Excising Conflicting Supervised Release Conditions: The Fifth Circuit’s Bright-Line Rule in United States v. Currier

I. Introduction

In United States v. Currier, No. 24-50974 (5th Cir. Dec. 2, 2025), the Fifth Circuit addressed a recurring but previously under‑theorized problem: What is the precise remedy when a criminal defendant’s written judgment includes supervised release conditions that were not properly pronounced at sentencing and conflict with the oral sentence?

The case arises out of a supervised release revocation in the Western District of Texas. At the revocation hearing, the district court orally announced that defendant Ricky Lynn Currier would be subject to “the same conditions of release previously imposed and not yet completed.” But the later written revocation judgment incorporated, by reference, the Western District of Texas’s district-wide Standing Order on supervised release conditions, which contained at least one new and more burdensome discretionary condition—Standard Condition 7’s full-time work requirement of at least thirty hours per week.

While prior Fifth Circuit authority—especially the en banc decision in United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2020)—had made clear that discretionary conditions must be orally pronounced, the exact remedial rule when the written judgment diverges remained unsettled. Currier squarely answers that question. The court adopts and applies a new bright-line rule:

Any discretionary condition in the written judgment that conflicts with the sentence as orally pronounced must be excised on remand.

At the same time, the panel clarifies that duplicative discretionary conditions—those that do not broaden the restrictions beyond what was orally imposed—may remain in the written judgment. This commentary analyzes the opinion’s background, its legal reasoning, and its broader impact on supervised release jurisprudence and sentencing practice.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Original Conviction and 2009 Judgment

In 2009, Currier was convicted in the Western District of Texas of receipt of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). The district court imposed:

• 210 months’ imprisonment; and
• a life term of supervised release.

The 2009 judgment included:

• Mandatory conditions,
• Standard conditions, and
• Special conditions

of supervised release. Over time, some of these conditions were modified, but for purposes of Currier, two 2009 standard conditions are central:

1. Condition 5: “The defendant shall work regularly at a lawful occupation unless excused by the Probation Officer for schooling, training or other acceptable reasons.”
2. Condition 6: “The defendant shall notify the Probation Officer at least ten days prior to any change in residence or employment.”

B. Revocation and the 2024 Sentencing

By October 2024, after Currier had begun serving his life term of supervised release, a probation officer petitioned for a warrant based on four alleged supervised release violations. Currier pleaded “true” to certain allegations. The district court revoked supervised release and imposed:

• 36 months of imprisonment; and
• a new life term of supervised release.

At the revocation hearing, the court orally pronounced that Currier would be subject to:

“the same conditions of release previously imposed and not yet completed.”

That oral pronouncement clearly incorporated the conditions from the 2009 judgment (as previously modified), but said nothing about any new, district-wide Standing Order.

C. The 2024 Written Judgment and the Standing Order

The written revocation judgment (the “2024 Judgment”) largely tracked the 2009 conditions and stated that Currier’s new supervised release term would include “all conditions previously imposed and not yet completed.” However, it added a new clause:

“A term of Life Supervised Release is imposed with all Mandatory and Standard Conditions approved for the Western District of Texas and all conditions previously imposed and not yet completed.”

This reference pulled in the Western District of Texas’s 2016 Standing Order on supervised release conditions. That Standing Order contains:

• “Mandatory Conditions” 1–9, and
• “Standard Conditions” 1–17.

Most of those provisions overlapped with conditions already in Currier’s 2009 judgment. However, one provision was materially different and more burdensome:

Standard Condition 7 (Standing Order):
“The defendant shall work full time (at least [thirty] hours per week) at a lawful type of employment, unless the probation officer excuses the defendant from doing so. If the defendant does not have full-time employment, he or she shall try to find full-time employment, unless the probation officer excuses the defendant from doing so. If the defendant plans to change where the defendant works or anything about his or her work (such as the position or job responsibilities), the defendant shall notify the probation officer at least [ten] days before the change. If notifying the probation officer at least [ten] days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, the defendant shall notify the probation officer within [seventy-two] hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.”

