Establishing Standing in Discrimination Claims: The Imperative of a Concrete, Particularized Injury in Targeted Online Advertising

Establishing Standing in Discrimination Claims: The Imperative of a Concrete, Particularized Injury in Targeted Online Advertising

Introduction

The case of Neuhtah Opiotennione v. Bozzuto Management Company et al. presents a contentious issue regarding standing to sue in discrimination claims. At the heart of this dispute is whether an abstract allegation of being disadvantaged by targeted Facebook advertisements can suffice as a concrete and particularized injury under Article III of the United States Constitution.

The Plaintiff-Appellant, Neuhtah Opiotennione, a 55-year-old long-time Facebook user, alleged that several property management companies intentionally targeted Facebook advertisements for rental housing exclusively to users 50 years old or younger. Claiming that this practice effectively denied her access to critical housing information, Opiotennione pursued relief by asserting violations of several local statutes, including the Montgomery County Code, the D.C. Human Rights Act, and the D.C. Consumer Protections and Procedures Act. Her claim, however, was dismissed at the district court level for lack of standing, a decision that the current opinion from the Fourth Circuit affirms.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion authored by Judge Rushing, affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Opiotennione’s claims, holding that the plaintiff failed to allege a concrete and particularized injury in fact. Despite the underlying concern that targeted advertisement practices might have a discriminatory effect, the court emphasized that a mere generalized injury—stemming from being part of a disfavored age group—is insufficient for establishing standing. Instead, the plaintiff needed to show a personal, individualized harm resulting directly from the defendants’ conduct.

The opinion clarifies that while targeted advertising may indeed be discriminatory in appearance, the constitutional requirement for an “injury in fact” demands a more tangible, individualized harm rather than an abstract grievance shared broadly by all members of a particular group.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Court’s decision is anchored in a rich body of precedent that collectively establishes the necessity for a concrete injury to sustain standing:

  • LUJAN v. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, 504 U.S. 555 (1992): This case set forth the three-pronged test for standing, emphasizing the need for a concrete and particularized injury.
  • Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016): Here, the Court elucidated that an injury must be actual or imminent rather than hypothetical or abstract.
  • HECKLER v. MATHEWS, 465 U.S. 728 (1984) and associated precedents: These cases highlight that even discriminatory treatment, unless manifesting in a personal denial of benefits, does not automatically create standing.
  • Other cases including Baehr v. Creig Northrop Team, P.C., Allen v. White, and Johnson v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management further solidify the view that standing demands undeniable evidence of injury that is distinctly personal.

In reviewing these precedents, the court underscored the principle that a mere allegation of “unequal treatment” fails as a basis for standing unless it is coupled with a demonstration of a specific harm that affected the plaintiff uniquely.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s legal reasoning rests on the fundamental principle that federal courts are limited to adjudicating "cases" and "controversies" as mandated by Article III of the Constitution. To meet this standard, Opiotennione was required to demonstrate that she suffered an “injury in fact” that was both concrete and particularized.

The majority opinion carefully distinguishes between a general grievance affecting a broad group and a specific harm affecting an individual. In this case, even though the advertisement targeting practice may have been discriminatory on its face, the plaintiff’s injury was deemed too abstract because:

  • The alleged injury arose merely as a consequence of not receiving certain advertisements—a scenario that almost all users, regardless of age, might experience given the algorithmic and competitive nature of social media advertisement delivery.
  • There is no evidence that Opiotennione was individually singled out or that she personally was denied access to rental opportunities solely because she was over the age threshold.
  • The comparison with similar cases (including a Ninth Circuit opinion concerning disparities in advertisement delivery) highlighted that a personal request for information or an explicit denial is necessary to constitute the particularization of the injury.

As a result, the Court concluded that mere membership in an ostensibly disadvantaged age category does not establish the requisite injury in fact. The decision reinforces that standing is not conferred by abstract claims of discriminatory practices alone but by evidence of demonstrated, individualized harm.

Impact on Future Cases and the Legal Landscape

This ruling has significant implications for future cases involving discrimination claims in the digital advertising sphere. The decision clarifies that:

  • Plaintiffs must present a clear, concrete demonstration of how targeted advertising practices resulted in a personal denial of opportunity or benefit.
  • Courts are likely to scrutinize allegations of abstract harm in claims of discrimination, especially in cases where algorithms and machine learning determine ad delivery, separating the role of the advertiser from that of the platform.
  • The precedent set here may limit the ability to generalize a systemic issue as sufficient for standing, urging future litigants to focus on individualized harm rather than a broad group injury.

By reinforcing established standing principles, the opinion helps delineate the boundaries of judicial authority in cases where modern technology intersects with traditional civil rights claims.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Several complex legal concepts emerge in this case:

  • Standing: The legal requirement that a plaintiff must show an individualized, concrete harm that is directly traceable to the defendant’s actions, rather than a generalized grievance shared by many.
  • Concrete and Particularized Injury: An injury that is real and specific to the plaintiff, as opposed to an abstract harm that affects a broad group without individualized impact.
  • Algorithmic Advertisement Delivery: The process by which platforms like Facebook use machine learning to determine which users receive certain advertisements based on a set of targeting criteria; this diffuses responsibility between the advertiser and the platform and complicates claims of direct harm.
  • Injury in Fact: A legal term that requires an identifiable harm, without which a court cannot provide a remedy; the plaintiff must clearly show that she was personally and directly affected.

By breaking down these concepts, the court bolsters the understanding that while innovative advertising techniques might raise concerns about fairness and discrimination, any legal challenge must come with proof of a direct, personal injury before federal courts can adjudicate the matter.

Conclusion

In summary, the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Opiotennione v. Bozzuto Management Company et al. reinforces a fundamental principle of federal judicial jurisdiction: a plaintiff must allege a concrete and particularized injury to satisfy standing requirements. By rejecting Opiotennione’s claim that an abstract discriminatory targeting of online advertisements is sufficient for standing, the Court has clarified that generalized harms—without clear personal denial or exclusion—do not suffice.

This decision is significant in the digital era, emphasizing that even when practices appear potentially discriminatory, litigants must establish an individualized injury to bring a claim. Future challenges involving targeted advertising and discrimination will undoubtedly need to consider these stringent standing requirements, ensuring that federal courts remain focused on resolving genuine, personalized controversies.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

Judge(s)

RUSHING, Circuit Judge

Attorney(S)

Jonathan Ellis Taylor, GUPTA WESSLER PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Michael E. Kenneally, MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. Matthew K. Handley, Rachel Nadas, HANDLEY FARAH & ANDERSON PLLC, Washington, D.C.; Deepak Gupta, Peter Romer-Friedman, Linnet Davis-Stermitz, Robert Friedman, GUPTA WESSLER PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Lynn E. Calkins, Christine N. Walz, HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee Bozzuto Management Company. W. Christian Moffitt, FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP, Blue Bell, Pennsylvania, for Appellee Kettler Management Inc. Grace E. Speights, Michael Burkhardt, MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee JBG Smith Management Services, LLC. Michael Evan Jaffe, Jack McKay, David C. Grossman, PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee Tower Construction Group, LLC. Daniel B. Kohrman, Elizabeth Aniskevich, William Alvarado Rivera, AARP FOUNDATION, Washington, D.C., for Amici AARP and AARP Foundation. Jon Greenbaum, Thomas Silverstein, David Brody, Adonne Washington, LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, Washington, D.C.; Jim Davy, ALL RISE TRIAL & APPELLATE, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Amici The American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, The National Fair Housing Alliance, and The Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs.

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