Esteras in Action: Express Reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A) at Revocation Is Plain Error; Home Confinement Treated as an Alternative to Incarceration for Substantial-Rights Analysis

Introduction

United States v. Horne, No. 25-11734 (11th Cir. Oct. 15, 2025) (per curiam), is a significant, if unpublished, application of the Supreme Court’s decision in Esteras v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2031 (2025). The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded a revocation sentence where the district court expressly invoked the need “to promote respect for the law”—a retributive consideration codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)—in imposing post-revocation sanctions.

The case spotlights two important points:

After Esteras, it is plain error for a district court to consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors (seriousness of the offense, respect for the law, just punishment) when imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release under § 3583(e).
For the plain-error prejudice analysis, the panel counted the liberty burden of home confinement imposed under § 3583(e)(4) as an “alternative to incarceration,” treating Horne’s six months of imprisonment plus three years of home confinement as the functional equivalent of 42 months of confinement—an upward variance of at least 30 months from the advisory 6–12 month range for his Grade C violations.

The parties jointly moved for summary reversal, and the Eleventh Circuit granted the motion, concluding that the legal error was clear and outcome-determinative under plain-error review.

Summary of the Opinion

The district court revoked Travis Horne’s supervised release after he admitted two Grade C violations. It imposed six months of imprisonment and five years of supervised release, including three years of home confinement with electronic monitoring. In explaining the revocation sentence, the court expressly identified “the need to promote respect for the law” as one of three carefully considered § 3553(a) factors.

Citing Esteras, the Eleventh Circuit held that § 3583(e) excludes § 3553(a)(2)(A) from the factors a court may consider at revocation. Because the district court expressly relied on an impermissible factor, the panel found plain error satisfying all four prongs:

Error: Reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A) during revocation sentencing is prohibited by Esteras.
Plainness: The error was clear at the time of appellate review (see Henderson).
Substantial rights: There was a reasonable probability of a lower sentence absent the error, given the effective 42-month liberty deprivation compared to a 6–12 month advisory range for noncriminal Grade C violations.
Fairness/integrity/public reputation: The risk of unnecessary deprivation of liberty warranted correction (see Rosales-Mireles).

Because the parties’ position was “clearly right as a matter of law,” the court granted summary reversal, vacated the sentence, and remanded.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Esteras v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2031 (2025): The Supreme Court held that district courts may not consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) when imposing a revocation sentence under § 3583(e). The Court drew a negative inference from Congress’s omission of § 3553(a)(2)(A) in § 3583(e), reinforced by neighboring provisions that expressly incorporate all § 3553(a) factors. The decision emphasizes that revocation sentencing is forward-looking, aimed at deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, not retribution.
United States v. Gomez, 955 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2020): Identifies the § 3553(a) factors that may be considered under § 3583(e) at revocation, excluding § 3553(a)(2)(A).
United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2014): Articulates the four-prong plain-error standard applied here.
United States v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231 (11th Cir. 2023): Clarifies that an error is “plain” when resolved by controlling precedent or unambiguous statutory text.
Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266 (2013): Plainness is assessed at the time of appellate review, permitting reliance on intervening Supreme Court decisions like Esteras.
United States v. Arias-Izquierdo, 449 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2006): Substantial-rights prong is met where there is a reasonable probability of a lower sentence absent the error.
Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129 (2018): The unnecessary deprivation of liberty typically satisfies the fourth prong of plain error in sentencing contexts.
Groendyke Transportation, Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1969): Summary disposition is proper where one party is clearly correct as a matter of law (adopted in the Eleventh Circuit via Bonner).
Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc): Adopts pre-October 1981 Fifth Circuit decisions as binding precedent.
Statutes and Guidelines: 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (revocation framework and permissible factors), § 3583(e)(4) (home confinement only as an alternative to incarceration), § 3553(a) (sentencing factors), and U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1 (violation grades) and § 7B1.4(a) (advisory ranges upon revocation).

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning hews closely to Esteras and the plain-error framework:

Statutory structure and negative inference: Section 3583(e) authorizes revocation after considering “most” § 3553(a) factors, but it omits § 3553(a)(2)(A)—the retributive purposes (seriousness, respect, just punishment). Esteras treats this explicit omission as intentional, confirming that revocation is not a vehicle for retribution but for forward-looking objectives.
Express reliance satisfies the “actual reliance” threshold: The panel emphasized Esteras’s requirement that it be “clear or obvious” that the district court actually relied on § 3553(a)(2)(A). That threshold was met because the district court expressly listed “the need to promote respect for the law” as one of only three factors it had “carefully considered.” This is the paradigm case of impermissible reliance, unlike cases where vague or generic language leaves reliance uncertain.
Plainness at the time of review: Even if the district court sentenced Horne before Esteras (the opinion does not specify), Henderson allows the court to deem the error “plain” based on current law at the time of appeal. With Esteras on the books, the error was plainly established.
Substantial rights and the treatment of home confinement: The panel’s prejudice analysis is notable. By statute, home confinement under § 3583(e)(4) “may be imposed only as an alternative to incarceration.” Using that statutory signal, the court evaluated the liberty impact of Horne’s six months of imprisonment plus three years of home confinement as the functional equivalent of 42 months of confinement. Against an advisory range of 6–12 months for two Grade C violations, that constitutes an upward variance of at least 30 months—amply demonstrating a reasonable probability of a lower sentence if the district court had not relied on § 3553(a)(2)(A).
Fairness and integrity of proceedings: Citing Rosales-Mireles, the panel underscored that unnecessary deprivations of liberty undermine public confidence in sentencing. That concern applied squarely here.

