Ex parte Best Choice Roofing Alabama, LLC: Clarifying Alabama’s “Seriously Inconvenient” Standard for Outbound Forum‑Selection Clauses

I. Introduction

In Ex parte Best Choice Roofing Alabama, LLC (Ala. Sup. Ct. Nov. 26, 2025), the Supreme Court of Alabama issued a mandamus decision that meaningfully tightens and clarifies the already demanding standard for avoiding enforcement of an outbound forum‑selection clause on the ground that the chosen forum is “seriously inconvenient.”

The case arises out of a residential roofing dispute. Michael and Kalie Dixon, Alabama homeowners in Washington County, sued Best Choice Roofing Alabama, LLC (“BCRA”), alleging breach of contract and wantonness after a roof replacement allegedly left their home “damaged and nearly uninhabitable.” The contract contained a clause requiring that any lawsuit “will be brought in Sumner County, Tennessee” and that Tennessee law would govern.

The trial court denied BCRA’s Rule 12(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss for improper venue, concluding that the forum‑selection clause was “clearly unreasonable” and that Tennessee was “seriously inconvenient” under the circumstances. BCRA petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus compelling enforcement of the clause and dismissal of the claims against it in Alabama.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, issued the writ, and ordered the trial court to dismiss the Dixons’ claims against BCRA. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed the strong presumption in favor of enforcing outbound forum‑selection clauses and clarified what does—and does not—amount to “extraordinary facts” or “serious inconvenience” sufficient to invalidate such a clause, particularly in consumer‑type disputes involving individuals of modest means.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that:

The forum‑selection clause in the roofing contract was unambiguous and mandatory: all lawsuits to enforce obligations under the contract had to be brought in Sumner County, Tennessee.
Once BCRA established the existence and applicability of that clause, the burden shifted to the Dixons to “clearly establish” that enforcement would be unfair (due to fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power) or unreasonable (because the chosen forum is “seriously inconvenient”).
The Dixons did not allege fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power, and thus relied solely on “serious inconvenience.”
Applying the five non‑exclusive factors from Ex parte Northern Capital Resource Corp. and Ex parte Rymer, the Court concluded that:
- The fact the Dixons are individuals of modest means, and that BCRA is a business, does not by itself show lack of business acumen or justify avoiding enforcement.
- The subject matter—a roof replacement on a residence—does not trigger any special public‑policy interest warranting retention of the dispute in Alabama.
- Although Tennessee is more convenient for BCRA and all witnesses and evidence are in Alabama, this is merely an inconvenience that the parties knowingly assumed when they agreed to the clause.
- The forum‑selection clause is clear and understandable; a party who signs a contract is deemed to know and be bound by its contents, even if they did not read it or it was not discussed.
- The circumstances cited by the Dixons—having to buy a camper because the home was allegedly uninhabitable, travel distance of over 400 miles, unreliable vehicles, cost of hotels, spouse’s job constraints, and the desire for a jury view of the premises—either:
  - Were known or foreseeable at the time of contracting (and so are not “extraordinary facts arising since” the contract), or
  - Amount to routine hardship or inconvenience, insufficient as a matter of law to show that the Dixons would be deprived of their day in court.
Financial hardship—even severe hardship—does not automatically constitute an “extraordinary” circumstance that renders a chosen forum seriously inconvenient, especially where other factors favor enforcement.
The trial court therefore exceeded its discretion in refusing to enforce the forum‑selection clause.

Accordingly, the Court granted BCRA’s petition and directed the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion to dismiss and to dismiss the Dixons’ claims against BCRA for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3).

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Mandamus Standard and Procedural Posture

Ex parte Nall, 879 So. 2d 541 (Ala. 2003), and Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270 (Ala. 2001)

These cases provide the classic four‑part mandamus standard, quoted and applied through Ex parte Alabama Dep’t of Corr., 252 So. 3d 635 (Ala. 2017):

A clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought;
An imperative duty on the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so;
No other adequate remedy; and
Properly invoked jurisdiction.

In this case, the Court treats mandamus as the appropriate vehicle to review an interlocutory order denying a Rule 12(b)(3) motion based on an outbound forum‑selection clause, following:

Ex parte D.M. White Constr. Co., 806 So. 2d 370 (Ala. 2001), and
Ex parte CTB, Inc., 782 So. 2d 188 (Ala. 2000).