The first portion of this condition (the full-time, thirty hours per week requirement) went beyond the 2009 Condition 5, which required only that Currier “work regularly at a lawful occupation” unless excused.

D. The Appeal

Currier appealed, arguing that:

• The 2024 written judgment included discretionary conditions from the Standing Order that were never orally pronounced, in violation of Diggles and related jurisprudence.
• Standard Condition 7’s thirty-hour-per-week requirement was more burdensome than his prior, orally pronounced work condition and therefore conflicted with the oral sentence.
• The remedy should be to remove the Standing Order reference—and therefore all unpronounced discretionary conditions—from the written judgment.

The government conceded that Standard Condition 7’s full-time requirement conflicted with the oral sentence and had to go, but argued:

• Other Standing Order conditions that were merely duplicative of Currier’s already-imposed conditions did not create a conflict and could be preserved; and
• The remand should be limited to excising only the offending portion of Standard Condition 7.

III. Summary of the Opinion

Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Edith Brown Clement held:

1. Standard of review: Because Currier had no meaningful opportunity to object to the Standing Order’s conditions at sentencing, the court reviewed for abuse of discretion, not plain error.
2. Pronouncement requirement: Under Diggles and 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), the district court must orally pronounce all discretionary supervised release conditions. The court did not pronounce (or adopt by clear reference) the Standing Order’s discretionary conditions, so any conflicting conditions were improper.
3. Conflict vs. ambiguity: When the written judgment conflicts with the oral pronouncement by broadening the defendant’s supervised release obligations, the oral sentence controls. Duplicative conditions that do not enlarge obligations represent, at most, ambiguities that may be resolved by consulting the record.
4. Application to Standing Order conditions:
   • The Standing Order’s “Mandatory Conditions” 1–7 tracked statutory mandatory conditions and did not need to be pronounced.
   • Standing Order “Mandatory Conditions” 8–9 and “Standard Conditions” 1–6 and 8–17 were discretionary under § 3583(d). But because they were duplicative of the 2009 conditions, they did not broaden Currier’s obligations and were not in conflict.
   • Standard Condition 7’s first two sentences (the full-time, thirty-hour requirement and the obligation to seek full-time employment) were more burdensome than the earlier “work regularly” requirement in the 2009 judgment and therefore conflicted with the oral sentence.
   • The third sentence (ten-day notice before changes in work) could be reconciled with 2009 Condition 6’s requirement of ten days’ notice for “any change in … employment,” and thus was not a conflict but a permissible clarification.
5. New bright-line remedial rule: Adopting reasoning from the unpublished decision in United States v. Jackson, the court held:

   “Any discretionary condition in the written judgment that conflicts with the sentence as orally pronounced must be excised on remand.”

6. Disposition: The Fifth Circuit vacated the sentence in part and remanded for the district court to:
   • Delete the first two sentences of Standing Order Standard Condition 7 from the written judgment; and
   • Leave intact the third sentence and any other duplicative, non-conflicting conditions.
   The panel also suggested—without requiring—that the district court consider removing the Standing Order reference altogether to avoid future confusion.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Statutory Framework

1. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d): Mandatory vs. Discretionary Conditions

Section 3583(d) governs conditions of supervised release. It:

• Identifies conditions that are required by statute—so-called “mandatory” conditions (e.g., no new federal, state, or local crimes; submission to DNA collection; etc.); and
• Authorizes the court to impose additional discretionary conditions, provided they are reasonably related to statutory sentencing factors, involve no greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary, and are consistent with Sentencing Commission policy statements.

Diggles aligned the Fifth Circuit’s “mandatory vs. discretionary” terminology with § 3583(d), rejecting prior, more idiosyncratic labels (“true special,” “not-really-special,” etc.). Currier reiterates that the Standing Order’s use of the labels “Mandatory” and “Standard” is not controlling. Conditions labeled “Mandatory 8” and “Mandatory 9” in the Standing Order are still discretionary as a matter of statutory classification if they are not compelled by § 3583(d).

