Evidentiary Use of Post‑Offense Firearm Videos and Victim Contact Testimony to Prove § 924(c) “Firearm” in Carjacking Cases: Commentary on United States v. Righter (3d Cir. 2025)

Evidentiary Use of Post‑Offense Firearm Videos and Victim Contact Testimony to Prove § 924(c) “Firearm” in Carjacking Cases:
Commentary on United States v. Keenan Righter (3d Cir. 2025)

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Non‑Precedential Opinion)

Date: December 19, 2025

Panel: Judges Restrepo, McKee, and Smith

Author: Judge Restrepo

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Third Circuit’s non‑precedential opinion in United States v. Keenan Righter, No. 24‑2955, affirming convictions arising out of two armed carjackings near Wawa convenience stores in Delaware County, Pennsylvania.

Although formally designated “not precedential” under the court’s Internal Operating Procedures, the opinion is rich in doctrinal content in two recurring areas of federal criminal practice:

  • The admissibility of post‑offense firearm‑possession evidence (here, a jail video call showing the defendant holding a handgun with an extended magazine) under the Federal Rules of Evidence, especially Rules 401, 403, and 404(b); and
  • The sufficiency of evidence for carjacking and § 924(c) firearm charges where:
    • no eyewitness directly identifies the defendant at the scene,
    • no weapon is recovered, and
    • proof is predominantly circumstantial, relying heavily on digital forensics (CSLI, LPR data, texts, social media, and vehicle recovery data) and victim testimony about the look, feel, and weight of the gun used.

The Government charged Righter with:

  • Conspiracy to commit carjacking (18 U.S.C. § 371);
  • Two substantive counts of carjacking and aiding and abetting (18 U.S.C. §§ 2119 and 2); and
  • Two counts of using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence and aiding and abetting (18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and 2).

On appeal, Righter advanced two central arguments:

  1. The district court erred in admitting a March 29, 2023 video call (roughly two months after the carjackings) showing him holding a handgun with an extended magazine, in conversation with an incarcerated associate. He argued the video was irrelevant (Rule 401), unfairly prejudicial (Rule 403), and inadmissible “other act” character evidence (Rule 404(b)).
  2. The evidence was insufficient to support any of his convictions, particularly:
    • insufficient proof that he planned or participated in either carjacking, and
    • insufficient proof under § 924(c) that the weapons used were real “firearms” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3).

The Third Circuit rejected both strands of argument, affirming all convictions and the 280‑month sentence. While non‑binding as precedent, the opinion provides a useful, concrete illustration of:

  • how courts weigh probative value and prejudice for digital firearm imagery closely linked in time and detail to the charged offense, and
  • how victim tactile testimony (weight, feel, impact) and threat context can satisfy the statutory definition of “firearm” even in the absence of recovered weapons or discharged rounds.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Background

The Government alleged two carjacking incidents:

  1. January 14, 2023 – Mercedes SUV carjacking (Victim: Gaurav Arora)
    Three men (including Righter and Jamar Miller) arrived in a white Chevrolet Malibu at a Wawa parking lot. Two masked, armed men approached Arora as he entered his Mercedes SUV. One struck him on the head with what Arora believed was a pistol. Arora wrestled with the gun; one perpetrator threatened to shoot him if he did not let go. Arora dropped his belongings and keys and fled into the store. The Malibu departed first, and the gunmen drove off in the Mercedes, later recovered by police.
  2. January 24, 2023 – Lexus sedan carjacking (Victim: Eric Singleton)
    Again using the white Malibu, three men approached Singleton at a different Wawa as he walked to his Lexus. One man confronted Singleton from the front, brandishing a gun with an extended magazine. Another took Singleton’s keys from his pocket and struck him on the back of the head with the butt of a gun. Singleton heard them drive off in his Lexus, which was recovered about three hours later.

Digital evidence linked Righter and Miller to both incidents: surveillance videos, license‑plate reader data, cell‑site location information (CSLI), vehicle location data, text messages, recorded calls, and social media messages, including Instagram communications and images.

Before trial, the district court denied Righter’s motion to exclude a March 29, 2023 video call with incarcerated associate Jasir Henry, during which Righter was seen at home holding a handgun with an extended magazine. Righter renewed the objection at trial; the court again denied it.