Those cases established that mandamus is proper when a trial court refuses to enforce an outbound forum‑selection clause. The Court reiterates that its review is for whether the trial court exceeded its discretion. See also O'Brien Eng’g Co. v. Continental Machs., Inc., 738 So. 2d 844 (Ala. 1999).

2. Enforceability of Outbound Forum‑Selection Clauses

Professional Ins. Corp. v. Sutherland, 700 So. 2d 347 (Ala. 1997)

Sutherland is the foundational Alabama case adopting the modern rule that outbound forum‑selection clauses are presumptively valid and enforceable. A challenger must show either:

Unfairness: the contract was affected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power, or
Unreasonableness: enforcement would be unreasonable because the chosen forum is “seriously inconvenient.”

The Court in Best Choice Roofing quotes Sutherland (via Ex parte CTB and D.M. White) and applies the same two‑pronged framework. Significantly, the Dixons did not rely on fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power; their challenge was limited to “serious inconvenience.”

Ex parte D.M. White Constr. Co., 806 So. 2d 370 (Ala. 2001)
Ex parte CTB, Inc., 782 So. 2d 188 (Ala. 2000)

These decisions reaffirm that:

Outbound forum‑selection clauses are generally enforceable, and
It is “difficult” for the opposing party to meet the burden of proving unfairness or unreasonableness.

The Court in Best Choice Roofing explicitly invokes this high burden, tightening the practical ability of Alabama plaintiffs to escape such clauses.

3. The “Seriously Inconvenient” Standard and the Five‑Factor Test

Ex parte Northern Capital Resource Corp., 751 So. 2d 12 (Ala. 1999)
Ex parte Rymer, 860 So. 2d 339 (Ala. 2003)

Northern Capital articulated a five‑factor set of considerations for evaluating whether enforcement of a forum‑selection clause is unreasonable. Rymer adopted and applied those factors, which the Court again adopts in this case:

Are the parties business entities or businesspersons?
What is the subject matter of the contract?
Does the chosen forum have any inherent advantages?
Should the parties have been able to understand the agreement as written?
Have extraordinary facts arisen since the agreement was entered that would make the chosen forum seriously inconvenient?

Rymer also restated the core substantive standard: the challenging party must show that litigating in the chosen forum would be “so gravely difficult and inconvenient that the [party] will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court.”

In Best Choice Roofing, the Court uses these five factors as the analytical framework for assessing the Dixons’ arguments, reinforcing that:

The factors are not elements, but “considerations,” yet collectively they should “give a clear indication” whether enforcement is reasonable.
The bar remains very high: “seriously inconvenient” is not mere inconvenience or even substantial hardship; it is the functional equivalent of losing access to the courts.

4. Forum‑Selection Clauses Against Individuals and Business Acumen

Castleberry v. Angie’s List, Inc., 291 So. 3d 37 (Ala. 2019)
Madasu v. Berry Co., 950 So. 2d 333 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006)

These cases are cited to show that Alabama courts have routinely enforced forum‑selection clauses against individuals, not only sophisticated business entities. In Castleberry, the Court rejected an attempt to avoid a forum‑selection clause based on an alleged lack of business sophistication, where the plaintiffs had not provided meaningful evidence of their lack of acumen.

The Court uses Castleberry as a template: although the Dixons characterize themselves as “unsophisticated people of very modest means,” they presented no evidence regarding their business experience or sophistication. The Court therefore refuses to treat their status as individuals as weighing against enforcement of the clause.

5. Duty to Read and the Effect of Electronic Signatures

Locklear Dodge City, Inc. v. Kimbrell, 703 So. 2d 303 (Ala. 1997)
Ex parte Rymer, 860 So. 2d 339 (Ala. 2003)

Locklear stands for the principle—reaffirmed in Rymer and reiterated here—that a person who signs a contract is presumed to know and assent to its contents:

“[A] person who signs a contract is on notice of the terms therein and is bound thereby even if he or she fails to read the document.”

In Best Choice Roofing, this principle defeats several of the Dixons’ arguments:

The clause was not discussed before signing;
The contract was signed electronically; and
The Dixons thought BCRA was an Alabama company.

None of these facts, the Court holds, negate contractual assent or undermine the Dixons’ responsibility to know the terms they accepted, particularly where:

The contract is only two pages;
Immediately above the signature line it states in capital letters that the customer has read and agrees to the “terms on back of page”; and
Michael initialed the page containing the forum‑selection clause.

