Equitable Rescission in Grantor-Support Agreements Clarified:
Comprehensive Commentary on Helvik v. Tuscano, 2025 MT 150

Introduction

Helvik v. Tuscano is the Montana Supreme Court’s most significant statement in decades on the equitable powers of courts to rescind “grantor-support” agreements—contracts in which elderly grantors convey real property in return for future care and financial support. The decision arose out of a dispute between octogenarian brothers Sidney and Julian Helvik (plaintiffs) and their longtime neighbors Wesley and Karen Tuscano (defendants) concerning ownership of the Helvik family ranch near Big Timber. After a complicated series of written and unwritten arrangements—including a 2020 contract for deed and a later “gift” deed—the district court rescinded the contract, invalidated the gift deed, and quieted title in the Helviks. The Tuscanos appealed on six issues, ranging from the court’s equitable rescission to several evidentiary rulings and a third-party claim against Sidney’s step-daughter, Jacqueline Conner.

The Supreme Court affirmed in full, firmly endorsing the district court’s use of equity to restore the ranch to the elderly brothers and clarifying several procedural and substantive doctrines along the way. Most notably, the Court held:

• Even when a jury has awarded money damages for breach of a grantor-support contract, a district court may invoke its equitable power to rescind the agreement and restore property to the vulnerable grantor when legal remedies are inadequate.
• The statute of frauds bars evidence of oral land transfers, but does not prevent extrinsic evidence going to the validity of a written instrument.
• Failure to object to jury instructions waives appellate review, and a tortious-interference claim cannot survive summary judgment without proof of damages.

Summary of the Judgment

1. Equitable Rescission Upheld. The Court, relying on Hjartarson v. Hjartarson and De Atley v. Streit, affirmed that grantor-support agreements attract a special fiduciary overlay. When the supporting party breaches its duty, rescission is available even if an “adequate” remedy at law (here, jury damages) has been identified.
2. Evidentiary Rulings Affirmed.
   • The district court correctly barred testimony about an alleged oral promise to reconvey land made after the written Agreement because § 28-2-905(1)(b), MCA, allows parol evidence only to test the validity of the written instrument itself.
   • An Adult Protective Services (APS) investigation conducted seven months after the deed signing was irrelevant to Sidney’s capacity at the critical time and was properly excluded under M.R.E. 401–402.
3. Instructional Error Waived. The Tuscanos stipulated to the jury instructions on undue influence; having failed to object, they could not challenge those instructions on appeal.
4. Summary Judgment for Jacqueline Conner Sustained. Regardless of the later jury finding that a contract existed, the Tuscanos failed to raise a genuine dispute as to damages, an essential element of tortious interference. Summary judgment was therefore appropriate.
5. No Sanctions Awarded. Although ultimately unsuccessful, the appeal was not deemed frivolous, vexatious, or dilatory, so Rule 19(5) attorney-fee sanctions were denied.

Detailed Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Hjartarson v. Hjartarson, 2006 MT 273 – Reaffirmed that courts may rescind grantor-support deeds for failure of consideration, fraud, or breach. Helvik extends this principle by allowing rescission even after a jury has quantified damages.
• De Atley v. Streit, 81 Mont. 382 (1928) – Defined “grantor-support agreements” and recognized the heightened fiduciary duty owed to elderly grantors. The Court cited De Atley to classify the Helvik-Tuscano Agreement squarely within that doctrine.
• Renz v. Everett-Martin, 2019 MT 251 – Discussed the historic willingness of equity to intervene in real-property matters. The Tuscanos invoked Renz to argue against rescission, but the Court read the case as support for equity’s flexibility.
• Jeppeson v. Dep’t of State Lands, 205 Mont. 282 (1983) – Quoted for the proposition that equitable relief requires inadequacy of legal remedies. The Court distinguished Jeppeson on the special facts of grantor-support contracts.
• Vincelette v. Metropolitan Life, 1998 MT 259 – Affirmed broad trial-court discretion to exclude irrelevant evidence; used to uphold exclusion of APS materials.
• Thornton v. Songstad, 263 Mont. 390 (1994) – Applied § 28-2-905(1)(b), MCA; relied on to limit parol evidence of oral land transfers.
• Seipel v. Olympic Coast Investments, 2008 MT 237 & Emmerson v. Walker, 2010 MT 167 – Provided the conjunctive elements for tortious interference and summary-judgment standards.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

