Precedents Cited

Estate of Eichstadt, 2022 S.D. 78, 983 N.W.2d 572

Estate of Eichstadt is the opinion’s primary modern benchmark for voluntariness in premarital agreements. The Court in Webb reiterated Eichstadt’s key point: voluntariness is not reduced to whether the signer was “forced,” but instead requires “a more comprehensive examination” of surrounding circumstances—i.e., a “totality of the circumstances” inquiry.

Webb used Eichstadt largely as a contrast case: in Eichstadt, the signer was unaware of the agreement until execution day, had limited education, was emotionally distressed, and lacked meaningful opportunity to consult counsel. By contrast, in Webb, Stephanie was college-educated, an experienced business manager/owner, not shown to be emotionally distressed, and the circuit court credited testimony suggesting she had opportunity to ask questions and seek counsel.

The Court also invoked Eichstadt for unconscionability methodology—considering both the circumstances of execution and the agreement’s terms, including whether it provides for the non-drafting spouse and whether terms are disproportionate to the drafting spouse’s holdings.

Estate of Smid, 2008 S.D. 82, 756 N.W.2d 1

Smid supplies two doctrinal building blocks:

• The general presumption that a person who signs a contract is “conclusively presumed to know its contents and to assent to them, in the absence of fraud, misrepresentation or other wrongful act by another contracting party.”
• The application of elective-share waiver enforcement in a probate setting where the surviving spouse alleged limited understanding and a benign purpose (“avoid probate”).

In Webb, Smid functions as supportive authority for upholding the circuit court’s finding of voluntary execution, and for the proposition that unconscionability is not established merely because an agreement results in the surviving spouse receiving less than statutory entitlements.

Dunham v. Sabers, 2022 S.D. 65, 981 N.W.2d 620, and Roberts v. Roberts, 2003 S.D. 75, 666 N.W.2d 477

These cases were cited to define and reinforce the clear error standard applied to the circuit court’s factual findings on voluntariness. Webb used them to emphasize appellate restraint: credibility and factfinding remain primarily the trial court’s domain, reversible only with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”

Barton v. Barton, 2012 S.D. 44, 815 N.W.2d 553; Lodde v. Lodde, 420 N.W.2d 20 (S.D. 1988); Olson v. Olson, 1996 S.D. 90, 552 N.W.2d 396

These decisions were invoked for a unifying restraint principle: courts are not in the business of rescuing parties from “bad bargains.” In Webb, this principle narrows the voluntariness inquiry to the integrity of execution (absence of wrongful conduct, meaningful choice, etc.) rather than the ex post fairness of outcomes.

Estate of Gaaskjolen, 2020 S.D. 17, 941 N.W.2d 808

Gaaskjolen provided authority for deference to circuit court credibility findings—critical here because the circuit court credited attorney Eric Bogue’s testimony about explaining provisions and encouraging independent counsel in line with his practice.

Smetana v. Smetana, 2007 S.D. 5, 726 N.W.2d 887

Cited (through Eichstadt) for the proposition that unconscionability is decided “as a matter of law,” supporting Webb’s de novo review of unconscionability.

Wilkes v. Estate of Wilkes, 27 P.3d 433 (Mont. 2001)

Although not a South Dakota case, Wilkes was relied upon (via Smid) to illustrate a common rationale for enforcing prenuptial terms where the decedent’s key assets were built before the marriage and intended to benefit children from a prior relationship, and where the new spouse contributed little to those assets. Webb similarly emphasized that Butch’s primary wealth (payday-lending LLCs and ranching operations) predated the marriage and that Stephanie did not substantially contribute to their development at the time of execution.

Estate of Simon, 2024 S.D. 47, 11 N.W.3d 36 (Kern, J., dissenting)

Referenced in a footnote for context on the purpose of elective-share statutes: protecting against unintentional disinheritance. While cited in dissent in Simon, the reference in Webb underscores the policy backdrop against which waiver statutes operate.

Sanford v. Sanford, 2005 S.D. 34, 694 N.W.2d 283

Sanford supplied the practical disclosure benchmark: disclosure need not be perfect; it must be “sufficiently precise” to give a “reasonable approximation” of the other party’s net worth, including approximate valuations of assets and liabilities to the extent possible. Webb used Sanford to validate Exhibit B’s asset list and valuations as adequate, notwithstanding later-alleged omissions.

Legal Reasoning

1) Voluntary Execution: Totality of the Circumstances + Appellate Deference

The governing waiver statute, SDCL 29A-2-213(a), permits waiver of the elective share “before or after marriage” by a written instrument signed by the surviving spouse. But SDCL 29A-2-213(b)(1) renders a waiver unenforceable if “not executed voluntarily.” A parallel rule exists for premarital agreements in SDCL 25-2-21(a)(1).

Webb treated voluntariness as a fact-intensive inquiry. Applying Eichstadt and Smid, the Court endorsed examining the “totality of the circumstances,” not merely:

• the closeness to the wedding date,
• the absence of separate counsel, or
• the signer’s later dissatisfaction.