6. Financial Hardship and “Extraordinary Facts”

Ex parte International Paper Co., 285 So. 3d 753 (Ala. 2019)
Ex parte United Propane Gas, Inc., 258 So. 3d 1103 (Ala. 2018)
Ex parte Nawas Int’l Travel Serv., Inc., 68 So. 3d 823 (Ala. 2011)

International Paper is crucial. In that case, plaintiffs argued that the defendant’s actions had “essentially bankrupted” them, making it impossible to litigate in the contractually chosen forum. The Court nevertheless enforced the forum‑selection clause, concluding that—even accepting serious financial strain—the overall balance of factors still favored enforcement.

In Best Choice Roofing, the Court explicitly analogizes the Dixons’ alleged financial hardship (needing to purchase a camper as temporary housing due to roof damage) to the bankruptcy‑level hardship claimed in International Paper:

If bankruptcy was not enough in International Paper to avoid the clause, then the Dixons’ financial strain from buying a camper, though unfortunate, likewise cannot be deemed “extraordinary” in the legal sense.

United Propane and Nawas further underscore that Alabama courts routinely enforce outbound forum‑selection clauses favoring the defendant’s home state, even where doing so is inconvenient for Alabama plaintiffs.

7. Freedom of Contract and Inability to Repudiate Unfavorable Terms

Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Ard, 772 So. 2d 1131 (Ala. 2000)

Southern Energy Homes contains a principle the Court highlights: one may not “simultaneously claim the benefits of a contract and repudiate its burdens and conditions.”

In Best Choice Roofing, the Dixons are seeking damages under the very contract that contains the forum‑selection clause. The Court uses Southern Energy Homes to emphasize that the clause is one of the “burdens and conditions” they agreed to when they accepted the contract’s benefits. Their attempt to ignore or undo that clause while suing on the contract itself is fundamentally inconsistent.

8. Insufficient Inconvenience and Travel‑Related Hardship

Ex parte Northern Capital Resource Corp., 751 So. 2d 12 (Ala. 1999)
Ex parte PT Sols. Holdings, LLC, 225 So. 3d 37 (Ala. 2016)

Northern Capital held that travel distance and inconvenience to witnesses or parties, standing alone, are not enough to show a chosen forum is unreasonable. The Court applies that principle here to reject:

The 400‑mile distance between the Dixons’ home and the Tennessee courthouse;
The claim that their vehicles are unreliable for such a trip; and
The expense of hotels and other travel costs.

In PT Sols., the Court had previously rejected an argument that litigating in another state would “spread thin [the plaintiff’s] resources,” holding that such hardship fails to meet the “seriously inconvenient” threshold. Best Choice Roofing extends that logic: even quite real financial burdens do not suffice unless the plaintiff can show practical deprivation of access to the chosen forum.

9. Jury View of the Premises

Kohn v. Johnson, 565 So. 2d 165 (Ala. 1990)

The Dixons argued that a Tennessee jury could not feasibly conduct an on‑site inspection of their home in Alabama, and that such an inspection was important to understanding the scope of the alleged damage (smelling “rot and mildew,” feeling “soft places in the walls,” etc.).

Citing Kohn, the Court notes that:

A jury view of a site is a matter of trial court discretion, not a right; and
Photographs or other evidentiary alternatives can adequately present the condition of property to a jury.

Therefore, the absence of a likely on‑site jury visit does not deprive the Dixons of their “day in court” and cannot justify invalidating the forum‑selection clause.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Step One: Existence and Applicability of the Forum‑Selection Clause

The clause at issue stated:

“If any lawsuit is brought to enforce the obligations of either party to this contract, it is agreed that such lawsuit will be brought in Sumner County, Tennessee and that the laws of Tennessee will govern the contract unless prohibited by law, as applicable.”

Key points:

The clause is mandatory (“will be brought”) rather than permissive.
Its scope clearly covers the Dixons’ claims for breach of contract and wantonness arising from roof replacement.
The Dixons did not contest that the clause applied; they challenged only its enforceability.

Because the clause was unambiguous and obviously covered the dispute, BCRA satisfied its prima facie burden to show the claims were subject to the clause. The burden then shifted to the Dixons to “clearly establish” unfairness or unreasonableness.

