Establishing Actual Conflict in Joint Representation with Divergent Mandatory Minimums

Introduction

Keithon Stanley v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections (11th Cir. Feb. 21, 2025) addresses whether a habeas petitioner can challenge a joint‐representation conflict of interest when co‐defendants face different mandatory minimum sentences based on who is identified as the shooter. Petitioner Keithon Stanley and his brother Omar were tried together for an attempted convenience‐store murder in Florida. Both brothers were represented by the same attorney, Assistant Public Defender Harvey Hyman. After conviction and life sentencing for Keithon, Stanley filed state and federal postconviction actions arguing that Hyman labored under an actual conflict and that the trial court failed to secure a proper waiver. The Eleventh Circuit panel considered (1) whether the federal court had jurisdiction over all challenged convictions, (2) whether the state court’s handling of Stanley’s conflict claim was entitled to AEDPA deference, and (3) whether, under de novo review, Stanley proved an actual conflict that adversely affected Hyman’s performance.

Summary of the Judgment

1. Jurisdiction: The court held that Stanley was not “in custody” for two five-year concurrent sentences (burglary of a conveyance and grand theft of a motor vehicle) because those terms had expired; relief for those counts must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

2. AEDPA Deference: The last reasoned state decision (denying Stanley’s 3.850 motion) applied the Strickland standard instead of the Cuyler v. Sullivan standard for conflict claims. That divergence from “clearly established Federal law” meant the federal habeas court owed no deference and would review Stanley’s conflict‐of‐interest claim de novo.

3. Actual Conflict: Under de novo review, Stanley demonstrated that Hyman’s joint representation created an “actual conflict of interest” because the shooter faced a 25-year mandatory minimum while the accomplice faced only 10 years. Hyman (a) omitted key impeachment of witnesses pointing to Omar, (b) allowed jury instructions/verdict forms to force the conclusion that Keithon was the shooter, and (c) made sentencing arguments for Omar that disparaged Keithon. These tactics reflected divided loyalties and deprived Stanley of conflict-free counsel.

4. Disposition: The district court’s grant of habeas relief is affirmed as to Stanley’s attempted‐felony‐murder and attempted‐robbery convictions. Relief for the two expired five-year terms is vacated and those counts dismissed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Cuyler v. Sullivan (446 U.S. 335, 1980) – A joint‐representation conflict of interest need not show prejudice; petitioner must prove an actual conflict that adversely affected counsel’s performance.
Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668, 1984) – Governs ineffective‐assistance claims requiring deficiency and prejudice; not the proper standard for conflict of interest.
Maleng v. Cook (490 U.S. 488, 1989) – A habeas petitioner is not “in custody” under an expired sentence.
Garlotte v. Fordice (515 U.S. 39, 1995) – Concurrent sentences; custody remains for the longest term only.
Wilson v. Sellers (584 U.S. 122, 2018) – “Look-through” presumption for unexplained state‐court decisions when applying AEDPA deference.

Legal Reasoning

Jurisdiction: Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), Stanley had to be “in custody” on each challenged conviction. His five-year sentences had fully expired by the time he filed habeas, so the court dismissed relief as to those counts (Maleng, Garlotte).

AEDPA Standard: When a state court decides a claim on the merits, federal habeas review is subject to deference unless the decision is “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of” clearly established law (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). The Second District’s summary affirmance of the 3.850 denial rested on a reasoned order applying Strickland, not Cuyler, thus conflicting with Supreme Court precedent. Under Wilson v. Sellers, the unexplained per curiam affirmance is presumed to adopt that reasoning, and because it is “contrary to” Cuyler, AEDPA deference is forfeited.

Actual Conflict Analysis:

Existence of an actual conflict: Both Keithon and Omar were charged with felony murder. If the jury identifies one brother as the shooter, he faces a 25‐year mandatory minimum, while the non-shooter faces only 10 years. This divergence created direct, inconsistent interests.
Adverse effect on counsel’s performance: Hyman made strategic choices—failing to impeach key witness statements identifying Omar, acquiescing in verdict forms that listed Keithon as the shooter, and arguing at Omar’s sentencing that Keithon was the “mastermind”—that benefited one brother at the expense of the other. He admitted at the evidentiary hearing that advocating more vigorously for Keithon would have damaged Omar’s position. That trade-off demonstrates that an alternative, plausible defense (insisting Keithon was not the shooter) was sacrificed to protect Omar.

Cuyler requires only that the conflict be “actual” and have “adversely affected” counsel’s performance; no showing of Strickland prejudice is necessary.

Impact

This decision underscores critical lessons for criminal practice and postconviction review:

Joint representation of co‐defendants with directly opposing interests demands a searching colloquy and an informed, documented waiver. A boilerplate inquiry will not suffice when co-defendants face divergent mandatory sentences based on factual allegations.
State courts must apply the correct conflict standard (Cuyler) in collateral proceedings. Misapplication of Strickland forfeits AEDPA deference and subjects the case to de novo review.
Defense counsel must identify and either resolve or decline joint representation when mandatory minimums create irreconcilable incentives to shift blame. Failure to do so risks reversal without a showing of trial prejudice.
Federal habeas courts will enforce the jurisdictional “in custody” requirement strictly, dismissing expired‐sentence claims even if heard below.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Actual vs. Potential Conflict: A potential conflict is hypothetical; an actual conflict is one where defense choices for one client directly harm the other’s interests.
Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Florida’s “10/20/Life” scheme prescribes fixed minimum terms based on firearms use—10 years for possession, 20 years for discharge, 25 years to life if death occurs.
AEDPA Deference: Federal habeas review of state‐court decisions is highly deferential unless the state court’s reasoning conflicts with Supreme Court holdings.
“In Custody” Requirement: A litigant must still be serving the sentence at the time of filing habeas to invoke federal jurisdiction under § 2254.

Conclusion

Keithon Stanley v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections establishes that when co‐defendants face materially different mandatory minimums based on who is labeled the shooter, joint counsel creates an actual conflict that cannot be waived absent a thorough, on-the-record inquiry and informed consent. Misapplication of the wrong conflict standard by a state court forfeits AEDPA deference and triggers de novo review. Defense lawyers and trial judges must be alert to sentencing divergences that force conflicting loyalties. This ruling will shape how lower courts evaluate joint representation and ensure that every defendant receives the undivided loyalty guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.