2. United States v. Diggles (en banc) and Its Progeny

In United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc), the Fifth Circuit held:

• District courts must orally pronounce all discretionary conditions of supervised release.
• Pronouncement is satisfied if the defendant is given notice of the proposed conditions and a meaningful opportunity to object.
• This can occur through oral adoption of a written list of proposed conditions (such as a PSR addendum or a standing order) if the court clearly and expressly references that list in open court.

The en banc court grounded this requirement in the defendant’s constitutional right to be present at sentencing, derived from the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and codified in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43. As the court later summarized in Gomez, the right to be present at sentencing underpins the pronouncement requirement.

Subsequent cases elaborated the mechanism of pronouncement:

• Martinez, 47 F.4th 364 (5th Cir. 2022): Clarified that oral adoption of a “list of recommended supervised release conditions from a court-wide or judge-specific standing order, or some other document” can satisfy Diggles, but only if the defendant is clearly put on notice and given an opportunity to object.
• Baez-Adriano, 74 F.4th 292 (5th Cir. 2023): Emphasized that a clear “reference to and oral imposition of the court-wide standard conditions” is dispositive for pronouncement.
• Grogan, 977 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2020): Clarified that pronouncement does not require reciting every condition word-for-word, but the defendant must know what conditions are being imposed.

Crucially, the mere existence of a standing order is not enough. If the court does not say that it is imposing the conditions of that standing order (or otherwise adopt a list in open court), then the defendant has no notice and no meaningful opportunity to object.

In Currier, the district court:

• Never mentioned the Standing Order at the revocation hearing;
• Simply stated that Currier would be subject to “the same conditions of release previously imposed and not yet completed”; and
• Later incorporated “all Mandatory and Standard Conditions approved for the Western District of Texas” only in the written judgment.

Under Diggles, that is inadequate pronouncement for discretionary conditions.

3. Conflict vs. Ambiguity: Mireles, Bigelow, Woods, and Nelson

A second line of cases governs what happens when the oral pronouncement and written judgment differ. The Fifth Circuit’s framework distinguishes:

• Conflict – where the written judgment “broadens the restrictions or requirements of supervised release from an oral pronouncement” (Mireles, 471 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir. 2006)); versus
• Ambiguity – where the two can be harmonized or where the difference can be understood by looking to the entire record.

Key principles:

• If there is a conflict, the oral pronouncement controls. See Diggles, 957 F.3d at 557; Nelson, 114 F.4th 478, 481 (5th Cir. 2024).
• If there is merely an ambiguity, the appellate court looks to the sentencing court’s evident intent, examining the whole record. See Bigelow, 462 F.3d 378, 381 (5th Cir. 2006); Woods, 102 F.4th 760, 767 (5th Cir. 2024).

Currier applies this framework to differentiate between:

• Duplicative Standing Order conditions that match the previously imposed 2009 conditions and therefore do not broaden obligations (no conflict); and
• New or more burdensome Standing Order conditions (specifically, parts of Standard Condition 7) that expand Currier’s obligations beyond what was orally reimposed (a conflict).

4. Remedy Cases: Rivas-Estrada, Fields, Chavez, Garcia-Marcelo, and Jackson

The Fifth Circuit has long held that when a district court fails to pronounce discretionary conditions, the usual remedy is to:

• Vacate the sentence in relevant part; and
• Remand for the limited purpose of amending the written judgment to conform to the oral pronouncement and statutory mandatory conditions.

Examples include:

• Rivas-Estrada, 906 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2018): Remand to excise unpronounced special conditions.
• Fields, 977 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 2020): A special condition not orally pronounced or included in the PSR had to be stricken from the written judgment.
• Chavez, No. 20‑50550, 2022 WL 767033 (5th Cir. Mar. 14, 2022): Vacatur in part where discretionary conditions were not pronounced.
• Garcia-Marcelo, No. 21‑50700, 2022 WL 3684613 (5th Cir. Aug. 25, 2022): Same general remedial approach.