At the heart of the opinion is a two-step syllogism:

1. The Agreement was a grantor-support contract imposing a fiduciary obligation on the purchaser.
2. The purchasers (Tuscanos) materially breached that obligation—by failing to pay, by mortgaging the ranch, and by providing no care—thus equity demands rescission.

The Court emphasized that in such fiduciary-laden transactions, money alone may be insufficient to compensate elderly grantors who risk losing their homes, livelihoods, and security. Consequently, the district court’s choice to unwind the transaction and strike the $150,000 jury award was not an abuse of discretion; rather, it restored the status quo ante and protected the vulnerable parties.

On evidentiary issues, the Court applied textbook statutory interpretation: the statute of frauds (¶¶ 28–29) limits oral evidence of land transfers, while M.R.E. 401–402 guard against irrelevant post-transaction investigations (¶¶ 30–32). On the instructional waiver (¶ 34), the Court reinforced Montana’s long-standing insistence on contemporaneous objections.

3. Likely Impact on Montana Law and Beyond

• Expanded Use of Equitable Rescission. Trial courts now have explicit appellate blessing to rescind grantor-support contracts even when a jury finds damages for breach. This widens judicial discretion and may encourage elder-law practitioners to seek equitable rather than purely legal relief.
• Heightened Scrutiny of “Confidential” Land Deals. Provision 24 of the Agreement imposed strict confidentiality—something the Court implicitly frowned upon. Real-estate professionals and attorneys will likely advise greater transparency, especially where elderly grantors are involved.
• Proof of Damages in Economic-Tort Cases. The summary-judgment portion re-affirms that plaintiffs must adduce actual, calculable loss. Speculation about prospective profits or inheritance will not survive Rule 56 scrutiny.
• Evidentiary Clarity. The opinion demarcates the boundary between admissible “validity” evidence and inadmissible parol testimony about oral land conveyances, guiding trial courts on motions in limine.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Grantor-Support Agreement

A contract where an elderly (often vulnerable) property owner deeds land or other assets to another party, who in return promises lifelong care, maintenance, or financial support.

Equitable Rescission

A remedy that cancels a contract and seeks to restore the parties to the positions they held before the agreement, used when monetary damages are inadequate or unfair.

Undue Influence

Improper persuasion that overcomes the will of a vulnerable person, resulting in a transaction that evidences unfairness or benefit to the influencer.

Statute of Frauds

A legal requirement that certain agreements—such as those for the sale of real property—must be in writing and signed to be enforceable.

Tortious Interference with Contract

A civil wrong where someone intentionally and without justification disrupts another’s contractual relationship, causing measurable damage.

Rule 56 Summary Judgment

A procedural device under which a court can decide a claim without trial when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Conclusion

Helvik v. Tuscano cements Montana’s protective stance toward elderly property owners and clarifies that equity remains a powerful—sometimes superior—tool in resolving real-property disputes marred by betrayal or undue influence. The Supreme Court’s unanimous opinion:

• Authoritatively confirms that grantor-support contracts carry fiduciary obligations whose breach can trigger rescission regardless of legal remedies.
• Strengthens evidentiary gate-keeping around oral land transfers and irrelevant post-fact investigations.
• Reiterates procedural doctrines on jury-instruction waiver and the damages element in economic-tort claims.

Practitioners should view Helvik as both a warning and a roadmap: transactions with vulnerable grantors will be scrutinized through an equitable lens, and litigants must be prepared to prove each element of their claims—especially damages—while honoring procedural safeguards at every stage.