After a four‑day trial, the jury convicted Righter on all five counts. The district court denied his motion for judgment of acquittal and imposed a 280‑month prison term plus five years’ supervised release. Righter appealed, challenging both the evidentiary ruling and the sufficiency of the evidence.

B. Holdings

The Third Circuit held:

  1. Admission of the March 29 video was not an abuse of discretion.
    The video was relevant under Rule 401; not unduly prejudicial under Rule 403; and either outside Rule 404(b)’s “other act” framework as intrinsic or, alternatively, admissible under the usual Rule 404(b) test because it was offered for a proper, non‑propensity purpose: corroborating Singleton’s description of a distinctive handgun with an extended magazine and linking Righter to the weapon used in the January 24 carjacking.
  2. The evidence was sufficient to support each conviction.
    Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the Government, a reasonable juror could find:
    • Righter agreed with Miller and an associate to commit carjackings (conspiracy, § 371);
    • Righter participated in and aided and abetted two carjackings (§§ 2119, 2);
    • Righter used or carried, or aided and abetted the use or carrying of, a firearm during and in relation to the carjackings (§ 924(c)(1)(A), § 2); and
    • the weapons used were “firearms” as defined in § 921(a)(3), even though no weapons were recovered.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

The panel relied on a range of precedents for evidentiary standards, conspiracy and substantive elements, aiding‑and‑abetting liability, and § 924(c) firearm proof. The key cited decisions are:

  • United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2000) – abuse‑of‑discretion review for evidentiary rulings;
  • Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep’t, 174 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 1999) – low threshold for relevance under Rule 401;
  • United States v. Universal Rehabilitation Services (PA), Inc., 205 F.3d 657 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) – “great deference” to district court’s Rule 403 balancing;
  • United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2010) – framework for admitting Rule 404(b) evidence and defining “intrinsic” evidence;
  • United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 2014) – rejecting use of gun‑possession evidence merely to show a defendant’s “propensity to possess guns”;
  • United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2009) – plenary review for sufficiency challenges;
  • United States v. Moyer, 674 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 2012) – deference to jury fact‑finding and viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the Government;
  • United States v. Caraballo‑Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) – high bar for overturning convictions on sufficiency grounds (“only if no reasonable juror could accept the evidence”);
  • United States v. Scarfo, 41 F.4th 136 (3d Cir. 2022) – elements of a § 371 conspiracy;
  • United States v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679 (3d Cir. 1999) – elements of federal carjacking under § 2119;
  • United States v. Stevens, 70 F.4th 653 (3d Cir. 2023) – framework for § 924(c) and aiding and abetting;
  • Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014) – aiding‑and‑abetting liability for § 924(c);
  • United States v. Beverly, 99 F.3d 570 (3d Cir. 1996) – sufficiency of victim testimony to prove that a weapon was a “firearm” under § 924(c);
  • United States v. Lake, 150 F.3d 269 (3d Cir. 1998) – similar point regarding victim testimony and fear; and
  • Parker v. United States, 801 F.2d 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1986) – the “threatening others with a gun is tantamount to saying the gun is loaded” rationale.

Collectively, these authorities shape three doctrinal pillars in the opinion:

  1. Evidence admissibility standards (Rules 401, 403, 404(b));
  2. Standards for sufficiency review and circumstantial proof in conspiracy and substantive crimes; and
  3. Proof that a weapon is a “firearm” in § 924(c) prosecutions without a recovered weapon.

B. Evidence of Post‑Offense Gun Possession: Legal Reasoning Under Rules 401, 403, and 404(b)

1. Relevance under Rule 401

Rule 401 asks two basic questions:

  1. Does the evidence have any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without it?
  2. Is that fact “of consequence” in determining the action?

The court emphasizes, quoting Hurley, that “Rule 401 does not raise a high standard.”

Here, the “fact of consequence” was whether Righter was one of the perpetrators of the January 24 carjacking and whether he used or carried a gun with an extended magazine during that offense. Singleton testified that:

  • one perpetrator had a handgun,
  • with an extended magazine capable of holding more bullets than normal.

The March 29 video call showed Righter:

  • holding “this exact type of gun” – a handgun with an extended magazine, and
  • doing so only two months after the carjacking.

