"Entire Amount" Means Joint and Several: Utah Supreme Court Holds Comparative Fault Is Inapplicable to Criminal Restitution Under the Crime Victims Restitution Act

Introduction

In State v. Debrok, 2025 UT 40, the Utah Supreme Court addressed whether trial courts may apportion criminal restitution between codefendants under comparative fault principles or must instead impose joint and several liability for the full, overlapping damages each defendant proximately caused. The case arose from a multi-incident retail theft scheme targeting Walmart; the defendant, William Bisset Debrok, pled guilty and admitted the victim’s pecuniary losses exceeded $10,000. At sentencing, he asked the district court to split the restitution equally between him and a codefendant, arguing comparative fault principles should govern.

The district court declined, citing State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), and ordered Debrok jointly and severally liable for the entire amount, as it had already ordered for the codefendant. On certification from the court of appeals, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed—though not on McBride’s reasoning. Interpreting the current Crime Victims Restitution Act, Utah Code § 77-38b-205(1)(a), the Court held that the Act’s requirement that a defendant pay the “entire amount” of pecuniary damages he proximately caused forecloses comparative fault apportionment and requires joint and several liability where codefendants caused the same damages.

Summary of the Opinion

The question: May criminal restitution be apportioned between codefendants based on comparative fault, or must each be jointly and severally liable for the full overlap of damages they proximately caused?
The holding: The Crime Victims Restitution Act requires courts to order a defendant to pay “the entire amount of pecuniary damages that are proximately caused to each victim by the criminal conduct of the defendant.” Utah Code § 77-38b-205(1)(a)(ii). This language mandates joint and several liability among codefendants for overlapping damages and is incompatible with comparative fault apportionment.
McBride’s status: The Court explained that McBride’s premise—no comparative fault for intentional torts—was abrogated by Graves v. North Eastern Services, Inc., 2015 UT 28, which recognized that Utah’s Liability Reform Act (LRA) permits allocation of fault for intentional torts. But the Court affirmed on the independent statutory ground that the current Restitution Act itself disallows apportionment.
Statutory evolution: In 2021, the Restitution Act was amended to decouple criminal restitution from civil damages and to remove the “complete” vs. “court-ordered” distinction and related ability-to-pay considerations. The Act now directly imposes liability for the entire amount proximately caused. See Utah Code § 77-38b-205.
Stare decisis and statutory change: The Court noted trial courts may recognize that earlier caselaw no longer applies when statutes materially change.
No double recovery: Joint and several liability persists only until the victim is made whole; it does not permit double recovery.
Temporal rule: As a general matter, the version of the Restitution Act in effect at sentencing applies, though the Court left open the possibility that a future case could treat a provision differently.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ogden, 2018 UT 8:
McBride rejected comparative negligence in restitution orders because, at the time, Utah civil law did not apply comparative fault to intentional torts. In Debrok, the Court explained that this premise was later undermined by Graves, and thus McBride no longer controls.
Graves v. North Eastern Services, Inc., 2015 UT 28:
The Court recognized that Utah’s LRA permits allocation of fault in intentional torts. This abrogated McBride’s underlying foundation. However, because the Restitution Act has since been amended and decoupled from civil damages, the LRA’s comparative regime does not govern restitution under the current statute.
State v. Ogden, 2018 UT 8:
Clarified proximate cause as the causation standard in restitution under the prior Act. Debrok cites Ogden to frame review standards and to show the historical linkage between restitution and civil standards; the current Act now contains its own proximate cause language, eliminating the need to import civil law.
State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53:
Discussed the former statutory distinction between “complete restitution” and “court-ordered restitution.” The 2021 amendments removed this distinction and the ability-to-pay balancing in setting the amount ordered at sentencing.
State v. Oliver, 2018 UT App 101; State v. Grant, 2021 UT App 104; State v. Calata, 2022 UT App 127:
These court of appeals decisions recognized, pre-2021, that whether comparative fault applied in restitution was unsettled. Debrok resolves the question under the current statute.
State v. Robinson, 2023 UT 25:
A trial court may acknowledge that changed statutory text undercuts earlier appellate interpretations of prior versions; stare decisis does not force adherence to precedent that interprets a materially different statute. This supports the district court’s ability to move past McBride after statutory change.
Temporal application cases:
- State v. Clark, 2011 UT 23: General rules of temporal application.
- State v. Blake, 2025 UT 21; State v. Garcia, 2023 UT App 143: Restitution Act generally applied as it exists at sentencing.
- State v. Sevastopoulos, 2021 UT 70: Earlier contrary suggestion clarified; Debrok confirms the sentencing-time rule generally applies.
Hexcel Corp. v. Labor Commission, 2022 UT App 52:
Cited for the general principle that double recovery is disfavored. The Court in Debrok emphasized that joint and several liability ends once the victim is fully compensated.