2. Step Two: No Showing of Fraud, Undue Influence, or Overweening Bargaining Power

The Court notes that the Dixons:

Did not allege that the clause was the product of fraud (e.g., misrepresentation or concealment specifically about the forum clause),
Did not claim undue influence (e.g., improper pressure undermining their free will), and
Did not assert “overweening bargaining power” beyond the typical imbalance between a corporate roofer and homeowners.

As a result, the only live question was “serious inconvenience.”

3. Step Three: Application of the Five Northern Capital Factors

(1) Business Entities vs. Individuals and Business Acumen

The trial court emphasized that:

The plaintiffs (the Dixons) are individuals of “very modest means” with “unsophisticated” backgrounds; and
The defendants are businesses.

The Supreme Court rejects the inference that being an individual equals lack of business acumen. It notes:

There is no evidence in the record concerning the Dixons’ education, work history, prior contracting experience, or actual understanding of business transactions.
The only evidence relates to current financial status and vehicle age, which is not the same as business sophistication.
Under Castleberry, mere assertion of “unsophistication” or modest means is insufficient to tilt this factor against enforcement.

Therefore, factor (1) does not weigh against enforcement.

(2) Subject Matter of the Contract

The contract concerned replacement of the roof on a residence in Washington County, Alabama. The trial court emphasized the Alabama location and the local character of the work and damages.

The Supreme Court holds:

Nothing about a residential roofing contract is so “unique” or tied to localized policy interests that it should override a freely negotiated forum‑selection clause.
This is, in the Court’s words, a “simple contract” and a “vanilla lawsuit.”

Thus, factor (2) is neutral or slightly in favor of enforcement.

(3) Inherent Advantages of Tennessee as the Chosen Forum

The trial court correctly observed that:

All witnesses and physical evidence are in Washington County, Alabama;
The house and work at issue are in Alabama; and
The only connection to Tennessee is that BCRA (and/or its corporate affiliate) has its headquarters there.

BCRA effectively conceded that Tennessee is inherently more advantageous for it, and less so for the Dixons. However, the Court notes that:

Alabama courts routinely enforce forum‑selection clauses choosing the defendant’s home state (e.g., International Paper, United Propane, Nawas).
The parties voluntarily agreed to that allocation of convenience and risk.

Accordingly, even though Tennessee plainly favors BCRA, factor (3) weighs only slightly against enforcement and is not dispositive.

(4) Ability to Understand the Clause

Here, the Court and the trial court agree: the clause is clear and understandable. Relevant facts:

It is plainly worded, short, and located on the second page.
Michael initialed the very page containing the clause.
The signature line, in capital letters, warned that the customer has read and agreed to the back‑page terms.

Even if the clause was not verbally explained, and even though the contract was signed electronically, those facts do not render the clause unintelligible or hidden in any legally relevant way. Under Locklear and Rymer, a party is bound by what they sign.

Thus, factor (4) strongly favors enforcement.

(5) Extraordinary Facts Arising After Contract Execution

This is the central battleground. The trial court found “extraordinary facts” in:

The alleged uninhabitability of the home following the roof work;
The need to purchase a camper trailer for living quarters, creating financial hardship;
The long distance to Tennessee (400+ miles);
The alleged unreliability of the Dixons’ vehicles for long trips;
The cost of lodging and travel;
Kalie’s inability to easily take time off work to attend a Tennessee trial;
The desire for a jury to personally inspect the damaged home in Washington County.

The Supreme Court methodically rejects these points:

Timing and Foreseeability: “Extraordinary facts” must arise after the contract was signed. Many of the cited hardships (distance, local witnesses, potential site issues, employment obligations, vehicle condition) were known or foreseeable when the contract was executed. Parties cannot later recast known or obvious circumstances as “extraordinary.”
Degree of Hardship: Even if the purchase of a camper and the resulting financial strain are serious, International Paper teaches that even bankruptcy‑level hardship does not automatically void a clause when other factors favor enforcement.
Vehicles and Travel: The mere assertion that older vehicles are “untrustworthy” is unsupported by evidence (e.g., no repair records or expert testimony). The Court also notes that alternative travel options—borrowing a car, flying—were not shown to be impossible. Routine travel difficulties do not equal deprivation of a day in court.
Witness Location and Distance: Under Northern Capital, distance and witness location, by themselves, do not make a forum unreasonable. This applies even where, as here, all key witnesses and physical evidence are in Alabama.
Jury View of the Premises: Kohn makes clear that on‑site inspections are discretionary and often unnecessary; photos and other evidence can adequately substitute. Thus, the likely unavailability of a jury site visit is not a constitutional or practical barrier to the Dixons’ “day in court.”
Employment Constraints: That one spouse may not find it easy to attend trial due to work is a common litigation burden, not an “extraordinary fact.”

