Evolving Market Realities and NCAA Eligibility Rules: Antitrust Scrutiny and Market Definition After Jett Elad v. NCAA

I. Introduction

The Third Circuit’s precedential decision in Jett Elad v. NCAA, No. 25‑1870 (3d Cir. Nov. 25, 2025), marks a major development in the antitrust treatment of NCAA rules in the era of name, image, and likeness (“NIL”) compensation. Although the Court ultimately vacated a preliminary injunction that had allowed Rutgers football player Jett Elad to participate in the 2025–26 season, the opinion establishes two critical principles:

NCAA “eligibility” rules are not categorically immune from antitrust scrutiny; a court must ask in each case whether a specific rule is “commercial” in effect.
Antitrust market definitions in college sports must be grounded in current economic realities, not borrowed wholesale from pre‑Alston cases, and must be supported by actual economic evidence.

The case sits at the intersection of antitrust law, the rapidly commercializing world of college sports, and the strict standards governing preliminary injunctive relief. It is especially important because it substantially limits the Third Circuit’s earlier decision in Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998), which had treated NCAA eligibility rules as noncommercial and thus outside the Sherman Act, and because it gives district courts a clear roadmap for how to approach market definition in post‑Alston athlete‑labor cases.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The NCAA and the “JUCO Rule”

The NCAA is a membership association of roughly 1,100 colleges and universities, organized into Divisions I, II, and III. Each Division adopts bylaws that bind member institutions, and through them, student‑athletes. Rutgers University competes in Division I.

Two NCAA Division I bylaws together create what the opinion calls the “JUCO Rule”:

A student‑athlete may compete in only four seasons of intercollegiate athletics in a given sport,
within a five‑year clock, and
any season played at a junior college (“JUCO”) counts toward those four seasons.

As applied here, this means that a football player who spends one season at a JUCO and three at NCAA Division I institutions has exhausted his four seasons of eligibility—even though he has played only three seasons at the Division I level.

B. Jett Elad’s Career Path and NIL Deal

Between 2019 and 2024, Elad played four seasons of college football:

at Ohio University (Division I),
at Garden City Community College (JUCO), and
at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV, Division I).

This exhausted his four seasons of eligibility over a five‑year period under the JUCO Rule. Because one season was at a JUCO, he had only three Division I seasons but was still barred from playing again in Division I.

Initially, Elad accepted that limitation and turned toward pursuing an NFL career. But in 2024, the Middle District of Tennessee in Pavia v. NCAA, 760 F. Supp. 3d 527 (M.D. Tenn. 2024), granted a preliminary injunction to Vanderbilt quarterback Diego Pavia, who had played two JUCO seasons and challenged the same JUCO Rule under § 1 of the Sherman Act. The court in Pavia found a strong likelihood of success on the merits, reasoning that the JUCO Rule improperly restrained the labor market for college football athletes.

In light of Pavia, Elad saw a new path: seek a waiver and attempt to play a final Division I season. He entered the NCAA transfer portal, and Rutgers recruited him to play safety for the 2025–26 season. As part of its recruiting efforts, Rutgers helped Elad secure an NIL deal with Sir Henry Advertising Agency worth approximately $500,000—a “life‑altering” amount for him and his family, as the District Court noted.

C. NCAA Denial, District Court Injunction, and Appeal

Rutgers sought an NCAA waiver of the JUCO Rule for Elad, invoking the reasoning in Pavia. The NCAA denied the waiver; Rutgers appealed internally, and the next day Elad filed suit in the District of New Jersey, alleging that the JUCO Rule was an unlawful restraint of trade under § 1 of the Sherman Act and requesting a preliminary injunction permitting him to play while the case was litigated.

The District Court (Judge Quraishi) granted the preliminary injunction, enjoining the NCAA from counting Elad’s JUCO season against his eligibility. The NCAA appealed, arguing, among other things, that:

the JUCO Rule was a noncommercial eligibility rule and therefore outside the Sherman Act (relying heavily on Smith v. NCAA), and
Elad had failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits because he had not properly defined the relevant antitrust market.

The Third Circuit had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) to review the interlocutory order granting the preliminary injunction.

