Excluding Unconstitutional Convictions from Criminal History Scores: Implications from State of Kansas v. Robert Edward Smith

Introduction

The Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in State of Kansas, Appellee, v. Robert Edward Smith, Appellant establishes important new guidelines regarding the application of constitutional rights during trial delays, evidentiary admissions, and, most notably, the calculation of criminal history scores in sentencing. At the heart of the case are multiple claims raised by Robert Edward Smith, including a challenging allegation that significant trial delays and certain evidentiary exclusions violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial and to present a complete defense. However, the crux of the Judgment—and the precedent it sets—resides in the district court’s error regarding the inclusion of a 2003 conviction for criminal threat in Smith’s criminal history score, a conviction that stemmed from a statute later deemed unconstitutional.

The case involves a series of complex procedural developments, including a mistrial, a retrial conducted over an extended period, and several evidentiary controversies ranging from DNA evidence to testimonial strategies. Beyond the underlying factual matrix of a tragic home invasion and murder, the Judgment examines how statutory construction and case law principles converge when a defendant’s prior conviction is implicated in sentencing.

Summary of the Judgment

In its detailed opinion, Justice Wilson and the Court affirmed Smith’s convictions on charges including first-degree felony murder, aggravated burglary, attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and criminal possession of a weapon. However, the Court vacated his sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.

The Court analyzed several issues: the alleged violation of Smith’s speedy trial right due to a 21.5‑month delay between the mistrial and retrial; arguments concerning prosecutorial error during closing statements; the appropriateness of excluding certain pieces of evidence, particularly third-party testimony implicating an alternative suspect; and finally, the State’s midtrial amendment to its information. Ultimately, the decisive factor was found in the sentencing phase. The Court held that pursuant to K.S.A. 21‑6810(d)(9), a conviction arising from a statute that has since been declared unconstitutional must not be used in calculating a defendant’s criminal history score. Since Smith’s 2003 criminal threat conviction was based on such an unconstitutional statute, its inclusion in his criminal history score rendered his sentence illegal.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Judgment draws from a robust body of case law and statutory interpretation. Notable citations include:

BARKER v. WINGO: The Court laid out the four-factor balancing test (length of delay, reason for delay, assertion of rights, and prejudice) as the framework for evaluating claims of a violation of the right to a speedy trial.
State v. Shockley: This precedent supports the notion that appellate courts may review claims regarding speedy trial rights without limitation.
State v. Boettger and Counterman v. Colorado: These cases are central to the discussion on constitutional validity. In particular, Boettger’s decision, which found the statute criminalizing reckless criminal threats unconstitutional, forms the basis for excluding the subsequent conviction from criminal history scoring.
Other cases such as State v. Owens, State v. Ford, and STATE v. MATHENIA are discussed regarding evidentiary issues and the context necessary to determine when delays become prejudicial.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolds logically in several parts:

Speedy Trial Analysis: The Court analyzed the allegation of a constitutional speedy trial violation by focusing on the length of the trial delay. It concluded that, while the 21.5‑month delay was substantial, it was ultimately reasonable considering the complexities of the case and the additional delays incurred due to DNA testing and the COVID‑19 pandemic. Thus, no further inquiry into the remaining factors was necessary.
Prosecutorial Conduct and Evidentiary Rulings: The opinion scrutinizes arguments that the prosecutor’s statements during closing arguments and the exclusion of third‑party evidence undermined Smith’s right to present a complete defense. The Court held that the prosecutor acted within the permissible latitude when discussing the implications of a “not guilty” plea and rebutting defense claims regarding evidentiary gaps. The evaluation emphasized that the context of the evidence and the roles of cross‑examination and jury instructions mitigated any potential error.
Mid‑Trial Amendment and Cumulative Error: The Court reviewed the State’s mid‑trial amendment to its charging document. Though some differences in the statute’s elements were noted, the Court found that any error stemming from such an amendment was harmless under the circumstances—in part because the amendment did not fundamentally prejudice the defendant’s ability to raise an effective defense.
Criminal History Scoring: The central legal analysis turned on interpreting K.S.A. 21‑6810(d)(9). Despite arguments to the contrary, the plain language of the statute is unambiguous. The Court held that if a prior conviction is based on a statute that has been later ruled unconstitutional, it must be excluded from the criminal history score. This “literal reading” overrides discussions concerning possible overrulings or later repudiations. As a result, Smith’s 2003 criminal threat conviction—a conviction arising from an unconstitutional statute—cannot be a component of his criminal history score, thus compelling the vacatur of his sentence.

Impact on Future Cases and the Law

This Judgment carries significant implications:

Sentencing Practices: The ruling reinforces the principle that sentencing calculations must strictly adhere to the Legislature’s clear directive. Future cases involving criminal history scoring will need to carefully evaluate whether any prior conviction was procured under a statute later held to be unconstitutional.
Statutory Interpretation: The decision serves as a benchmark for applying a “plain language” approach in statutory interpretation—even where evolving case law or public policy might suggest otherwise.
Pretrial and Evidentiary Procedures: While the speedy trial analysis in this case affirms that delays are not automatically prejudicial, the detailed discussion provides a roadmap for courts balancing the interplay of delays, evidence, and the right to a fair trial in complex criminal proceedings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Several legal doctrines in the Judgment might seem technical, so a brief explanation is helpful:

Speedy Trial Right and the Barker Factors: The right to a speedy trial is not solely about the total time between the arraignment and trial. Instead, courts look at four key factors (delay length, reason for delay, the defendant’s assertion of the right, and actual prejudice) to decide if the delay was unreasonable.
Mid‑Trial Amendments: A mid‑trial amendment allows the prosecution to alter a charging document before the verdict so long as it does not charge a new crime or prejudice the defendant’s rights. The court’s careful two‑part test underscores the importance of fairness and due process.
Criminal History Scoring and Unconstitutional Statutes: When a prior conviction is derived from a statute that later is found unconstitutional, including that conviction in a criminal history score would be unfair. The Constitution demands that only valid, lawful convictions contribute to the legal reckoning of a defendant’s criminal background.

Conclusion

The Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in this case is a landmark pronouncement on both procedural and substantive matters. While it affirmed Smith’s convictions on multiple serious charges, its holding on the exclusion of the 2003 criminal threat conviction from his criminal history score marks a pivotal development. By adopting a plain language interpretation of K.S.A. 21‑6810(d)(9), the Court reinforces that any conviction based on an unconstitutional statute cannot be used to aggravate a defendant’s sentence.

This Judgment not only clarifies numerous evidentiary and procedural nuances—such as the application of the Barker factors and the latitude afforded to prosecutorial conduct—but also ensures that sentencing practices remain firmly grounded in constitutional rights and statutory mandates. As such, it sets an important precedent that will influence future cases, safeguarding defendants against the legacy of outdated or unconstitutional statutory provisions.

In summary, the decision underscores the importance of adhering to legislative intent and constitutional guarantees in every facet of criminal proceedings—from pretrial delays to sentencing calculations—and serves as a comprehensive guide for courts and practitioners alike.