Exclusive-Control Communications, Not Clean Deeds, Trigger Quiet Title Act Accrual for Implied Easements; ANILCA Access Claims Must Proceed Under the QTA; Takings Declaratory Relief Unripe Without Tucker Act Compensation

Introduction

In Purgatory Recreation I, LLC v. United States, the Tenth Circuit delivered a significant decision at the intersection of federal land management, water rights, and federal jurisdiction. The case involves a ski resort owner’s attempt to secure access across National Forest System lands to develop conditional groundwater rights decreed under Colorado law. The core legal disputes were:

When a Quiet Title Act (QTA), 28 U.S.C. § 2409a, claim for an implied easement of necessity accrues for statute-of-limitations purposes;
Whether declaratory relief claims under the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2201, can proceed outside the QTA where the plaintiff asserts statutory access via ANILCA or objects to agency policies affecting instream flows; and
Whether a takings-based declaratory judgment is available without first pursuing Tucker Act compensation in the Court of Federal Claims.

The panel (Judge Ebel authoring, joined by Judges Matheson and Carson) affirmed dismissal of all claims. The opinion clarifies multiple doctrinal points: (1) communications by the Forest Service asserting authority to wholly deny access suffice to trigger QTA accrual for an implied easement claim; (2) the mere fact that a deed says “Reservations: None” does not start the QTA clock for implied easements; (3) claims to statutory access (e.g., under ANILCA § 3210(a)) are within the exclusive ambit of the QTA and cannot be brought via the DJA/APA to circumvent the QTA’s limitations; and (4) takings-based declaratory relief is prudentially unripe where Tucker Act compensation is available, with limited exceptions not applicable here.

Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal on two tracks:

Quiet Title Act (Claim I): Time-barred. The court held the twelve-year QTA limitations period accrued, at the latest, by 2006, when the Forest Service’s letters in response to special use permit (SUP) proposals asserted authority to deny any test wells and ultimately the development of the water rights absent hydrologic proof—an assertion of “exclusive control” adverse to the claimed implied easement. Suit filed in 2022 was thus untimely. The panel expressly rejected the district court’s alternate reasoning that recordation of a deed stating “Reservations: None” in 1991, by itself, triggered accrual for an implied easement claim.
Declaratory Judgment Act (Claim II): All three requests were dismissed on jurisdictional or prudential grounds:
- Request 1 (state-law instream flows): No federal question jurisdiction. The McCarran Amendment does not create jurisdiction for a private, non-comprehensive water-rights dispute with the United States.
- Request 2 (federal access under ANILCA § 3210(a)): Falls within the QTA’s exclusive domain as a claim to an easement/right-of-access; thus cannot proceed under the DJA/APA.
- Request 3 (takings declaratory judgment): Prudentially unripe; Purgatory must first seek just compensation under the Tucker Act in the Court of Federal Claims. The Eastern Enterprises exception for money-exaction statutes does not apply.

