Ensuring Administrative Exhaustion Under the PLRA: Mandatory Pavey Hearings for Factual Disputes

Introduction

In Brandon L. Johnson v. Larry Haskell, No. 24-1156 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 2025), the Seventh Circuit addressed whether a prisoner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), can be decided on summary judgment when there remain factual disputes about timeliness and the existence of additional grievances. Brandon Johnson, incarcerated at Indiana State Prison, sued two guards for Eighth Amendment violations—specifically, for leaving him in a feces-stained cell for 13 days. The district court granted summary judgment to the guards on the ground that Johnson had not completed Indiana’s three‐step grievance process. On appeal, Johnson contended (1) that remedies were effectively unavailable because of prison officials’ actions and (2) that the court should have deferred ruling to allow further discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for an evidentiary (Pavey) hearing to resolve key factual questions.

Summary of the Judgment

The Seventh Circuit held:

Factual questions remain as to (a) whether Johnson timely filed his first‐level appeal after receiving the April 21 grievance response and (b) whether other, potentially relevant grievances exist that were never recorded or produced.
Under Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008), a court must hold an evidentiary hearing when exhaustion turns on unresolved factual issues.
The district court should have granted Johnson limited discovery under Rule 56(d) to investigate missing grievances and procedural barriers imposed by prison officials.
The case was vacated and remanded for a Pavey hearing to determine exhaustion—specifically, (i) the timeliness of his appeal and (ii) the relevance and disposition of any other grievances.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008): Establishes that when exhaustion turns on disputed facts, the district court must hold an evidentiary hearing rather than decide exhaustion on summary judgment.
Jackson v. Esser, 105 F.4th 948 (7th Cir. 2024): Emphasizes “strict adherence” to PLRA grievance procedures, but recognizes procedural ambiguities may excuse formal noncompliance.
Williams v. Rajoli, 44 F.4th 1041 (7th Cir. 2022): Clarifies that summary‐judgment review of exhaustion is de novo and factual inferences are drawn in favor of the non‐movant.
Sapp v. Hyatte, No. 3:21-CV-768 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 15, 2023): Explains that marking “disagree” on a grievance response sheet obliges officials to furnish the correct appeal form.
Smith v. OSF HealthCare Sys., 933 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 2019): Interprets Rule 56(d), permitting postponement of summary judgment for discovery when the non‐movant shows diligence and necessity.
Tuduj v. Newbold, 958 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2020): Declines to consider additional evidence on appeal that was not presented to the district court.
Gooch v. Young, 24 F.4th 624 (7th Cir. 2022): Confirms that defendants bear the burden of proving a prisoner’s failure to exhaust.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning rests on two pillars: (1) the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement must be enforced but not applied mechanically when genuine disputes of fact exist, and (2) procedural fairness under Rule 56(d) demands the opportunity to explore missing evidence before summary judgment.

1. Factual Ambiguities in Timeliness: Indiana’s grievance rules allow a five‐business-day appeal “after the date of the grievance response” or, under another prison official’s affidavit, five days “after receiving” the response. Johnson received a response dated July 8 on July 29 and filed an appeal immediately—well outside five business days from mailing but within five days of receipt. The divergence of these two starting points creates a fact question that summary judgment cannot resolve.

2. Missing Grievances and Officials’ Conduct: Johnson’s grievance log included additional sanitation complaints predating or contemporaneous with April 21; yet the defendants provided only two grievances and did not explain the disposition of the others. Johnson’s sworn assertion that officials withheld his records and denied access to his property box warrants further inquiry into whether remedies were truly “available.”

3. Rule 56(d) Discovery: By submitting a sworn declaration explaining why he could not obtain the missing grievance documents, Johnson satisfied Rule 56(d)’s requirements. No discovery deadline had been set, and his request was neither untimely nor futile in light of the unaddressed logs and prison withholding tactics.

4. Pavey Hearing Requirement: Under Seventh Circuit precedent, disputed factual issues concerning exhaustion mandate a Pavey evidentiary hearing rather than summary disposition. This process ensures both adherence to PLRA’s exhaustion mandate and protection against erroneous deprivation of a prisoner’s right to proceed when administrative barriers are in dispute.

Impact

This decision clarifies and strengthens procedural protections for incarcerated litigants under the PLRA:

Lower courts must scrutinize factual disputes over grievance timeliness—particularly where rules are ambiguous or prison‐official affidavits conflict with written procedures.
Rule 56(d) motions should be liberally construed in pro se prisoner cases to permit exploration of administrative records withheld or lost by the institution.
Pavey hearings are essential whenever exhaustion depends on contested facts, safeguarding both the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement and the prisoner’s access to judicial remedies.
Prison administrators must maintain accurate grievance logs and comply with their own procedures for providing appeal forms; failure to do so may render remedies unavailable and excuse exhaustion.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA): Federal law requiring prisoners to exhaust internal grievance processes before suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Exhaustion Requirement: The obligation to complete all steps of an administrative remedy process (here, a three‐step grievance system) before filing suit.
Pavey Hearing: An evidentiary hearing required when exhaustion turns on disputed facts, named for Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008).
Rule 56(d): A provision allowing a court to delay summary judgment and permit discovery when the non-movant cannot present essential facts without it.
Summary Judgment: A ruling that a case can be decided without trial when there is no genuine dispute of material fact.

Conclusion

Brandon Johnson v. Larry Haskell reaffirms that strict enforcement of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement must be balanced against procedural fairness when factual uncertainties exist. By mandating a Pavey hearing and endorsing Rule 56(d) discovery in pro se prisoner cases, the Seventh Circuit ensures that available administrative remedies are not illusory. Going forward, this decision will guide lower courts to probe ambiguities in grievance procedures, scrutinize prison officials’ adherence to their own rules, and protect inmates’ access to federal courts when genuine exhaustion disputes arise.