Evidentiary Rigor and Neutral Professional Input in Parenting Plan Restrictions: Commentary on Parenting of A.C.P.S. (2025 MT 297N)

I. Introduction

The Montana Supreme Court’s memorandum opinion in In re the Parenting of A.C.P.S., 2025 MT 297N (DA 25‑0161), arises from a high-conflict parenting dispute between Anthony Tyler (father/appellant) and Ashley Smith (mother/appellee) concerning their minor child, A.C.P.S. Although issued as a noncitable memorandum opinion under the Court’s Internal Operating Rules (I.O.R. Section I, ¶ 3(c)), the decision provides a detailed and revealing application of Montana’s evidentiary standards and best-interest framework in parenting cases—particularly where severe restrictions on a parent’s contact are imposed.

Tyler sought a parenting plan granting him primary guardianship of A.C.P.S. The case was referred to a standing master, who crafted a plan that placed primary physical residence with Smith, imposed a substantial period of supervised and gradually expanding contact for Tyler before even reaching the baseline plan, and required incremental transitions to unsupervised parenting time. The District Court affirmed the standing master’s findings and plan. On appeal, Tyler challenged multiple findings of fact as clearly erroneous, focusing on:

• Findings based on late-December 2022 text messages to his then‑girlfriend/now-wife Seymour, in which he allegedly expressed suicidal ideation.
• Findings linking a positive THC hair follicle test of the child to Tyler’s exclusive care through a 7‑10 day exposure window.
• The standing master’s treatment and rejection of expert testimony from mental health professional Tonya Carpenter.
• The standing master’s effective disregard of the guardian ad litem’s (GAL’s) report and recommendation.

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that several key findings were clearly erroneous because they relied on inadmissible, unauthenticated, or improperly presented evidence, and that the standing master abused her discretion in discounting neutral professional evidence without adequate reasoning. While the Court agreed that Tyler’s behavior (hostility, parental alienation, marijuana use, discovery misconduct) justified placing primary residence with Smith, it held there was no substantial, admissible evidence to support the severity of the restrictions imposed on Tyler’s parenting time.

Though not binding precedent, the opinion underscores a critical principle in Montana family law practice: severe parenting-time restrictions, including extended supervised-only contact, must be grounded in properly admitted, non-hearsay evidence, and trial courts must meaningfully engage with neutral professional evaluations (expert assessments and GAL reports) rather than dismiss them in a conclusory way.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Context

Tyler and Smith were never married and had a brief relationship resulting in the birth of A.C.P.S. Smith had a history of drug abuse; A.C.P.S. was born drug-exposed and required an extended stay in the NICU due to withdrawal symptoms, and a Youth in Need of Care (YINC) case was opened and later dismissed, with Tyler receiving full custody at that time.

Initially, Tyler allowed Smith frequent time with the child (three to four nights per week), but as conflict escalated he increasingly restricted her access, withheld visits and phone calls, and engaged in what the standing master later characterized as parental alienation. His communications with Smith included demeaning comments (referring to her as an “incubator,” calling his new partner the child’s “mother”), and taunts about “destroying” her in court and being “undefeated” in family court.

Smith, in turn, moved for an emergency ex parte interim parenting plan in January 2023, attaching screen shots of text messages Tyler purportedly sent to Seymour over the December 2022 holidays, expressing suicidal ideation. These messages were never properly authenticated or admitted at the evidentiary hearing, yet they later became a central pillar of the standing master’s findings. Additionally, a hair follicle test of the child performed by Doreen King (Big Sky Drug Testing) showed THC exposure; King testified about a 7‑10 day detection window and tied it to Tyler’s exclusive care of the child during that period.

The standing master, after multiple hearing days and a contentious evidentiary process, crafted a final parenting plan heavily favoring Smith:

• Primary residence with Smith.
• Tyler required first to complete six four-hour supervised visits, then three overnights, before the final plan would even begin.
• After that, one visit per month and eventual 50/50 summer time when the child reached school age.
• Contempt finding against Tyler for failing to timely disclose his Illinois criminal record.