The court exercised § 1653 discretion to treat the complaint as amended to include the APA § 702 sovereign immunity waiver for the DJA claims, even though plaintiffs had not pled it, but that did not change the outcome.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. 152 (2023): QTA limitations is nonjurisdictional. The panel cites Wilkins to anchor its Rule 12(b)(6) posture, but emphasizes (via United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38) that equitable tolling is unavailable because Congress already provided an unusually generous 12-year period.
Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273 (1983): The QTA is the exclusive means to challenge the United States’ title or interests in real property. Used to hold that ANILCA-derived access claims are QTA claims in substance.
George v. United States, 672 F.3d 942 (10th Cir. 2012); Kane County v. United States, 772 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2014); San Juan County v. United States, 754 F.3d 787 (10th Cir. 2014):
- Establish the “exclusive control” vs. “peaceable coexistence” framework for accrual of nonpossessory interests (easements) under the QTA. Mere government ownership is not inherently inconsistent with an easement.
- Here, the court distinguishes those cases because the plaintiffs in them used existing rights-of-way; continued access clouded accrual. In contrast, Purgatory never had access—so agency statements asserting authority to deny access entirely sufficed to trigger accrual.
Michel v. United States, 65 F.3d 130 (9th Cir. 1995); McFarland v. Norton, 425 F.3d 724 (9th Cir. 2005); Werner v. United States, 9 F.3d 1514 (11th Cir. 1993): Support that clean title recordation alone does not provide notice adverse to an implied easement. The Tenth Circuit aligns with this view and explicitly rejects accrual based solely on “Reservations: None.”
Amoco Prod. Co. v. United States, 619 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1980): Proper recording provides constructive notice, but here the conflict must be with the particular asserted interest. The panel holds the recorded deed conflicted only with express easements, not with implied easements.
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation, 599 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 2010): You cannot wait for disputes to become “well-defined and open disagreements” to start the QTA clock. The “exceedingly light” trigger is reaffirmed.
Kinscherff v. United States, 586 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1978): Easements are real property interests subject to the QTA. Used to situate implied easements within QTA disputes.
United States v. Jenks, 22 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1994): USFS can require a special use permit even where common law/statutory rights-of-way exist—regulatory oversight is not, by itself, adverse. But here, the letters asserted authority to deny entirely—crossing into exclusive control.
Rosette, Inc. v. United States, 141 F.3d 1394 (10th Cir. 1998): Declaratory claims “inextricably linked” to title must be brought under the QTA. This principle forecloses using the DJA to reach statutory access.
Nicodemus v. Union Pac. Corp., 440 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2006); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950): DJA does not supply jurisdiction; a separate federal question must exist.
Fent v. Oklahoma Water Resources Board, 235 F.3d 553 (10th Cir. 2000); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963): The McCarran Amendment applies to comprehensive basin adjudications/administrations, not discrete private disputes with the United States. Used to reject federal jurisdiction for the state-law instream flow theory.
5 U.S.C. § 702 (APA waiver of sovereign immunity); Simmat v. BOP, 413 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2005): The APA’s sovereign immunity waiver applies beyond APA causes of action. The panel uses 28 U.S.C. § 1653 to cure plaintiffs’ failure to plead the waiver below, but still dismisses for other reasons.
ANILCA § 3210(a), 16 U.S.C. § 3210(a); United States v. Jenks, supra: ANILCA provides inholders access subject to reasonable regulation. The court holds a claim to ANILCA access is a claim to an easement/right-of-access that must be brought under the QTA.
Tucker Act and Takings: Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U.S. 180 (2019); Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 569 U.S. 513 (2013); Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1 (1990); Gordon v. Norton, 322 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2003); North Mill Street, LLC v. City of Aspen, 6 F.4th 1216 (10th Cir. 2021):
- Takings claims are generally remedied by just compensation via the Tucker Act; equitable/declaratory relief is improper where an adequate compensation remedy exists.
- Horne clarifies the “Tucker Act first” requirement is prudential, not jurisdictional; North Mill Street applies that in this circuit. The panel dismisses Purgatory’s takings-DJA claim for lack of prudential ripeness.
- Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998), is limited to direct money exactions where Tucker Act compensation would be “pointless.” The court finds that exception inapplicable to alleged takings of water rights.

Legal Reasoning

1) QTA Accrual for Implied Easement Claims Turns on Government’s Assertion of “Exclusive Control”—Not Mere Clean Title

The QTA’s limitations period accrues when the plaintiff or predecessor knew or should have known of the United States’ adverse claim, a “light” trigger. For nonpossessory interests like easements, government ownership is not inherently adverse; the question is whether the government’s position claims “exclusive control” or allows the interests to “peaceably coexist.”

Applying that standard, the court rejected the district court’s view that a recorded deed stating “Reservations: None” (1991) necessarily started the clock for an implied easement. That language at most negates express reservations; it does not notify of a government claim to extinguish implied easements that arise by operation of law at severance. This is an important doctrinal refinement that aligns the Tenth Circuit with the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits on implied easements.

