Equitable Tolling Opens the Tax Court Door:
Sixth Circuit Declares § 6213(a) Deadline Non-Jurisdictional

Introduction

In Naysha Y. Oquendo v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit confronted a question that has divided the circuits for several years: Is the ninety-day period for filing a petition in the Tax Court under Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 6213(a) jurisdictional, or is it a claim-processing rule that may be equitably tolled?

The case arose after Naysha Oquendo, an individual taxpayer, missed the ninety-day window by roughly two months when disputing a 2022 deficiency notice disallowing her head-of-household status and associated Earned Income and Child Tax Credits. The Tax Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, adhering to decades-old Sixth Circuit precedent. Oquendo appealed, arguing that modern Supreme Court jurisprudence on “clear statement” requirements renders the deadline non-jurisdictional and therefore amenable to equitable tolling.

Sitting before Judges Clay, Readler, and Davis, the Sixth Circuit reversed. Aligning itself with the Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in Boechler v. Commissioner, and with recent Second and Third Circuit rulings, the court held that (1) § 6213(a)’s filing period is an ordinary claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional limit, and (2) the Tax Court may exercise equitable tolling. The panel remanded for the Tax Court to decide—on the facts—whether tolling is merited.

Summary of the Judgment

• Holding: The ninety-day filing requirement in I.R.C. § 6213(a) is non-jurisdictional; failure to meet it does not strip the Tax Court of subject-matter jurisdiction.
• Consequences: Because the deadline is non-jurisdictional, it is presumptively subject to equitable tolling. The Tax Court must examine Oquendo’s circumstances (late notice, diligence, prejudice, etc.) under the Sixth Circuit’s five-factor equitable-tolling test.
• Disposition: Judgment of the Tax Court reversed; case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The court walked through a dense thicket of Supreme Court and circuit precedent, drawing a line between the “old” approach—labeling anything deadline-related as jurisdictional—and the “modern” clear-statement regime.

• Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161 (1976) & earlier Sixth Circuit cases (Gradsky 1954; Patmon & Young 1995): referred to § 6213(a) as a “jurisdictional prerequisite.” The panel characterized these as “unrefined dispositions” issued before the Supreme Court’s tightened usage of the term “jurisdiction.”
• Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006); Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011); Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541 (2019): foundational “clear-statement” cases insisting that a statutory condition is jurisdictional only if Congress clearly says so.
• Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 596 U.S. 199 (2022): key precedent concerning § 6330(d)(1)’s 30-day period for collection-due-process appeals. The Supreme Court held that provision non-jurisdictional because Congress did not “clearly state” otherwise. Boechler is the linchpin; its reasoning on textual ambiguity and statutory structure directly translated to § 6213(a).
• Post-Boechler circuit split:
  • Non-jurisdictional side: Culp v. Commissioner, 75 F.4th 196 (3d Cir. 2023); Buller v. Commissioner, — F.4th — (2d Cir. 2025).
  • Jurisdictional side: Tilden v. Commissioner, 846 F.3d 882 (7th Cir. 2017); Organic Cannabis Foundation v. Commissioner, 962 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2020).
  The Sixth Circuit joins the Second and Third Circuits, deepening the split and making future Supreme Court review more likely.
• MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC, 598 U.S. 288 (2023): reinforced that “jurisdictional” carries heavy consequences; courts must be disciplined before applying the label.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Textual Analysis. The 90-day deadline appears in the first sentence of § 6213(a) without any reference to the Tax Court’s jurisdiction; the word “jurisdiction” appears several sentences later. This spatial separation—coupled with the statute’s focus on what taxpayers “may” do rather than what courts “shall” do—failed the Supreme Court’s clear-statement test.
2. Comparison with § 6330(d)(1). If the Supreme Court found ambiguity in § 6330(d)(1)’s text that does mention jurisdiction, then § 6213(a), which is even less explicit, cannot plausibly be deemed jurisdiction-camouflaged.
3. Historical Usage—“Old Wine, New Bottle.” Prior cases using jurisdictional terminology were products of a bygone era when “jurisdiction” was used loosely. The panel, citing Kontrick v. Ryan, emphasized that such casual usage no longer binds modern courts.
4. Statutory Context. The Commissioner argued that § 7459(d)—which presumes a deficiency when the Tax Court dismisses for lack of jurisdiction—would be undermined. The Sixth Circuit responded that Congress can tolerate that outcome and, in any event, policy considerations cannot override the absence of a clear textual command.
5. Equitable Tolling Presumption. Once the deadline was deemed non-jurisdictional, traditional equitable principles revived. The court cited Kwik Fun Wong, Wilkins, and Boechler, noting that Congress must speak clearly if it wishes to disallow tolling.

3. Impact of the Decision

• Immediate Case: Oquendo now gets a chance to prove her factual entitlement to tolling. The Tax Court must apply the Sixth Circuit’s five-factor test and issue a merits ruling.
• Tax Litigation Landscape: Thousands of deficiency petitions are filed each year; many pro se taxpayers miss the ninety-day deadline due to address problems or misunderstanding. Those litigants within the Sixth Circuit (Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee) now have a potential equitable-tolling lifeline.
• IRS Administrative Practice: The IRS may need more rigorous address-verification protocols and may face increased staffing demands to defend tolling motions. Collection activity could be delayed where tolling arguments are pending.
• Circuit Split & Supreme Court Prospects: The split (6th/2d/3d vs. 7th/9th) is clear and outcome-determinative. The issue meets the Supreme Court’s traditional criteria for granting certiorari: conflict, recurring importance, and federal revenue implications.
• Doctrinal Clarification Beyond Tax: The opinion reinforces a broader trend: statutory filing deadlines, absent unmistakable language, are usually not jurisdictional. This approach continues to erode earlier, more rigid readings in administrative and civil-procedure contexts.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Jurisdiction vs. Claims-Processing Rule
  • Jurisdictional: goes to the court’s power; cannot be waived; courts must dismiss if lacking.
  • Claims-processing: procedural timing requirement; can be forfeited or equitably tolled.
• Equitable Tolling
  A doctrine that lets courts pause a filing deadline when a litigant—despite diligence—cannot meet it because of forces beyond her control (e.g., misleading advice, unavoidable absence, delayed notice).
• Notice of Deficiency
  A formal IRS letter informing a taxpayer of proposed additional tax; triggers the ninety-day period to file in Tax Court.
• Clear-Statement Rule
  Courts will deem a statutory condition “jurisdictional” only if Congress expressly says so; silence or ambiguity yields a non-jurisdictional reading.

Conclusion

Oquendo marks a pivotal shift in Sixth Circuit tax jurisprudence. By holding that § 6213(a)’s 90-day petition deadline is non-jurisdictional and open to equitable tolling, the court harmonizes its doctrine with recent Supreme Court guidance and aligns itself with emerging circuit authority. The opinion widens an already significant split with the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, setting the stage for eventual Supreme Court resolution.

Practically, taxpayers within the Sixth Circuit now have a viable path to salvage untimely Tax Court petitions, provided they can satisfy the demanding equitable-tolling factors. For the IRS, the decision introduces new uncertainty and may encourage earlier, more detailed communications to ensure taxpayers receive deficiency notices. For the broader legal community, the case serves as yet another reminder that “jurisdiction” is not a catch-all label; statutory text—and only clear text—controls.

In sum, the Sixth Circuit’s decision breathes life into equitable principles within the tax arena, reaffirming that procedural defaults should not bar justice where Congress has not unmistakably closed the courthouse door.