The Court concludes that none of these circumstances, individually or collectively, is “extraordinary” in the legal sense, nor do they make Tennessee “so gravely difficult and inconvenient” that the Dixons would effectively be denied their day in court. Factor (5) therefore favors enforcement.

4. Overall Balancing and the High Burden on the Challenging Party

Weighing all factors, the Court finds:

Factors (1), (2), and (4) do not support avoidance of the clause.
Factor (3) slightly disfavors enforcement but is not significant in light of the parties’ voluntary agreement.
Factor (5), properly analyzed, favors enforcement because the alleged hardships are neither extraordinary nor newly arisen, and they do not amount to effective denial of a day in court.

Against this backdrop, the Court returns to the overarching principle: the party challenging an outbound forum‑selection clause bears a “difficult” burden to “clearly establish” unreasonableness or unfairness. The Dixons’ showing, even taken at face value, falls short. The trial court therefore “exceeded its discretion” in refusing to enforce the clause.

C. Impact and Significance

1. Reinforcement of a Strong Pro‑Enforcement Stance

This opinion strongly reaffirms Alabama’s deep commitment to enforcing outbound forum‑selection clauses. It underscores that:

Routine or even substantial inconvenience does not equate to “serious inconvenience” in the legal sense; and
Financial hardship alone—short of clearly demonstrated inability to access the chosen forum—will seldom, if ever, suffice.

Given that Alabama already had a robust line of cases enforcing such clauses, Best Choice Roofing operates less as a doctrinal shift and more as a sharpening of the standard. It signals that trial courts must be particularly cautious not to substitute sympathy for legal analysis when consumers or less affluent individuals face hardships associated with litigating out of state.

2. Application to Consumer and Homeowner Contracts

The facts involve a relatively typical consumer/homeowner transaction: a residential roof replacement. The Court’s willingness to enforce a Tennessee forum even in this context sends a clear message:

Homeowners and consumers who sign standard‑form contracts with outbound forum clauses should expect those clauses to be enforced, absent specific, well‑proved grounds of fraud, undue influence, or genuinely extraordinary events arising later.
The involvement of an Alabama residence and local contractors or subcontractors does not create a strong enough public‑policy interest to override a freely agreed foreign forum.

Practically, this may mean that Alabama homeowners with grievances against multi‑state or out‑of‑state construction and service companies will often be compelled to litigate in the company’s home forum.

3. Evidentiary Expectations for Challenging Forum‑Selection Clauses

The case also clarifies what type of evidence is insufficient to carry the challenger’s burden:

Affidavits asserting modest means, older vehicles, and subjective descriptions of “untrustworthy” transportation, without corroboration, are unlikely to suffice.
Assertions of “unsophistication” must be supported by tangible evidence (education, prior experience, detailed circumstances), not simply economic status.
General statements that litigation costs will be burdensome or resources will be “spread thin” will not meet the “seriously inconvenient” threshold.

For plaintiffs’ counsel, the opinion signals that a successful challenge will require:

Specific, objective proof of inability to access the chosen forum (e.g., medical incapacity, legal impediments, extreme and substantiated financial impossibility); and
Clear linkage between those circumstances and the chosen forum, coupled with an explanation of why no reasonable alternative (remote testimony, limited attendance, etc.) could preserve the plaintiff’s day in court.

4. Drafting and Corporate Practice Implications

For businesses, especially multi‑state service providers:

Best Choice Roofing confirms that clearly drafted, conspicuous outbound forum‑selection clauses will almost always be enforced in Alabama, even in consumer settings.
Locating the forum in the company’s headquarters or principal place of business (as in Tennessee here) aligns with prior Alabama cases and is a safe drafting practice.
Electronic signature processes remain effective to bind parties to such clauses, so long as the clause is textually accessible and the signature/initialing process evidences assent.

The decision may encourage more companies doing business in Alabama to adopt standardized terms pointing litigation to their home jurisdictions, knowing Alabama’s courts will be reluctant to override that choice.

