Escalating Sanctions for Repeat Client-Trust-Account Misconduct: Commentary on Disciplinary Counsel v. Gill

Escalating Sanctions for Repeat Client-Trust-Account Misconduct: Commentary on Disciplinary Counsel v. Gill, 2025-Ohio-5392

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in Disciplinary Counsel v. Gill, 2025-Ohio-5392, is a significant disciplinary opinion that clarifies and reinforces how prior, similar misconduct and ongoing probationary status affect sanctions for client trust account violations.

While the case does not create a brand-new rule, it sharpens two existing principles into a clear directive:

  1. Client-trust-account violations warrant “substantial” sanctions even in the absence of client harm or dishonest motive; and
  2. Where an attorney repeats the same type of misconduct for which he has previously been sanctioned—especially while on monitored probation—a fully stayed suspension will generally be inadequate, and an actual period of suspension is justified to protect the public and vindicate the disciplinary system’s deterrent function.

The case involves respondent Sterling Everard Gill II, a long-time Columbus attorney with a disciplinary history going back to the 1980s, including prior trust-account misconduct and misappropriation. Despite prior suspensions, monitored probation, and extensive opportunities to reform, Gill again violated client-trust-account rules. The Board of Professional Conduct recommended a fully stayed two-year suspension with monitored probation focused on trust-account compliance. The Supreme Court, however, increased the sanction to a two-year suspension with only 18 months stayed, thus requiring a six-month actual suspension followed by monitored probation.

The opinion—issued per curiam and joined by four justices, with two dissenting as to the sanction—thus stands as a precedent on how repeat, similar misconduct and violations during probation are to be treated in the Ohio disciplinary system.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Respondent and His Prior Discipline

Sterling Everard Gill II was admitted to practice in Ohio in 1978. His disciplinary history is central to this case and to the court’s sanction analysis:

  • 1988: Indefinite suspension for misappropriating $4,700 in client funds (Columbus Bar Assn. v. Gill, 39 Ohio St.3d 4).
  • 1990: Reinstated (Columbus Bar Assn. v. Gill, 56 Ohio St.3d 602).
  • 2007: Short suspension for failure to comply with CLE requirements under Gov.Bar R. X (In re Gill, 2007-Ohio-1970), followed by reinstatement a few weeks later (In re Gill, 2007-Ohio-2710).
  • 2013: Two-year suspension with one year stayed for over 40 rule violations arising from nine grievances, many involving:
    • Failure to have or use a client trust account;
    • Failure to communicate with multiple clients; and
    • Failure to respond to disciplinary inquiries.
    See Columbus Bar Assn. v. Gill, 2013-Ohio-4619.
  • 2019: Reinstated and placed on two years of monitored probation (Columbus Bar Assn. v. Gill, 2019-Ohio-4154).
  • January 2023: Probation terminated (Columbus Bar Assn. v. Gill, 2023-Ohio-233).

The present misconduct overlaps in subject matter with his 2013 violations—again centering on trust-account mismanagement. The timing is critical: much of the new misconduct occurred while Gill was under monitored probation for prior trust-account failings.

B. The 2024 Disciplinary Complaint

In October 2024, the Disciplinary Counsel filed a complaint alleging that Gill had violated six provisions of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct by:

  • Failing to keep client funds separate from his own (trust-account commingling);
  • Failing to maintain required trust-account records and perform monthly reconciliations;
  • Charging a clearly excessive fee; and
  • Knowingly making a false statement of material fact in connection with the disciplinary matter.

At the hearing before a three-member panel of the Board of Professional Conduct:

  • Gill testified, as did three other witnesses.
  • The parties had no stipulations of fact or misconduct, but jointly submitted 29 exhibits.
  • Each side submitted additional exhibits individually.

C. The Panel and Board’s Findings

The panel found that Gill committed four violations related to client-trust-account management and dismissed the two remaining allegations (excessive fee and false statement) for insufficient evidence. The violations arose from his handling of client funds—particularly a $10,000 criminal-defense retainer from Gerald Smith:

  • Gill deposited Smith’s $10,000 retainer into his client trust account on August 20, 2020, where funds belonging to several other clients were already held.
  • He admitted:
    • He did not maintain client-by-client ledgers;
    • He did not maintain a general trust-account ledger; and
    • He did not perform monthly reconciliations.
  • He also admitted paying an advertising expense (a personal/business expense) directly from his trust account.
  • Even after paying $1,015.70 in costs and $3,850 to himself from Smith’s retainer, the trust-account balance between May and November 2021 ranged from $13,651.80 to $27,946.80.
  • Gill could not explain at the hearing to whom those remaining funds belonged.