III. Summary of the Third Circuit’s Opinion

Judge Montgomery‑Reeves, writing for a unanimous panel, vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded. The Court’s core conclusions are:

The JUCO Rule is “commercial” and subject to the Sherman Act.
The Court rejected the NCAA’s broad reading of Smith v. NCAA that NCAA eligibility rules are categorically noncommercial. Instead, it held that the JUCO Rule has a commercial effect because it restricts Elad’s participation in, and ability to profit from, the college football labor market. Thus, the Sherman Act does apply.
The District Court erred by failing to define a relevant market supported by current economic evidence.
Although the parties agreed to a rule‑of‑reason framework, the District Court did not make its own explicit market findings and appeared simply to repeat the market definition used by Elad’s expert (Dr. Joel Maxcy): “the labor market for college football athletes in general and NCAA Division I football specifically.” The Third Circuit held that:
- This failure to conduct an independent fact‑specific market analysis is legal error; and
- Dr. Maxcy’s opinion itself was insufficient because it relied almost exclusively on NCAA v. Alston, 594 U.S. 69 (2021), and on pre‑Alston market assumptions, without any economic data or analysis reflecting the post‑Alston NIL era.
Without a properly defined relevant market, Elad failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits, one of the two “most critical” preliminary injunction factors. Accordingly, the District Court abused its discretion in granting the injunction.

The case is remanded so that the District Court can conduct a proper relevant‑market analysis, taking into account “changing market realities” that it had identified but not formally integrated into its legal findings.

IV. Detailed Analysis of the Opinion

A. Preliminary Injunction Standard and Its Role in the Decision

The Court reiterates the now-familiar four‑factor test for preliminary injunctions, citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997); Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009); and its own decision in Boynes v. Limetree Bay Ventures LLC, 110 F.4th 604 (3d Cir. 2024):

Likelihood of success on the merits,
Risk of irreparable harm absent relief,
Balance of the equities, and
Public interest.

The first two factors are “the most critical,” and only if both favor the movant does the court turn to the balance of harms and the public interest. Because the Third Circuit finds that Elad failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits, it does not need to reach the questions of irreparable harm or the equities (citing Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475 (3d Cir. 2000)).

This procedural posture is important: the appellate court is not deciding whether the JUCO Rule ultimately violates the Sherman Act. It is deciding only whether, on the existing record, Elad made a sufficiently strong showing of likely success to justify the “extraordinary and drastic remedy” of a preliminary injunction. That creates space for the district court, on remand and with a fuller record, to reach a different conclusion on the merits than it did at the preliminary stage.

B. The Sherman Act Framework and the Centrality of Market Definition

Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, prohibits “[e]very contract, combination … or conspiracy, in restraint of trade.” As the Court explains—drawing on Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), and NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984)—the statute embodies a commitment to competition as the best means of allocating resources.

The opinion underscores two threshold requirements for § 1 liability:

Concerted action between separate entities (here, NCAA and its member schools—a point not contested), and
A “commercial” restraint of trade—the Sherman Act does not reach purely noncommercial, non‑business conduct (Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940); Smith v. NCAA; United States v. Brown University, 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993)).

Once a commercial restraint is identified, courts choose a framework—per se, “quick look,” or rule‑of‑reason—based on how obviously anticompetitive the conduct appears (FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999); Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 2010)). Here, the parties agreed that the rule‑of‑reason applies.

Under the modern articulation from Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U.S. 529 (2018), rule‑of‑reason analysis generally involves:

Plaintiff’s burden: Show that the restraint has a substantial anticompetitive effect in a properly defined relevant market.
Defendant’s burden: Produce a procompetitive rationale for the restraint.
Plaintiff’s rebuttal: Demonstrate that the same procompetitive benefits could be achieved through less restrictive means.

While the Supreme Court cautioned in Alston that courts should not treat these three steps as a “rote checklist,” there remains a core requirement: a “fact‑specific examination of market power and market structure … to assess the challenged restraint’s actual effect on competition” (American Express, 585 U.S. at 541–42). That, in turn, requires an accurately defined relevant market, and the plaintiff bears the burden of identifying and supporting that market (Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430 (3d Cir. 1997)).

The fundamental defect the Third Circuit identifies in Elad’s case is that this market‑definition prerequisite was not met.

