Enhancing Standards for Jury Awards in Wrongful Death and Survival Actions: Kiser v. Schulte

Enhancing Standards for Jury Awards in Wrongful Death and Survival Actions: Kiser v. Schulte

Introduction

The case of John A. Kiser and Cheryl Kiser, Administrators of the Estate of Kerry Ellen Kiser, Deceased; John A. Kiser and Cheryl Kiser, in their own right, v. Daryl Schulte (538 Pa. 219) adjudicated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on September 13, 1994, addresses critical issues surrounding the adequacy of damages awarded in wrongful death and survival actions. This case involves the tragic death of Kerry Ellen Kiser due to a vehicular accident caused by Daryl Schulte, who was found negligent. The Kisers, as administrators of Kerry’s estate, sought compensation for both wrongful death and survival claims. The central controversies included whether the jury's $25,000 damage award was "so inadequate as to shock the conscience" and whether a new trial should be mandated solely on the issue of damages.

Summary of the Judgment

In this case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Superior Court's decision to vacate the jury’s award of $25,000 in damages as inadequately compensatory for the wrongful death and survival claims. The jury had apportioned negligence 60% to Daryl Schulte and 40% to Linda L. Fox Trinnes and Edward Trinnes, finding that Ms. Kiser's negligence was not a substantial factor in her death. The Kisers presented expert testimony calculating significant economic losses resulting from Ms. Kiser's death. The court found that the jury's verdict did not align with the uncontradicted evidence, thereby necessitating a new trial focused solely on damages.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment heavily relies on established precedents to justify the remanding of the case for a new trial on damages. Key cases include:

  • Burrell v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 438 Pa. 286 (1970) – Established that granting a new trial is within the trial court’s discretion but is subject to appellate review if abused.
  • ELZA v. CHOVAN, 396 Pa. 112 (1959) – Defined when a jury verdict is deemed inadequate, such as when it appears driven by passion or bears no reasonable relation to the evidence.
  • Slaseman v. Meyers, 309 Pa. Super. 537 (1983) – Demonstrated that a verdict significantly lower than expert testimony can warrant a new trial.
  • BURKETT v. GEORGE, 118 Pa. Commw. 543 (1988) – Affirmed that failure to award damages in survival actions when evidence supports it justifies overturning the verdict.
  • PRINCE v. ADAMS, 229 Pa. Super. 150 (1974) – Illustrated that minimal awards in wrongful death actions against significant evidence are inadequate.

These precedents collectively underscore the necessity for jury awards to reflect the evidence presented, especially when expert testimony establishes substantial economic losses.

Impact

The judgment in Kiser v. Schulte reinforces the accountability of juries in accurately reflecting substantial economic losses in wrongful death and survival actions. It sets a clear precedent that:

  • Jury awards must align with uncontradicted expert testimony regarding economic losses.
  • Awarding damages significantly lower than the expert’s estimation, without contrary evidence, is grounds for vacating the verdict.
  • Appellate courts will actively intervene to ensure justice is served when verdicts are incongruent with supported evidence.

This case serves as a crucial reference for future wrongful death and survival action litigations, emphasizing the necessity for thorough and evidence-based damage assessments.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Wrongful Death vs. Survival Actions

Wrongful Death Actions: Brought by the family members of the deceased to recover damages for their own losses resulting from the death, such as loss of services, companionship, and funeral expenses.

Survival Actions: Brought by the estate of the deceased to recover damages for the decedent's own losses that they suffered before death, including pain and suffering and loss of earning capacity.

Net Economic Loss

This refers to the quantifiable financial losses resulting from the decedent’s death, including potential income, benefits, and household services, minus personal maintenance expenses.

Personal Maintenance Expenses

These are costs that would have been necessary to maintain the decedent's standard of living, such as food, housing, and other personal needs. In calculating net economic loss, these expenses are subtracted from the total projected earnings.

Shock the Conscience Standard

A legal threshold used to determine whether a jury's verdict is so egregiously inadequate that it goes against fundamental notions of fairness and justice, warranting appellate review and potential reversal.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's decision in Kiser v. Schulte underscores the imperative for jury awards in wrongful death and survival actions to be substantively supported by the evidence presented, especially when expert testimony delineates significant economic losses. By vacating an inadequate $25,000 award and mandating a new trial on damages, the court reaffirmed the standards necessary to ensure just compensation for both the surviving family members and the decedent’s estate. This judgment reinforces the judiciary’s role in safeguarding against undervalued verdicts, thereby maintaining the integrity of civil litigation and the pursuit of fair reparation for grievous losses.

Case Details

Year: 1994
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Judge(s)

FLAHERTY, Justice, dissenting.

Attorney(S)

Peter B. Skeel, Swensen, Perer Johnson, Pittsburgh, PA, for appellants in No. 71. Frank M. Gianola, Michael Nerone, Dickie, McCamey Chilcote, P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, for appellants in No. 72. James B. Cole, Pittsburgh, for John and Cheryl Kiser. Deborah A. Little, Pittsburgh, for Jeffrey Hampe. Frank M. Gianola, Michael Nerone, Dickie, McCamey Chilcote, P.C., Pittsburgh, for Daryl Schulte. Warren Siegfried, Wayman, Irvin McAuley, Pittsburgh, for Michael A. Slachta and Roxanne M. Fox Slachta. Maury Nusbaum, Pittsburgh, for Marshall Black, Pittsburgh, PA, for appellee in No. 71.

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