Gill’s own testimony suggested that:

  • He had only “two or three” paying retainer clients from 2020–2022; and
  • He typically earned those retainers quickly and then transferred the funds to his business account, meaning that trust-account balances should not have remained high for long.

Given this, the court observed that at best, the unexplained funds were earned fees left too long in the trust account; at worst, they were Gill’s personal funds improperly deposited there (commingling). Either scenario violates Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a).

The Board found that Gill violated:

  • Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a): Failure to keep client property in a trust account separate from the lawyer’s own property.
  • Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a)(2): Failure to maintain client-specific records (client ledgers showing deposits, withdrawals, and balances).
  • Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a)(3): Failure to maintain a trust-account ledger (record of all credits and debits by client).
  • Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a)(5): Failure to perform and retain monthly reconciliations of the trust account.

The Board recommended:

  • A two-year suspension fully stayed on conditions:
    • No further misconduct; and
    • Two years of monitored probation focusing on Prof.Cond.R. 1.15 compliance.

The Supreme Court adopted the Board’s findings of misconduct but rejected the fully stayed sanction, imposing a more severe actual suspension.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

A. Holding

The Supreme Court of Ohio:

  • Affirmed the Board’s finding that Gill violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a), 1.15(a)(2), 1.15(a)(3), and 1.15(a)(5).
  • Imposed a two-year suspension from the practice of law, with:
    • 18 months stayed on condition that Gill commit no further misconduct; and
    • An actual suspension of 6 months.
  • Required that upon reinstatement Gill serve a two-year period of monitored probation in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(21), with particular focus on Prof.Cond.R. 1.15 compliance.
  • Taxed costs to Gill.

B. Division of the Court

  • The opinion was per curiam, joined by Chief Justice Kennedy and Justices Fischer, Deters, and Hawkins.
  • Justices DeWine and Shanahan dissented as to the sanction, favoring the Board’s recommendation—a fully stayed two-year suspension.
  • Justice Brunner did not participate.

C. Core Rationale

The court’s central reasoning for increasing the sanction above the Board’s recommendation:

  1. Trust-account violations are inherently serious and warrant substantial sanctions regardless of client harm.
  2. Gill’s misconduct is repeat misconduct of the same type for which he was previously disciplined in 2013 (and more distantly, 1988).
  3. Much of the new misconduct occurred while Gill was on monitored probation for trust-account violations, showing he had not learned from prior discipline.
  4. Under those circumstances, the court deemed a fully stayed suspension insufficient to protect the public, to impress upon Gill the seriousness of his obligations, and to deter future misconduct.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

1. Aggravating Factors (Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B))

The court agreed with the Board’s finding of two significant aggravating factors:

  • Prior Disciplinary Record – Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1):
    • Three prior suspensions, including:
      • A suspension for misappropriation of client funds (1988);
      • A CLE-related suspension; and
      • A two-year suspension (one year stayed) in 2013 for multiple ethical violations, including four violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a) (trust-account related).
    • The prior misconduct includes substantially similar conduct (trust-account and client-fund mishandling), which weighs more heavily than unrelated prior discipline.
  • Pattern of Misconduct – Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(3):
    • Failure to maintain and reconcile trust-account ledgers over time; and
    • Improper use of the trust account to pay a personal advertising expense.

The court also noted that:

  • Gerald Smith, an incarcerated client, was arguably a vulnerable client, but there was no evidence that he or any other client suffered financial harm from Gill’s violations in this case.

2. Mitigating Factors (Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C))

Mitigating considerations included:

  • Absence of Dishonest or Selfish Motive – Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(2):
    • The record did not show intentional theft, fraud, or personal enrichment at client expense in the current misconduct.
  • Cooperative Attitude – Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(4):
    • Gill cooperated with the disciplinary proceedings.
  • Good Character and Reputation – Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(5):
    • Four character letters, including from OLAP director Scott Mote, attested to Gill’s positive contributions and reputation.
  • Acknowledgment of Wrongdoing:
    • Gill admitted his violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a), (a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(5).