C. Rejecting Categorical Immunity for NCAA “Eligibility” Rules

1. The NCAA’s reliance on Smith v. NCAA

The NCAA’s first major argument was that the JUCO Rule is an “eligibility” rule, and under Smith v. NCAA such rules are not “related to the NCAA’s commercial or business activities” and therefore fall outside the Sherman Act.

In Smith, the plaintiff challenged a bylaw that prevented student‑athletes from competing in intercollegiate athletics as postgraduate students at schools other than the institution from which they had earned their undergraduate degree. The Third Circuit there held that the eligibility rule was noncommercial and thus non‑actionable under § 1.

In Elad, the NCAA sought to extend Smith into a broad categorical rule: if a bylaw is labeled an “eligibility” rule, it is per se noncommercial and immune from antitrust scrutiny.

2. The Third Circuit’s limitation of Smith in light of Alston

The panel refuses to follow Smith to that extent. Citing Reich v. D.M. Sabia Co., 90 F.3d 854 (3d Cir. 1996), it acknowledges that while a panel cannot overrule prior circuit precedent, it may decline to follow it where “intervening authority” from the Supreme Court makes the old rule untenable.

The intervening authority is NCAA v. Alston, 594 U.S. 69 (2021), where the Supreme Court:

Emphasized the dramatic commercialization of college sports over time (increasing revenue, media rights, and the integration of athletics into university business operations), and
Warned that “static judicial decrees in ever‑evolving markets may themselves facilitate collusion or frustrate entry and competition,” adding that “if market realities change, so may [a] legal analysis” (Alston, 594 U.S. at 93, 99).

In light of that, the Third Circuit holds:

Smith cannot be read as creating a blanket antitrust immunity for all eligibility rules.
The relevant inquiry is not labels but economic substance—whether the particular rule at issue has a commercial effect on a market in trade or commerce.

The Court underscores the danger of the NCAA’s position with a hypothetical: if any bylaw that affects compensation could be immunized simply by styling it as an “eligibility bylaw,” the NCAA could evade antitrust review for plainly anticompetitive compensation restrictions. That would be inconsistent with the Sherman Act’s intended “expansive reach” (Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975)) and with Board of Regents, which focuses on the impact on competition, not on the formal label of a rule.

3. Why the JUCO Rule is “commercial”

Turning to the specific bylaw at issue, the Court agrees with the District Court that the JUCO Rule does have a commercial effect. It:

Restricts Elad’s ability to participate in NCAA Division I football, and
Consequently restricts his ability to earn NIL compensation and other economic benefits tied to playing at that level.

In antitrust terms, Elad is challenging the JUCO Rule as a limitation on his ability to sell his labor to Division I football programs—a labor‑market restraint. The Court notes that the Supreme Court has long recognized that association rules affecting access to a labor market can violate § 1. It cites Anderson v. Shipowners Ass’n of the Pacific Coast, 272 U.S. 359 (1926), where a shipping association’s hiring rules for seamen were held potentially unlawful because they “unduly interfere[d] with the free exercise of the[] rights” of workers seeking to engage in trade and commerce (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919)).

On this reasoning, the JUCO Rule is plainly commercial: it affects who can participate in a remunerative labor market, and under modern NIL arrangements, the financial implications are unmistakable. The Court holds that the JUCO Rule is not exempt from Sherman Act scrutiny, even though it is an eligibility rule.

At the same time, the panel is careful not to swing the pendulum too far in the opposite direction. It does not declare that all NCAA eligibility rules are commercial or unlawful. Rather, it states explicitly that:

Not every eligibility rule is “per se commercial,” and
The NCAA may be able to justify many such rules under the rule‑of‑reason (citing Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012)).

The key holding is that eligibility rules are not categorically outside the Sherman Act. Courts must examine whether a specific rule has commercial effects and then apply the rule‑of‑reason accordingly.

D. Market Definition: The Critical Defect in Elad’s Case

1. Why a “relevant market” is indispensable

The Court leans heavily on American Express and related precedents (Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962)) to emphasize that antitrust plaintiffs must define:

the product market (what is being bought and sold), and
the geographic market (where effective competition occurs).

The “relevant market” is “the area of effective competition”—the “arena within which significant substitution in consumption or production occurs”—and it must “correspond to the commercial realities” of the industry (American Express, 585 U.S. at 543).

