Exclusion of Relationship-Specific Discrimination from “Marital Status” under the NYCHRL

Introduction

The Second Circuit’s summary order in Hunter v. Debmar-Mercury LLC addresses a novel question of municipal anti-discrimination law: whether the New York City Human Rights Law’s (“NYCHRL”) prohibition on discrimination based on “marital status” encompasses adverse employment actions taken because of an employee’s marriage or divorce with a specific person. Plaintiff Kelvin Hunter, who served as Executive Producer of The Wendy Williams Show while married to its host, was terminated shortly after Williams filed for divorce. Hunter sued under the NYCHRL, alleging he was fired “solely because of his marital status” to Wendy Williams. The district court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss, certification for interlocutory appeal followed, and this Court now resolves the scope of “marital status” under the city law.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of Debmar-Mercury’s motion to dismiss. It held that “marital status” under the NYCHRL refers only to the legal condition of being single, married, divorced, separated, or widowed—not to discrimination based on a person’s relationship with a particular spouse. In doing so, the Court relied on the New York Court of Appeals’ recent decision in McCabe v. 511 West 232nd Owners Corp., which conclusively rejected the intermediate appellate court’s contrary holding in Morse v. Fidessa. The case is remanded with instructions to dismiss Hunter’s marital-status claim, as it rests on relationship-specific discrimination outside the statute’s scope.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Board (51 N.Y.2d 506, 1980): Held under the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”) that “marital status” protects only the condition of being married or not, not whom one has married.
Hudson View Properties v. Weiss (59 N.Y.2d 733, 1983): Applied the same definition in the housing context under both NYSHRL and NYCHRL.
Levin v. Yeshiva University (96 N.Y.2d 484, 2001): Reaffirmed that “marital status” focuses on the individual’s participation in marriage, not on the identity of the spouse.
Morse v. Fidessa Corp. (165 A.D.3d 61, 1st Dept. 2018): An intermediate appellate court held that two amendments to the NYCHRL expanded “marital status” to include relationship-specific discrimination—a view now overruled.
McCabe v. 511 West 232nd Owners Corp. (--- N.Y.3d ----, 2024 WL 5126078, 2024): The New York Court of Appeals definitively ruled that “marital status” under the NYCHRL denotes only one’s legal condition (single, married, divorced, etc.) and excludes discrimination tied to a particular relationship.

Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory Text and Structure: The Court emphasized that “marital status” by its plain terms denotes a legal condition—participation in a marriage—rather than the identity of a spouse.

2. Legislative History: Although the 2005 and 2016 amendments to the NYCHRL stressed liberal construction and independence from state and federal analogues, the Court found no indication the City Council intended to depart from longstanding definitions recognized by the New York Court of Appeals.

3. Consistency Across Contexts: McCabe rejected the notion of different meanings for “marital status” in housing and employment contexts, reasoning that identical statutory language typically carries a uniform meaning throughout the statute.

4. Rejection of Morse: The Court held that Morse misconstrued the amendments and improperly expanded the statute beyond its text and the guiding precedents of Manhattan Pizza Hut, Hudson View, and Levin. McCabe’s overruling of Morse is binding.

Impact

Limits Scope of Claims: Plaintiffs cannot rely on the NYCHRL to challenge adverse actions taken because of their marriage or divorce with a specific person.
Uniform Interpretation: Courts will apply a unified definition of “marital status” across all NYCHRL provisions—housing, employment, public accommodations, and others.
Strategic Considerations: Potential litigants must focus on other protected categories (e.g., gender, age) when their harm stems from personal relationships rather than marital condition.
Legislative Response?: If the City Council disagrees with this interpretation, it may amend the NYCHRL to explicitly cover relationship-specific discrimination.

Complex Concepts Simplified

NYCHRL vs. NYSHRL: The NYCHRL is New York City’s anti-discrimination law, broader in remedy but often interpreted in light of state law precedents like Manhattan Pizza Hut.
Summary Order: A non-precedential appellate ruling that resolves a specific case but does not establish binding circuit precedent (though this analysis follows the New York Court of Appeals’ binding decision in McCabe).
Interlocutory Appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b): A mechanism allowing immediate appeal of certain non-final orders when they involve controlling questions of law and may materially advance the litigation.
Motion to Dismiss Standard: At the pleading stage, all well-pleaded factual allegations are assumed true, and the complaint must state a plausible claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Conclusion

Hunter v. Debmar-Mercury LLC clarifies that, under the NYCHRL and as confirmed by McCabe, “marital status” covers only the abstract legal condition of marriage or its absence. It does not extend to adverse treatment based on a person’s relationship with a particular spouse or partner. This decision restores uniformity to the NYCHRL’s marital-status provision, confines its reach, and signals to employers and employees alike the precise boundaries of city-level marital-status protections.