Regarding Gill’s longstanding struggle with alcoholism:

  • The court recognized that his prior relapse contributed to the 2013 misconduct.
  • Gill testified he has been sober since 2015; OLAP confirmed he has been in “successful recovery” for nearly a decade and now serves on OLAP’s board.
  • There was no evidence that alcohol or a mental-health condition contributed to the current misconduct, so this factor played no clear mitigating role under Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7) (substance abuse or mental disability as a cause of misconduct).

The Board and court also declined to treat Gill’s recent completion of an online trust-accounting course (sponsored by Disciplinary Counsel) as significant mitigation; a course taken one month before the hearing does little to offset years of noncompliance, particularly after prior discipline.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Role

1. Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Gerchak, 2015-Ohio-4305

In Gerchak, the attorney failed to deposit unearned fees for a single client into a trust account and committed related trust-account violations. The aggravation/mitigation profile included:

  • Aggravation: Prior discipline, but not for similar misconduct.
  • Mitigation:
    • No dishonest or selfish motive;
    • Cooperation;
    • Good character evidence;
    • Refund of fees (even though some work was performed);
    • Acknowledgment of the need for mentoring.

Sanction: a two-year suspension, fully stayed, conditioned on:

  • Two years of monitored probation; and
  • Annual CLE in law-office management; and
  • No further misconduct.

The Board relied on Gerchak to support its recommendation of a fully stayed two-year suspension in Gill’s case. The Supreme Court distinguished it on the key point that in Gerchak the prior discipline involved different types of misconduct, while Gill’s history includes two occasions of similar client-fund mismanagement.

2. Disciplinary Counsel v. Simmons, 2019-Ohio-3783

In Simmons:

  • The attorney commingled personal, client, and business funds in his trust account for nearly a year.
  • He used the trust account to pay personal and business expenses.
  • The account was overdrawn three times.
  • He failed to keep individual client ledgers and did not cooperate promptly with the investigation.

Aggravation and mitigation:

  • Aggravation: Prior discipline for:
    • Attorney-registration suspensions; and
    • A partially stayed one-year suspension for unauthorized practice of law and false representations to courts in another state.
  • Mitigation:
    • Lack of selfish motive;
    • Eventual cooperation;
    • Remorse; and
    • Engagement of another attorney to help organize his practice and fee procedures.

The Supreme Court concluded that allowing Simmons to keep practicing posed no threat to the public and imposed a two-year suspension, fully stayed, conditioned on:

  • One year of monitored probation; and
  • Additional CLE in trust-account and law-office management.

The Board cited Simmons as another case where substantial trust-account violations resulted in a fully stayed suspension. Again, the Supreme Court distinguished Gill’s situation: Simmons’s prior discipline, while serious, did not involve the same type of misconduct. Gill’s repeated violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.15, including while on probation for that very conduct, made his case materially more serious.

3. Foundational Trust-Account Cases: Wise, Erie-Huron, and Thompson

The court reaffirmed longstanding precedents emphasizing the gravity of mishandling client funds:

  • Disciplinary Counsel v. Wise, 2006-Ohio-1194 (quoting Erie-Huron Counties Joint Certified Grievance Commt. v. Miles):
    • It is “of the utmost importance that attorneys maintain their personal and office accounts separate from their clients’ accounts.”
    • Any violation of this rule “warrants a substantial sanction whether or not the client has been harmed.”
  • Columbus Bar Assn. v. Thompson, 69 Ohio St.2d 667 (1982):
    • Mishandling client funds by conversion, commingling, or poor management is an area of the “gravest concern” for the court in attorney misconduct cases.
  • Erie-Huron Counties Joint Certified Grievance Commt. v. Miles, 1996-Ohio-359:
    • Separation of client funds from lawyer’s funds is necessary both to protect clients and “to avoid even the appearance of impropriety.”

By invoking these authorities, the court signaled that even “technical” violations of the recordkeeping and segregation requirements for trust accounts are treated as serious breaches of professional duty, not minor paperwork lapses.