In Jackson, an unpublished decision the panel finds persuasive, the court explained that when discretionary conditions in the written judgment “conflict with the sentence as orally pronounced, those conditions must be deleted from the judgment.” 2022 WL 738668, at *2.

Currier elevates this remedial principle into a clear, explicit, and precedential bright-line rule.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in Currier

1. Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion

The choice between abuse-of-discretion and plain-error review turns on whether the defendant had an opportunity to object in the district court. See Grogan, 977 F.3d at 352; Martinez, 47 F.4th at 366.

Because the district court never mentioned the Standing Order at sentencing, Currier:

• Could not know that its discretionary conditions were being imposed; and
• Had no meaningful chance to object to those conditions.

Accordingly, the panel reviews for abuse of discretion, asking whether the gap between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment constitutes:

• a conflict (in which case the oral pronouncement controls), or
• a mere ambiguity (in which case the written judgment may stand if it reflects the sentencing court’s intent).

2. Identifying Which Conditions Required Pronouncement

The court first sorts the Standing Order’s conditions into statutory categories:

• Standing Order Mandatory Conditions 1–7: These track § 3583(d)’s mandatory conditions and thus did not have to be orally pronounced.
• Standing Order Mandatory Conditions 8–9 and Standard Conditions 1–17: These are discretionary under § 3583(d) and therefore must be orally pronounced (or clearly adopted by reference) to be validly imposed.

Here, the district court did not orally adopt the Standing Order. It only:

“pronounced the imposition of ‘the same conditions of release previously imposed and not yet completed.’”

This formulation captures the 2009 conditions but says nothing about district-wide additions. Under Diggles, discretionary conditions from the Standing Order that go beyond the 2009 terms were never properly pronounced.

3. Conflict vs. Duplication: Applying the Mireles Framework

The court then asks the critical question: Do the unpronounced Standing Order conditions in the written judgment conflict with, or merely , the orally reimposed 2009 conditions?

• If they broadly match the 2009 conditions and do not expand Currier’s obligations, they are not in conflict.
• If they broaden the restrictions (for example, by transforming a general “work regularly” requirement into a “work at least thirty hours per week” requirement), they conflict and are invalid.

The panel concludes:

• Standing Order Mandatory Conditions 8–9 and Standard Conditions 1–6 and 8–17: The parties agree—and the court accepts—that these provisions are fully duplicative of the 2009 conditions. They do not expand Currier’s obligations and therefore do not conflict with the oral pronouncement. At most, their presence in the 2024 judgment is an ambiguity that can be resolved by the record, showing that the district court intended to carry forward the earlier conditions.
• Standing Order Standard Condition 7: This provision is partially conflicting and partially duplicative/clarifying, requiring more careful parsing.

4. Parsing Standard Condition 7 Sentence by Sentence

Standard Condition 7 contains several sentences. The court treats them as functionally three components for conflict analysis:

1. First sentence: “The defendant shall work full time (at least [thirty] hours per week) at a lawful type of employment, unless the probation officer excuses the defendant from doing so.”
2. Second sentence: “If the defendant does not have full-time employment, he or she shall try to find full-time employment, unless the probation officer excuses the defendant from doing so.”
3. Third sentence: “If the defendant plans to change where the defendant works or anything about his or her work (such as the position or job responsibilities), the defendant shall notify the probation officer at least [ten] days before the change.” (The Standing Order’s further 72‑hour fallback language is textually present but not separately analyzed; the panel’s reasoning nonetheless encompasses the core notice requirement.)