On the facts as found, the Court emphasized:

• No fraud or trickery conceded: Stephanie conceded she was not deceived or “tricked.”
• No bullying/wrongful conduct: The circuit court found no evidence Butch bullied her or engaged in wrongful conduct.
• Capacity and independence: Stephanie was a college-educated business owner/manager, not financially dependent on Butch.
• Opportunity and ability to ask questions: The circuit court credited attorney Bogue’s testimony that he reviewed the agreement and would have encouraged independent counsel.
• Rescheduling was possible: Witness testimony supported that a reschedule could have occurred; any time pressure was characterized as largely self-imposed.
• Circuit court credibility calls: Because the circuit court credited Bogue’s account over Stephanie’s (including duration and substance of the meeting), the Supreme Court deferred under the clear error standard.

The majority’s approach effectively clarifies (without creating a new bright-line rule) that timing and lack of independent counsel are factors, but not determinative in the absence of coercion, deceit, or credible evidence of compromised free choice.

2) Unconscionability: Two-Part Gatekeeping Under the Statutes

SDCL 29A-2-213(b)(2) and SDCL 25-2-21(a)(2) share a structured test: the challenging spouse must prove the agreement was unconscionable when executed, and must also prove disclosure/knowledge deficiencies (lack of fair disclosure, no written waiver of further disclosure, and lack of adequate knowledge).

The Court treated unconscionability as a legal question (reviewed de novo) and resolved the claim on two tracks:

1. The agreement was not unconscionable at execution because it contained meaningful divorce provisions (2% per year up to 20%), and because Stephanie retained substantial separate property including the Colorado property Butch bought and titled in her name prior to marriage. The Court also emphasized that Butch’s major assets were premarital, and Stephanie did not substantially contribute to them at the time of execution.
2. Disclosure was fair and reasonable: Exhibit B gave an itemized list valuing Butch’s assets at ~ $26 million, including business valuations and a disclaimer warning that pending lawsuits could dramatically impact net income and valuations. The Court deemed this sufficient to provide a reasonable approximation of wealth, and found that alleged omissions (~$1.8 million; ~8%) did not materially undermine the disclosure.

Importantly, once the Court concluded Stephanie received fair and reasonable disclosure, it stated it “need not address” the remaining statutory factors under SDCL 29A-2-213(b)(2)—a practical sequencing point that can streamline litigation where disclosure is adequate.

3) Justice Salter’s Partial Concurrence/Dissent: A Push for a Definitional Rule

Justice Salter agreed with enforcing the agreement but criticized the majority’s voluntariness analysis as insufficiently rule-based. He argued for adopting a clear definition: “Voluntary means that the act was taken intentionally and is a product of a person’s free will.” His view reflects concern that a purely comparative approach (measuring facts against Smid and Eichstadt) may leave trial courts and parties without a predictable doctrinal test.

Even though this view did not command a majority, it signals a potential future doctrinal development: litigants may cite the concurrence/dissent to advocate for a more explicit standard or jury-like factors.

Impact

1) Reinforcement of Enforceability Despite “Last-Minute” Presentation

Estate of Webb strengthens the practical understanding that a premarital agreement presented close to a wedding is not automatically involuntary. The decision suggests that absent credible evidence of coercion, deception, or inability to choose freely, courts may enforce such agreements—particularly where the challenging spouse is sophisticated, independent, and capable.

2) Disclosure: “Reasonable Approximation” and Materiality of Omissions

The Court’s acceptance of Exhibit B—despite omission claims—adds concrete guidance about materiality. An omission of roughly 8% of a disclosed $26 million estate did not defeat “fair and reasonable disclosure,” especially absent proof of intentional concealment. Future litigants can expect courts to ask not only “was something omitted?” but also “did the disclosure still reasonably approximate the magnitude of net worth?”

3) Litigation Strategy and Trial Court Dynamics

The opinion highlights the centrality of credibility and record-building in voluntariness disputes. Because voluntariness is fact-bound and reviewed for clear error, parties should anticipate that:

• trial testimony from drafting attorneys and witnesses to execution will often be outcome-determinative, and
• appellate reversal is difficult without a strong record showing coercion, deception, or compromised capacity.

4) Drafting Practices: Disclaimers and Plain Waiver Language

The Court treated the Exhibit B lawsuit disclaimer as relevant in explaining why liability values were not fixed and why valuations could change. Drafters may respond by:

• including clearer disclaimers where valuations are uncertain,
• listing assets with approximate values and noting known contingencies, and
• ensuring waiver language (like paragraph 8) plainly references rights as “husband, wife, widower, widow,” and binds heirs/executors.

5) Potential Future Development: A Clearer Voluntariness Definition

Justice Salter’s writing keeps alive the argument that South Dakota should articulate a more explicit voluntariness rule. Future cases may adopt a clearer definition or multi-factor test, especially if inconsistent results arise from “comparison” reasoning.