The GAL nonetheless recommended that Tyler have primary custody, with Smith enjoying unsupervised parenting time as often as feasible given distance. Expert witness Tonya Carpenter (early childhood attachment and addiction) likewise supported placement with Tyler, found a strong attachment between Tyler and the child, and assessed Tyler as low suicide risk and without signs of addiction.

B. Procedural Posture and Standards of Review

The Supreme Court reaffirmed the two-tier framework when reviewing cases involving a standing master:

• The District Court must accept the master’s findings of fact unless “clearly erroneous” under M. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2) and In re G.J.A., 2014 MT 215, ¶ 21, 376 Mont. 212, 331 P.3d 835.
• The Supreme Court reviews de novo whether the District Court applied the correct standard of review to the master’s report (Davis v. Davis, 2016 MT 52, ¶ 4, 382 Mont. 378, 367 P.3d 400), and then applies the familiar “clearly erroneous” and “abuse of discretion” standards to the master’s findings and evidentiary rulings.

The Court also noted that a standing master, under § 3‑5‑124(3)(c), MCA, must make evidentiary rulings and maintain a record under the same evidentiary rules as a district court judge in a nonjury trial.

C. Holdings in Brief

The Supreme Court held, in substance:

• Hearsay and authentication errors: Findings based on the unadmitted December 2022 suicidal-ideation text messages to Seymour were clearly erroneous. Smith never authenticated or admitted the messages as exhibits, and the standing master improperly relied on them (via the ex parte motion) without satisfying the Montana Rules of Evidence, including M. R. Evid. 901 and 1002.
• Improper lay “expert” testimony: The 7‑10 day THC detection window testimony by Doreen King was impermissible lay opinion under M. R. Evid. 701. King was not qualified nor offered as an expert under M. R. Evid. 702, and her 7‑10-day range was based on specialized training, not personal perception. Without that expert foundation, the causal inference tying the child’s THC exposure exclusively to Tyler’s care collapsed, rendering the related finding clearly erroneous.
• Misuse and rejection of expert Carpenter’s evaluation: The master erred by importing inadmissible December 2022 suicidal-threat evidence into Carpenter’s evaluation, then discounting Carpenter’s conclusions as “self-serving” simply because they relied on Tyler’s self-report. This was an abuse of discretion; psychological evaluations inherently rely on self-report, and the master failed to engage in “conscientious judgment” as required by In re D.C.N.H., 2020 MT 119, ¶¶ 15, 21, 400 Mont. 59, 463 P.3d 445.
• GAL report and recommendation improperly disregarded: While a court is not required to adopt a GAL’s recommendation (Marriage of Solem, 2020 MT 141, ¶ 23, 400 Mont. 186, 464 P.3d 981), the master abused discretion by effectively disregarding the GAL’s recommendation based on perceived inexperience and incomplete information, despite the GAL’s substantial family-law experience and 25+ hours of investigation. The court must at least consider the GAL’s neutral, statutory role evidence.
• Other findings upheld: The Court upheld findings that Tyler was “not entirely forthcoming” with the GAL (failure to produce Illinois record), that he used marijuana in the child’s presence and the child smelled of marijuana, and that the NICU stay was extended due to withdrawal symptoms (even if drug use did not precipitate the initial admission).
• Best-interest analysis and parenting plan: After striking clearly erroneous findings (specifically Findings of Fact 38–41, the December timing portion of Finding 44, and Finding 47), the remaining admissible record supported placing primary residence with Smith, but did not support the extremely restrictive supervised-only regime imposed on Tyler. The standing master’s conclusion that Tyler posed a “serious safety risk” rested on evidence now deemed inadmissible or unsupported. The case was remanded for the District Court to:
  • Reassess the best-interest factors under § 40‑4‑212(1), MCA, without the stricken findings.
  • “Meaningfully engage” Carpenter’s evaluation and the GAL report, articulating record-based reasons if discounting either.
  • Craft a new or modified parenting plan proportionate to the actual, admissible risks unless new evidence justifies continued strict limitations.

III. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Standards of Review and Standing Masters: In re G.J.A. and Davis v. Davis

The Court relied on In re G.J.A., 2014 MT 215, and Davis v. Davis, 2016 MT 52, to structure its review:

• In re G.J.A.: Provides the definition of “clearly erroneous” for findings of a standing master:
  • Not supported by substantial evidence, or
  • The master misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or
  • Review of the record convinces the court a mistake was made.
• Davis v. Davis: Confirms that the Supreme Court reviews de novo whether the district court applied the correct standard of review to the master’s report. Once that threshold is satisfied, the appellate court applies the “clearly erroneous” standard to factual findings and an “abuse of discretion” standard to discretionary rulings (e.g., evidentiary decisions, weighting of testimony).

These cases underscore that even in family law—where trial courts enjoy broad discretion and fact-driven inquiries are the norm—factual findings must be anchored in admissible, substantial evidence, and masters function under the same evidentiary regime as judges.

B. Evidentiary Standards and Judicial Discretion: In re D.C.N.H.

In re D.C.N.H., 2020 MT 119, was invoked to define abuse of discretion, emphasizing that courts must use “conscientious judgment” and stay within “the bounds of reason.” In A.C.P.S., this principle was applied twice:

• To condemn the standing master’s cursory rejection of Carpenter’s mental health evaluation solely due to its reliance on Tyler’s self-report.
• To criticize the master’s summary rejection of the GAL’s neutral recommendation based on generalized concerns rather than a reasoned, record-tethered analysis.

The Court’s insistence on articulated reasoning resonates with D.C.N.H.’s requirement that findings be “complete enough that this Court need not speculate when assessing the conscientiousness or reasonableness of [the court’s] judgment.”

C. Role and Weight of Guardian ad Litem: Brockington & Brown, Solem, and Tummarello

The Court acknowledged and applied three key GAL-related precedents:

• In re Marriage of Brockington & Brown, 2017 MT 92, ¶ 23, 387 Mont. 260, 400 P.3d 205:
  • Interprets § 40‑4‑205, MCA, confirming the GAL’s role is to represent the child’s interests and to inform and make recommendations concerning support, parenting, and parental contact after necessary investigation.
• In re Marriage of Solem, 2020 MT 141, ¶ 23:
  • Clarifies that a district court is not required to adopt or follow all recommendations of a GAL.
• In re Marriage of Tummarello, 2012 MT 18, ¶ 34, 363 Mont. 387, 270 P.3d 28:
  • Reiterates that credibility determinations and the weight assigned to testimony are within the trial court’s province, and appellate courts do not substitute their judgment for those determinations.

In A.C.P.S., the Court harmonizes these precedents: a trial court retains ultimate discretion and is not bound by the GAL, but it must exercise that discretion by actually engaging with and evaluating the GAL’s work, rather than marginalizing it through generalized critiques of experience or incomplete review, especially where the GAL is the sole neutral synthesizer of the parties’ histories and collateral information.

D. Best-Interest Factors: Parenting of C.J. and § 40‑4‑212, MCA

The Court cited In re the Parenting of C.J., 2016 MT 93, ¶ 14, 383 Mont. 197, 369 P.3d 1028, to reaffirm that § 40‑4‑212(1), MCA, provides a non-exhaustive list of factors guiding the best-interest analysis. These include:

• The child’s interaction and interrelationship with parents and others.
• The child’s adjustment to home, school, and community.
• The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
• Evidence of physical abuse, chemical dependency, and other safety-related concerns.
• Each parent’s willingness and ability to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent–child relationship with the other parent.

On remand, the Court directs the District Court to “meaningfully engage” Carpenter’s evaluation and the GAL’s investigation within this statutory framework, and to tether any restrictions—especially severe ones like supervised-only contact—to specific § 40‑4‑212(1) factors supported by admissible evidence.

IV. Legal Reasoning in Depth

A. Multi-Layer Hearsay and Unauthenticated Text Messages

Central to the Court’s reasoning is its treatment of the late-December 2022 text messages in which Tyler allegedly threatened suicide to Seymour. Those messages were attached to Smith’s January 27, 2023 ex parte motion, but were never authenticated or admitted as exhibits at the evidentiary hearing.

1. The Hearsay “Onion”

The Court breaks down the evidentiary structure into three layers:

1. Tyler’s out-of-court statements to:
   • Seymour (via texts), and
   • Lequin (his mother-in-law in relation to another child) over the phone.