The 2009 Condition 5 required Currier to “work regularly at a lawful occupation unless excused” by the probation officer. Unlike Standard Condition 7, it:

• Did not specify a minimum number of hours per week;
• Did not explicitly require “full-time” employment; and
• Imposed a more flexible obligation to work “regularly,” as determined by the probation officer.

The panel’s analysis:

• First sentence – conflict: Requiring Currier to work “full time (at least thirty hours per week)” is more burdensome than requiring him to “work regularly” at a lawful occupation. Because this new condition broadens the requirements of supervised release beyond what the district court orally continued from the 2009 judgment, it conflicts with the oral sentence.
• Second sentence – conflict: The government argued this sentence merely restates the practical need to find a job in order to be employed. But the panel reads it together with the first sentence. If “full-time employment” is defined as “at least thirty hours per week,” then obligating the defendant to “try to find full-time employment” necessarily incorporates the same, more burdensome thirty-hour requirement. Thus, the second sentence also conflicts with the oral pronouncement.
• Third sentence – no conflict (clarifying): The 2009 Condition 6 required Currier to notify his probation officer at least ten days before “any change in residence or employment.” The Standing Order’s third sentence requires notice ten days before any change in job location or “anything about his or her work (such as the position or job responsibilities).”
  
  The panel takes a textualist approach:
  • “Any change” in employment under 2009 Condition 6 is broad and “capacious,” encompassing a non-exhaustive range of changes, such as changes in position or job responsibilities.
  • The Standing Order’s third sentence, by listing such changes as examples, merely clarifies what was already covered by “any change” in employment.
  • The ten-day notice period is identical in both the 2009 condition and the Standing Order.
  Therefore, the third sentence is not a conflict but a clarification consistent with the oral pronouncement. It may be preserved.

On this basis, the court holds that the district court abused its discretion by failing to pronounce the new, more burdensome work requirements (the first two sentences of Standard Condition 7). Those conflicting provisions cannot stand.

5. The New Bright-Line Rule on Remedy

The key doctrinal contribution of Currier is the articulation of an explicit, bright-line remedial rule:

“Any discretionary condition in the written judgment that conflicts with the sentence as orally pronounced must be excised on remand.”

In adopting this rule, the court:

• Relies on the persuasive, though nonbinding, reasoning of United States v. Jackson, 2022 WL 738668; and
• Harmonizes its remedial approach with prior pronouncement-error cases like Martinez, Chavez, and Garcia-Marcelo.

The court then applies this rule in a granular way:

• Because the first two sentences of Standard Condition 7 conflict with the oral pronouncement, they must be deleted from the written judgment.
• The third sentence of Standard Condition 7, being consistent with the 2009 Condition 6, may be preserved.
• The other Standing Order conditions that are duplicative (Mandatory 8–9; Standard 1–6, 8–17) may also be preserved because they do not expand Currier’s obligations.

The court further notes—in dicta—that the district court “might be most efficient” on remand simply to remove the reference to the Standing Order entirely, relying only on the 2009 conditions as orally reimposed. This would:

• Avoid confusion over which enumerated conditions govern Currier’s supervised release; and
• Eliminate all unpronounced conditions in one stroke, obviating future Diggles issues.

However, that broader step is not mandated; the only binding requirement is to excise the conflicting discretionary conditions.

6. No “Second Chance” to Resentence

Consistent with prior cases, the panel underscores that the usual remedy is not to grant the district court a new sentencing hearing to impose additional conditions it failed to pronounce. Instead, the court simply orders the written judgment conformed to the oral pronouncement and statutory mandates. As Diggles had noted, this is a “stark remedy” and reflects the Fifth Circuit’s reluctance to give district courts a “second chance” where they failed to provide the required notice and opportunity to object.

C. Impact and Significance

1. Clarifying the Remedy for Pronouncement Errors

Before Currier, it was clear that unpronounced discretionary conditions were problematic, but less clear how broadly appellate courts should excise such conditions on remand. Currier:

• Clarifies that the focus is on conflict: only those discretionary conditions that conflict with (i.e., broaden) the orally pronounced sentence must be excised.
• Preserves flexibility for duplicative or clarifying conditions that do not increase the defendant’s obligations.

