Establishing Disparate-Impact Liability under the Fair Housing Act: Keller v. Inclusive Communities Project

Establishing Disparate-Impact Liability under the Fair Housing Act: Keller v. Inclusive Communities Project

Introduction

Keller v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (576 U.S. 519, 2015) is a landmark case adjudicated by the United States Supreme Court that addressed the scope of the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The central issue in this case was whether the FHA permits individuals to bring disparate-impact claims, which challenge practices that disproportionately affect minorities, even in the absence of discriminatory intent by the defendant.

The parties involved included the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs, serving as petitioners, and The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (ICP), a nonprofit organization advocating for affordable housing, as the respondent. The case revolved around the distribution of low-income housing tax credits (LIHTCs) by the Texas Department, which ICP alleged resulted in segregated housing patterns favoring minority inner-city areas over white suburban neighborhoods.

Summary of the Judgment

In a majority opinion delivered by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court affirmed the recognition of disparate-impact claims under the FHA. The Court held that the FHA's language, particularly the phrases “otherwise make unavailable” and “because of,” supports the inclusion of disparate-impact liability. This interpretation aligns the FHA with other antidiscrimination statutes like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which have acknowledged disparate-impact claims to address practices that, while neutral in intent, result in discriminatory effects.

The Court reasoned that the FHA’s results-oriented language necessitates the ability to challenge housing practices that inadvertently sustain racial segregation. However, it also emphasized the importance of safeguards to prevent the overreach of disparate-impact liability, ensuring that legitimate governmental and private interests are not unduly impeded.

Dissenting opinions, led by Justice Thomas and joined by Justices Scalia and Alito, strongly opposed this interpretation. The dissenters argued that the FHA explicitly prohibits actions taken “because of” a protected characteristic, interpreting this language as requiring demonstrable discriminatory intent, thereby excluding disparate-impact claims.

The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which had recognized disparate-impact claims under the FHA but remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the new interpretation.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Court's decision heavily relied on precedents from GRIGGS v. DUKE POWER CO. (401 U.S. 424, 1971) and SMITH v. CITY OF JACKSON (544 U.S. 228, 2005). In Griggs, the Supreme Court recognized disparate-impact claims under Title VII, establishing that practices causing disproportionate adverse effects on minorities, even without discriminatory intent, could be actionable if not justified by business necessity. Similarly, in Smith, the Court extended this reasoning to the ADEA, affirming that disparate-impact claims could be recognized under antidiscrimination laws that focus on the outcomes of actions rather than the intentions behind them.

Additionally, the Court considered the 1988 amendments to the FHA, which included exemptions that implicitly acknowledged the existence of disparate-impact claims by specifying conduct not to be prohibited, such as considerations by real estate appraisers and occupancy restrictions. The unanimity of Courts of Appeals in applying disparate-impact liability under the FHA was also a significant factor in shaping the majority's stance.

Legal Reasoning

The majority contended that the FHA’s language is results-oriented, focusing on the consequences of actions (“otherwise make unavailable”) rather than the motivations behind them. This parallels the language in Title VII and the ADEA, which have been interpreted to allow disparate-impact claims. The Court emphasized that the 1988 amendments, by introducing safe harbors, implicitly endorsed the recognition of disparate-impact liability, as these provisions would be unnecessary if such liability were not already acknowledged.

Furthermore, the Court asserted that giving housing authorities and private developers the leeway to demonstrate that their practices serve legitimate interests prevents the imposition of undue burdens, akin to the business necessity defenses in employment discrimination cases. This balance ensures that the FHA achieves its purpose of reducing racial segregation without stifling legitimate housing policies.

The dissent, however, criticized the majority for overextending precedents and misinterpreting the statutory language of the FHA. They argued that “because of” unequivocally ties liability to discriminatory intent, not to the effects of neutral practices.

Impact

This judgment significantly broadens the scope of the FHA by allowing disparate-impact claims, empowering plaintiffs to challenge housing practices that inadvertently perpetuate racial segregation. It aligns the FHA with other antidiscrimination laws, promoting a more integrated society as envisioned by the Act’s legislative history.

Potential impacts include increased litigation against housing authorities and developers to ensure equitable distribution of affordable housing across diverse neighborhoods. It may lead to more stringent criteria in the allocation of LIHTCs to prevent inadvertent racial imbalances, thereby fostering greater integration.

However, the decision also raises concerns about the complexity of proving discriminatory effects and the burden it places on housing entities to justify their allocation practices. Balancing the prevention of racial segregation with the operational autonomy of housing programs will be a critical challenge moving forward.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Disparate-Impact Claims

Disparate-impact claims involve challenging policies or practices that, while seemingly neutral, result in significant adverse effects on protected groups. Unlike disparate-treatment claims, which require evidence of intentional discrimination, disparate-impact claims focus on the outcomes of actions to identify systemic biases.

Fair Housing Act (FHA)

The FHA is a federal law enacted in 1968 aimed at eliminating discrimination in housing based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, and national origin. It seeks to promote equal opportunity in housing and prevent segregationist practices.

Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTCs)

LIHTCs are incentives provided by the federal government to encourage the development of affordable rental housing for low-income households. These credits reduce the federal tax liability of developers in exchange for building or rehabilitating affordable housing units.

Business Necessity Defense

This defense allows defendants to justify practices that have a disparate impact by demonstrating that the practice is essential for achieving a legitimate business objective and that no less discriminatory alternatives are available.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court's decision in Keller v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. marks a pivotal moment in fair housing jurisprudence by formally recognizing disparate-impact claims under the FHA. This interpretation reinforces the Act’s goal of dismantling systemic barriers that sustain racial segregation in housing, aligning it with broader antidiscrimination principles.

While the affirmation empowers marginalized groups to seek redress against unintentional discriminatory practices, it also necessitates careful implementation to balance equity with the operational freedoms of housing entities. The judgment underscores the ongoing commitment to fostering an integrated society, echoing the FHA’s foundational objectives.

Case Details

Year: 2015
Court: U.S. Supreme Court

Judge(s)

Justice KENNEDYdelivered the opinion of the Court.

Attorney(S)

Scott A. Keller, Solicitor General, for the petitioners. Michael M. Daniel, for the respondent. Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the respondent. Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, Charles E. Roy, First Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, TX, Scott A. Keller, Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Joseph D. Hughes, Beth Klusmann, Alex Potapov, Assistant Solicitors General, for Petitioners. Brent M. Rosenthal, Counsel of Record, Rosenthal Weiner LLP, Dallas, TX, for Respondent Frazier Revitalization Inc. Michael M. Daniel, Counsel of Record, Laura B. Beshara, Daniel & Beshara, P.C., Dallas, TX, for Respondent The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, Daniel T. Hodge, First Assistant Attorney General, Austin, TX, Jonathan F. Mitchell, Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Andrew S. Oldham, Deputy Solicitor General, Beth Klusmann, Alex Potapov, Assistant Solicitors General, for Petitioners.

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