Ex parte Young Exception Upholds Federal Jurisdiction Over State Easement Revocation

Introduction

This commentary examines the Sixth Circuit’s April 23, 2025 decision in Enbridge Energy, LP v. Gretchen Whitmer, concerning whether Enbridge’s federal lawsuit challenging Michigan’s revocation of a 1953 pipeline easement is barred by state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The dispute centers on Enbridge Energy’s Line 5 pipeline, which runs across the bottomlands of the Straits of Mackinac (state-owned land). Governor Whitmer and the Director of the Michigan Department of Natural Resources sought to revoke the easement, alleging safety‐related breaches. Enbridge filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief in federal court, invoking federal preemption under the Pipeline Safety Act and various Commerce Clause protections. The threshold dispute on appeal is whether Enbridge’s suit fits within the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity, thus permitting federal jurisdiction.

Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Michigan’s Eleventh Amendment immunity defense. The court held:

Enbridge’s suit seeks only prospective, equitable relief against state officials—not damages or retroactive relief.
The complaint alleges ongoing violations of federal law (federal pipeline‐safety preemption, Commerce Clause impermissible burdens and discrimination, Foreign Commerce Clause/Foreign Affairs concerns) and requests relief tailored to prevent those violations.
The suit therefore satisfies the Ex parte Young test: it names state officers, alleges federal‐law violations, and seeks prospective relief.
Narrow exceptions to Young do not apply. Under Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, a suit is barred only where the relief sought is functionally equivalent to quiet‐title over sovereign lands or entirely extinguishes state control. Enbridge’s requested injunction would leave Michigan’s title and regulatory authority—including incidental regulation—intact.
Nor does this suit amount to “specific performance” of a state contract. Enbridge’s claims rest on federal law, not breach of the 1953 easement; the requested relief simply bars state officers from acting in violation of federal law.

The court therefore held that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar jurisdiction and affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Ex parte Young (1908): Established that federal courts may enjoin state officers who violate federal law, evading Eleventh Amendment immunity when the relief is prospective and equitable.
Virginia Office for Protection & Advocacy v. Stewart (2011): Clarified that Young rests on a legal “fiction” treating official‐capacity suits as against officers, not the state.
Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe (1997): Carved out a narrow exception where suits that functionally transfer sovereign lands (quiet title) or fully extinguish state control are barred.
Edelman v. Jordan (1974): Held that Young does not authorize retroactive monetary relief that would draw funds from the state treasury.
In re Ayers (1887) and Hagood v. Southern (1886): Pre-Young decisions barring suits that seek specific performance of state contracts, emphasizing that a suit to compel a state’s contractual obligation is effectively against the state.
Westside Mothers v. Haveman (6th Cir. 2002): Explained the two-part Young inquiry—ongoing federal‐law violation and prospective relief.

Legal Reasoning

The court performed the standard Young inquiry:

Does the complaint allege an ongoing violation of federal law?
— Yes. Enbridge alleged state officials’ attempt to revoke a long‐standing easement conflicts with the Pipeline Safety Act’s field preemption and unduly burdens interstate and foreign commerce.
Does the relief sought qualify as prospective, equitable relief?
— Yes. Enbridge seeks injunctions preventing state officers from interfering with pipeline operations in the future and a declaratory judgment of illegality under federal law.

Next, the court considered two narrow exceptions:

1. Coeur d’Alene Quiet Title Exception

Under Coeur d’Alene, Young does not apply when the plaintiff seeks “substantially all benefits of ownership and control” over sovereign lands, or would wholly strip state regulatory authority. Here:

Enbridge’s easement claim affects only a limited property interest—the right to operate the pipeline—not fee simple title.
The State retains ultimate title, right to sell subject to the easement, and general regulatory powers, provided regulations comply with federal law.
The requested relief does not remove Michigan’s authority but merely enjoins federal‐law violations.

Thus, the intrusion on sovereignty is far less than in Coeur d’Alene.

2. Specific Performance of a Contract Exception

Under Young and its antecedents, suits seeking to compel a state to perform its contractual obligations (specific performance) are barred. But Enbridge’s suit:

Does not rest on breach of the 1953 easement or seek to enforce its contractual terms.
Relies exclusively on federal‐law preemption and constitutional provisions, not the contract.
Seeks to stop state officers from acting in violation of federal law, not to compel affirmative contractual acts by the State.

Accordingly, it is not a disguised contract enforcement action.

Impact

This ruling reinforces and refines Ex parte Young doctrine:

Future litigants may bring suits against state officials to protect property interests conferred by state easements when federal law (preemption or Commerce Clause) is implicated, so long as relief remains prospective and equitable.
States cannot evade federal‐law constraints on their regulatory actions by hiding behind sovereign immunity.
The decision narrows the reach of the Coeur d’Alene exception to cases where relief would functionally transfer entire sovereign property interests or wholly eliminate regulatory authority.
Contract holders cannot invert Young simply by pointing to an existing state contract when fundamental federal rights are at issue.

In the pipeline context, the decision likely constrains states seeking unilateral revocation of long‐standing easements on safety grounds when federal safety standards and Commerce Clause protections apply.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity: States cannot be sued in federal court without consent, but there is an exception for stopping ongoing violations of federal law.
Ex parte Young Doctrine: Allows suits against state officers (not the state itself) for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief to prevent federal‐law violations.
Quiet Title Action: A legal proceeding to establish ownership or clear competing claims against property. When it targets state‐owned submerged lands, it may be too intrusive to fit within Young.
Specific Performance: A remedy compelling a party to fulfill a contractual obligation. Suits seeking such relief against state contracts remain barred by sovereign immunity.

Conclusion

Key Takeaways:

Ex parte Young permits federal jurisdiction over suits against state officials seeking to enjoin future violations of federal law, even when property or contract interests are implicated.
Only in rare “quiet title” circumstances—where relief would strip the State of substantially all property rights or regulatory power—or where a suit truly seeks specific performance of a state contract, will sovereign immunity bar such claims.
Enbridge Energy v. Whitmer thus affirms the federal courts’ role in checking state actions that conflict with federal pipeline‐safety preemption and constitutional commerce guarantees.

This decision clarifies the boundaries of sovereign immunity and confirms that the Eleventh Amendment cannot be used as a shield against federal‐law claims and constitutional protections affecting critical interstate and international infrastructure.