   These are admissions of a party-opponent and therefore “not hearsay” under M. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A).

2. Seymour’s communications to Smith: forwarding the texts, providing screen shots with Tyler’s name and phone number, and including a photo of Tyler and the child.
3. Relayed statements from Smith (and perhaps others) to Lequin about what the texts contained.

The problem: neither Seymour nor Tyler testified about these messages, and Smith did not formally introduce the screen shots as exhibits at the evidentiary hearing. Instead, the messages lived only in the ex parte motion, which is not self-authenticating evidence. When the standing master’s findings of fact referred back to those messages, she effectively treated them as though they were admitted, bypassing foundational requirements under:

• M. R. Evid. 901(a): Evidence must be authenticated as a condition precedent to admissibility. One common method is testimony from a witness with knowledge (Rule 901(b)(1)).
• M. R. Evid. 1002 (Best Evidence Rule): To prove the content of a writing (including text messages), the original or a reliable duplicate is required, subject to specific exceptions.

While some testimony from Lequin about what Tyler told her was admissible as admissions by a party-opponent, her recounting of the content of messages she personally never saw—and that reached her through unidentified “around town” gossip—constituted classic hearsay-within-hearsay with no qualifying exception for the outer layer.

2. Failure to Admit and Authenticate

Smith did ultimately introduce some of Tyler’s text messages as separate exhibits at the April hearing, but those were not the suicidal-ideation Seymour messages. The standing master, however, explicitly relied on “the motion for ex parte parenting plan” when finding that Tyler “sent multiple concerning text messages over the Christmas Holiday stating he was going to kill himself” and that his claimed “revenge plot” theory involving Seymour did “not reflect a stable and healthy relationship or environment.”

Because those specific messages:

• Were never authenticated under Rule 901,
• Were never admitted into evidence, and
• Were used for their truth (Tyler’s suicidal intent),

the resulting findings were unsupported by the record and deemed clearly erroneous.

Notably, Tyler did not challenge on appeal the finding that he communicated suicidal thoughts to Lequin directly by phone. The Court therefore left intact the findings that he made suicidal threats to her, while excising the findings based on the December text messages to Seymour. This fine distinction underscores the Court’s insistence on tracing each factual finding to actual admitted evidence.

B. Carpenter’s Expert Evaluation and Self-Report

Tonya Carpenter testified as an expert on early childhood attachment and substance addiction. She:

• Found that the child was strongly attached to Tyler.
• Assessed Tyler as having a low risk of suicide.
• Found no signs of addictive behavior.

The standing master discounted her testimony, in part because:

• She allegedly did not know about “suicidal threats” made in December 2022 (derived from the inadmissible Seymour texts), and
• Her evaluation was considered “self-serving” because it relied on information Tyler himself provided.

The Supreme Court identified two distinct errors:

1. Incorporating inadmissible evidence: The master’s criticism of Carpenter’s evaluation for failing to account for December 2022 “threats” was itself tainted, because the only December evidence was the unadmitted Seymour texts. The Court clarified that the phone calls to Lequin occurred in January 2023, making it evident the “December” reference flowed from the impermissible messages. This mistake rendered that critique clearly erroneous.
2. Conflating self-report with unreliability: The master’s wholesale dismissal of Carpenter’s evaluation as “self-serving” failed to recognize that mental health evaluations inherently rely on the subject’s self-report, coupled with clinical training, standardized instruments, and corroborative information where available. The Court stressed that this characteristic does not automatically render such opinions incredible:
   • The master could permissibly find Carpenter’s conclusions less persuasive than other evidence, but could not simply discard the entire evaluation without analyzing how it compared to the rest of the record.
   • This unreasoned rejection violated the requirement of conscientious judgment and thus was an abuse of discretion.

On remand, the District Court must meaningfully address Carpenter’s conclusions, either giving them some weight or explaining, with reference to specific conflicting evidence, why they are discounted.

C. Guardian ad Litem’s Role and the Court’s Duty to Consider Neutral Evidence

The GAL, an experienced family-law attorney, invested over 25 hours investigating the case and recommended that:

• Tyler be awarded primary custody, and
• Smith receive unsupervised parenting time as frequently as practicable given the distance between the parents.

