Establishing Duty of Care Under the Connecticut Rule and Contractor Liability for Municipal Snow and Ice Services

Introduction

Sara Roman v. The City of Providence et al., decided by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island on April 8, 2025, arises from a slip-and-fall accident on the grounds of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Elementary School in Providence. The plaintiff, Sara Roman, alleged that she slipped on untreated snow and ice while picking up her children, sustaining personal injuries. She sued both the City of Providence—through its Treasurer and the Providence Public School District Superintendent—and K. Scott Construction & Disposal, Inc., the contracted snow‐removal vendor. The central dispute concerned whether the City or its contractor owed her a duty to clear hazards before she fell, and if so, when that duty accrued under Rhode Island’s interpretation of the “Connecticut Rule.” The case was consolidated on appeal after both defendants obtained summary judgment in Superior Court.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court vacated the City’s summary judgment but affirmed the judgment in favor of K. Scott. Key holdings include:

City of Providence: The Court held that genuine issues of fact remained regarding whether Roman’s fall was caused by ice pre‐existing the storm (for which the City might have had a duty to address immediately) or by fresh snow accumulation (for which the City’s duty would not accrue until after the storm ended and a reasonable time to clear had passed). Summary judgment was therefore inappropriate.
K. Scott Construction: The contract under which K. Scott provided snow‐removal services authorized work only after the City’s designated representative issued a written start time—here after 6:00 p.m. on the day of the storm. Roman’s accident occurred before that authorization, so K. Scott owed her no duty at the time of her fall. Summary judgment in favor of K. Scott was proper.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Fuller v. Housing Authority of City of Providence (108 R.I. 770, 279 A.2d 438 (1971)): Established the “Connecticut Rule,” holding that an invitor’s duty to remove snow or ice does not arise while a storm is ongoing but accrues only after it ends and a reasonable time to clear has elapsed.
Banks v. Bowen’s Landing Corp. (522 A.2d 1222 (R.I. 1987)): Set forth a general negligence framework for invitees, requiring invitors to exercise reasonable care under all circumstances even when the Connecticut Rule does not apply.
Terry v. Central Auto Radiators, Inc. (732 A.2d 713 (R.I. 1999)): Recognized an “unusual circumstances” exception to the Connecticut Rule when a landowner’s own actions or municipal directives effectively create or exacerbate a hazard during a storm.
Aubin v. MAG Realty, LLC (161 A.3d 1143 (R.I. 2017)): Distinguished black ice formed overnight from storm‐related accumulations, clarifying that the Connecticut Rule applies only to hazards attributable directly to fresh snow or ice from the storm itself.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis began with whether Roman was a business invitee—a status she ultimately conceded on appeal—thus bringing her within the Connecticut Rule’s scope. Under that rule, a landowner or invitor owes no duty to remove or treat snow and ice during an ongoing storm. Only after the storm’s cessation and a reasonable interval may the invitor be found negligent for failing to clear the premises.

City Liability: The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that the hazard was storm‐related and that they had no duty until well after the accident. Roman countered that she slipped on pre‐existing ice hidden beneath fresh snow—a phenomenon not covered by the rule—and that an issue of material fact existed as to causation. The Supreme Court agreed, citing Aubin and Banks, and held that resolution of whether the slip was due to storm accumulation or prior ice must await trial.

Contractor Liability: K. Scott’s agreement with the Providence School Department specified that operations could begin only upon formal authorization by the Superintendent’s representative, who would monitor weather and notify the contractor. Evidence showed authorization occurred only after 6:00 p.m. on February 12, 2019—well after Roman’s estimated fall time. Because K. Scott’s duty under contract had not yet arisen, no duty existed toward Roman at the time of her fall. The law‐of‐the‐case doctrine, invoked by the second hearing justice, reinforced that Rhode Island’s Connecticut Rule applies to third‐party contractors retained for snow removal.

Impact on Future Cases

Preexisting versus Storm‐Created Ice: Plaintiffs alleging slip‐and‐fall injuries on snow and ice must now clearly establish whether the hazard was caused by fresh accumulation (invoking the Connecticut Rule’s timing limitations) or by pre‐existing ice formation (potentially invoking general negligence principles).
Contractual Authorization: Municipal snow‐removal vendors can shield themselves from liability by adhering strictly to contract terms governing notice and start times. Injured parties must demonstrate that a contractor had assumed responsibility before a fall.
Unusual Circumstances Exception: The “Terry” exception remains viable but confined to scenarios where a landowner’s affirmative directive or municipal requirement creates a hazard during a storm—insufficient here absent evidence that the City compelled attendance on a known danger day.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Connecticut Rule: A legal principle holding that property owners need not clear snow or ice during an active storm but must do so within a reasonable time after it ends.
Business Invitee: A person invited onto property for the owner’s commercial benefit (e.g., a parent picking up a child at public school).
Summary Judgment: A court decision made without a full trial, granted when there is no dispute on key facts or legal issues so that one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Law‐of‐the‐Case Doctrine: A principle that once an issue is decided in a case, that decision governs all subsequent stages of the same litigation unless clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

Sara Roman v. The City of Providence et al. refines the application of Rhode Island’s Connecticut Rule by underscoring the distinction between hazards caused by ongoing storms and those predating them. It reinforces that summary judgment is improper when factual disputes exist as to causation. The decision also clarifies that municipal snow‐removal contractors owe no duty to invitees until their contractual obligations are formally triggered. Together, these holdings guide both property owners and contractors in structuring risk‐management protocols and inform litigants of the evidentiary thresholds required to proceed past summary judgment in slip‐and‐fall claims.