By contrast, the Forest Service’s letters to the resort’s predecessor between 2003 and 2006—stating that test wells and subsequent water development were “not approved” absent definitive hydrologic proof and asserting a policy basis to “deny proposals” in conflict with fishery objectives—were read as claims of authority to deny any use of the water rights. That is an assertion of exclusive control adverse to the claimed implied easement. The possibility of a discretionary special use permit did not negate adversity; exclusive control means the agency can say no, even if it sometimes says yes. Thus, accrual occurred by 2006 “at the latest,” time-barring the 2022 suit.

2) QTA Exclusivity Captures Statutory Access (ANILCA § 3210(a)) Pled as Declaratory Relief

The resort’s second DJA request sought a declaration that federal law (principally ANILCA § 3210(a)) guaranteed access to its inholding water rights, subject to reasonable regulation. The court characterized this as a claim to an access right/easement, i.e., a real property interest in which the United States claims an adverse interest. Under Block, Rosette, and related authorities, such claims must be brought under the QTA, not repackaged under the DJA/APA. Accordingly, the court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the DJA.

3) No Federal Jurisdiction over State-Law Instream Flow Declaration; McCarran Amendment Does Not Apply

The first DJA request—asserting the Forest Service’s actions violated Colorado’s “instream flow” regime—failed to invoke federal question jurisdiction. The plaintiff invoked the McCarran Amendment, but the court reiterated that McCarran waives immunity only for comprehensive adjudication/administration of water rights across a basin, not a bilateral dispute over agency conduct. With no other federal hook, the claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

4) Takings Declaratory Relief Is Prudentially Unripe; Tucker Act First

The third DJA request sought a declaration that complete denial of access would be a Fifth Amendment taking. The court treated the claim as not within the QTA because it did not rest on any preexisting access right, but still dismissed it as prudentially unripe: the plaintiff must pursue just compensation in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act. The court distinguished Eastern Enterprises as limited to money-exaction statutes where compensation is effectively unavailable or pointless; takings of property interests (including water rights) are generally compensable in money, and the possibility that “money cannot replace water” was insufficient to displace the Tucker Act remedy.

Impact

On Property Owners and Inholders (Including Water Right Holders) on Federal Land

Limitations Accrual Can Happen Early via Agency Correspondence: Negotiations and “not approved unless…” letters can trigger the QTA clock if they assert authority to deny use entirely. A formal final denial is not required.
Do Not Rely on Ongoing Dialogue to Delay Accrual: Continued agency engagement or possible future permits do not negate “exclusive control” where the agency reserves the right to forbid access altogether.
Recorded Deeds Stating “Reservations: None” Do Not Start Accrual for Implied Easements: Owners should still proactively protect implied access rights, but the clock likely starts with government adversity, not recordation alone.
ANILCA § 3210(a) Access Claims Are QTA Claims: Framing statutory access as a DJA/APA claim cannot evade QTA exclusivity and its 12-year statute of limitations.
Takings Strategy: Where agency action prevents use of water rights, compensation must be pursued in the Court of Federal Claims; equitable/declaratory relief is generally unavailable unless the Eastern Enterprises exception applies (rare for property interests).

On Federal Land Managers (USFS and Other Agencies)

Communications Can Start the QTA Clock: Letters asserting authority to deny access may trigger accrual for would-be plaintiffs, which can ultimately strengthen the government’s limitations defense.
ANILCA and Similar Statutory Access Duties: While agencies must provide access “adequate” to secure reasonable use, disputes over the existence/scope of access rights belong under the QTA—even if the plaintiff invokes the APA.