The panel reasons that the video:

  • made it more likely that Righter was one of the men who used such a gun during the January 24 incident; and
  • corroborated Singleton’s testimony about the distinctive firearm, thereby bolstering Singleton’s credibility.

Righter’s argument that the video was irrelevant because he was “not charged with any crime related to the possession of the firearm” is rejected. The panel notes that he was charged with “using or carrying a firearm” during and in relation to carjackings (§ 924(c)(1)(A)). Post‑offense gun possession—when closely related in time and type to the weapon described by the victim— had clear relevance to identity and weapon use in the offense.

2. Unfair Prejudice and Rule 403 Balancing

Under Rule 403, even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a risk of unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. The Third Circuit, citing Universal Rehabilitation Services, reiterates that it gives “great deference” to the trial court’s Rule 403 decisions.

The district court found the video’s probative value “substantial” because:

  • the call occurred only two months after the January 24 carjacking;
  • the gun’s distinctive configuration (extended magazine) directly matched Singleton’s description; and
  • the clip was described by a witness and provided corroboration of the victim’s account.

The panel agrees and emphasizes that the risk of unfair prejudice was “limited”:

  • Although Righter was talking with an incarcerated person, Righter himself was at home, not shown in custody.
  • Mere possession of a handgun, standing alone, is not illegal in the abstract.

In other words, the video did not depict violence or inherently inflammatory behavior unrelated to the charged crimes; it showed Righter in what appears to be normal surroundings holding a lawful‑looking object whose significance derived from its similarity to the crime‑scene description.

Within this framework, the panel finds no abuse of discretion in concluding that the probative value was not “substantially outweighed” by unfair prejudice. The analysis implicitly instructs trial courts to:

  • closely tie weapon‑related evidence to specific features described by witnesses, and
  • explain why the manner of presentation limits unfair prejudice (e.g., non‑custodial setting, absence of gratuitous violence).

3. Rule 404(b) and the Character/Propensity Concern

Rule 404(b)(1) bars evidence of “any other crime, wrong, or act” offered solely “to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Rule 404(b)(2) allows such evidence if offered for permissible purposes such as identity, intent, opportunity, preparation, or absence of mistake.

The panel makes two key moves:

  1. It notes that Rule 404(b) does not apply to evidence that is “intrinsic” to the offense – that is, evidence that directly proves the charged crime or is inextricably intertwined with it (Green). The court states that it “questions” whether the video even falls within Rule 404(b)’s scope, implying that it may be considered direct proof of the charged § 924(c) offense (identity and weapon type) rather than a separate “other act.”
  2. It then proceeds as if Rule 404(b) applied and demonstrates that, even under that more restrictive framework, the video is admissible.

Under Green, 404(b) evidence is admissible if:

  1. It has a proper evidentiary purpose other than propensity;
  2. It is relevant under Rule 401;
  3. Its probative value is not substantially outweighed by Rule 403 concerns; and
  4. A limiting instruction is given if requested.

The panel characterizes the video’s purpose as identity and corroboration, not propensity. Citing Caldwell, it distinguishes between:

  • Impermissible use: “He possessed a gun before, therefore he is the kind of person who possesses guns, therefore he probably possessed a gun during the crime” (propensity), and
  • Permissible use: “He possessed a specific type of gun with an extended magazine which matches the victim’s description, making it more likely he was the particular perpetrator in this case” (identity and corroboration).

The panel concludes:

  • The video is “probative of a material issue other than character” (quoting Huddleston via Green);
  • The Rule 403 analysis, already discussed, is satisfied; and
  • The trial court offered a limiting instruction confining the jury’s use of the video to a permissible purpose, but defense counsel rejected the offer. Thus, any complaint on this front effectively evaporates.

Doctrinal takeaway:

  • The Third Circuit confirms that post‑offense firearm‑possession evidence can be admitted in § 924(c) and violent crime prosecutions where:
    • the weapon’s configuration is distinctive and matches witness descriptions,
    • the evidence is close in time to the offense, and
    • the Government uses it for identity/participation and corroboration, not to paint a general “gun‑person” character profile.
  • Defense rejection of a limiting instruction can weaken or foreclose later Rule 404(b) complaints on appeal.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence: Conspiracy, Carjacking, and § 924(c)

1. General Standard of Review

Citing Starnes, Moyer, and the en banc decision in Caraballo‑Rodriguez, the court reiterates:

  • Review is plenary as to the legal sufficiency standard, but
  • The appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, honors the jury’s credibility assessments, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict.
  • A conviction will be reversed for insufficiency “only if no reasonable juror could accept the evidence as sufficient” to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

This standard is intentionally demanding; on appeal, the question is not whether the panel, as fact‑finder, would be convinced, but whether any reasonable juror could be.

