Establishing Awareness and But-For Causation: Clarifying Title VII Retaliation Standards in Khazin v. City of New York

Introduction

Khazin v. City of New York is a summary order issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on April 8, 2025. The plaintiff, Valentin Khazin, was a sergeant in the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”). He alleged that, after refusing to discriminate against a Black subordinate (Officer Dana Harge) and filing several Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) complaints, the City of New York and ten NYPD officers subjected him to adverse employment actions in retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”). The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants; Khazin appealed. This commentary examines the appellate decision affirming that judgment, focusing on the court’s reinforcement of (1) the requirement that an employer understand an employee’s protected activity, and (2) the “but-for” causation standard in Title VII retaliation claims.

Summary of the Judgment

On de novo review, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The panel held that Khazin failed to establish two critical elements of a Title VII retaliation claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework:

Aware of Protected Activity: Khazin could not show that the NYPD or its officers understood his refusal to follow orders as opposition to racial discrimination against Officer Harge.
But-For Causation: Even assuming arguendo a prima facie case, Khazin did not produce evidence to cast doubt on the legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons proffered by defendants for the adverse actions (disciplinary measures for off-duty employment and false complaints).

The court also affirmed dismissal of Khazin’s constructive discharge claim and declined to reach his NYSHRL and NYCHRL arguments for lack of proper briefing.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (411 U.S. 792 (1973))
— Established the three-step burden-shifting framework for Title VII retaliation claims.
Kelly v. Howard I. Shapiro & Assocs. (716 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 2013))
— Held that an employer must understand that an employee’s conduct is opposition to unlawful discrimination to satisfy the “awareness” requirement.
Carr v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth. (76 F.4th 172 (2d Cir. 2023))
— Restated the four-element prima facie test for retaliation: protected activity, awareness, materially adverse action, and causal connection.
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White (548 U.S. 53 (2006))
— Defined “materially adverse” actions as those that might dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a discrimination charge.
Hicks v. Baines (593 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2010))
— Emphasized that “petty slights or minor annoyances” do not qualify as materially adverse.
Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp. (248 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2001))
— Held that temporal proximity alone does not support an inference of retaliation if adverse actions began well before protected activity.
Burkybile v. Bd. of Educ. of Hastings-on-Hudson (411 F.3d 306 (2d Cir. 2005))
— Rejected an inference of causation when over a year elapsed between protected activity and retaliatory act.
Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co. (654 F.3d 347 (2d Cir. 2011))
— Confirmed that the non-movant must offer more than “conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation” to defeat summary judgment.

Legal Reasoning

1. De Novo Review & Summary Judgment Standard: The court applied de novo review, construing evidence in Khazin’s favor but granting summary judgment where no genuine dispute of material fact existed (Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).

2. Prima Facie Case—Awareness Requirement: Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Khazin needed to show that defendants understood his refusal to carry out discriminatory instructions as prohibited activity. The record contained no indication that Khazin linked his refusal to Title VII or racial discrimination—so the NYPD could not reasonably have been aware of any protected protest.

3. Materially Adverse Actions: The court agreed with the district court that some actions (e.g., waitlisting for training) were too minor to deter a reasonable employee. For the remaining actions assumed adverse, defendants offered non-retaliatory reasons.

4. But-For Causation & Pretext: Once defendants articulated legitimate reasons (investigations into unauthorized off-duty work and false complaints), Khazin bore the burden to show pretext. His conclusory affidavits and denials failed to raise a genuine issue. Temporal gaps—discipline predating and long postdating his EEO filings—further undermined any inference of retaliation.

Impact

This decision reinforces that:

Employers must actually understand the conduct as opposition to unlawful discrimination to satisfy awareness.
Not all workplace slights or scheduling inconveniences meet the materially adverse threshold.
“But-for” causation remains a firm burden on plaintiffs after defendants proffer legitimate explanations.

Future litigants should ensure that any refusal to follow directives is clearly linked to discriminatory conduct, and gather evidence beyond timing and conclusory statements to prove pretext.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Prima Facie Case: A basic showing that (1) you engaged in protected activity, (2) your employer knew about it, (3) you faced adverse action, and (4) there is a causal link between the two.
Summary Judgment: A court ruling without a full trial when there is no real dispute over important facts.
“Materially Adverse” Action: Any conduct by the employer that might discourage a reasonable worker from complaining about discrimination.
But-For Causation: You must prove that the adverse action would not have occurred but for your protected activity.
Pretext: Evidence suggesting that the employer’s stated reason for disciplining you is false and masks a retaliatory motive.

Conclusion

Khazin v. City of New York reaffirms the Second Circuit’s rigorous application of Title VII retaliation standards. It clarifies that employers must have clear notice of protected opposition to discrimination, that minor workplace inconveniences do not qualify as materially adverse, and that plaintiffs bear a substantial burden to prove but-for causation once an employer offers a legitimate explanation. This decision will guide future litigants and courts in distinguishing genuine retaliation from routine or justified personnel actions.