On Water Law Litigation

McCarran Amendment Boundaries: Private water disputes with the United States cannot be shoehorned into federal court under McCarran absent comprehensive basin proceedings.
Colorado Instream Flows vs. Federal Land Management: Challenges premised solely on state law will likely be dismissed in federal court absent a clear federal claim or waiver.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Quiet Title Act (QTA) Accrual for Easements: The 12-year clock starts when the plaintiff knows or should know the United States asserts a claim adverse to the specific property interest (here, an implied easement), not just that the United States holds fee title. For easements, look for agency assertions of “exclusive control”—i.e., authority to deny access entirely.
“Peaceable Coexistence” vs. “Exclusive Control”: If the government allows ongoing use of a right-of-way, its ownership may “coexist” with the easement, delaying accrual. If it claims authority to prohibit all use, that is “exclusive control,” triggering accrual.
Implied Easement of Necessity: Arises when a tract is severed, leaving a portion landlocked; it does not need to appear in the deed and is not defeated by “Reservations: None.” In Colorado, it requires unity of ownership before severance, necessity at severance, and great necessity.
DJA and Sovereign Immunity: The DJA is procedural; plaintiffs still need a federal question and a sovereign immunity waiver. APA § 702 waives immunity for non-damages claims challenging agency action/inaction, but cannot override another statute’s exclusive remedial scheme (like the QTA).
McCarran Amendment: Waives immunity only for comprehensive adjudication/administration of entire water systems—not bilateral disagreements over how an agency manages a discrete project.
ANILCA § 3210(a): Requires the Forest Service to provide access sufficient for reasonable use of inholdings, subject to reasonable regulation. A claim to such access is, in substance, a claim to a property interest (an easement) and thus a QTA claim.
Tucker Act and Takings: The usual remedy for a federal taking is money damages in the Court of Federal Claims. Declaratory/injunctive relief is foreclosed unless the compensation remedy is inadequate (e.g., certain money-exaction schemes as in Eastern Enterprises). Horne clarifies this is a prudential ripeness prerequisite, not a jurisdictional bar.

Practical Guidance

Calendar the QTA Clock Early: Treat agency statements asserting authority to deny access as potential accrual events. Do not wait for final denials.
Plead the Right Vehicle: Claims to access/easements over federal land—whether implied by necessity or statutory (ANILCA/FLPMA)—belong under the QTA. Do not rely on the DJA/APA to sidestep QTA exclusivity.
Plead Sovereign Immunity Waivers: If you pursue DJA/APA claims, plead APA § 702 expressly. Courts may cure defects under § 1653, but do not count on it.
Takings Claims: If seeking relief for effective loss of a property interest due to federal action, file for just compensation under the Tucker Act in the Court of Federal Claims. Reserve equitable/declaratory theories for the narrow circumstances where money is truly inadequate.
Land Exchanges and Documentation: If access matters, negotiate and expressly reserve easements. Do not assume implied easements will be risk-free decades later.
Hydrologic Connectivity and Resource Concerns: Where groundwater withdrawals may impact surface flows and sensitive species, expect the Forest Service to assert authority to deny permits—potentially triggering QTA accrual.

Conclusion

Purgatory Recreation I clarifies three important rules in federal property and water-access litigation:

For implied easement claims under the QTA, accrual hinges on government assertions of exclusive control over access—not simply recordation of a deed without reservations. Letters signaling authority to deny access can start the twelve-year limitations period.
ANILCA-based access claims are property-interest claims “inextricably linked” to title and must proceed under the QTA, with all its jurisdictional and limitations consequences. The DJA/APA cannot be used to bypass QTA exclusivity.
Takings-based declaratory relief is prudentially unripe where the Tucker Act provides an adequate compensation remedy. Eastern Enterprises’ narrow exception for pure money exactions does not apply to deprivations of water rights or other tangible property interests.

The decision is a cautionary tale for inholders and water-right holders on federal lands: the limitations clock may start years before a formal denial, and litigants must carefully select the correct vehicle (QTA or Tucker Act) and plead jurisdictional waivers from the outset. For federal land managers, the opinion confirms that access disputes belong in the QTA, and that firm assertions of regulatory authority—especially those reserving discretion to deny—have meaningful consequences for accrual and litigation posture.