2. Elements of the Offenses

The court sets out the elements of each count with citations:

  • Conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count One) – (Scarfo):
    1. Agreement between two or more persons to commit carjacking;
    2. Defendant knowingly and intentionally joined the agreement;
    3. At least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy by any coconspirator.
  • Carjacking and aiding and abetting (Counts Two & Four) – (§§ 2119 & 2; Applewhaite):
    1. With intent to cause death or serious bodily harm,
    2. the defendant (or a principal he aided) took a motor vehicle,
    3. that had been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce,
    4. from the person or presence of another,
    5. by force and violence or by intimidation.
  • Using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and aiding and abetting (Counts Three & Five) – (§ 924(c)(1)(A) & § 2; Stevens, Rosemond):
    • Defendant used or carried a firearm during and in relation to the carjacking, or
    • a principal did so and the defendant aided and abetted that conduct with advance knowledge and intent to facilitate the offense.

3. Proof of Righter’s Participation in the Carjackings

Righter argued that because there was no eyewitness identification or DNA placing him at either scene, the evidence could not support his involvement. The panel counters with a detailed mosaic of circumstantial proof, emphasizing that:

Circumstantial evidence is not disfavored; juries may infer guilt from patterns, timing, and digital traces.

a. January 14 Mercedes Carjacking

The key pieces of evidence:

  • White Chevrolet Malibu linkage: Surveillance video and LPR data identified the Malibu used in both incidents as a vehicle registered to Miller’s parents at his address.
  • Pre‑incident travel to Righter’s home: Text messages and CSLI showed Miller traveling to Righter’s residence about two hours before the January 14 carjacking.
  • Co‑location at crime scene: CSLI placed both Righter’s and Miller’s phones within an area encompassing the Wawa during the carjacking timeframe.
  • Post‑incident GPS sharing: About 11 minutes after the carjacking, Righter:
    • called Miller, and
    • texted him the GPS location of the block where the stolen Mercedes was later recovered.

From these facts, the panel concludes that a reasonable juror could infer:

  • There was a deliberate, coordinated plan between Righter and Miller;
  • Righter was not passively nearby – he was sharing precise information about the stolen vehicle’s location minutes after the crime; and
  • This behavior supported both conspiracy and direct or accomplice participation in the carjacking.
b. January 24 Lexus Carjacking

For the second incident, the Government’s case is even stronger, due to explicit incriminating messages:

  • January 16 planning text: Righter messaged Miller:
    “you trying to take me and 3 to get another one ... I’ll give you gas money.”
    • The phrase “another one” reasonably refers to another vehicle to steal, especially in light of the January 14 carjacking.
    • FBI Special Agent Kessler testified that he saw “evidence for three and only three people involved” in the carjackings, supporting an inference that “3” was a nickname for the third associate.
  • CSLI pattern on January 24: Data showed:
    • Miller traveling to Righter’s location; then
    • both phones moving to an area that includes the Wawa where Singleton was carjacked.
  • Post‑carjacking Instagram communication:
    • Within minutes of the carjacking, Righter started an Instagram video chat with Miller and then messaged: “we going to the lot.” The timing and content reasonably suggest coordination in post‑theft movement of the stolen Lexus.
    • A photograph extracted from Miller’s phone showed a Lexus logo matching the stolen vehicle’s interior. The image’s location data placed it at a parking lot in Wilmington, Delaware.
    • CSLI showed both Righter and Miller traveling to and remaining in the general area of that parking lot at the time the photo was taken.

Putting these pieces together, the panel concludes that a rational jury could find:

  • Righter helped plan the January 24 carjacking (“get another one” for gas money);
  • He traveled with Miller to the area of the crime scene;
  • He participated in the offense and post‑offense movement of the stolen car (the “lot” and Lexus logo photo); and
  • At minimum, he aided and abetted the carjacking and firearm offenses.