5. Trial Court Discretion and Appellate Oversight

The opinion serves as a caution to trial courts:

Even when plaintiffs present sympathetic facts—such as alleged uninhabitability of their home, temporary displacement, and constrained finances—trial courts must apply the Northern Capital/Rymer framework rigorously.
A failure to do so, especially where the record does not support a finding of “extraordinary facts” or “serious inconvenience,” may result in mandamus relief.

In other words, the Court is prepared to use the “extraordinary” remedy of mandamus to correct perceived drift or overreach in trial‑level application of forum‑selection jurisprudence.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. What Is a Forum‑Selection Clause?

A forum‑selection clause is a provision in a contract stating where (in which state or court) any lawsuit relating to that contract must be filed.

Outbound forum‑selection clause: chooses a forum outside Alabama (e.g., Tennessee courts for an Alabama homeowner).
Inbound clause: chooses Alabama as the exclusive forum.
Mandatory clause: uses language like “must” or “will be brought” in the designated forum, leaving no alternative.
Permissive clause: suggests a preferred forum but does not prohibit suit elsewhere.

2. What Does “Seriously Inconvenient” Mean?

Under Alabama law, enforcement of a forum‑selection clause is “unreasonable” only if litigation in the chosen forum would be:

“so gravely difficult and inconvenient that the [challenging party] will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court.”

This is much more than:

Long distance or travel inconvenience;
Greater cost or inconvenience compared with suing at home; or
Moderate financial hardship or tight resources.

It approaches a functional inability to litigate there—e.g., extreme health conditions, insurmountable legal barriers, or truly catastrophic financial circumstances with no feasible workaround.

3. What Are “Extraordinary Facts” Arising After the Contract?

One of the Northern Capital factors asks whether:

Events occurring after the contract was signed;
Which were not reasonably foreseeable at the time;
Have made the chosen forum particularly burdensome or inaccessible.

Examples might include:

A severe, unexpected disability preventing travel;
A drastic legal change (e.g., the chosen forum becomes unavailable for such claims);
Some extraordinary calamity uniquely affecting the plaintiff’s ability to appear in the chosen forum.

Everyday hardships stemming from the contract’s subject matter—such as property damage or ordinary financial strain—generally do not count as “extraordinary” in this sense.

4. What Is a Writ of Mandamus?

A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary order from a higher court directing a lower court or public official to perform a specific duty. It is not a routine appeal; it is granted only when:

The petitioner has a clear legal right to the relief;
The lower court has a duty to act and has refused to do so;
There is no adequate alternative remedy (like a standard appeal); and
The higher court has proper jurisdiction.

In this case, mandamus was the vehicle to immediately review a pre‑trial order (denial of a motion to dismiss) instead of waiting for a final judgment, which could not adequately remedy the harm of being forced to litigate in an improper forum.

5. Rule 12(b)(3) Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue

Under Rule 12(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., a defendant can seek dismissal of a case on the ground of “improper venue.” When a contract requires an out‑of‑state forum, an Alabama court is typically an improper venue for that dispute, and the proper remedy is dismissal rather than transfer (because the chosen forum is outside Alabama’s court system).

V. Conclusion

Ex parte Best Choice Roofing Alabama, LLC stands as a robust reaffirmation—and subtle tightening—of Alabama’s pro‑enforcement stance on outbound forum‑selection clauses. The Supreme Court:

Reemphasizes that the burden on a party challenging such a clause is “difficult” and requires a clear showing of either unfairness (fraud, undue influence, overweening power) or unreasonableness (serious inconvenience).
Clarifies that individual status, modest means, travel distance, localized evidence, and even substantial—but routine—financial hardship do not satisfy the “seriously inconvenient” standard.
Insists that “extraordinary facts” must arise after contract formation and be truly exceptional, not merely consequences of the underlying dispute.
Reaffirms that parties—whether businesses or individuals—are bound by clear contractual terms they sign or electronically execute, including outbound forum‑selection clauses.

For Alabama litigants and practitioners, the decision underscores the centrality of freedom of contract in forum selection and the limited scope of judicial power to relieve parties of contractual burdens they later regret. For businesses, it provides further assurance that well‑drafted, conspicuous outbound forum‑selection clauses will be enforced, even in consumer and homeowner contexts. For individuals, it is a powerful reminder of the legal weight carried by “small print” provisions and the importance of understanding and, where necessary, negotiating forum terms before signing.