This is not a mere formality. Without understanding what the market is, a court cannot sensibly determine whether a restraint has raised prices, reduced output, degraded quality, or otherwise harmed competition. Nor can it assess market power. Accordingly, the Third Circuit has consistently held that district courts must make explicit, fact‑supported market findings and cannot simply accept one side’s definition without analysis (FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327 (3d Cir. 2016)).

2. The District Court’s error: no genuine market finding

In Elad, the District Court appeared to accept the market proposed by Elad’s expert economist, Dr. Joel Maxcy: “the labor market for college football athletes in general and NCAA Division I football specifically.” But, as the Third Circuit notes, the District Court:

never explicitly adopted that market definition as a factual finding, and
never explained why that was the proper market in light of the evidence and competing expert testimony.

That is a legal error under Penn State Hershey and American Express. When parties “differ” about the relevant market—as they did here via their dueling experts—the district court cannot avoid making its own “fact‑specific” market determination.

3. The inadequacy of plaintiff’s expert evidence

Even if one assumes the District Court implicitly adopted Dr. Maxcy’s market, the Third Circuit concludes that doing so would have been “clearly erroneous.”

The key problem: Dr. Maxcy’s market opinion rested almost entirely on previous case law, especially Alston, and not on any independent economic analysis, data, or study of the current market. The opinion underscores that:

Dr. Maxcy testified he did not conduct or consult any economic analyses to support his market opinion.
He effectively assumed that the relevant market here was the same as that described in Alston, even though Alston concerned a narrower group (Division I football and basketball) and arose in a different procedural posture.

The Court emphasizes a crucial point: in Alston, the Supreme Court did not itself make any binding factual finding about the relevant market. It simply accepted, for purposes of appellate review, the market definition that the parties had not contested at trial. As later recognized in Fourqurean v. NCAA, 143 F.4th 859 (citation in the opinion), Alston stands for the proposition that the Supreme Court took the district court’s market findings as given; it did not freeze that market into permanent law.

Thus, relying solely on Alston (or Pavia, which itself relied heavily on Alston) as a market “source” is legally inadequate. The Third Circuit insists that antitrust markets must be proven by evidence, not simply adopted by analogy to older cases.

4. The role of changing “market realities” after Alston

A deeper conceptual flaw is that Dr. Maxcy’s analysis treated the college athlete labor market as static, relying on pre‑Alston understandings. The Third Circuit, echoing Alston, stresses that:

The college sports marketplace has undergone significant transformation, especially with the emergence of NIL rights and related NIL “collectives.”
This has altered how athletes are recruited, compensated, and evaluated, and thus changed the structure and dynamics of the athlete labor market.

Citing scholarship on NIL and Title IX issues (Kassandra Ramsey, NIL Collectives—Title IX’s Latest Challenge), the Court suggests that post‑Alston compensation mechanisms have turned the college athletic environment into something more overtly commercial and complex than when Smith was decided.

In this context, the Court reiterates Alston’s warning: “when market realities change, so may the legal analysis.” It then draws a strong inference: an antitrust plaintiff cannot simply lift a market definition from an older case without examining whether the real‑world market has changed in economically significant ways.

Accordingly, because:

Dr. Maxcy provided no empirical analysis of the modern NIL‑driven market, and
the District Court performed no independent market evaluation,

Elad failed to carry his burden to define a relevant market. That failure, in turn, meant he did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits under the rule‑of‑reason.

5. Collateral estoppel and prior NCAA antitrust rulings

Elad attempted to argue that Alston (and in effect Pavia) collaterally estopped the NCAA from contesting the relevant market definition. The Third Circuit rejects this.

Drawing on Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979), the Court notes that collateral estoppel does not apply where “changes in facts essential to a judgment” have occurred. Relevant markets, almost by definition, are “non‑static” factual inquiries, sensitive to evolving economic conditions. In a domain like college sports where compensation practices, NIL rules, transfer rules, and institutional behavior are evolving rapidly, prior market findings are particularly unlikely to be frozen in place.

Thus, prior NCAA antitrust judgments do not conclusively settle the market definition for future cases, especially where the factual underpinnings have changed.

E. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion situates itself within, and subtly reshapes, a line of antitrust and NCAA‑related precedents:

Standard Oil, Board of Regents, Apex Hosiery, Brown University: Provide the historical and doctrinal basis for the Sherman Act’s focus on commercial restraints and the commitment to competitive markets.
Smith v. NCAA: Previously used to insulate eligibility rules from antitrust scrutiny as noncommercial; here, narrowed substantially. Smith survives, but only as a case about a particular eligibility rule in a pre‑NIL era, not as a broad immunity doctrine for everything the NCAA calls “eligibility.”
Alston: The lynchpin for modern NCAA antitrust analysis. The Third Circuit uses Alston not as a template for market definition, but as a warning against relying on outdated market assumptions and as a reminder that NCAA rules are subject to full antitrust scrutiny.
American Express, California Dental, Indiana Fed. of Dentists, Deutscher Tennis Bund, Penn State Hershey: Provide the structure for rule‑of‑reason analysis and the imperative of defining, and proving, an accurate relevant market based on “commercial realities.”
Anderson v. Shipowners Ass’n, Colgate: Support the recognition of labor‑market restraints imposed by associations as cognizable under the Sherman Act.
Reich: Authorizes the panel to limit Smith in light of intervening Supreme Court authority, without formally overruling it.
Agnew v. NCAA (7th Cir.) and Fourqurean v. NCAA: Persuasive authority emphasizing both (a) that NCAA rules are subject to antitrust review and (b) that Alston did not itself fix the relevant market for all time.
Montana: Reinforces that issue preclusion does not apply when underlying facts (here, market structure) have materially changed.

Collectively, these cases provide both the doctrinal backbone for the decision and the justification for updating Third Circuit law in response to Alston and the NIL revolution.

F. What the Opinion Does Not Decide

It is equally important to note what Elad does not decide:

The Court does not hold that the JUCO Rule is lawful or unlawful under § 1. It only concludes that the plaintiff has not yet shown a likelihood of success, largely because he failed to define and support a relevant market.
The Court does not declare all NCAA eligibility rules commercial. Some may be noncommercial, especially those that genuinely and exclusively concern academic or purely sporting qualifications. Others may be commercial and anticompetitive but justified by strong procompetitive rationales (competitive balance, preservation of amateurism, integrity of competition) under the rule‑of‑reason.
The Court does not decide whether Elad could, on a fuller evidentiary record, define an appropriate market and prove anticompetitive effects. It leaves that possibility open on remand.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Commercial” vs. noncommercial restraints

The Sherman Act only applies to restraints that affect “trade or commerce.” A rule is generally “commercial” if:

It affects buying and selling of goods or services, including labor as a service.
It has economic consequences in a market (e.g., wages, prices, output, quality).

A purely internal, non‑economic rule—for example, a genuinely academic eligibility standard that does not affect market competition—may be noncommercial. But where a rule affects who can participate in a profitable labor market (such as Division I football with NIL income), it is commercial in effect.

2. Relevant market

In antitrust, a “market” has two dimensions:

Product market: what good or service is at issue (here, the “labor” of college football players; but questions may arise about whether to include JUCO, Division II, professional leagues, etc.).
Geographic market: the area where buyers and sellers compete (national? regional? conference‑based?).

Courts look for where consumers (or, in labor markets, employers and workers) can feasibly substitute one product or opportunity for another. That is why “commercial realities” matter: the market must reflect how the industry actually functions.

3. Rule-of-reason

Under the rule‑of‑reason, the court balances harms and benefits:

Step 1: Plaintiff shows the rule significantly harms competition in a defined market (e.g., reduces opportunities, suppresses compensation, limits output).
Step 2: Defendant shows procompetitive benefits (e.g., preserving competitive balance, maintaining product quality, preventing fraud or free‑riding).
Step 3: Plaintiff shows the same benefits could be achieved with a less restrictive rule.

This is context‑specific and flexible, but always anchored in economic evidence.

4. Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion)

Collateral estoppel stops a party from relitigating an issue already decided in a prior case, but only if:

the same issue was actually litigated and decided,
that decision was essential to the judgment, and
the factual circumstances have not materially changed.

Because antitrust markets are fact‑dependent and can change rapidly (especially in fields like college sports), past findings about “the market” are rarely final for all future time.

5. Preliminary injunction and “likelihood of success”

To get a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show more than a non‑frivolous case. “Likelihood of success on the merits” means the plaintiff has a strong chance of ultimately winning, based on the present record. Where a plaintiff cannot even define the relevant market—an essential element in rule‑of‑reason cases—courts ordinarily cannot say he is “likely” to prevail.