Practically, this means:

• Defense counsel can target specific conditions that materially increase their clients’ burdens compared to what was announced at sentencing.
• The appellate remedy can be surgical rather than wholesale, preserving the enforceability of conditions that are adequately grounded in prior, valid pronouncements.

2. Guidance on the Use of Standing Orders

Currier is particularly important for districts that use standing orders listing “mandatory” and “standard” supervised-release conditions. The opinion makes several points clear:

• Labels in a standing order are not determinative. Even if a local document calls a condition “Mandatory,” it is discretionary for Diggles purposes unless § 3583(d) makes it compulsory.
• Mere existence of a standing order is insufficient. The sentencing judge must clearly adopt it in open court (or adopt a document, like the PSR, that lists those conditions) to satisfy the pronouncement requirement.
• Revocation sentencings are not exempt. When revoking supervised release and imposing a new term, district courts must be equally careful not to smuggle in new discretionary conditions via boilerplate written language that was never mentioned at the hearing.

For the Western District of Texas in particular, the opinion is an implicit warning: relying on a Standing Order in the written judgment without clearly invoking it orally invites reversal and partial vacatur when the Standing Order contains burdensome discretionary conditions not already imposed.

3. Reinforcing the Due Process Right to Be Present at Sentencing

By insisting that more onerous conditions must be pronounced—and that written additions cannot overrule the oral sentence—the Fifth Circuit strengthens the protection of the defendant’s due process right to be present at sentencing. The defendant:

• Must be able to hear the conditions that will govern his liberty;
• Must know their scope and burdens; and
• Must have a chance to object or argue for modification.

Currier thus reaffirms that sentencing is not a purely clerical function; it is a critical stage of the criminal process at which liberty conditions must be openly decided, not silently added later.

4. Practical Implications for Sentencing Practice

For district judges and practitioners, Currier suggests several best practices:

• Be explicit about adoption of standing orders. If a judge intends to impose the conditions of a standing order, the judge should say so on the record (e.g., “I am imposing the mandatory and standard conditions of supervised release as set forth in the Western District of Texas’s Standing Order dated November 28, 2016.”).
• Confirm that the defendant has seen the list. To satisfy Diggles, defense counsel should have the standing order or list of conditions in advance, and the judge should confirm in court that counsel and the defendant have reviewed them.
• Beware of adding “glosses” at revocation. Revocation is not a free opportunity to tack on new, more onerous conditions via boilerplate language. If new discretionary conditions are desired, they must be clearly pronounced at the revocation hearing.
• Use clear language when reincorporating old conditions. Language like “all previously imposed and uncompleted conditions” is generally effective in reimposing earlier conditions, but it does not open the door to additional, unmentioned district-wide conditions.

5. Future Litigation and Open Questions

While Currier clarifies much, some issues may continue to generate litigation:

• Boundary between “conflict” and “clarification”: The court was comfortable treating Standard Condition 7’s third sentence as a clarification of “any change in employment.” In close cases, litigants may dispute whether a new detail truly clarifies or subtly expands a prior condition.
• Plain-error cases: Currier is an abuse-of-discretion case. How aggressively courts will apply the same bright-line remedial rule under plain-error review (where defendants failed to object despite knowing the conditions) remains to be developed.
• Scope of revocation authority: While not addressed head-on, the decision implicitly cabins district courts’ ability to significantly ratchet up supervised release obligations upon revocation without a clear, on-the-record pronouncement.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

1. Supervised Release, Conditions, and Revocation

After prison, many federal defendants serve a term of supervised release, during which they must comply with certain conditions (e.g., reporting to a probation officer, not committing new crimes, work requirements). If they violate those conditions, the court can:

• Revoke supervised release,
• Send the defendant back to prison for a revocation sentence, and
• Impose a new term of supervised release with its own conditions.

