Excludable Pretrial Motion Delays Under the Speedy Trial Act: United States v. Owens

Introduction

United States v. Zachariah Owens (3d Cir. Apr. 18, 2025) addressed whether extended delays between the filing of pretrial motions and the court’s disposition of those motions are properly excluded from the 70-day limit imposed by the Speedy Trial Act (18 U.S.C. § 3161).

Background:

Defendants: Zachariah Owens and Kayla Fair.
Charges: Federal drug offenses, Western District of Pennsylvania.
Key procedural dates:
- Initial appearances: April 12, 2022.
- Owens’s suppression motions filed December 15, 2022.
- Fair’s suppression motions filed March 17, 2023; she joined Owens’s motions on March 20.
- Government response: March 31, 2023; replies by appellants in mid-April.
- No docket activity until motions to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act on August 9–10, 2023.
- Hearing on suppression motions: September 6, 2023; subsequent guilty pleas with Speedy Trial Act issues preserved.

Summary of the Judgment

The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of appellants’ motions to dismiss for Speedy Trial Act violations. The panel held that all time from the filing of pretrial motions through the conclusion of the hearing on those motions is excludable under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D). It rejected appellants’ contention that, once reply briefs were filed, the motions were “under advisement” and that the clock resumed under § 3161(h)(1)(H). Because a hearing was requested and subsequently held, the delay remained excludable until the hearing’s end.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1): 70-day trial commencement rule.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D): exclusion for “delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing … through the conclusion of the hearing ….”
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(H): exclusion for up to 30 days “while any proceeding … is actually under advisement.”
Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196 (2010): 70-day requirement and exclusions.
Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321 (1986): plain-language reading of § 3161(h)(1)(D).
United States v. Hamilton, 46 F.3d 271 (3d Cir. 1995): statutory directive to “exclude” certain delays.
United States v. Adams, 36 F.4th 137 (3d Cir. 2022): § 3161(h)(1)(D) applies when a hearing is required.
United States v. Claxton, 766 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2014): pretrial motions toll the Speedy Trial clock until a hearing occurs.

Legal Reasoning

1. Standard of Review:

De novo review of statutory interpretation (Speedy Trial Act).
Clear-error review of factual findings (e.g., whether hearings were required/requested).

2. § 3161(h)(1)(D) vs. § 3161(h)(1)(H):

Section (D) excludes all time from filing a pretrial motion through the conclusion of its hearing, regardless of whether the court schedules the hearing promptly.
Section (H) excludes up to 30 days while a matter is “under advisement,” but does not apply if the delay is already covered by § (D).

3. Application:

Owens and Fair requested suppression-motion hearings; the court granted those requests.
The delay between the motions’ filing (December 2022 – March 2023) and the hearing (September 6, 2023) fell squarely within § 3161(h)(1)(D).
Appellants’ argument that the motions were “under advisement” upon filing of reply briefs was foreclosed by the statute’s plain text and binding precedent.
The panel declined to adopt a rule forcing courts to announce the timing of hearings or risk exposure to § (H) rather than § (D).

Impact

This decision reinforces that:

Counsel and courts can rely on § 3161(h)(1)(D) to exclude substantial pretrial delays when a hearing on motions is requested or required, without needing a formal “intent to schedule” announcement.
Defendants must make a stronger showing if they wish to invoke § 3161(h)(1)(H) to toll post-filing delays when hearings are neither requested nor necessary.
Future Speedy Trial Act challenges will likely focus on whether defendants legitimately required hearings or whether hearings were scheduled as a mere formality—potentially inviting fact-specific inquiry into a court’s scheduling motives.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Speedy Trial Act (18 U.S.C. § 3161): Requires federal criminal trials to begin within 70 days of arraignment or indictment, subject to specified exclusions.
Excludable time: Periods not counted toward the 70-day limit, including time for pretrial motions (§ 3161(h)(1)(D)) and “advisement” periods (§ 3161(h)(1)(H)).
“Under advisement”: Traditionally means the court has received all briefing and isn’t actively gathering more information before ruling.
Tolling: Suspending the running of the Speedy Trial clock during excluded periods.

Conclusion

United States v. Owens clarifies that when defendants request or require a hearing on pretrial motions, the entire interval from the motions’ filing through conclusion of the hearing is excluded from the Speedy Trial Act’s 70-day period under § 3161(h)(1)(D). This interpretation respects the statute’s unambiguous language and binding precedent, ensuring that defendants who seek hearings cannot later complain of prosecutorial or judicial delay during that preparation and adjudication window. The decision underscores the importance of understanding which exclusionary provision applies and how courts must track pretrial scheduling to avoid genuine Speedy Trial violations.