Introduction

The case of Neil J. Mellen; Paul S. Knick v. Josiah Bunting, III addresses the contentious issue of state-sponsored prayer within a military educational institution. The plaintiffs, former cadets of the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), challenged the constitutionality of a daily "supper prayer" sponsored by the institution under the leadership of General Josiah Bunting, III. This commentary delves into the background of the case, the pivotal legal questions it raises, the court's analysis, and the broader implications for the intersection of religion and state functions in educational settings.

Summary of the Judgment

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's decision. While the court upheld that the supper prayer at VMI violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, it granted General Bunting qualified immunity. The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief became moot upon their graduation but maintained that the claim for damages regarding the constitutional violation remained actionable. Ultimately, the court concluded that although the prayer infringed upon constitutional principles, Bunting was protected by qualified immunity due to the absence of clearly established law at the time of his actions.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment extensively references pivotal Supreme Court cases that have shaped the interpretation of the Establishment Clause:

• ENGEL v. VITALE (1962): Struck down state-sponsored prayer in public schools, emphasizing the inherently religious nature of prayer.
• School District of Abington Township v. Schempp (1963): Invalidated school-sponsored Bible readings and prayers, reinforcing the prohibition against establishing religion in schools.
• LEMON v. KURTZMAN (1971): Established the Lemon test, a trinity of criteria to assess violations of the Establishment Clause.
• LEE v. WEISMAN (1992): Invalidated school-sponsored prayers at graduation ceremonies due to their coercive nature.
• Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe (2000): Struck down student-led prayers at football games, highlighting the coercive effect of such prayers.

Additionally, the court referenced lower court decisions like ANDERSON v. LAIRD and cases from other circuits such as TANFORD v. BRAND and Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, which dealt with prayer in higher education and military contexts, demonstrating a landscape of inconsistent appellate responses to state-sponsored prayer in non-elementary settings.

Legal Reasoning

The court employed a meticulous analysis grounded in the Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Initially, the court considered mootness due to the plaintiffs’ graduation, applying the standard set forth in POWELL v. McCORMACK and other relevant cases. However, it recognized the ongoing viability of the plaintiffs' monetary damages claim against General Bunting.

In assessing the constitutionality of the supper prayer, the court prioritized the Lemon test, evaluating the prayer against its three prongs:

• Secular Purpose: The court found that the prayer lacked a genuine secular purpose, instead serving as religious indoctrination.
• Primary Effect: The prayer was deemed to promote religion, conveying a message of state endorsement of religious activity.
• Excessive Entanglement: The administration's active role in composing, mandating, and monitoring the prayer indicated an undue entanglement with religious activities.

Furthermore, the court addressed General Bunting's qualified immunity defense, concluding that due to the lack of clearly established law regarding prayer at military institutions, Bunting was entitled to immunity.

Impact

This judgment reinforces the application of the Establishment Clause to state-sponsored religious activities beyond traditional elementary and secondary educational settings, extending its reach into higher education and military institutions. The decision emphasizes that state entities cannot endorse religious practices, even in contexts traditionally associated with religious expression, such as military training. The affirmation of qualified immunity for General Bunting underscores the complexities officials face when navigating uncharted constitutional territory, potentially prompting legislative clarification on the permissible scope of religious activities within state-run institutions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified Immunity

Qualified Immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages, provided their actions did not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." In this case, General Bunting was protected because the law regarding state-sponsored prayer in military institutions was not well-defined.

Establishment Clause

The Establishment Clause is part of the First Amendment, prohibiting the government from making any law “respecting an establishment of religion.” This clause ensures the state remains neutral in religious matters, preventing the endorsement or inhibition of religious practices.

Mootness

Mootness refers to a situation where the underlying issue of a lawsuit has been resolved or is no longer relevant, thereby removing the need for a court to decide the case. In this judgment, the plaintiffs' requests for declaratory and injunctive relief were deemed moot because they had graduated from VMI.

Lemon Test

The Lemon Test is a three-part test established in LEMON v. KURTZMAN to determine whether a government action violates the Establishment Clause:

• The action must have a secular legislative purpose.
• The principal or primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion.
• The action must not result in excessive government entanglement with religion.

Conclusion

The Mellen v. Bunting decision is a significant reaffirmation of the Establishment Clause's stringent stand against state-sponsored religious activities within educational institutions. By disallowing the supper prayer at VMI as unconstitutional, the court clarified that religious endorsements by state entities are impermissible, regardless of the institution's nature or the perceived maturity of its participants. This case underscores the judiciary's role in maintaining the delicate balance between freedom of religion and state neutrality, ensuring that governmental institutions do not infringe upon individual religious rights through official practices. Moreover, the affirmation of qualified immunity in the absence of clearly established law highlights the evolving nature of constitutional interpretations and the necessity for legislative bodies to provide clearer guidelines on permissible religious expressions within state-run institutions.