4. Prior Similar Misconduct and Probation Violations: Rieser, Nelson, O’Neill, Lawson, and Lieberman

A central theme is the treatment of repeat, similar misconduct, especially during probation:

  • Columbus Bar Assn. v. Rieser, 2018-Ohio-3860:
    • The court recognized that misconduct is more serious when an attorney has previously been disciplined for the same type of misconduct than when prior discipline involves different violations.
  • Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Nelson, 2022-Ohio-1288:
    • Cited for the proposition that an attorney who repeats misconduct for which he was previously disciplined—especially during or after probation—demonstrates that earlier sanctions did not deter him, necessitating stronger safeguards.
  • Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 2004-Ohio-4704:
    • Reaffirmed that the primary purpose of attorney discipline is public protection, not punishment.
  • Disciplinary Counsel v. Lawson, 2011-Ohio-4673 (quoting In re Disbarment of Lieberman, 163 Ohio St. 35 (1955)):
“If a prior attempt at discipline has been ineffective to provide the protection intended for the public, then such further safeguards should be imposed as will either tend to effect the reformation of the offender or remove him entirely from the practice. The discipline for a repeated offense may be much greater than would have been imposed were it a first offense, yet such greater discipline is not a meting out of further punishment for prior acts but is a determination of the attorney’s fitness to practice.”

This passage is quoted with approval in Nelson and is essentially the norm invoked here: the court is not punishing Gill a second time for his prior misdeeds, but using the pattern of misconduct to evaluate his fitness and the level of sanction necessary for protection of the public.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Nature of the Violations

Gill’s misconduct focuses on the “housekeeping” dimension of Prof.Cond.R. 1.15:

  • Commingling or at least failure to segregate client funds;
  • Absence of client-specific ledgers;
  • No general trust-account ledger; and
  • No monthly reconciliation.

The court emphasized that:

  • Whether the unexplained trust-account balances in 2021 were earned fees that should have been moved to Gill’s operating account or personal funds improperly placed in trust, Gill violated the core separation requirement of Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a).
  • Even in the absence of clear evidence of misappropriation or depletion of client funds, the failure to maintain proper records and to reconcile the account prevents meaningful oversight and undermines client protection.

2. Distinguishing “Technical” from “Substantive” Violations

Gill’s counsel apparently suggested these were “technical” violations—i.e., procedural errors rather than substantive wrongdoing. The court directly rejected this framing:

  • The opinion labels these as “repeated substantive violations” of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
  • The court stresses that the trust-account framework is not optional bureaucracy but the mechanism by which the bar safeguards client property and maintains public trust.

By pressing this point, the court signals that Ohio lawyers should not expect leniency when trust-account recordkeeping is treated casually, especially after a prior disciplinary case on the same subject.

3. Weight of Prior Similar Discipline and Misconduct During Probation

The court attaches special weight to two intertwined features:

  1. Prior similar discipline – Gill has:
    • A 1988 indefinite suspension for misappropriation of client funds; and
    • A 2013 suspension including four violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a), where he failed to maintain a trust account and deposit client funds.
  2. Misconduct during probation – Much of the present misconduct occurred while Gill was under monitored probation specifically tasked with oversight of his practice following the 2013 case.

This combination triggers the Nelson / Lawson / Lieberman line of reasoning: prior discipline that fails to deter indicates that stronger measures are needed, not as retroactive punishment but as a forward-looking assessment of fitness to practice and public protection.

Thus, although Gill’s mitigating factors (sobriety, OLAP involvement, cooperation, lack of dishonest motive) are meaningful, they cannot overcome the implications of his persistent failure to internalize and implement client-fund obligations.

4. Protection of the Public as the Primary Aim

Citing O’Neill, the court reiterates that the goal of discipline is not to punish but to protect the public. Within this framework:

  • A fully stayed suspension (no actual interruption of practice) is appropriate when:
    • The misconduct, though serious, is unlikely to recur; and
    • The attorney appears to have learned from the experience and reformed.
  • But when the attorney has:
    • Repeated the same misconduct;
    • Done so while on probation; and
    • Shown limited response to prior corrective measures,
    the court sees an actual period of suspension as necessary “to impart the seriousness of this misconduct to Gill” and “to convince him” that these are substantive duties.

In other words, the imposition of a six-month actual suspension functions both as:

  • A safeguard for clients during the suspension period; and
  • A calibrated but serious wake-up call that lesser sanctions have failed to deliver.

5. Rejection of the Board’s Fully Stayed Recommendation

The Board recommended a fully stayed two-year suspension, relying heavily on Gerchak and Simmons. The court agreed that those cases establish that fully stayed suspensions can be appropriate in trust-account cases with no client harm and substantial mitigation. However, the court concluded that:

  • Those precedents are limited to cases where:
    • The attorney does not have a history of similar trust-account violations; and
    • The current misconduct is not committed during ongoing probation for analogous conduct.
  • Gill therefore stands in a materially different category, justifying an escalation in sanction severity.

