Erlinger-Wooden Clarification: Unanimous Jury Finding Required for ACCA “Occasions Different” Enhancement

Introduction

United States v. Sergio Antonio Hood (11th Cir. 2025) arises from Hood’s appeal of his 262-month sentence following convictions for possession of ammunition by a felon (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503), and witness tampering (18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)). After the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in early 2024, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in light of its intervening decision in Erlinger v. United States (602 U.S. 821 (2024)). On remand, the court had to decide:

• Whether Rule 404(b) admission of Hood’s prior felon‐in‐possession convictions to prove “knowledge” was proper;
• Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause authority;
• Whether the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (“ACCA”) mandatory-minimum enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) violated Hood’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by leaving to the judge, rather than a jury, the “occasions different” inquiry; and
• Whether aiding and abetting convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 2 qualify as “serious drug offense” predicates under the ACCA.

The appellant, Sergio Antonio Hood, challenged both evidentiary and constitutional aspects of his trial and sentence. The government defended the district court’s rulings and urged affirmance except for sentencing adjustments under Erlinger.

Summary of the Judgment

1. Evidence Admission (Rule 404(b)): The court held that prior convictions for knowing possession of firearms were properly admitted to prove Hood’s knowledge element under Rehaif v. United States, and that any prejudicial effect was mitigated by redactions and limiting instructions.
2. Commerce Clause Challenge: The court rejected Hood’s facial and as-applied Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g)(1), deeming it foreclosed by binding Eleventh Circuit precedent and not plainly erroneous.
3. ACCA “Occasions Different” (Erlinger Issue): Applying Erlinger (602 U.S. 821), the panel concluded the district court erred by having the judge, rather than a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt, determine that Hood’s three prior drug‐distribution offenses occurred on “occasions different from one another.” Because the government could not show that every reasonable jury would have reached that unanimous finding, the error was not harmless. The court vacated Hood’s sentence and remanded for a jury determination or resentencing under the correct standard.
4. Aiding-and-Abetting Convictions (18 U.S.C. § 2): The panel affirmed that § 2 convictions count as “serious drug offense” predicates under the ACCA, since aiding and abetting is not a separate offense but an alternative theory of liability for the same substantive crime.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) – Prior‐offense evidence must be excluded if a stipulation can prove the element without undue prejudice.
• Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019) – Government must prove the defendant knew both that he possessed a firearm and that he was a member of the prohibited class.
• Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) – Any fact (other than a prior conviction) that increases the penalty beyond the statutory maximum must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) & Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016) – Categorical approach for determining whether prior convictions qualify as ACCA predicates.
• Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360 (2022) & Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024) – Judges may not decide the ACCA “occasions different” inquiry by a preponderance standard; the jury must unanimously find that fact beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) – Prior convictions may only be proven by charging documents, plea colloquies, or comparable judicial records.
• Eleventh Circuit’s United States v. Rivers, 134 F.4th 1292 (11th Cir. 2025) – Erlinger error is subject to harmless-error review, not structural error.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning divides into two main components:

1. Evidentiary Rulings:
   • Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion—evidence of prior acts is admissible to prove intent, knowledge, or absence of mistake.
   • Prior felon-in-possession convictions bear directly on the knowledge element required by §§ 922(g) & 924(a); a stipulation to status does not eliminate the government’s separate burden to prove “knowing possession.”
   • Limiting instructions and redactions sufficiently mitigated any unfair prejudice under Rule 403.
2. Constitutional Sentencing Challenge:
   • Under Apprendi and its progeny, any fact that increases a mandatory minimum (other than the prior‐conviction fact itself) must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
   • Erlinger extends this rule to the ACCA’s “occasions different” requirement: a sentencing court may not make that finding by preponderance of the evidence.
   • The Eleventh Circuit’s own Rivers framework applies harmless-error review to an Erlinger error, demanding that the government show beyond a reasonable doubt that no jury could have failed to unanimously find three separate occasions.
   • On this record—two drug deals on successive days in the same location to the same undercover officer—harmlessness was not established, so resentencing is required.

Impact

United States v. Hood crystallizes key takeaways for lower courts and practitioners:

• Judges must submit the ACCA’s “occasions different” fact to juries under a unanimous‐verdict, beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.
• Sentencing courts should scrutinize temporal, geographic, and transactional distinctions among predicate offenses to assess whether a rational jury might find a single episode.
• Where the record does not conclusively show three disaggregated occasions, defendants will secure remand for resentencing or jury findings.
• Rule 404(b) remains a robust admissibility vehicle for prior firearm convictions to prove “knowledge” under Rehaif, even when the defendant stipulates to his felon status.

Complex Concepts Simplified

ACCA (“Armed Career Criminal Act”)

A federal statute (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)) imposing a mandatory minimum 15-year sentence on anyone convicted of § 922(g) who has three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses committed on “occasions different from one another.”

Categorical vs. Modified Categorical Approach

Categorical: Compare the statutory elements of the prior offense with the generic definition of the predicate offense—no extra facts allowed.
Modified Categorical: If the statute is “divisible”—lists multiple, alternative elements—courts may consult certain documents (charging paper, plea colloquy) to identify which element supported the conviction.

Occasions Different Inquiry

A factual inquiry into whether prior convictions arose from distinct events. Unlike the categorical analysis, it necessarily looks at temporal and factual circumstances underlying each prior crime.

Rule 404(b)

Governs admission of other‐act evidence. Such evidence is inadmissible to show “propensity” but may be admitted to prove intent, knowledge, absence of mistake, etc., if its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.

Harmless-Error Review

Non-structural errors are reversed only if they had a “substantial and injurious effect” on the verdict or, in sentencing context, unless the government shows “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the error did not affect the outcome.

Conclusion

United States v. Hood reaffirms that while lower courts have broad discretion to admit prior‐conviction evidence under Rule 404(b) to prove knowledge, constitutional guardrails strictly limit judicial fact‐finding at sentencing. Under Erlinger, the ACCA’s “occasions different” requirement is a jury question that must be proved unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt. Where the record leaves reasonable doubt about whether predicates stem from separate events, sentencing must be vacated or remanded for a jury determination. This decision sharpens the ACCA landscape and underscores the continuing vitality of jury‐trial protections under Apprendi and its progeny.