Ensuring Knowing and Voluntary Appeal Waivers in Plea Agreements: The Severance Remedy and Miscarriage of Justice Exception

Introduction

United States v. Quamaine Smith is a Fourth Circuit decision issued April 14, 2025. In this robbery‐and‐firearm case, the defendant pleaded guilty under a written agreement that included a broad waiver of his right to appeal sentence or to collaterally attack it. After a succinct Rule 11 colloquy and a brief sentencing hearing, the district court imposed 144 months’ imprisonment and enforced the appeal waiver to block review. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the waiver was neither knowing nor voluntary—and that, given the court’s routine omission of essential Rule 11 and sentencing procedures, enforcing it would produce a miscarriage of justice. The court vacated and remanded for re-sentencing before a different judge.

Summary of the Judgment

1. Quamaine Smith pleaded guilty to Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951) and brandishing a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). 2. His plea agreement contained a general waiver of appeal and collateral attack rights. 3. The district court conducted a 16-minute plea hearing, misdescribed the waiver as only affecting the conviction, and never ensured Smith understood its scope or exceptions. 4. At sentencing (13 minutes), the court adopted the PSR, heard arguments for and against a downward variance, but gave no individualized explanation for the 144-month total term. 5. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit:

Applied a de novo standard to the question of waiver validity;
Held the waiver was not knowingly and voluntarily entered under Rule 11(b)(1)(N);
Concluded enforcing it would be a miscarriage of justice given the court’s habitual procedural shortcuts;
Severed the waiver clause (leaving the rest of the plea agreement intact); and
Vacated the sentence as procedurally unreasonable and remanded for re-sentencing before a different judge.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Fourth Circuit: Wiggins (905 F.2d 51), Wessels (936 F.2d 165), Johnson (410 F.3d 137), Thornsbury (670 F.3d 532), Boutcher (998 F.3d 603), Taylor-Sanders (88 F.4th 516) — all establishing that appeal‐waiver validity is reviewed de novo and depends on a knowing, intelligent waiver under the totality of circumstances.
First Circuit: Teeter (257 F.3d 14) and Villodas-Rosario (901 F.3d 10) — requiring clear written waiver terms, a specific colloquy about the waiver, and refusal to enforce if waiver causes miscarriage of justice.
Eleventh Circuit: Bushert (997 F.2d 1343) — endorsing severance as the remedy for an involuntary appellate waiver.
Supreme Court: Dominguez-Benitez (542 U.S. 74) and Vonn (535 U.S. 55) — setting the standard for plain‐error review of Rule 11 errors in plea withdrawals, distinguished here because Smith did not seek to withdraw his plea, only to enforce his appeal rights.

Legal Reasoning

1. Rule 11(b)(1)(N) Requirement: A sentencing court must personally inform a defendant of any waiver of appeal or collateral‐attack rights and determine that the defendant understands them. 2. Colloquy Failures: The district court misdescribed the waiver as applying only to conviction (not to sentence), never explained its exceptions (e.g., ineffective assistance, prosecutorial misconduct, constitutional claims), and asked only “Is that what you agreed to?” without probing Smith’s understanding. 3. Totality of Circumstances: Given Smith’s minimal education, serious mental‐health history, and lack of any true explanation at the hearing, the waiver was not knowingly and intelligently made. 4. Severance Remedy: Under Wessels, Bushert, Teeter and related cases, the appropriate fix is to sever the invalid waiver from the plea agreement rather than undo the entire bargain. 5. Miscarriage of Justice Exception: Even a valid waiver would not block review when a court habitually omits essential Rule 11 and sentencing‐explanation duties, thereby placing itself “entirely at the whim” of the court. 6. Procedural Unreasonableness: The 13-minute sentencing omitted any consideration of Smith’s non-frivolous mitigation (mental illness, family responsibilities, genuine remorse) or § 3553(a) analysis, violating this Circuit’s requirement of an individualized, reasoned explanation. 7. Reassignment on Remand: To preserve confidence in judicial integrity—and guarding against both actual bias and its appearance—the Fourth Circuit directed a different judge to handle the resentencing.

Impact

Reinforces strict compliance with Rule 11(b)(1)(N) to secure valid, enforceable appeal waivers.
Emphasizes that appellate waivers are severable if entered without full understanding, protecting defendants from unwitting loss of rights.
Expands the “miscarriage of justice” exception to invalid waivers in cases where courts routinely depart from required colloquy or sentencing explanations.
Requires district courts to articulate an individualized sentencing rationale responsive to each defendant’s particular mitigation, ensuring meaningful appellate review.
Signals that habitual procedural shortcuts—backed by blanket waiver enforcement—will no longer shield districts from appellate oversight.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 11(b)(1)(N): Part of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requiring the judge to explain any appeal waiver and confirm the defendant’s understanding.
Appeal Waiver: A contractual agreement in a plea deal where a defendant gives up the right to appeal certain aspects of the case, usually sentence or conviction.
De Novo vs. Plain-Error Review: De novo means the appellate court decides anew whether the waiver was valid; plain error is a more forgiving standard used only when a defendant seeks to withdraw a plea for Rule 11 mistakes.
Miscarriage of Justice Exception: A narrow rule allowing appeal even under a valid waiver, when enforcement would work a fundamental injustice (e.g., illegal sentence, total lack of explanation).
Severance Remedy: Cutting out the invalid waiver from the plea agreement so the rest of the bargain remains binding, while restoring the defendant’s appeal rights.

Conclusion

United States v. Smith crystallizes a robust framework for enforcing—and voiding—appeal waivers in federal plea agreements. A waiver must be explained fully under Rule 11(b)(1)(N) and entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently; otherwise it is severed. Moreover, a court’s insistence on rapid plea and sentencing hearings, coupled with routine procedural omissions, can amount to a miscarriage of justice that defeats any waiver. Finally, sentencing decisions must be individually reasoned and responsive to each defendant’s mitigation under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Together, these requirements reinforce the fairness of the plea process and the integrity of appellate review.