The opinion thus implicitly draws a line: once a lawyer has received formal discipline and probationary oversight for trust-account issues, any subsequent recurrence—particularly during probation—will rarely if ever be met with only a fully stayed suspension.

D. The Dissenting View (Inferred)

Justices DeWine and Shanahan dissented solely on the sanction, supporting the Board’s recommendation of a fully stayed two-year suspension with monitored probation. The opinion does not elaborate their reasoning, but the likely bases include:

  • Deference to the Board’s sanction recommendation, especially when:
    • No objections were filed; and
    • The Board saw Gill’s conduct and demeanor firsthand.
  • Recognition of significant mitigation:
    • Longstanding sobriety and active OLAP involvement;
    • Absence of harm to clients; and
    • Absence of dishonest motive.
  • A possible view that a fully stayed suspension plus monitored probation is sufficient to protect the public under Gerchak and Simmons.

The majority’s departure from the Board’s recommendation thus reflects a conscious choice to emphasize the importance of prior similar misconduct and probationary violations over deference to the Board in sanctioning.

V. Impact and Significance

A. For Ohio’s Trust-Account Jurisprudence

This decision consolidates and sharpens Ohio’s approach to trust-account violations by:

  • Reaffirming that:
    • Trust-account violations are inherently serious;
    • Substantial sanctions are warranted even when no client harm occurs; and
    • Meticulous recordkeeping and segregation requirements are not mere technicalities.
  • Clarifying that:
    • Repeat, similar violations—especially during probation—will be met with escalating sanctions, up to and including actual suspension.

The opinion essentially draws a doctrinal distinction between:

  • First-time or dissimilar trust-account misconduct cases with strong mitigation, where fully stayed suspensions remain available; and
  • Repeat, similar misconduct where prior warnings and probation have failed, where a fully stayed suspension is presumptively inadequate.

B. For Attorneys on Monitored Probation

Attorneys currently under monitored probation should draw several lessons:

  • Probation is not a formality; it is a testing period. Misconduct during probation is treated as evidence that:
    • Earlier sanctions were insufficient; and
    • More robust measures are needed to protect the public.
  • Violations of the same type as the conduct that led to probation will be viewed particularly harshly, because they indicate a failure to internalize core professional obligations.
  • Attorneys cannot rely on cooperation, good character, or lack of client harm to shield them from an actual suspension when probation conditions are effectively flouted.

C. For Future Disciplinary Cases

Going forward, Disciplinary Counsel v. Gill gives Disciplinary Counsel and the Board a strong basis to:

  • Argue for actual suspensions—not fully stayed suspensions—when:
    • The respondent has prior trust-account discipline; and/or
    • The misconduct occurs during or shortly after probation for related violations.
  • Emphasize that:
    • The absence of client harm and dishonest motive, while important, will not by themselves justify a fully stayed suspension in repeat cases.

The decision also serves as a warning that an attorney’s narrative—e.g., that violations are “technical”—will not be persuasive in the face of repeated noncompliance with trust-account rules.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Client Trust Account (IOLTA) Basics

A client trust account is a special bank account where an attorney holds money that belongs to clients or third parties. In Ohio:

  • Client funds that are too small in amount or held too briefly to generate net interest for the client are placed in an IOLTA (Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts) account.
  • The interest from IOLTA accounts funds access-to-justice and legal-aid programs.

Key requirements include:

  • No commingling: The lawyer’s personal or firm funds must not be mixed with client funds, except as strictly permitted to cover minimal bank charges.
  • Deposit of unearned fees: Advance fees (retain­ers) must be placed in trust until earned.
  • Prompt disbursement: Once earned, fees should be promptly transferred to the lawyer’s operating account; client funds should be promptly paid to clients and third parties when due.

B. Recordkeeping Requirements under Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a)

Rule 1.15(a) imposes detailed bookkeeping duties:

  • Client Ledgers (1.15(a)(2)):
    • A separate record for each client showing: date, amount, and source of all funds received; disbursements made; and the current balance.
  • Trust-Account Ledger (1.15(a)(3)):
    • A master record of the trust account as a whole, showing all deposits and withdrawals and the running total balance.
  • Monthly Reconciliation (1.15(a)(5)):
    • Every month, the lawyer must reconcile:
      • The bank statement balance;
      • The aggregate of all client-ledger balances; and
      • The trust-account ledger balance.
    • This reconciliation must be documented and retained.