The standing master rejected the GAL recommendation, reasoning that the GAL:

• Lacked experience,
• Did not review the first-day hearing transcript,
• Did not have Tyler’s full Illinois criminal record, and
• Relied too heavily on Carpenter’s recommendations and was unaware of some alienating behavior.

The Supreme Court balanced three principles:

• The trial court is not required to follow the GAL (Solem).
• The GAL’s statutory duties under § 40‑4‑205, MCA, require investigation and recommendations in the child’s best interest (Brockington & Brown).
• Credibility assessments are for the factfinder and normally not disturbed on appeal (Tummarello).

Yet the Court determined that, here, the master did not exercise true discretion about whether the GAL’s recommendation was in the child’s best interest; rather, she disposed of it on generalized, unsupported criticisms of the GAL’s adequacy, despite:

• The GAL’s extensive family-law background.
• The GAL’s unique status as the only neutral integrator of multiple information streams.

The Court therefore held that the master abused her discretion by failing to meaningfully consider the GAL’s work. On remand, the District Court must re-engage with the GAL’s recommendation, explaining—if it chooses not to follow it—why specific aspects of the recommendation are inconsistent with particular § 40‑4‑212(1) factors or contradicted by other admissible evidence.

D. Lay vs. Expert Testimony: The THC Hair Follicle Evidence

Doreen King, owner of Big Sky Drug Testing, collected a hair follicle sample from the child and sent it to a lab, which reported a positive result for THC. King testified that:

• It takes approximately 7–10 days for marijuana to show up in a hair follicle test after exposure.
• During the relevant timeframe, Tyler had exclusive custody of the child.

Critically:

• King expressly testified that she was not a “certifying scientist,” lab personnel, or a doctor, and that she was “not qualified enough” to answer whether exposure times differed between adults and children.
• Smith’s counsel admitted King was not qualified as an expert and did not seek to admit the drug testing results as an exhibit.

The Supreme Court drew a sharp line between permissible lay opinion and expert opinion:

• M. R. Evid. 701 (lay opinion): Limited to opinions rationally based on the witness’s own perception and helpful to understanding testimony or determining a fact.
• M. R. Evid. 702 (expert opinion): Applies when “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” will assist the factfinder. Requires that the witness be qualified by “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.”

The Court held:

• King was not testifying from personal observation about the timing of THC appearance in hair; she was relaying what she had been trained or taught in the course of running a drug-testing business.
• This 7–10 day time frame clearly involved specialized, scientific knowledge under Rule 702, not lay inference under Rule 701.
• Because she was never qualified as an expert, her testimony regarding the 7–10-day detection window lacked the requisite foundation.

Without that expert time range, there was no reliable evidentiary link tying the child’s THC exposure exclusively to Tyler’s period of care. The standing master’s finding that the THC exposure necessarily occurred during Tyler’s exclusive custody was therefore clearly erroneous; it was not supported by substantial evidence in the record.

However, the Court retained separate findings based on:

• Lequin’s testimony that she had seen Tyler use marijuana in the child’s presence, and
• Her testimony that the child smelled of marijuana when transferred to her care.

Those findings stood independently of King’s flawed expert-like testimony.

E. NICU Stay and Drug Withdrawal

Tyler argued that the standing master’s findings regarding the child’s NICU stay minimized the impact of Smith’s drug use at birth by stating that drug use “did not play a role in the admission” to the NICU. He pointed out that Dr. Kenny had indicated that withdrawal symptoms “probably resulted in [the] continued stay” in the NICU.

The Supreme Court observed that the standing master’s finding addressed exactly that: it acknowledged that, while drug exposure may not have prompted the initial admission, it did extend the NICU stay due to withdrawal symptoms. Thus, the finding was neither misleading nor clearly erroneous, and it captured the pertinent information.