Statutory Text and Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis begins and ends with the Restitution Act’s current language. Section 77-38b-205(1)(a) provides that upon conviction, the court shall order a defendant to pay restitution:

(i) in accordance with the terms of any plea agreement; or
(ii) “for the entire amount of pecuniary damages that are proximately caused to each victim by the criminal conduct of the defendant.”

Two interpretive principles drive the result.

Specific over general: The Restitution Act is the specific statute governing criminal restitution; the LRA is a general tort framework. When statutes conflict or potentially overlap, the specific statute controls. Thus, even if the LRA has a broad comparative fault regime, the Restitution Act’s directive controls restitution determinations.
Plain meaning and each word used advisedly: The Court gives effect to the words “entire amount” and “proximately caused by the criminal conduct of the defendant.” “Entire” means the whole—with nothing left out. Read naturally, if multiple defendants each proximately caused the same pecuniary loss, each must be ordered to pay the whole of that loss. Apportionment would defeat the command that the defendant pay the “entire amount” of the damages his conduct caused.

The Court bolsters this textual reading with § 77-38b-205(2)(a), which requires courts to set an amount that “fully compensates a victim for all pecuniary damages proximately caused by the criminal conduct of the defendant.” Joint and several liability aligns with that goal by placing insolvency risk on wrongdoers rather than on the victim. By contrast, importing comparative fault would reduce a defendant’s obligation below the “entire amount” of damages he proximately caused, frustrating both the text and the purpose of full compensation.

The Court also clarifies that joint and several liability does not open the door to double recovery. Payments by either codefendant are credited against the total owed; once the victim has received the full amount, the joint obligation is satisfied.

Finally, the Court acknowledges subsection 205(1)(a)(i), which instructs courts to order restitution “in accordance with the terms of any plea agreement.” Although the parties did not invoke that subsection here (and the Court expressly did not decide its effect in this case), the opinion signals that plea agreements may allow parties to stipulate to a different arrangement. In the absence of such a stipulation, however, subsection (1)(a)(ii)’s “entire amount” rule governs.

Statutory Evolution and Decoupling from Civil Damages

Historic linkage: For decades, Utah’s restitution statutes keyed criminal restitution to what could be recovered in a civil action. Courts therefore often imported civil causation and damages principles into restitution.
2021 amendments: The Legislature amended the Act to:
- Define “pecuniary damages” directly, without reference to civil law.
- Remove the “complete restitution” vs. “court-ordered restitution” dichotomy and eliminate defendant ability-to-pay as a basis to order less than full restitution at sentencing.
- Require the sentencing court to order the “entire amount” proximately caused by the defendant’s criminal conduct.
These changes severed the need to look to the LRA for apportionment rules and positioned the Restitution Act as the governing and complete framework for restitution orders.

Temporal Application

The Court clarifies that, as a general matter, the version of the Restitution Act in effect at the time of sentencing applies to restitution orders, because restitution is ordered “as part of the sentence imposed.” The Court acknowledges prior inconsistency and explicitly clarifies the rule, while leaving open the possibility that a party could argue for a different treatment of a particular provision in a future case.

