Enhanced Sentencing for Physical Restraint and Obstruction of Justice in Hobbs Act Robbery: United States v. Maikel Pedroso

Introduction

United States v. Maikel Bruzon Pedroso (11th Cir. May 1, 2025) addresses two key sentencing‐guideline enhancements in the context of a Hobbs Act robbery: (1) the physical restraint enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B), and (2) the obstruction of justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The defendant, Pedroso, appealed his 125-month sentence imposed by the Southern District of Florida, arguing that neither enhancement was properly applied and that the obstruction boost amounted to impermissible double counting.

Key issues:

• Whether forcibly seating or confining a robbery victim at gunpoint qualifies as “physical restraint.”
• Whether implied threats to deter the victim from reporting the crime constitute obstruction of justice.
• Whether applying both enhancements punishes the same harm twice (double counting).

Plaintiff-Appellee: United States of America.
Defendant-Appellant: Maikel Bruzon Pedroso.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit unanimously affirmed. First, it held that Pedroso’s ordering the victim to sit on the floor at gunpoint, coupled with threats (“I know where you live”) and a forced twenty-second countdown, fell squarely within the physical restraint enhancement. Second, it found that those same threats—intended to intimidate the victim into silence—supported the obstruction of justice enhancement. Third, the court rejected any notion of impermissible double counting, deeming the harms addressed by each enhancement conceptually distinct.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

• United States v. Ware (11th Cir. 2023): Held that using a firearm to force victims to move or stay in place triggers the physical restraint enhancement even absent tying or binding.
• United States v. Deleon (11th Cir. 2024): Reaffirmed that compelling a victim’s compliance and preventing flight—by gunpoint or implied threat—qualifies as physical restraint.
• United States v. Victor (11th Cir. 2013): Clarified that moving a victim is not a prerequisite for the physical restraint enhancement.
• United States v. Guevara (11th Cir. 2018): Set out standards for reviewing obstruction‐of‐justice enhancement findings.
• United States v. Taylor (11th Cir. 1996) & United States v. Wayerski (11th Cir. 2010): Addressed when a district court may adopt a PSI’s findings without making fresh, individualized findings.
• United States v. Johnson (11th Cir. 2012): Explained that unpreserved sentencing‐guideline claims are reviewed only for plain error.
• United States v. Dudley (11th Cir. 2006): Defined impermissible double counting as applying two enhancements for the same “kind of harm.”

2. Legal Reasoning

Physical Restraint Enhancement (§ 2B3.1(b)(4)(B))
The court applied a two‐level increase because Pedroso’s gunpoint commands created an environment in which the victim had no realistic choice but to comply and remain on the floor. Under Ware and Deleon, “threatened force” suffices to restrain, even absent ropes or handcuffs. Pedroso’s threat that he “knew where [the victim] lived” and his forced countdown further ensured compliance and delayed any report to law enforcement, satisfying the enhancement’s requirements.

Obstruction of Justice Enhancement (§ 3C1.1)
The court held that Pedroso’s implied threats were “purposefully calculated” to thwart investigation—precisely the conduct § 3C1.1 targets. Because Pedroso failed to object at sentencing, review was for plain error. No such error existed: the threat “I know where you live,” delivered at gunpoint to deter reporting, falls squarely within application note 4(K)’s examples and does not expand the guideline beyond its plain text.

Double Counting
The Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that enhancements only double count when they penalize the same harm. The physical restraint enhancement addresses control over the victim during the robbery; the obstruction enhancement addresses efforts to impede subsequent investigation. Because these are conceptually distinct harms, no double counting occurred.

3. Impact

This decision cements the principle that any use of threatened deadly force to compel movement or immobility triggers the physical restraint enhancement—even absent bonds or physical bindings. It also clarifies that implied threats to deter reporting qualify as obstruction, without impermissible overlap. Lower courts will rely on Pedroso—alongside Ware and Deleon—to apply these enhancements consistently in Hobbs Act and other violent‐crime cases.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Sentencing Guidelines (§ 2B3.1 & § 3C1.1): Federal rulebooks that recommend sentencing ranges and adjustments for specific conduct.
• Physical Restraint Enhancement: A two-level increase when a victim is forced to stay in place or move under threat of violence.
• Obstruction of Justice Enhancement: A two-level increase when a defendant’s conduct is designed to impede reporting, investigation, or prosecution.
• De Novo vs. Clear Error Review: “De novo” means the appellate court reviews legal questions from scratch. “Clear error” means factual findings are overturned only if plainly wrong.
• Plain Error Review: Applied when an issue wasn’t raised at trial; the error must be obvious and affect substantial rights to be corrected.
• Double Counting: Unlawful to apply two enhancements that punish the exact same harm. Permissible when each enhancement addresses a distinct aspect of wrongdoing.

Conclusion

United States v. Pedroso reaffirms that armed coercion—whether by explicit orders or implied threats—constitutes “physical restraint” under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). It also confirms that threats designed to silence victims trigger the obstruction enhancement under § 3C1.1, without running afoul of double counting principles. Together, these holdings strengthen sentencing consistency for violent robberies and clarify the boundaries of guideline enhancements.