The panel added contextual details that bolstered the prejudice and fairness determinations: Horne’s Grade C violations were noncriminal and arose from briefly attending an uncle’s funeral; they were his only violations during 18 months of home confinement, contrasted against a very serious underlying offense (drugs, firearms, violence) that had led to a 450-month sentence. These facts reinforced that retributive considerations tied to the underlying offense were especially inappropriate under § 3583(e), and that the revocation sentence’s severity was more likely to have been affected by the impermissible factor.

Impact

This decision, though not published, has immediate and practical implications:

Bright-line constraint on revocation reasoning: In the Eleventh Circuit, district courts may not rely—expressly or by unmistakable implication—on § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors when imposing revocation sentences. References to “seriousness of the offense,” “respect for the law,” or “just punishment” can jeopardize a revocation sentence if they appear as part of the court’s stated rationale.
Record discipline for sentencing judges: Courts must tailor revocation explanations to the permissible purposes: deterrence (§ 3553(a)(2)(B)), protection of the public (§ 3553(a)(2)(C)), and rehabilitation (§ 3553(a)(2)(D)), in addition to the other § 3583(e) cross-referenced considerations (e.g., history and characteristics, policy statements, disparities, restitution).
Defense practice: Counsel should object contemporaneously if the court invokes § 3553(a)(2)(A) at revocation. While Esteras and Henderson allow relief under plain-error review, a prompt objection avoids the added hurdles of demonstrating prejudice and the fourth prong. Defense counsel should also build a record distinguishing underlying offense retribution from forward-looking revocation goals.
Government practice: Prosecutors should avoid urging retributive rationales at revocation and ensure arguments are framed around deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, as well as applicable policy statements (e.g., Chapter 7).
Home confinement in prejudice analysis: The panel’s use of § 3583(e)(4) to treat home confinement as an alternative to incarceration is a practical template for assessing the liberty impact of mixed sanctions in the substantial-rights analysis. Expect litigants to cite this approach when arguing prejudice from revocation sentences that combine prison and lengthy home confinement.
Increased appellate scrutiny: Post-Esteras, revocation sentences that include language echoing § 3553(a)(2)(A) are vulnerable on appeal, especially where the record is explicit. Sentencing judges will likely adjust colloquies and written statements of reasons to avoid prohibited factors.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised release vs. the original sentence: Supervised release follows imprisonment and is designed to help defendants reintegrate while protecting the community. If a defendant violates conditions, the court may revoke supervised release and impose sanctions. Revocation is not a time to revisit punishments for the original crime; it addresses the breach of trust and future risk.
§ 3553(a) factors: These are the statutory purposes and considerations for sentencing. At revocation, courts must consider only a subset of these factors (notably excluding § 3553(a)(2)(A)’s retributive purposes). The permissible aims are forward-looking: deterring future violations, protecting the public, and providing needed treatment or training.
Plain error review: When a party did not object in the district court, an appellate court corrects only “plain errors” that affect substantial rights and seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. The error must be clear under current law at the time of review.
Negative inference (expressio unius): When Congress lists some items but omits others in a related context, courts often infer the omission was deliberate. In § 3583(e), Congress omitted § 3553(a)(2)(A), signaling courts are not to consider retributive goals at revocation.
Summary reversal: An appellate court may summarily reverse without full briefing or argument when the correct outcome is clear as a matter of law. Here, both parties agreed that Esteras compelled reversal.
Home confinement as an alternative to incarceration: Under § 3583(e)(4), a court can impose home confinement only in lieu of incarceration. That statutory structure supports treating home confinement as a meaningful deprivation of liberty when assessing whether an error likely altered the sentence’s severity.

Conclusion

United States v. Horne underscores a now-settled post-Esteras principle: district courts cannot rely on § 3553(a)(2)(A) when imposing revocation sentences under § 3583(e). The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion is a clear blueprint for identifying and remedying such errors: look for express references to retributive purposes, measure prejudice by the full liberty burden (including home confinement imposed as an alternative to incarceration), and correct sentences that risk unnecessary deprivation of liberty.

Practically, Horne will shape revocation proceedings across the circuit. District courts will refocus rationales on deterrence, public protection, rehabilitation, applicable Guidelines policy statements, and the defendant’s conduct on supervision. Defense and government counsel alike should align arguments with these permissible aims. Even though the decision is not published, its faithful application of Esteras and its methodical plain-error analysis provide persuasive guidance that will likely influence future revocation appeals and sentencing practices in the Eleventh Circuit and beyond.