VI. Likely Impact and Future Implications

A. NCAA Litigation Strategy and the Demise of “Label‑Based” Immunity

After Elad, the NCAA cannot rely on a simple argument that “this is an eligibility rule” to shield its bylaws from the Sherman Act within the Third Circuit. Instead, in future cases, it will need to:

Engage with whether a given rule has a commercial effect, and
Be prepared to justify the rule’s competitive effects under the rule‑of‑reason.

This may alter how the NCAA drafts and defends its rules. Attempts to label substantive compensation or transfer rules as “eligibility” rules to avoid scrutiny are now legally suspect.

B. The NIL Era and the “Commercialization” of College Athletics

The opinion explicitly embraces the idea that modern college sports—especially Division I football—operate as a commercial marketplace in crucial respects. NIL contracts like Elad’s $500,000 deal are powerful evidence of this. Consequently:

Restrictions that affect an athlete’s ability to play at the Division I level will frequently be market‑affecting labor restraints, not mere educational policies.
Courts will likely treat athlete‑school relationships far more like employer‑employee (or principal‑independent contractor) relationships for antitrust purposes, even if they are not so labeled in other areas of law.

C. Heightened Demands on Expert Evidence in Sports Antitrust Cases

Elad sends a strong signal to litigants:

Antitrust experts must perform economic analysis tailored to the current market—surveys, data analysis, competitive effects modeling, etc.—rather than simply citing old cases.
Courts will scrutinize whether an expert’s market definition accounts for new economic phenomena such as NIL deals, transfer portals, conference realignment, and media‑rights developments.

That will likely increase both the complexity and cost of litigating antitrust claims in the college sports context, but it also promises more economically grounded decisions.

D. Guidance to District Courts on Remand and in Future Cases

The remand instructions are clear: the District Court must:

Conduct a “relevant market analysis,”
“Tease out the changing market realities” post‑Alston, and
Make explicit factual findings on the market(s) at issue.

This guidance extends beyond Elad’s case. In future college sports antitrust litigation, district courts in the Third Circuit will have to:

Resist the urge to import market definitions from previous NCAA cases without careful factual re‑evaluation.
Demand empirical support from both sides’ economists.

As a result, we may see diverging market definitions tailored to different types of NCAA rules:

Markets limited to Division I football, or
Broader markets including JUCO and lower divisions,
Or even multi‑layered markets that treat NIL collectives, schools, media entities, and athletes as participants in interconnected platforms.

E. Influence Beyond the Third Circuit

Other circuits confronting similar NIL‑era challenges—like the Seventh Circuit in Agnew and the rulings referenced in Fourqurean—may look to Elad as persuasive authority, particularly on:

The rejection of categorical immunity for NCAA eligibility rules, and
The insistence on current, evidence‑based market definition rather than rote reliance on Alston.

The opinion thus contributes to a growing national trend: treating NCAA rules as fully subject to modern antitrust principles, while recognizing that some restraints may ultimately be justified as procompetitive.

VII. Conclusion

Jett Elad v. NCAA does not answer whether the JUCO Rule is lawful under the Sherman Act, but it reshapes the analytical landscape in which that question must be decided. The decision:

Limits the reach of Smith v. NCAA, holding that NCAA eligibility rules are not categorically noncommercial and therefore not automatically beyond the Sherman Act.
Recognizes the JUCO Rule as a commercial labor‑market restraint because it restricts athletes’ ability to compete and earn NIL income in Division I football.
Insists on rigorous, evidence‑based market definition, particularly in a rapidly evolving NIL era, and rejects reliance on static market assumptions imbibed from Alston or earlier cases.
Clarifies that prior NCAA antitrust decisions do not collaterally estop new market analyses where the underlying economic facts have changed.

For courts, the message is doctrinal: antitrust analysis must track “market realities” and cannot be frozen in pre‑NIL case law. For the NCAA and student‑athletes, the message is practical: rules that meaningfully affect the flow of money and opportunity in college sports will be judged by the full measure of the Sherman Act, with no refuge in mere labels.

As the case proceeds on remand, and as similar challenges arise nationwide, Elad will likely serve as a foundational authority on how to approach antitrust scrutiny of NCAA rules in the modern, commercialized world of college athletics.