Enforcing Separation Agreements in Alaska: Capacity, Duress, and Unconscionability as Gatekeepers to Unequal Property Divisions

Case: Burton Haviland Jr. v. Kimberly Haviland

Court: Supreme Court of the State of Alaska

Date: October 8, 2025

Note: This is a memorandum opinion and judgment (MOJ). Under Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d), MOJs do not create binding precedent. They can, however, be persuasive and are often used by practitioners and trial courts for guidance on the application of settled principles to recurring fact patterns.

Introduction

This memorandum opinion arises from a divorce between Burton and Kimberly Haviland, who married in 2000 and separated finally in 2022 following marital strain tied to a family death and Burton’s struggles with alcoholism. The couple executed two written property agreements prior to their eventual divorce proceedings: a 2014 “Separation Agreement” and a 2019 “Division of Assets & Property Agreement.” The 2019 agreement attempted a comprehensive division of real estate, vehicles, debts, and included mutual pension waivers, while expressly stating it was intended as a final disposition to be incorporated into a divorce decree if needed. Kimberly also used an inheritance to pay off the mortgage on the marital residence in early 2019.

At the 2024 divorce trial, the superior court relied on the 2019 agreement and the parties’ joint property table to structure an unequal division of property, concluding the agreement was valid and enforceable. Burton appealed, arguing (1) he did not voluntarily and knowingly enter the 2019 agreement because of alcoholism and blackout episodes; and (2) the resulting property division was inequitable.

The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed. While emphasizing the non-precedential posture of the case, the Court’s decision illuminatingly reaffirms the standards governing enforcement of marital property agreements in divorce—particularly the deference given to trial-level credibility determinations and the demanding showings needed to invalidate such agreements on contract defenses like incapacity, duress, undue influence, and unconscionability.

Summary of the Opinion

Validity of the 2019 Agreement: The superior court did not clearly err in finding Burton had capacity and voluntarily signed the agreement while sober. The court credited Kimberly’s testimony over Burton’s lack of memory and generalized evidence of alcoholism.
No Duress or Undue Influence: There was no evidence that Kimberly used threats, coercion, or overwhelming influence to induce the agreement.
No Unconscionability: Burton failed to prove a “vast disparity of bargaining power” coupled with terms “unreasonably favorable” to Kimberly. Inequality alone does not equal unconscionability.
Equitable Division Upheld: Adopting the 2019 agreement and the parties’ joint property table—and allocating disputed DVDs to Burton—the court’s division was not “clearly unjust.” Hence, no abuse of discretion.
Important Clarification: While the superior court reasoned that the 2019 agreement effectively allowed Kimberly to “reclaim” her inheritance (used to pay off the mortgage) as separate property, the Supreme Court expressly did not adopt that rationale. Nevertheless, it affirmed the outcome on other grounds.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

Notkin v. Notkin (1996) and Kerslake v. Kerslake (1980): A property division agreement “should be controlling in the absence of fraud, duress, concealment of assets or other facts showing that the agreement was not made voluntarily and with full understanding.” This bedrock principle frames the enforceability of separation agreements in Alaska divorces.
Morris v. Morris (2022) and Pasley v. Pasley (2019): Establish the “clear error” standard for reviewing factual findings, including assessments of voluntariness, capacity, and unconscionability. Clear error exists only when the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction a mistake was made.
Numann v. Gallant (2024) and Doyle v. Doyle (1991): Outline the three-step property division framework (identify, value, divide) and confirm that the equitable division (step three) is reviewed for abuse of discretion and will not be disturbed unless “clearly unjust.”
In re Adoption of S.K.L.H. (2009) and Horton v. Hansen (1986): Clarify that undue influence, duress, and unconscionability determinations are factual and reviewed for clear error.
Jones v. Jones (2022) and Askinuk Corp. v. Lower Yukon School District (2009): Provide the Alaska standard for unconscionability—requiring a “vast disparity of bargaining power” and terms “unreasonably favorable” to the stronger party.
Stanhope v. Stanhope (2013) and Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute (2009): Emphasize heightened deference to trial courts on credibility determinations based on live testimony.
Andrew B. v. Abbie B. (2021): Discusses prenuptial agreements; the Court distinguished it as inapplicable here because the parties were in separation, not gearing up for marriage, and the mutual-interest dynamic typical of prenups was not present.
Miller v. Miller (2005): Recognizes that inherited property is separate but can be transmuted into marital property by intent; the Court declined to embrace the trial court’s “reclaiming inheritance” logic but affirmed the result on other grounds.
Tobar v. Remington Holdings LP (2019): Supports a generous reading of pro se briefs; used to construe Burton’s arguments as invoking recognized contract defenses.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 cmt. c: “Inadequacy of consideration does not of itself invalidate a bargain.” This reinforces that uneven deals are not, without more, unconscionable.

Legal Reasoning

1) Capacity and Voluntariness: Burton argued he would not have signed if sober and in good health, citing alcoholism and blackouts. The superior court credited Kimberly’s testimony that Burton signed in the morning, sober, and clearheaded, after being invited to suggest edits. Burton conceded the signature appeared to be his and offered no specific evidence of intoxication at the moment of execution. Given the strong deference to trial-level credibility assessments, the Supreme Court found no clear error in the finding that he had capacity and voluntarily signed.

2) Duress and Undue Influence: The Court reiterated that duress requires clear and convincing evidence that the acceptance was involuntary, that no reasonable alternative existed, and that the circumstances were the product of coercive acts by the other party. Undue influence requires proof of overborne will or lack of free, deliberate judgment. Burton’s generalized fear of losing the relationship did not equate to threats, coercion, or dominance by Kimberly. No clear error was found in rejecting these defenses.