F. Best-Interest Analysis and Proportionality of Restrictions

After disentangling the evidentiary errors, the Court distilled the remaining facts:

• Tyler exhibited significant hostility toward Smith, including derogatory, demeaning communications and an unwillingness to cooperate in co-parenting.
• He engaged in parental alienation, frequently and arbitrarily restricting Smith’s parenting time and phone contact with the child.
• He displayed instability in residences and poor litigation conduct (e.g., threatening Treatment Court staff, late disclosure of his criminal record).
• Evidence (from Lequin) showed marijuana use in the child’s presence and that the child at times smelled of marijuana.

These facts, the Court concluded, justified awarding primary physical placement to Smith and raised credible concerns about Tyler’s judgment and co-parenting behavior. However, once the clearly erroneous findings were stripped out—particularly those about the December suicidal-text messages and the tightly time-bound THC exposure—the record no longer supported the bedrock assertion that Tyler posed a serious safety risk requiring:

• An extended period of supervised-only visitation (six four-hour visits plus three overnights) before the parenting plan even commenced, and
• A long-term regime of very limited contact (one visit per month) until a distant future time when a 50/50 summer schedule could begin at school age.

In the Court’s words, once the erroneous findings were removed:

• The factual foundation for such an “intrusive remedy” looked “materially different.”
• There was an “absence of substantial evidence supporting the most restrictive elements of the plan.”

The Court therefore held that a remand was necessary for:

• A fresh assessment of the best-interest factors under § 40‑4‑212(1), MCA, free of stricken findings.
• Reconsideration of whether such severe restrictions are proportionate to the admissible risk evidence.
• Possible crafting of a less restrictive plan, unless new or additional admissible evidence justifies continued strict limitations.

V. Impact and Practical Implications

A. Non-Precedential Yet Instructive

Formally, this memorandum opinion “shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent” under the Montana Supreme Court’s Internal Operating Rules. Yet its reasoning illustrates how settled evidentiary and family-law standards apply in a parenting context and therefore offers practical guidance for:

• Family law practitioners,
• Standing masters and district judges, and
• GALs and mental health professionals participating in parenting disputes.

B. Evidentiary Rigor in Family Law

The opinion reinforces that family law cases do not operate on a relaxed evidentiary regime simply because they are equitable or child-focused. Critical takeaways include:

• Text messages and other electronic communications must be authenticated and properly admitted before being used as substantive evidence for key findings (Rules 901 and 1002).
• Hearsay and hearsay-within-hearsay remain inadmissible absent specific exceptions; reliance on “it got to me” or “was told to me” is insufficient when used for the truth of the matter asserted.
• Lay witnesses cannot introduce scientific or technical propositions (such as drug-detection windows) based solely on training; that is expert territory under Rule 702, requiring formal qualification and, where appropriate, foundational support for reliability.

Practitioners must therefore:

• Plan authentication and hearsay strategies for digital evidence (e.g., text messages) early.
• Timely qualify experts and distinguish lay testimony from expert testimony.
• Object when opposing parties attempt to smuggle expert opinions through lay witnesses.

C. Neutral Professional Evidence Must Be Taken Seriously

Equally important is the Court’s insistence that neutral professional inputs—expert evaluations and GAL reports—receive meaningful judicial engagement:

• Courts remain free to disagree with experts and GALs, but must explain why with reference to concrete evidence and statutory best-interest factors.
• Dismissals based solely on self-report reliance or generalized perceptions of insufficient experience are insufficient and can constitute an abuse of discretion.

For GALs and evaluators, the opinion underscores the importance of:

• Documenting the scope and depth of investigation (time spent, individuals interviewed, records reviewed).
• Anchoring recommendations explicitly in § 40‑4‑212(1), MCA.
• Being prepared to explain how self-report information was weighed against other data sources.

D. Proportionality of Restrictions in Parenting Plans

The decision highlights a proportionality principle: severe parenting-time restrictions, such as long-term supervised-only regimes, should be reserved for situations where admissible evidence clearly establishes a serious safety risk, not merely poor co-parenting behavior or marijuana use in the abstract.

