Establishing Public Censure as Appropriate Sanction for Repeated Violations of Competence, Diligence, Communication, and Honesty

Introduction

In In the Matter of Michael K. Glucksman (No. 2020-160-M.P.), decided April 28, 2025, the Rhode Island Supreme Court confronted two consolidated attorney-disciplinary petitions arising from respondent Michael K. Glucksman’s repeated failures to represent clients competently, to communicate, and to act honestly in both civil litigation and bankruptcy matters. The petitioners—Disciplinary Counsel acting on behalf of two former clients, Patricia Esposito and Lori and Christopher Hann—alleged that Mr. Glucksman mishandled retainer funds, filed duplicative lawsuits without timely service, failed to file a bankruptcy petition he had professed to file, and made false representations to clients and to the disciplinary authorities. The Court reviewed the Disciplinary Board’s findings under Supreme Court Rule 6(d) and imposed public censure as the appropriate sanction.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court accepted the Disciplinary Board’s findings that Mr. Glucksman violated multiple Rules of Professional Conduct in two separate matters (Esposito and Hann).
Rule violations in the Esposito matter: 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4(a) (Communication), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission & Disciplinary Matters), 8.4(a) & (c) (Misconduct).
Rule violations in the Hann matter: 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4(a) (Communication), 1.16(d) (Terminating Representation), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission & Disciplinary Matters), 8.4(a) & (c) (Misconduct).
Although respondent advanced certain mitigating factors, the Court determined public censure best served the twin goals of protecting the public and preserving professional integrity.
The Court directed compliance with requirements set forth by the Disciplinary Board and warned that failure to comply would trigger further proceedings.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Court relied on established disciplinary principles:

In re McBurney, 13 A.3d 654 (R.I. 2011) (mem.): Professional discipline aims to protect the public and maintain the integrity of the bar rather than punish the attorney.
In re Almonte, 678 A.2d 457 (R.I. 1996): Reaffirming that sanctions are not punitive but corrective.
In re Fishbein, 701 A.2d 1018 (R.I. 1997): Courts must balance aggravating and mitigating factors in selecting an appropriate sanction.
In re Hellew, 828 A.2d 531 (R.I. 2003) (mem.): Although the Disciplinary Board’s recommendations carry great weight, the Supreme Court remains the final arbiter of attorney discipline.

Legal Reasoning

The Court applied a three-step framework: (1) adopt the Board’s findings of fact; (2) identify specific Rules of Professional Conduct violated; (3) determine the sanction by weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In both the Esposito and Hann matters, respondent’s failures were manifold:

He ignored client inquiries and failed to effect service or file critical documents within mandatory deadlines (Rules 1.1 & 1.3).
He misrepresented to clients and Disciplinary Counsel that tasks (service, appeal transcripts, bankruptcy filings) had been completed when they had not (Rules 1.4(a), 8.1(b), 8.4(a) & (c)).
He failed to withdraw properly or return client files in the Hann matter, breaching Rule 1.16(d).

The Court found that these breaches—especially the false statements to clients and to disciplinary authorities—constituted serious misconduct meriting public censure. Mitigating factors (e.g., respondent’s cooperation at hearing, absence of prior discipline) were insufficient to warrant a lesser sanction.

Impact

This decision reinforces for Rhode Island practitioners:

The indispensability of competence, diligence, and truthful communication in all client matters.
The obligation to effect timely service, to order transcripts where appeals are pursued, and to file petitions actually undertaken.
That false statements to clients or disciplinary authorities aggravate any sanction and will almost invariably trigger public censure.
The Court’s continued insistence on balancing public protection with preservation of professional integrity.

Future disciplinary matters are likely to cite Glucksman when considering public censure for overlapping violations of Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16, 8.1, and 8.4.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Public Censure: A formal, published reprimand of an attorney’s misconduct—less severe than suspension or disbarment but marked on the attorney’s record.
Rule 1.1 (Competence): Requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.
Rule 1.3 (Diligence): Mandates prompt and persistent prosecution or defense of a client’s matter.
Rule 1.4(a) (Communication): Obliges an attorney to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
Rule 1.16(d) (Terminating Representation): Requires an attorney, upon withdrawal, to take steps reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, including returning papers and unearned fees.
Rule 8.1(b) (Bar Admission & Disciplinary Matters): Prohibits knowingly making false statements in connection with disciplinary proceedings.
Rule 8.4(a) & (c) (Misconduct): Prohibits violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.

Conclusion

In the Matter of Michael K. Glucksman illustrates that repeated failures in competence, diligence, communication, and candor—even when isolated to two client matters—will subject an attorney to public censure. The decision underscores the Supreme Court’s unwavering commitment to protecting clients and preserving the integrity of the profession. By articulating clear boundaries and reaffirming established disciplinary precedents, Glucksman serves as a touchstone for future cases involving similar Rule breaches.