3) Unconscionability: Alaska applies a conjunctive test: a “vast disparity of bargaining power” and substantively “unreasonably favorable” terms for the stronger party. Although the division was uneven and Kimberly ultimately retained the residence, the agreement allocated other properties to Burton; both parties waived pension interests; and the record indicated Burton had an opportunity to review or modify the document. The parties had also signed a similar allocation in 2014, undermining any claim that the 2019 terms were shockingly one-sided. Inequality alone is insufficient, and the Restatement confirms inadequacy of consideration does not invalidate a bargain. The Court did not adopt the superior court’s rationale that the agreement “reclaimed” Kimberly’s inheritance but nonetheless affirmed the unconscionability finding because the requisite elements were not proven.

4) Equitable Division: Applying the three-step property division framework, the superior court substantially implemented the 2019 agreement and joint property table. It resolved the small remaining dispute (DVDs) by awarding them to Burton. Because the agreement was valid and the resulting division not “clearly unjust,” there was no abuse of discretion.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although non-precedential, the decision provides valuable signals for litigants and trial courts in Alaska family law:

Deference to Trial Courts: The opinion underscores how determinative live credibility findings can be. Parties alleging intoxication or coercion at signing must marshal specific, contemporaneous evidence; generalized substance-abuse history is insufficient.
High Bar to Invalidate Agreements: Alaska courts will enforce separation agreements absent concrete proof of fraud, duress, concealment, incapacity, or unconscionability. Uneven terms, by themselves, do not equal unconscionability.
Framing Inheritance in Property Divisions: The Court carefully declined to adopt the trial court’s “reclaiming inheritance” rationale. This is a quiet but important signal: use of separate inheritances for marital purposes can lead to transmutation; any allocation in divorce must be justified under recognized doctrines (e.g., equitable division factors, unconscionability analysis), not by treating the inheritance as automatically re-segregated absent a valid legal mechanism.
Separation vs. Prenuptial Context: The Court distinguished prenuptial cases, reminding practitioners that the relational dynamics and legal analyses can differ when parties are separating rather than preparing to marry.
Drafting and Execution Practices: Parties who want agreements to withstand later challenges should:
- Document the signing circumstances (date, time, sobriety, opportunity to review and edit).
- Include explicit statements of intent (final disposition; incorporation into any decree).
- Provide clear asset lists, values, and disclosures to minimize later claims of unfair surprise.
- Offer and encourage independent legal counsel, particularly where division is unequal or rights (like pensions) are being waived.
- Preserve prior consistent agreements (e.g., 2014 agreements) that reflect a pattern of asset allocation.
Litigation Strategy for Challengers: To mount a successful challenge based on incapacity, duress, undue influence, or unconscionability, litigants should gather:
- Evidence pinpointing the signatory’s mental/physical state at the time of signing (e.g., witness testimony, medical records, timestamps, video, text messages).
- Proof of coercive conduct or stark power imbalance (e.g., threats, isolation, exploitation of vulnerability).
- Substantive disparities that go beyond mere inequality to “unreasonably favorable” terms in context.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Clear Error (Appellate Review): The appellate court will overturn a factual finding only if it is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. This is a highly deferential standard, especially when the trial judge evaluated live testimony.
Abuse of Discretion: Used for reviewing the ultimate equitable division of property. The question is not whether the appellate court would have divided the property differently, but whether the trial court’s division was “clearly unjust.”
Duress: Requires clear and convincing evidence that a party involuntarily accepted terms, had no reasonable alternative, and that these circumstances resulted from the other party’s coercive acts (such as threats).
Undue Influence: Occurs where one party’s will is overborne so that the other’s will is substituted—often requiring proof of dominance, manipulation, or exploitation of a relationship of trust/dependence.
Unconscionability: A contract defense requiring both procedural problems (like a vast power imbalance) and substantive unfairness (terms unreasonably favorable to one side). Mere inequality is insufficient.
Transmutation of Property: Separate property (e.g., inheritance) can become marital if the owner intends to treat it as shared—for example, by using it to pay the marital home’s mortgage. Whether it remains separate or becomes marital depends on intent and circumstances.
Equitable Division Process: Alaska courts (1) identify marital property and debts; (2) assign values; and (3) divide equitably—guided by factors like the parties’ circumstances, contributions, and needs.
Memorandum Opinion and Judgment (MOJ): A decision that resolves the case but is not precedential. It can be persuasive but cannot be cited as binding authority.

Conclusion

The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed enforcement of the Havilands’ 2019 separation agreement and the resulting unequal property division. In doing so, the Court—while issuing a non-precedential memorandum—reaffirmed key principles that drive outcomes in marital agreement challenges:

Trial courts’ credibility determinations are pivotal and receive “especially great deference.”
Challengers must present specific, contemporaneous evidence to prove incapacity, duress, undue influence, or unconscionability.
Unequal division alone does not make an agreement unconscionable; the test in Alaska is demanding and conjunctive.
Although a spouse’s contribution of inheritance to marital property may conceptually support an unequal division, courts should analyze the issue under established doctrines rather than embracing a “reclaiming inheritance” theory post-transmutation.

For practitioners and litigants, the case underscores the enduring power of carefully drafted and executed separation agreements in Alaska divorces and the steep burden faced by parties seeking to set them aside. Even as a memorandum decision, it offers a practical road map for both drafting enforceable agreements and litigating their validity.