Evenhanded Pork Sales Bans Survive: First Circuit Applies National Pork to Reject Dormant Commerce Clause and FMIA/PSA Preemption Challenges

Introduction

In Triumph Foods, LLC v. Campbell (1st Cir. Oct. 3, 2025), out-of-state pork producers and a processor mounted a broad constitutional and preemption challenge to Massachusetts’s Act to Prevent Cruelty to Farm Animals. The Act forbids both (a) the in-state confinement of breeding pigs in “gestation crates” and (b) the in-state sale of pork derived from pigs so confined, regardless of where the confinement occurred.

Plaintiffs—Midwestern and Plains pig farmers and co-owned processor Triumph Foods—alleged the Act violates the dormant Commerce Clause (both as discriminatory and under the Pike balancing test), the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Due Process, and the Import-Export Clause, and is preempted by the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) and the Packers and Stockyards Act (PSA).

The district court dismissed most claims, severed a “slaughterhouse exemption” as unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause, and ultimately granted summary judgment to the Commonwealth on the remaining claims. On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed in full, offering a detailed roadmap for evaluating animal-welfare sales regulations after the Supreme Court’s decision in National Pork Producers Council v. Ross.

Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit held:

• No procedural error in dismissing claims without written findings under Rule 12 or in granting sua sponte summary judgment where the parties had notice, discovery had advanced sufficiently, and the issues were resolvable as matters of law.
• Privileges and Immunities Clause claim fails because corporations cannot invoke that clause.
• No dormant Commerce Clause discrimination: Massachusetts’s law applies evenhandedly to in-state and out-of-state producers; the fact Massachusetts has virtually no covered in-state producers does not make the law discriminatory (Exxon principle). Plaintiffs failed to show discriminatory purpose or effect.
• Pike claim fails under National Pork: plaintiffs did not plausibly demonstrate a substantial burden on interstate commerce, and the law’s noneconomic animal-welfare benefits are incommensurable with alleged economic costs, foreclosing Pike balancing.
• No FMIA preemption: post-severance, the Act regulates the sale of pork and on-farm production standards beyond the slaughterhouse gate; it does not impose operational requirements on FMIA-inspected facilities and does not create a new “adulteration” class.
• No PSA conflict preemption: the Act does not require preferences or discrimination among producers; it merely bars sale of noncompliant pork regardless of origin.
• No Full Faith and Credit, Due Process (vagueness), or Import-Export Clause violations.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• National Pork Producers Council v. Ross, 598 U.S. 356 (2023): Central blueprint. The First Circuit extends National Pork’s reasoning to an evenhanded sales ban. Key points applied:
  • Antidiscrimination is the core of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
  • Substantial-burden threshold for Pike claims; courts are ill-suited to weigh incommensurable noneconomic benefits (animal welfare) against alleged economic costs.
  • States may regulate the sale of ordinary goods on nondiscriminatory terms within their borders.
• Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978): A neutral statute is not discriminatory merely because its practical burdens fall mostly on out-of-state entities; the absence of local producers does not transform evenhanded rules into discrimination. This case anchors the First Circuit’s rejection of plaintiffs’ effect-based discrimination claim.
• Family Winemakers of California v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010): Distinguished. Jenkins struck a Massachusetts wine statute that, by design and effect, conferred competitive advantages on in-state wineries. The court explains no comparable favoritism exists here; the Act imposes the same rule on all sellers regardless of origin.
• Cherry Hill Vineyard, LLC v. Baldacci, 505 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2007): Emphasizes the need for substantial evidence of discriminatory effect when statutes are facially neutral and wholesome in purpose. Plaintiffs failed to present such evidence here.
• Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970): Supplies the balancing test and threshold requirement for “substantial” burden; used here with National Pork to deny Pike relief.
• National Meat Association v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452 (2012): FMIA expressly preempted California’s slaughterhouse “nonambulatory animal” operations ban because it intruded into FMIA-occupied slaughterhouse operations/inspection. Distinguished because Massachusetts regulates sales and upstream production, not slaughterhouse operations.
• Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 587 U.S. 761 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., concurring): Supports the upstream/downstream distinction; state regulation of upstream production is not preempted merely because downstream inspection is federally occupied.
• Walgreen Co. v. Rullán, 405 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2005): Illustrates invalid local favoritism through exemptions that tilt the playing field; used here to contrast Massachusetts’s evenhanded scheme.
• Becky’s Broncos, LLC v. Town of Nantucket, 138 F.4th 73 (1st Cir. 2025); American Trucking Ass’ns v. R.I. Tpk. & Bridge Auth., 123 F.4th 27 (1st Cir. 2024): Reiterate the focus on discriminatory purpose or effect in dormant Commerce Clause analysis of facially neutral laws.
• Sanchez v. Triple-S Mgmt. Corp., 492 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007); McCoy v. Town of Pittsfield, 59 F.4th 497 (1st Cir. 2023); Leyva v. On the Beach, Inc., 171 F.3d 717 (1st Cir. 1999); Nat’l Expositions, Inc. v. Crowley Mar. Corp., 824 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1987): Establish the standards for sua sponte summary judgment and adequacy of notice.
• Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. 123 (1869) and Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 588 U.S. 504 (2019): Clarify that the Import-Export Clause concerns international trade, not interstate trade.
• Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981): Corporations cannot invoke the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause.