These requirements are essential so that:

  • The lawyer can show, at any time, exactly whose money is in the trust account and in what amount; and
  • Regulators or auditors can quickly detect shortages, misallocations, or misuse.

C. Commingling vs. Misappropriation

  • Commingling: Mixing the lawyer’s funds with client funds in the trust account.
    • Example: depositing personal money into the trust account or leaving earned fees there instead of transferring them out.
    • Prohibited because it blurs the line between client and lawyer property and can obscure misappropriation or shortages.
  • Misappropriation (or conversion): Using client funds for the lawyer’s own purposes or for purposes not authorized by the client.
    • Example: paying personal bills with client funds before earning the fee.
    • Generally treated as among the most serious ethics violations and can justify disbarment or indefinite suspension.

In Gill, the court does not explicitly find misappropriation in the current case, but does find commingling and serious recordkeeping breaches.

D. Monitored Probation

Monitored probation is a structured oversight mechanism:

  • The court appoints or approves a monitor—typically an experienced attorney.
  • The monitor oversees specified aspects of the respondent’s practice, here focused on Prof.Cond.R. 1.15 (trust-account management).
  • The respondent must cooperate with the monitor and comply with all conditions.

Violations during probation may lead to:

  • Revocation of a stayed suspension; and/or
  • New disciplinary charges; and/or
  • Harsher sanctions in subsequent cases, as in Gill.

E. Stayed vs. Actual Suspension

  • Actual Suspension:
    • The attorney is prohibited from practicing law for a specified period (here, 6 months).
    • Clients must be notified; new client intake must stop; and the lawyer may have to apply for reinstatement.
  • Stayed Suspension:
    • The suspension is imposed but not enforced so long as the attorney complies with specified conditions (no misconduct, CLE, probation, etc.).
    • If the attorney violates conditions, the stay can be lifted and the full suspension imposed.

A fully stayed suspension means no actual interruption of practice unless conditions are later violated. A partially stayed suspension, like in Gill, requires the attorney to serve some portion of the suspension (here, 6 months) no matter what.

VII. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

Disciplinary Counsel v. Gill is an important reaffirmation and refinement of Ohio’s approach to trust-account violations and repeat misconduct. It underscores the following core points:

  1. Trust-account compliance is non-negotiable.
    • Meticulous segregation, recordkeeping, and reconciliation are essential professional duties, not technicalities.
    • Violations warrant substantial discipline even when clients are not harmed and no dishonest motive is proven.
  2. Prior similar discipline significantly elevates sanction severity.
    • Repeat trust-account violations—especially after prior discipline for the same kind of misconduct—justify more serious sanctions than first-time or dissimilar violations.
    • The court will distinguish cases like Gerchak and Simmons (fully stayed suspensions) when the attorney’s history shows a pattern of the same type of misconduct.
  3. Misconduct during probation is treated as a serious red flag.
    • Probation is an opportunity to reform under supervision. Continuing misconduct during that period shows that earlier measures did not suffice.
    • In such circumstances, the court is more inclined to impose an actual suspension to protect the public and reinforce the seriousness of the obligations.
  4. Mitigation has limits in repeat cases.
    • Gill’s sobriety, OLAP involvement, cooperative attitude, and character support were all acknowledged but did not outweigh the pattern of repeated, similar violations and misconduct during probation.
  5. Public protection remains the paramount goal.
    • Following O’Neill, the sanction is not about punishing Gill for the past alone, but about safeguarding clients going forward and ensuring that the disciplinary system effectively deters future violations.

In practical terms, the case sends a clear message to Ohio attorneys:

  • If you have ever been disciplined for trust-account issues, you must treat compliance with Prof.Cond.R. 1.15 as a top priority in your practice.
  • Probation is a serious test of your ability to practice ethically. Repeat violations, particularly of the same kind, will likely trigger actual suspension.

By imposing a two-year suspension with only 18 months stayed and requiring monitored probation upon reinstatement, the Supreme Court of Ohio demonstrates its willingness to escalate sanctions where prior efforts have not achieved lasting reform, thereby reinforcing public confidence in the bar’s regulatory framework and the integrity of the legal profession.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

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