Establishing FEHA as a Basis for Common Law Wrongful Discharge Claims in Age Discrimination Cases

Establishing FEHA as a Basis for Common Law Wrongful Discharge Claims in Age Discrimination Cases

Introduction

The case of Joan Stevenson v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, with Huntington Memorial Hospital as the real party in interest, represents a pivotal moment in California employment discrimination law. Decided by the Supreme Court of California on August 27, 1997, this case delves into the intersection of statutory protections against age discrimination and common law tort claims for wrongful discharge. Joan Stevenson, a long-term employee, alleged that her termination was based solely on her age, thus violating the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of California held that under FEHA, employers regularly employing five or more individuals are prohibited from discriminating against employees over the age of 40 based on age. Importantly, the court concluded that this statutory prohibition satisfies the necessary criteria to support a common law tort action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. As a result, Stevenson's wrongful termination claim was allowed to proceed without the necessity to exhaust administrative remedies under FEHA. The court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal, thereby expanding the avenues available to employees facing age discrimination.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment extensively referenced several key cases that shaped the landscape of wrongful discharge claims:

  • JENNINGS v. MARRALLE (1994): Addressed wrongful discharge by employers with fewer than five employees, leaving open the question for larger employers.
  • Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (1959): Established that wrongful discharge claims require a violation of public policy.
  • TAMENY v. ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO. (1980): Recognized the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, setting the foundation for such claims.
  • GANTT v. SENTRY INSURANCE (1992): Further defined the framework for tortious discharge claims, emphasizing the need for public policy to be clear, substantial, and well-established.
  • ROJO v. KLIGER (1990): Clarified that FEHA does not preempt common law claims, allowing for cumulative remedies.

Legal Reasoning

The court's legal reasoning hinged on four primary criteria for establishing a wrongfully discharged employee's common law tort claim:

  • Delineation by Law: The public policy against age discrimination must be articulated in a constitutional or statutory provision.
  • Public Benefit: The policy must benefit the public at large, not just individual interests.
  • Established Policy: The policy must have been well-established at the time of the discharge.
  • Substantial and Fundamental: The policy should be substantial and fundamental to warrant legal protection.

Applying these criteria, the court determined that FEHA explicitly articulates a public policy against age discrimination, which benefits society by promoting fair employment practices and utilizing manpower effectively. The policy was well-established, with precedents and extended legislative support over decades, thereby satisfying its fundamental and substantial nature.

Furthermore, the court clarified that FEHA's remedies are cumulative, meaning Eaton structures do not preclude common law claims. This interpretation aligns with the legislative intent to amplify, not replace, existing remedies for employment discrimination.

Impact

This judgment has profound implications for both employees and employers in California:

  • For Employees: It broadens the legal recourse available to individuals who face age discrimination, allowing them to pursue common law tort claims alongside statutory remedies.
  • For Employers: It underscores the necessity for compliance with FEHA's anti-discrimination provisions and the potential for increased liability in wrongful termination cases.
  • Legal Landscape: Establishes a precedent that strengthens the enforcement of anti-discrimination laws by recognizing them as foundational public policies warranting common law protection.

Future cases involving employment discrimination may rely on this precedent to argue for similar protections under FEHA, potentially leading to more robust safeguarding against wrongful terminations based on age.

Complex Concepts Simplified

FEHA (Fair Employment and Housing Act): A California statute that prohibits discrimination in employment and housing based on various protected characteristics, including age, race, sex, and more. It applies to employers with five or more employees.

Common Law Tort Claim: A legal claim based on court-established precedents rather than statutes. In this context, it refers to alleging wrongful termination as a violation of public policy.

Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy: A legal claim that an employee was terminated for reasons that contravene the established public policies of the state, making such termination unlawful.

Public Policy Exception: An exception to the at-will employment doctrine, which allows employees to sue for wrongful termination if the discharge violates a fundamental public policy.

LEGO's Act: Refers here to the concept of articulated public policies within statutes that protect certain rights and interests.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of California's decision in Joan Stevenson v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County marks a significant advancement in the protection of employees against age discrimination. By recognizing FEHA's anti-discrimination provisions as a foundation for common law wrongful discharge claims, the court has reinforced the statutory protections and provided a stronger legal framework for employees seeking redress. This decision not only aligns with existing precedents but also ensures that the legislative intent to protect against employment discrimination is effectively upheld. Moving forward, this judgment serves as a critical reference point for both legal practitioners and employers in navigating the complexities of employment law in California.

Case Details

Year: 1997
Court: Supreme Court of California.

Judge(s)

Joyce L. KennardMarvin R. BaxterJanice Rogers Brown

Attorney(S)

COUNSEL Antonio M. Lawson, Traber, Voorhees Olguin, Bert Voorhees, Fernando M. Olguin and Theresa M. Traber for Petitioner. Joseph Posner, Cathy Ventrell-Monsees, Laurie A. McCann and William C. Quackenbush as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Fonda, Garrard, Hilberman Davis, Peter M. Fonda, Laurie DeYoung, O'Flaherty Belgum, Brian P. Barrow, Todd E. Croutch and Robert M. Dato for Real Party in Interest. Gibson, Dunn Crutcher, David A. Cathcart, Mark Snyderman, Crosby, Heafey, Roach May, James C. Martin, Anna Segobia Masters and Ellen R. Brostrom as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

Comments