Legal Reasoning

Procedural Rulings: Rule 12 and Sua Sponte Summary Judgment

• Rule 52(a)(3) expressly states district courts need not issue findings or conclusions on Rule 12 motions. No procedural error in dismissing without a written order.
• Sua sponte summary judgment is permissible where the parties had adequate notice and opportunity to respond and discovery was sufficiently advanced (or where a pure question of law defeats the claim). The court found both criteria met:
  • Notice: Massachusetts’s opposition explicitly sought judgment; the court flagged the Pike theory’s vulnerability; plaintiffs replied on the issue.
  • Opportunity: Plaintiffs acknowledged extensive discovery and earlier asserted discovery was unnecessary; the dispositive issues were legal under National Pork.

Privileges and Immunities Clause

The claim fails at the threshold because plaintiffs are corporate entities (LLCs, LLP, corporation, cooperative). The Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause protects “Citizens,” not corporations. This cleanly disposes of the argument.

Dormant Commerce Clause – Discrimination

• No facial discrimination alleged; the law applies equally to the sale of covered pork in Massachusetts regardless of origin.
• No discriminatory purpose: plaintiffs pointed to stray statements, but none indicated a legislative intent to favor in-state economic interests; the statute arose via ballot initiative with a stated purpose to prevent animal cruelty. The opinion notes voter information, not sporadic legislative comments, is the better contextual source for initiatives.
• No discriminatory effect: the fact Massachusetts had little or no in-state use of gestation crates does not create discrimination. Under Exxon, evenhanded laws do not discriminate merely because their burdens fall on out-of-state firms. Plaintiffs presented no substantial evidence that in-state producers received a competitive advantage or that out-of-state producers suffered comparative competitive disadvantage attributable to the law itself.
• Jenkins and Hunt are distinguished: those laws structurally favored in-state producers (through gallonage caps or grading rules with leveling effects). Massachusetts’s Act contains no comparable favoritism and bars the sale of noncompliant pork regardless of source.

Dormant Commerce Clause – Pike

• National Pork controls. Five justices rejected the Pike challenge there, and the First Circuit treats National Pork as dispositive for materially indistinguishable allegations:
  • Substantial-burden threshold not met. Harm to favored production methods or increased costs is not a “substantial” burden on interstate commerce.
  • Incommensurability: Even if burdens were shown, courts cannot balance economic costs against noneconomic animal-welfare benefits in a judicially manageable way (a view that commanded a majority outcome in National Pork).
• Given the law’s evenhanded character and the National Pork framework, the claim “falls well outside Pike’s heartland.” Summary judgment for Massachusetts was proper without further balancing.

FMIA Preemption

• Express preemption: FMIA’s clause preempts state “requirements within the scope” of FMIA “with respect to premises, facilities and operations” of federally inspected establishments that are “in addition to, or different than” federal requirements (21 U.S.C. § 678).
• Crucial distinctions from National Meat:
  • Massachusetts’s Act, post-severance of the “slaughterhouse exemption,” regulates the sale of pork and on-farm production practices “beyond the slaughterhouse gate,” not the operations of FMIA-inspected facilities.
  • It imposes no operational mandate on slaughterhouses and does not alter inspection/condemnation decisions governed by FMIA.
• No “new class of adulteration”: The Act does not declare meat adulterated under federal law; it sets a state sales standard tied to production conditions. The upstream/downstream distinction (reinforced by Va. Uranium) defeats express and conflict preemption theories.
• Conflict preemption fails: It is neither impossible to comply with both laws nor does the Act obstruct FMIA purposes. Segregation and tracing to sell compliant products are feasible and commonly used for other premium attributes.

PSA Preemption (Conflict)

• The PSA bars packers/suppliers from giving undue preferences, but the Massachusetts Act does not require preferences based on locality or origin. It simply prohibits sale of noncompliant pork, regardless of source.
• No impossibility or obstacle to PSA objectives; thus, no conflict preemption.

Full Faith and Credit Clause

• Right-to-Farm provisions in other states do not compel Massachusetts to adopt their policy choices. The Clause does not require a state to replace its own statute governing in-state sales with another state’s contrary policy.
• Massachusetts does not ban out-of-state production methods; it governs in-state sales. No “policy of hostility” is shown.

Due Process (Vagueness)

• “Engage in the sale” is adequately defined. The statute specifies “sale” and location (where buyer takes possession), providing reasonable notice that sellers face liability.
• “Turn around freely” is defined with specificity: a complete circle without impediment or touching sides or other animals. The absence of square footage metrics does not render the standard unconstitutionally vague.
• Civil regulatory context further lowers the vagueness bar; the statute surpasses that threshold.

Import-Export Clause

• The Clause concerns international trade; it does not restrict state measures affecting interstate commerce between sister states. Longstanding Supreme Court precedent (Woodruff) controls. The claim fails.