4. Was Righter One of the Gunmen? Use of Circumstantial Evidence

Righter also challenged his convictions on Counts Two through Five on the ground that there was insufficient evidence he was one of the masked gunmen. The panel points to multiple inferences:

a. January 14 – Inference from Travel Patterns and Separate Vehicles
  • Surveillance footage showed that after the assault on Arora, the Malibu left first, followed by the two gunmen driving off in the Mercedes.
  • Shortly thereafter, Righter texted Miller from near where the Mercedes was recovered, transmitting its location.

From these facts, a reasonable juror could infer that:

  • Miller remained with (or returned to) the Malibu;
  • Righter was traveling in the stolen Mercedes; and
  • Therefore, Righter was one of the two gunmen who departed in the Mercedes, not a distant or peripheral participant.
b. January 24 – “Gas Money” Text and Role Allocation

The January 16 text—“take me and 3 to get another one ... I’ll give you gas money”—supports the inference that:

  • Miller was driving the Malibu;
  • Righter and the third associate were the two gunmen on foot during the carjacking; and
  • Righter expected to contribute “gas money” to induce Miller to drive them to target locations.

Combined with:

  • Singleton’s testimony about the extended‑magazine handgun,
  • the March 29 video of Righter with a matching weapon, and
  • Righter’s post‑incident Instagram message referencing a firearm – “dis slide [is] missing a piece,”

the panel finds that the jury could reasonably conclude Righter personally carried or used a firearm during both incidents.

Even assuming arguendo that a juror might doubt that he was physically one of the gunmen, the panel notes in footnote 7 that the evidence easily suffices to convict him as an accomplice under 18 U.S.C. § 2, citing Rosemond. Under that standard, liability attaches if he performed an affirmative act in furtherance of the crime with the intent to facilitate it and had advance knowledge of the firearm use.

D. Proving a “Firearm” Under § 924(c) Without a Recovered Weapon

1. Statutory Definition

Section 924(c) incorporates the § 921(a)(3) definition of “firearm,” which includes any weapon:

  • “which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive,”
  • as well as the frame or receiver of such a weapon; or
  • mufflers/silencers or destructive devices.

In practice, the question is usually whether the object was a real gun designed to fire bullets, as opposed to a toy, BB gun, replica, or non‑functional object.

2. Prior Third Circuit Guidance: Beverly and Lake

In United States v. Beverly, the Third Circuit held that a victim’s testimony that the defendant threatened him with a chrome‑plated revolver during a robbery was sufficient, even without a recovered weapon or evidence that the weapon had been fired. Key considerations included:

  • the victim’s close physical proximity to the weapon;
  • ample time to observe it; and
  • the context of threats implying the gun was loaded.

In United States v. Lake, similar testimony by victims—detailing their view of the gun and intense fear— also sufficed.

The D.C. Circuit’s observation in Parker—that threatening others with a gun is tantamount to asserting it is loaded and usable—provides further support: logically, robbers rarely gamble their freedom and safety on obvious toy weapons.

3. Application in Righter: Victim Contact as Powerful Corroboration

Righter extends and concretizes this line of cases in an important way: both victims physically interacted with the weapons.

  • Arora (January 14):
    • He grabbed one of the guns and “wrestled” with the armed assailant;
    • He described the gun as “very rugged, detailed, pretty rough around the edges”;
    • When he seized the gun, the perpetrator’s tone became “deeper” and “louder” and the situation “felt more intense,” consistent with a real, dangerous weapon now out of the assailant’s full control;
    • When struck with the gun, he experienced “pretty hard” impact, with swelling and bruising.
  • Singleton (January 24):
    • He was struck on the back of his head with the butt of the gun, leaving three welts;
    • He described the gun as “very heavy ... metal, you could tell there was weight behind it”;
    • He testified that he was familiar with guns and “know[s] the weight to [a gun].”

Neither victim could “definitively” say the guns were real; however, the panel does not require certainty, only proof beyond a reasonable doubt based on reasonable inferences.

Combining:

  • the detailed visual descriptions;
  • the physical feel (weight, metal texture, impact);
  • their injuries; and
  • the assailants’ use of the weapons to threaten and control compliant behavior,

the court concludes it is “highly unlikely” that the weapons were not real firearms. A reasonable juror could thus find that the guns fell within § 921(a)(3)’s definition.

