Epley v. Lopez: Mandamus Prerequisite for §1404(a) Transfers and Prisoner Medical Claim Standards

Introduction

In Epley v. Lopez, No. 23-10374 (5th Cir. April 21, 2025), Charles Epley—a Texas inmate with traumatic brain injury (TBI) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)—challenged officials at three Texas prison units for alleged use of excessive force, denial of medical care, refusal to accommodate his disabilities under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, conspiracy, retaliation, and state-law negligence. After his release, Epley filed suit in the Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas. The case was transferred to Lubbock, severed and portions sent to Abilene and Pecos, then dismissed in Abilene for failure to state a claim and lack of jurisdiction. Epley appealed, arguing that (1) the venue transfers were improper, (2) the district court wrongly refused to add defendants, (3) his constitutional and statutory claims should have survived preliminary screening, and (4) his state-law claims fell within diversity jurisdiction.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fifth Circuit affirmed in full. It held that:

The Lubbock court properly severed and transferred claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) to Abilene and Pecos, and Epley’s challenge to any § 1404(a) analysis required a mandamus petition under this Circuit’s precedent.
The Abilene court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend to add defendants already sued in Lubbock.
Under federal screening statutes 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A, Epley failed to state a plausible Eighth Amendment deliberate‐indifference claim; his First, Fourteenth, ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims likewise lacked sufficient alleged facts.
The district court properly dismissed state-law claims without prejudice for lack of diversity jurisdiction because Epley did not rebut the presumption of his Texas domicile and failed to allege defendants’ citizenship.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Bruck (30 F.4th 414): mandamus is required to review § 1404(a) transfer orders in this Circuit.
Itie (2024 WL 864304): summary affirmance of venue transfer to Pecos under § 1406(a); footnote declining review of § 1404(a) challenge for lack of mandamus.
Moler (18 F.4th 162) & Caldwell (811 F.2d 916): district courts have broad discretion under §§ 1404(a)/1406(a); abuse of discretion standard.
Screening cases on prisoner medical claims, including Rogers v. Boatright, Gobert v. Caldwell, and Farmer v. Brennan.
ADA/Rehabilitation Act standards from Valentine v. Collier, Cadena v. El Paso County, and Gonzalez (860 F. App’x 310).

2. Legal Reasoning

Venue Transfer: The Fifth Circuit agreed that the Lubbock trial court had authority under § 1406(a) to sever and transfer claims where venue was “wrong.” Any § 1404(a) factors cited on reconsideration did not alter the original § 1406(a) transfer, but, in any event, challenges to § 1404(a) transfers must be pursued by mandamus.

Denial of Leave to Amend: The Abilene court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to add defendants already named in the severed Lubbock action; Epley’s motion merely sought to relitigate the transfer decision.

Preliminary Screening—§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A:

Eighth Amendment: To plead deliberate indifference, a prisoner must allege (1) an objectively serious medical need and (2) a subjective awareness by the official of that risk. Bruises and difficulty walking without more do not plausibly show a “serious medical need” that even non-medical personnel would recognize.
First Amendment (retaliation): Requires a specific constitutional activity, intent to retaliate, adverse action, and causation. Here, no adverse action properly alleged and no connection to protected speech.
Fourteenth Amendment: Epley asserted equal protection and due process, but he offered no comparator class for equal protection and no substantive facts for due process.
ADA/Rehabilitation Act: To prove failure to accommodate, a prisoner must show (a) a qualifying disability, (b) knowledge by the entity of his limitations, and (c) denial of reasonable accommodation “by reason of” the disability. Epley showed qualifying disabilities but did not allege that Abilene officials appreciated his functional limitations or consciously failed to accommodate them.

Diversity Jurisdiction: Epley’s conclusory allegation of French citizenship could not overcome the presumption of his longstanding Texas domicile. He also failed to allege any defendant’s citizenship. Complete diversity was therefore not properly pleaded.

3. Potential Impact

Prisoner litigants must recognize that § 1404(a) venue transfers in this Circuit are reviewable only by mandamus, not by appeal from final judgment.
Trial judges retain broad discretion under § 1406(a) to sever and transfer improperly-filed claims, but must correctly identify the statutory basis for transfer.
Pro se prisoner complaints face a high bar on preliminary screening for Eighth Amendment deliberate‐indifference claims; obvious, lay-recognizable serious needs are required.
Prison ADA/RA claims hinge on showing that non‐medical officials appreciated a prisoner’s functional limitations and consciously failed to provide accommodations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

§ 1404(a) vs. § 1406(a): § 1404(a) allows transfer “for convenience” when venue is proper; § 1406(a) cures improper venue by transfer or dismissal. Challenges to § 1404(a) transfers here require mandamus, while § 1406(a) transfers can be reviewed on appeal.
Mandamus: A “do‐this” order to a lower court. In this Circuit, it is the exclusive route to challenge a § 1404(a) transfer.
Deliberate Indifference: To state an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must allege a “serious medical need”—one so obvious a layperson would know it needs treatment—and that the official knew but intentionally ignored it.
Prison Litigation Screening: Under §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A, courts must dismiss frivolous or non-cognizable prisoner claims before service.
ADA/RA Failure to Accommodate: Plaintiff must show a qualified disability, notice of limitations, and a denial “by reason of” that disability.

Conclusion

Epley v. Lopez reaffirms three core principles in Fifth Circuit prisoner litigation:

Challenges to § 1404(a) venue transfers must be pursued via mandamus; § 1406(a) transfers remain appealable on final judgment.
Screening under §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A imposes strict standards for Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference and ADA failure-to-accommodate claims.
Prisoner plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating diversity jurisdiction and cannot rely on conclusory allegations of out-of-state citizenship.

The decision underscores the high hurdles facing pro se prisoner-in-forma-pauperis litigants both in venue challenges and preliminary screening of constitutional and statutory claims.