Enforcing Tailored Internet Restrictions in Supervised Release: United States v. Kornacki (10th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

United States v. Kornacki, decided May 8, 2025 by the Tenth Circuit, addresses for the first time whether—and under what standards—a district court may impose two specialized supervised‐release conditions on a convicted sex offender: (1) a prior‐authorization requirement for any computer or internet-capable device, and (2) a mandatory monitoring-software requirement on authorized devices.

Defendant‐appellant Nathaniel Kornacki, originally convicted under Tennessee law in 2010 for sexual battery of a fifteen-year-old and thereafter twice prosecuted federally for failure to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), repeatedly violated standard and special conditions of his supervised release—failing to register, absconding from a Residential Reentry Center (RRC), and refusing to comply with probation officers. Over a series of four revocations (2016, 2019, 2023 and a subsequent correction under Rule 35), the district court imposed and reimposed the computer-related special conditions. Kornacki challenged them on appeal, arguing they exceed the bounds of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), invade fundamental liberties, are overbroad, and lack an individualized assessment. The Tenth Circuit unanimously affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), the court held that the challenged special conditions satisfy § 3583(d)’s three requirements:

Relation to § 3553(a) factors: The conditions are reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of Kornacki’s underlying sexual‐battery offense and SORNA‐registration convictions, his repeated failures to comply, and the need to deter future criminality, protect the public (particularly minors), and facilitate rehabilitation.
No greater deprivation of liberty than necessary: By following the Tenth Circuit’s blueprint in United States v. Blair (933 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2019)), the district court tailored restrictions—authorizing certain devices, forbidding only abuse, and requiring narrowly focused monitoring—to minimize chilling effects on lawful internet use.
Consistency with Sentencing Commission policy: The conditions comport with the Sentencing Guidelines and relevant policy statements governing special conditions of supervised release.

The court rejected Kornacki’s contentions that the conditions were overbroad, insufficiently justified, or imposed without an individualized inquiry. It found no abuse of discretion, no clear error in fact‐finding, and no misapplication of law. The judgments of the district court were affirmed in all respects.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

United States v. Blair, 933 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2019): Established that computer‐and-internet special conditions must (a) permit reasonable access for daily life, (b) prevent improper behavior, and (c) be no broader than necessary to achieve § 3553(a)(2) goals, thereby avoiding undue infringement on First Amendment interests.
United States v. Bear, 769 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2014): Confirmed that a district court may tailor special conditions to a defendant’s offense and characteristics, even “looking through” statutory offenses (e.g., SORNA) to the underlying conduct.
United States v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686 (10th Cir. 2011): Held special conditions must satisfy § 3583(d) and that this court reviews them for abuse of discretion when timely objected to.
United States v. Martinez-Torres, 795 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 2015): Emphasized the need for an individualized assessment and a statement of “generalized reasons” when restrictions implicate constitutional rights.
Other Authorities: United States v. Koch, 978 F.3d 719 (10th Cir. 2020); United States v. Englehart, 22 F.4th 1197 (10th Cir. 2022); United States v. Francis, 891 F.3d 888 (10th Cir. 2018); United States v. Hahn, 551 F.3d 977 (10th Cir. 2008).

2. Legal Reasoning

The opinion walks through § 3583(d), which authorizes special conditions of supervised release so long as they:

Are reasonably related to the offense, the defendant’s history and characteristics, deterrence, protection of the public, and the defendant’s rehabilitation (§ 3583(d)(1));

Involve no greater deprivation of liberty than necessary (§ 3583(d)(2)); and

Are consistent with pertinent Sentencing Commission policy statements (§ 3583(d)(3)).

Having repeatedly violated supervision terms—failing to register as a sex offender, escaping from an RRC, refusing treatment, and systematically ignoring probation officers—the defendant’s history and characteristics provided a strong factual basis for imposing the targeted computer restrictions. By authorizing only approved devices, forbidding prohibited websites or contacts, and requiring narrow, keystroke-capture monitoring software, the district court tailored the conditions to meet the statutory goals without imposing an open-ended ban on internet use.

The court stressed that the district court did conduct an individualized assessment, offering “generalized reasons” (record of noncompliance; sex-offender history; risk to minors; need for accountability) adequate for appellate review, without demanding hypertechnical findings under Martinez-Torres, since no fundamental right was directly at stake.

3. Impact on Future Cases

United States v. Kornacki clarifies that:

Even in the absence of internet-based criminality, a defendant’s sex-offender status and repeated flight or noncompliance can support tailored internet-use restrictions.
Courts must follow Blair’s blueprint when imposing monitoring conditions—permitting necessary flexibility for modern life while protecting public safety.
A district court’s finding of repeated noncompliance is a sufficient basis for deterring future violations through heightened supervision tools.
The abuse-of-discretion standard remains deferential when a district court provides generalized but adequate reasons for special conditions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised Release: A post-imprisonment period during which a defendant must follow court-imposed conditions under probation-style supervision.
SORNA: The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act requires certain offenders to register their residence and keep it updated. Failure is a federal crime.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(d): Governs special conditions of supervised release, mandating relation to offense/history, minimal liberty deprivation, and consistency with Sentencing Guidelines.
Abuse of Discretion Review: Appellate courts defer to district courts unless they make a clear error of fact or law or act arbitrarily.
Individualized Assessment: The district court must consider the defendant’s unique background and the offense when crafting special conditions—but need only give generalized, not hypertechnical, reasons.

Conclusion

United States v. Kornacki represents a pivotal application of § 3583(d) in the digital age, affirming that district courts may impose carefully tailored internet-use and monitoring conditions on high-risk offenders. By hewing to Blair’s standards and documenting the defendant’s sustained noncompliance and public-safety risks, the Tenth Circuit upheld the legitimacy of both prior-authorization and monitoring-software requirements. Going forward, Kornacki will serve as a persuasive guidepost for courts seeking to balance an offender’s liberty interests with society’s need for robust supervision and protection—especially where sex offenders and vulnerable minors are concerned.