Doctrinal significance:

  • The Third Circuit reinforces that § 924(c) does not require:
    • seizure of the gun;
    • forensic testing; or
    • proof that the gun was fired.
  • Detailed victim testimony about tactile sensations (weight, hardness), impact injuries, and realistic operation in context of threats can, collectively, be enough.
  • Righter arguably goes farther than Beverly and Lake by relying not just on visual observation and fear, but on physical contact and injury as corroborative indicia of authenticity.

E. Impact and Practical Implications

While explicitly “not precedential,” the opinion has substantial persuasive value for trial practitioners and district courts within and beyond the Third Circuit. It crystallizes several practical points.

1. Digital Forensics as Core Evidence in Violent Crime Prosecutions

The case is a paradigmatic example of modern prosecution strategy:

  • CSLI and LPR data to place defendants near crime scenes;
  • Text messages for pre‑offense planning and coordination;
  • Social media (Instagram video chats, DMs, and photographs) for real‑time communication and post‑offense conduct; and
  • Vehicle recovery data and geolocation of images to track stolen vehicles and dump sites.

Righter demonstrates the appellate court’s willingness to treat such digital mosaics as robust, sufficient proof of participation and intent, even without traditional eyewitness identifications.

2. Use of Post‑Offense Firearm Images/Videos

The opinion provides prosecutors with a roadmap for admitting digital content showing a defendant with a gun, even when:

  • the evidence is post‑offense,
  • the defendant is not separately charged with unlawful possession, and
  • the weapon is never recovered.

The key is to:

  • show close temporal proximity to the offense;
  • link the weapon via distinctive features (e.g., extended magazine) to witness descriptions;
  • articulate a non‑propensity purpose (identity, corroboration, opportunity, lack of mistake); and
  • be prepared to accept and frame a limiting instruction to guide the jury’s use of the evidence.

3. Defense Strategy on 404(b) and Limiting Instructions

The case illustrates a strategic caution for defense counsel:

  • Rejecting a limiting instruction may avoid highlighting damaging evidence, but it also undercuts later arguments that the jury used it improperly.
  • If counsel’s theory is that the video is purely propensity evidence, a well‑crafted limiting instruction might be the best available mitigation tool.

Post‑Righter, defense counsel faced with similar evidence should:

  • press the Government on articulating a precise 404(b) purpose,
  • insist on a detailed limiting instruction if the evidence is admitted, and
  • consider whether alternative explanations (e.g., gun related to entirely different lawful or unlawful context) can be introduced without opening more harmful doors.

4. Firearm Proof in § 924(c) Cases

Righter strengthens the Government’s hand in § 924(c) prosecutions where no weapon is found:

  • Victim testimony about sight, feel, and effect, especially when coupled with physical injuries, can be decisive.
  • Defense efforts to argue “it might have been a toy” will face serious headwinds where the weapon leaves welts, swelling, and is described as heavy metal with realistic detail.

At the same time, defense counsel can glean potential cross‑examination targets from the opinion:

  • questioning victims’ familiarity with firearms,
  • probing lighting, duration of observation, and potential distractions,
  • exploring alternative explanations for weight or hardness (e.g., metal replica or BB gun), and
  • emphasizing any inconsistencies in descriptions.

5. Conspiracy and Accomplice Liability in Group Robberies

The opinion reinforces longstanding propositions:

  • A defendant need not personally wield the firearm to be liable under § 924(c) if he knowingly participates in the underlying violent crime with advance knowledge that a gun will be used (Rosemond);
  • Planning texts (“get another one ... I’ll give you gas money”) and coordinated movements before and after the crime are powerful proof of conspiracy and aiding/abetting; and
  • Separate travel patterns (one car leaves, then another; coordination over phone and GPS) can justify inference of who occupied which role (driver vs. gunman).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

This section explains several legal concepts from the opinion in more accessible terms.

1. Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 403, and 404(b)

  • Rule 401 – Relevance:
    Evidence is relevant if it helps, even slightly, to answer something the jury must decide. It does not need to be decisive; it just has to move the needle.
  • Rule 403 – Unfair Prejudice:
    Even relevant evidence can be excluded if it will cause the jury to react emotionally or irrationally in a way that overwhelms its real value. But the bar is high: the prejudice must “substantially outweigh” the usefulness of the evidence.
  • Rule 404(b) – Other Acts/Character Evidence:
    Generally, the Government can’t use evidence of “other bad acts” simply to show: “He did bad things before, so he probably did this too.” That is forbidden character/propensity logic. But such evidence can be used to show things like motive, identity, or plan, if carefully limited.

2. “Intrinsic” vs. “Other Acts” Evidence

  • Intrinsic Evidence: Part of the story of the charged crime itself – it directly proves or is intertwined with the conduct charged.
  • 404(b) Other Acts Evidence: Separate acts that are not part of the charged offense, used for limited purposes like proving identity or motive.

The panel hints the March 29 video might be intrinsic because it so directly links Righter to the specific type of gun described in the January 24 carjacking, occurring only two months later.

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence on Appeal

When a defendant says “there wasn’t enough evidence to convict me,” the appellate court does not re‑try the case. Instead, it:

  • assumes the jury believed the Government’s witnesses;
  • views the evidence in the Government’s favor; and
  • asks whether any reasonable juror could have reached this verdict.

It is not enough that some jurors might have acquitted. The question is whether all reasonable jurors would have had to acquit. Righter illustrates how a web of circumstantial evidence can easily satisfy this test.

4. Conspiracy Under 18 U.S.C. § 371

A conspiracy is simply an agreement between two or more people to commit a crime, plus at least one person in the group taking some step to move that plan forward. The Government does not need:

  • a written contract or recorded pledge, or
  • evidence of a formal meeting.

In Righter, the combination of:

  • the “get another one” text,
  • coordinated movements shown by CSLI,
  • shared use of the Malibu to reach carjacking locations, and
  • joint handling and disposal of stolen vehicles,

gave the jury ample basis to infer a criminal agreement.

5. Aiding and Abetting (18 U.S.C. § 2)

Aiding and abetting is liability for helping someone else commit a crime. A person is guilty as an accomplice if:

  • he intentionally helps the crime succeed (through driving, planning, lookout, etc.); and
  • he means to make the crime happen.

Under Rosemond, for a § 924(c) gun charge, the accomplice must also have advance knowledge that a gun will be used, so he can decide whether to back out.

6. “Firearm” Under § 924(c)

In everyday speech, people use “gun” loosely. Under federal law, not every “gun‑like” object counts. To be a “firearm” under § 921(a)(3), an object must be:

  • designed to shoot bullets with explosive force, or
  • readily convertible into such a weapon.

But the Government doesn’t have to show the actual gun in court. Instead, jurors can rely on:

  • how the gun looked,
  • how heavy or solid it felt,
  • how hard it struck the victim, and
  • how the robber used and portrayed it (e.g., as a real, loaded weapon).

That is precisely the kind of proof the Third Circuit approved in Righter.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Righter offers a detailed, modern illustration of how federal courts handle:

  • the admission of digital evidence showing post‑offense firearm possession, and
  • the sufficiency of circumstantial and testimonial proof in carjacking and § 924(c) prosecutions without weapon recovery or eyewitness identification of the defendant at the scene.

Key takeaways include:

  1. Post‑offense firearm videos can be powerful, admissible evidence when they:
    • closely follow the crime in time,
    • depict a weapon whose distinctive features match witness accounts, and
    • are used to show identity and corroboration, not general gun‑possession propensity.
  2. Victim testimony, especially involving physical contact with the weapon, can suffice to prove the weapon was a real firearm under § 924(c), even absent recovery or discharge of the gun.
  3. Circumstantial digital evidence—CSLI, LPR data, texts, and social media—is fully acceptable and often compelling proof of conspiracy and participation in violent crimes.
  4. Accomplice liability remains broad and potent: even if a defendant is not conclusively identified as the gunman, he can still be liable for carjacking and firearm offenses if he plans, facilitates, and knowingly participates in the crimes.

While not binding precedent, Righter is likely to be cited and relied upon in future litigation as a persuasive explanation of how courts should analyze post‑offense firearm imagery, victim contact‑based firearm proof, and the sufficiency of digital circumstantial evidence in complex, multi‑participant carjacking cases.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

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