Impact

For State Policymakers and Drafters

• Blueprint affirmed: States may regulate the in-state sale of goods based on production standards, including animal-welfare criteria, provided the rules are evenhanded, origin-neutral, and avoid in-state favoritism.
• Drafting cautions:
  • Avoid exemptions that functionally advantage in-state actors (e.g., “slaughterhouse exemptions” that only in-state facilities can exploit). The district court severed such an exemption as unconstitutional; its absence helped defeat preemption and discrimination arguments on appeal.
  • Focus statutes on sales and upstream production standards “beyond the slaughterhouse gate,” not on FMIA-occupied slaughterhouse operations.
  • Define key terms (e.g., “turn around freely”) with operational clarity to avoid vagueness challenges.

For Producers, Packers, and Retailers

• Compliance pathways win: Segregation and traceability to supply compliant pork remain viable, as courts treat such measures as ordinary costs of doing business rather than cognizable “substantial burdens.”
• Market realignment is not discrimination: The dormant Commerce Clause does not protect existing business models or shield against shifts in market share when a neutral sales standard applies equally to all sellers.
• Multi-state regimes: With multiple states adopting similar standards, industry participants should anticipate harmonized compliance programs rather than constitutional relief.

For Litigators

• Discrimination claims require substantial, probative evidence of comparative advantage/disadvantage tied to the statute. Mere disproportional burden on out-of-state firms is insufficient under Exxon.
• Pike claims face steep headwinds after National Pork:
  • Enforce the substantial-burden threshold rigorously.
  • Expect courts to decline balancing where benefits are noneconomic and incommensurable with alleged economic costs.
• FMIA preemption is narrow:
  • Targeted at slaughterhouse operations and inspection. Sales or production standards “beyond the gate” are generally outside FMIA’s field.
  • Conflict theories will falter absent true impossibility or thwarting of federal objectives.
• Procedural posture: Courts may grant sua sponte summary judgment when National Pork controls as a matter of law; litigants should treat oppositions that seek judgment as notice and put their best evidence forward early.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Dormant Commerce Clause: An implied limit on states’ power to regulate interstate commerce. It primarily prohibits economic protectionism—laws that benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.
• Discriminatory Purpose vs. Effect:
  • Purpose: The law was enacted to favor in-state interests.
  • Effect: In operation, the law substantially advantages in-state and disadvantages out-of-state entities in comparable markets.
• Pike Balancing: If a neutral law serves a legitimate local interest and only incidentally affects interstate commerce, it is valid unless the burden on commerce is clearly excessive relative to local benefits. After National Pork, plaintiffs must show a substantial burden before any balancing, and courts are reluctant to weigh noneconomic against economic interests.
• Exxon Principle: A neutral, origin-agnostic statute is not discriminatory merely because it affects more out-of-state firms or because a state lacks in-state producers.
• FMIA Preemption: The FMIA occupies slaughterhouse operations and inspection. State rules imposing additional or different requirements on FMIA-inspected premises are preempted. Sales and on-farm production standards generally are not, especially when they operate beyond the slaughterhouse gate.
• PSA Conflict Preemption: Arises only if a state rule makes PSA compliance impossible or frustrates its purposes (e.g., mandating preferences). Neutral sales bans by origin do not do so.
• Full Faith and Credit: States respect other states’ laws, but need not abandon their own in-state regulatory choices. It does not force Massachusetts to adopt another state’s “Right to Farm” policy for Massachusetts sales.
• Vagueness: A statute is unconstitutionally vague if ordinary people cannot understand what it forbids or if it invites arbitrary enforcement. Clear definitions (e.g., “turn around freely”) defeat such claims.
• Import-Export Clause: Limits state duties on imports/exports in international trade; it does not apply to interstate commerce between U.S. states.

Conclusion

Triumph Foods, LLC v. Campbell cements a post–National Pork template in the First Circuit: evenhanded animal-welfare sales bans are neither discriminatory under the dormant Commerce Clause nor preempted by federal meat inspection or stockyard statutes, particularly when they regulate upstream production and in-state sales beyond the slaughterhouse gate. Plaintiffs’ failure to marshal substantial, probative evidence of discriminatory purpose or effect, coupled with National Pork’s insistence on a substantial-burden threshold and the incommensurability of values under Pike, forecloses core dormant Commerce Clause attacks.

The opinion also clarifies key procedural and substantive guardrails: district courts may grant sua sponte summary judgment on fully briefed legal issues; corporations cannot bring Privileges and Immunities claims; Full Faith and Credit does not export one state’s agricultural policy into another; carefully drafted definitions defeat vagueness claims; and the Import-Export Clause concerns international, not interstate, trade.

For legislatures, regulators, and industry alike, the message is clear: state-level, origin-neutral standards governing the sale of goods—grounded in legitimate local interests like animal welfare—will stand, absent proof of protectionist design, discriminatory effect, or direct conflict with a federal operational regime. As more jurisdictions enact analogous standards, compliance planning and supply chain segmentation, not constitutional litigation, will be the decisive tools for market access.