e., the tax is collected within that local government).
• Berhow v. State, No. SC100809, --- S.W.3d ---, 2025 WL 1239580 (Mo. banc Apr. 29, 2025)
  The counties invoked the “avoid absurd/unreasonable results” principle. The majority acknowledged the doctrine but found no absurdity because counties retain non-Article XIV regulatory authority; § 2.5(3) concerns only ordinances under the marijuana amendment.
• Hawkins v. Hawkins, 511 S.W.2d 811 (Mo. 1974)
  Addressed in the majority’s response to the dissent: converting “and” to “or” is disfavored absent strong contextual reasons. The majority argued it was not “converting” but reading “and” as connecting two exclusive “case” clauses rather than merging the entities into dual authority in incorporated areas.
• Hudson v. Joplin Reg'l Stockyards, Inc., 701 S.W.3d 862 (Mo. banc 2024)
  Used on standing: Robust was “aggrieved” because the judgment required it to pay/collect an additional 3% tax.
• M & P Enters., Inc. v. Transamerica Fin. Servs., 944 S.W.2d 154 (Mo. banc 1997)
  Cited for the general non-appealability of a denial of summary judgment—explaining why the appellate focus is on the granted summary judgment for the counties.

The dissent cited additional interpretive authorities (e.g., Stiers v. Dir. of Revenue, Burns v. Smith, State v. Honeycutt) to reinforce its view that “and” should be read conjunctively and that county authority should extend throughout county boundaries; the majority rejected that approach as inconsistent with the defined-term structure and the “in the case of” contrast.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The majority’s reasoning proceeds in three steps.

1. Defined term controls the tax authorization.
   Article XIV, § 2.6(5) authorizes “the governing body of any local government” to impose the 3% tax. But “local government” is expressly defined in § 2.2(12). Under Lisle v. Meyer Elec. Co., the definition is binding; the tax power cannot be broader than the defined term.
2. The definition is location-dependent and exclusive.
   The phrase “in the case of an incorporated area … and, in the case of an unincorporated area …” establishes two distinct scenarios. The majority reads “and” as linking two separate “case” clauses (two categories), not as giving overlapping taxing authority to both city and county within incorporated territory. This reading avoids surplusage (per Pestka v. State and State ex rel. Goldsworthy v. Kanatzar), because the counties’ reading would collapse the incorporated/unincorporated contrast.
3. Other sections do not expand county taxing authority.
   The counties pointed to § 2.6(5)’s “additional” and “such political subdivision” wording and to § 2.5(3)’s “binding ordinances and regulations” language to argue counties must be “local government” everywhere to protect public health and avoid gaps in enforceability. The majority rejected both:
   • “Additional” refers to being in addition to the statewide 6% marijuana tax and the general state sales tax—not to stacking city and county marijuana taxes at the same point of sale.
   • “Such political subdivision” is read as a referent back to the relevant “local government” (as defined) rather than an invitation to treat county geographical boundaries as automatically controlling within incorporated municipalities.
   • Section 2.5(3) is limited to ordinances and regulations enacted under Article XIV, § 2 (i.e., marijuana-specific ordinances), so counties retain general health and safety ordinance authority outside the amendment’s special regulatory/tax scheme.

On remedy, the Court vacated the counties’ summary judgment and remanded with directions to enter judgment for Robust—effectively barring county collection of the 3% marijuana tax within incorporated municipalities that have adopted their own 3% tax.

3.3 Impact

• No “stacked” local marijuana taxes in incorporated municipalities.
  Where an adult-use marijuana sale occurs within an incorporated city, that city’s voter-approved 3% tax may apply, but the county’s 3% tax may not (even though the city lies within the county). Counties remain able to tax adult-use marijuana sales in unincorporated areas.
• Administrative and fiscal consequences.
  The Department of Revenue must administer rate tables consistent with a location-specific “single local marijuana tax” rule. Counties with adopted taxes may experience reduced revenue relative to a countywide collection model, while incorporated municipalities may experience increased relative share (if they adopted the tax).
• Litigation posture for refunds/assessments.
  The decision’s logic invites disputes over past collections in incorporated areas (e.g., whether refunds are due, how burdens shift between retailers and taxing authorities), though those questions are not resolved in the opinion.
• Drafting lesson for initiatives and constitutional taxes.
  The case underscores that when initiative drafters include a definitional section, Missouri courts will apply it strictly—often resisting purpose-based expansions that would reallocate taxing power.
• Regulatory authority clarified (and contested).
  The majority’s narrowing of § 2.5(3) to marijuana-amendment ordinances attempts to prevent the “regulatory gap” posited by the counties and emphasized by the dissent; future disputes may test how far that narrowing extends in practice.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Incorporated” vs. “unincorporated” areas:
  An incorporated area is inside a legally incorporated municipality (city/town/village). Unincorporated areas are parts of a county not within an incorporated municipality.
• Defined term (“local government”):
  When the constitution provides a definition, courts must use it rather than ordinary assumptions. Here, the definition changes depending on whether the sale occurs in an incorporated or unincorporated area.
• Anti-surplusage:
  Courts assume drafters did not include meaningless words. The majority used this to insist the “in the case of … and, in the case of …” structure must do real work by separating authority.
• Reading words “in context”:
  Even seemingly broad words like “any” or “and” can be limited by surrounding text—especially by a definition and by contrastive clauses.
• Declaratory and injunctive relief:
  Declaratory relief determines legal rights (who may tax). Injunctive relief prevents enforcement (stopping the state from collecting a tax the court finds unauthorized).
• Summary judgment (de novo review):
  Because the parties agreed there were no material factual disputes, the courts decided the case purely as a matter of law; the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutional interpretation anew.

5. Conclusion

Robust Missouri Dispensary 3, LLC v. St. Louis County establishes a clear constitutional rule for Missouri’s adult-use marijuana local tax: the additional 3% tax is authorized for only one “local government” at a given location, determined by incorporation status. In incorporated municipalities, the city (or village/town) alone may impose the 3% tax; in unincorporated areas, the county alone may do so. The decision is a strong reaffirmation that, in Missouri constitutional interpretation, defined terms and grammatical structure control, and courts will not expand taxing authority based on generalized purpose arguments when the text draws a sharper line.