Although the Court did not define a precise threshold, its willingness to uphold primary residence with Smith but reject the accompanying severe restrictions suggests:

• Hostility, parental alienation, instability, and marijuana use are serious best-interest factors but do not automatically equate to immediate physical or psychological danger warranting near-exclusion from the child’s life.
• Courts should tailor remedies to address specific concerns (e.g., structured communication protocols, conditions against substance use around the child, parenting education, or monitored exchanges) before resorting to extended supervision absent stronger evidence.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “Clearly Erroneous” vs. “Abuse of Discretion”

• Clearly erroneous (findings of fact):
  • The appellate court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made.
  • Occurs where findings lack substantial evidence, misapprehend the evidence, or are contradicted by the record.
• Abuse of discretion (e.g., evidentiary rulings, weighting of testimony):
  • Occurs when the trial court acts arbitrarily, without conscientious judgment, or exceeds the bounds of reason.
  • Focuses more on the decision-making process and reasoning, not just the factual accuracy.

B. Hearsay and Hearsay Within Hearsay

• Hearsay: An out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of what it asserts (M. R. Evid. 801(c)). Generally inadmissible unless a specific exception applies (M. R. Evid. 802).
• Hearsay within hearsay: A statement that contains multiple layers of hearsay (e.g., “A told B that C said …”). Each layer must independently fit an exception or exclusion for the whole statement to be admissible.
• Admission by party-opponent: A statement made by a party to the case (e.g., Tyler) can be offered against that party and is defined as “not hearsay” under Rule 801(d)(2)(A).

C. Authentication of Text Messages and the Best Evidence Rule

• Authentication (Rule 901): The proponent of evidence must produce sufficient evidence to support a finding that the item is what they claim it is (e.g., having the sender, recipient, or another knowledgeable witness testify that the screen shots accurately reflect the texts).
• Best Evidence Rule (Rule 1002): To prove the content of a writing (including texts), the original or a reliable duplicate is required, unless an exception applies. Summaries, paraphrases, or secondhand descriptions are disfavored when the exact content matters.

D. Standing Master and Guardian ad Litem

• Standing Master: A quasi-judicial officer, often used in family law, who hears evidence, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and recommends orders to the district court. The district court must accept findings unless clearly erroneous but retains authority over legal conclusions and final orders.
• Guardian ad Litem (GAL): A person appointed under § 40‑4‑205, MCA, to represent a child’s interests in disputes over parenting, support, and contact. Investigates, gathers information, and makes recommendations to the court about what arrangement best serves the child’s welfare.

E. YINC Case

A “Youth in Need of Care” (YINC) case is a child protection proceeding typically initiated by the state when there are allegations of abuse, neglect, or other circumstances warranting state intervention. In this case, a YINC case was opened against Smith at the child’s birth due to drug exposure but was later dismissed, with Tyler initially obtaining full custody.

F. Supervised Visitation

“Supervised visitation” means a parent’s time with the child occurs in the presence of a neutral third party (professional supervisor or a trusted individual) to monitor and ensure the child’s safety. It is a significantly intrusive restriction, justified where the court finds credible evidence of risk (e.g., abuse, severe mental instability, serious substance abuse). Given its restrictive nature, courts must base such orders on solid, admissible evidence and tailor their scope to the actual risk.

VII. Conclusion

Parenting of A.C.P.S. offers a nuanced illustration of how Montana’s appellate courts insist on evidentiary discipline and reasoned judgment even in the emotionally charged arena of parenting disputes. The Supreme Court:

• Reaffirmed that factual findings must be grounded in admissible evidence, not unadmitted screen shots or multi-layered hearsay.
• Clarified that lay witnesses cannot provide scientific or technical conclusions absent proper expert qualification.
• Required trial courts to treat neutral professional evidence—expert mental health evaluations and GAL reports—as integral components of the best-interest analysis, not as disposable add-ons.
• Emphasized proportionality in parenting restrictions, particularly where supervised-only configurations are imposed.

Although designated as a noncitable memorandum opinion, the Court’s approach in A.C.P.S. effectively reinforces a principle that resonates across Montana parenting cases: where a court significantly constrains a parent’s role in a child’s life, those constraints must rest on a clear, admissible, and carefully reasoned factual foundation, and neutral professional assessments must be thoughtfully engaged, not summarily dismissed. On remand, the District Court is tasked with revisiting the parenting plan for A.C.P.S. under that standard, ensuring that both parental rights and child welfare are balanced through the disciplined application of Montana’s evidence rules and best-interest framework.