2. Mandatory vs. Discretionary Conditions

• Mandatory conditions: Conditions required by statute (e.g., do not commit another crime). The judge has no choice; they are always imposed.
• Discretionary conditions: Conditions the judge may, but need not, impose (e.g., specific employment requirements, treatment programs, restrictions on computer use). These must be:
  • Reasonably related to sentencing goals;
  • No more restrictive than necessary; and
  • Consistent with Sentencing Commission policy.

Under Diggles and Currier, only discretionary conditions must be orally pronounced; statutory mandatory conditions do not.

3. Oral Pronouncement vs. Written Judgment

• The oral pronouncement is what the judge says in open court at sentencing.
• The written judgment is the formal document entered later, summarizing the sentence and conditions.

If the two differ:

• The defendant’s right to be present at sentencing means the oral pronouncement is the operative sentence.
• The written judgment must be corrected to match the oral pronouncement, not the other way around.

4. Pronouncement Error

A pronouncement error occurs when:

• The court fails to state (or clearly adopt by reference) a discretionary condition at the sentencing hearing; or
• The written judgment later includes a discretionary condition that was not part of the oral sentence.

In such cases, the appellate court:

• Determines whether the condition conflicts with the oral pronouncement; and
• If it does, orders it to be excised from the written judgment.

5. Standards of Review: Abuse of Discretion vs. Plain Error

• Abuse of discretion: Applied when the defendant had no meaningful chance to object in the district court. The appellate court asks whether the district court’s action was unreasonable or based on incorrect legal principles.
• Plain error: Applied when the defendant could have objected but did not. The defendant must show:
  1. An error,
  2. That is clear or obvious,
  3. That affects substantial rights, and
  4. That seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

In Currier, because the Standing Order was never mentioned in court, Currier could not object, so the more forgiving abuse-of-discretion standard applied.

6. Conflict vs. Ambiguity; Duplicative vs. Conflicting Conditions

• A condition in the written judgment is in conflict with the oral sentence if it adds new burdens or broadens the defendant’s obligations beyond what the judge said in court.
• A condition is duplicative (or clarifying) if it basically restates or explains what was already imposed orally and does not increase the burden.

In Currier:

• The full-time, thirty-hours-per-week requirement was conflicting because it went beyond “work regularly.”
• The ten-day notice requirement for work changes was duplicative/clarifying of the prior requirement to give ten days’ notice of any change in employment.

7. Vacatur and Remand to Conform the Judgment

When the Fifth Circuit vacates “in part” and remands “for amendment of the written judgment to conform to the oral pronouncement,” it means:

• The court is not ordering a full resentencing;
• It is instead directing the district court to edit the written judgment so that it no longer includes any discretionary conditions that conflict with what was announced at the sentencing hearing; and
• The remainder of the sentence (including valid conditions) remains intact.

VI. Conclusion

United States v. Currier significantly refines Fifth Circuit supervised-release jurisprudence in three ways.

1. It solidifies the pronouncement requirement for discretionary conditions, making clear that silent incorporation of a district-wide Standing Order will not suffice. Defendants must have advance notice and an opportunity to object in open court.
2. It clarifies the conflict vs. ambiguity framework in the specific context of supervised release conditions, distinguishing between conflicting conditions (which broaden the sentence) and duplicative or clarifying conditions (which do not).
3. Most importantly, it establishes a bright-line remedial rule: any discretionary condition in the written judgment that conflicts with the oral sentence must be excised on remand, while duplicative conditions may be preserved.

By partially vacating Currier’s sentence and requiring removal of the burdensome portions of Standard Condition 7, the Fifth Circuit reinforces the primacy of the oral sentence, the defendant’s right to be present and heard at sentencing, and the integrity of the supervised release process. For district courts and practitioners, Currier offers both a warning and a roadmap: new or more onerous supervised release conditions must be clearly pronounced in open court, or they will not survive appellate scrutiny.