Impact of the Decision

Restitution is joint and several for overlapping damages: In cases with multiple defendants whose criminal conduct proximately caused the same loss (e.g., co-participant thefts, joint fraud schemes), each defendant may be ordered to pay the full loss until the victim is fully compensated.
No comparative fault apportionment: Courts may not split restitution by relative blameworthiness under the LRA. The LRA’s comparative regime does not apply in criminal restitution proceedings governed by § 77-38b-205.
Plea bargaining leverage: Subsection 205(1)(a)(i) suggests parties may allocate restitution via plea terms. Expect more negotiated stipulations concerning amounts and allocation among codefendants, though Debrok does not definitively resolve the outer limits of such stipulations.
Litigation focus shifts to causation and quantification: Because apportionment is off the table absent a plea stipulation, defendants’ primary litigation incentives will be to challenge whether specific losses were “proximately caused” by their own criminal conduct and to contest the amount of pecuniary damages.
Victim compensation and collection: Victims benefit from having multiple obligors for the same loss, improving collection prospects and ensuring the victim—not the victim’s solvency—controls when the restitution obligation ends.
Codefendant dynamics and contribution: The opinion does not create (or discuss) any statutory right of contribution among codefendants in criminal cases. Codefendants seeking equitable allocation may need to pursue civil contribution or indemnity remedies, if available, outside the criminal proceeding.
Consistency and clarity for trial courts: Courts no longer need to conduct fault-apportionment inquiries for restitution. The question is whether each defendant proximately caused the losses; if yes, each is ordered to pay the “entire amount” of those losses.
Open questions:
- The scope and enforceability of plea-based allocation under § 77-38b-205(1)(a)(i), which the Court did not decide here.
- How the “entire amount” rule applies when damages are divisible (e.g., clearly separable episodes or losses not jointly caused); by its terms, the Act still limits restitution to damages proximately caused by “the criminal conduct of the defendant.”
- Potential constitutional constraints in unusual temporal-change scenarios (the Court left room for argument that a particular provision might warrant different treatment).

Complex Concepts Simplified

Joint and several liability: Each liable defendant is responsible for the entire obligation. The victim may collect the full amount from any one or more of them. Payments by one reduce the overall balance; there is no double recovery.
Comparative fault (comparative negligence): A civil law mechanism that allocates damages among multiple actors based on their percentage of fault. Under Utah’s LRA, no defendant in a civil case is liable for more than their proportionate fault, and fault can be allocated to intentional actors. Debrok holds this regime does not apply to criminal restitution under the current Restitution Act.
Proximate cause: A legal cause standard limiting restitution to losses sufficiently connected to the defendant’s criminal conduct. It requires more than mere “but-for” causation; the loss must be a reasonably foreseeable and direct result of the conduct.
Specific-over-general canon: When two statutes could apply, the statute that specifically addresses the subject (here, criminal restitution) controls over a more general statute (the LRA’s general tort rules).
Abrogation vs. overruling: A decision can be effectively undermined (abrogated) by later statutory changes or higher court rulings, even if not expressly overruled. McBride’s premise was abrogated by Graves and by the 2021 statutory amendments, though the district court initially felt constrained to follow it.
Temporal application: As a general rule reaffirmed here, the Restitution Act in effect at sentencing governs restitution, because restitution is part of the sentence. The Court leaves open the possibility of exceptions in future cases.

Conclusion

State v. Debrok delivers a clear directive for Utah’s criminal restitution landscape under the amended Crime Victims Restitution Act: when a defendant’s criminal conduct proximately causes a victim’s pecuniary losses, the court must order that defendant to pay the “entire amount” of those losses. Where multiple defendants have each proximately caused the same damages, this mandate produces joint and several liability until the victim is fully compensated. The Court rejects the importation of the LRA’s comparative fault regime into criminal restitution and emphasizes the primacy of the Restitution Act’s specific text over general tort principles.

The opinion also clarifies that trial courts may recognize when statutory amendments have overtaken prior precedent and confirms, as a general matter, that the version of the Restitution Act in effect at sentencing governs restitution. While the Court leaves for another day the precise role of plea agreements in allocating restitution under § 77-38b-205(1)(a)(i), Debrok cements the core rule: absent a plea stipulation, apportionment by comparative fault is out, and joint and several liability is in.

Key takeaway: The Restitution Act’s “entire amount” language is a substantive command that prioritizes full victim compensation and places insolvency risk on those who committed the crime, not on the victim. This decision will streamline restitution proceedings and reshape plea negotiations in multi-defendant cases across Utah.