Enforcing Broad Bankruptcy Settlement Releases and Carve‑Outs: Commentary on Shirley White‑Lett v. The Bank of New York Mellon

I. Introduction

This Eleventh Circuit decision arises at the intersection of consumer bankruptcy, mortgage servicing, and contract law. It addresses how a court should interpret and enforce a settlement agreement—particularly a broad release and a carefully worded carve‑out—in the context of a long‑running dispute between a Chapter 7 debtor and her mortgage creditor.

The debtor, Shirley White‑Lett, litigated for more than a decade against The Bank of New York Mellon (“BoNYM”) and various servicers over a $636,000 mortgage, asserting repeated violations of her Chapter 7 discharge injunction and other claims. After multiple lawsuits and adversary proceedings, the parties entered into a settlement in December 2022. Less than a year later, White‑Lett filed a new adversary proceeding seeking contempt sanctions against BoNYM, arguing that BoNYM was liable, under an agency theory, for actions taken by its servicer, Select Portfolio Servicing (“SPS”), between 2013 and 2016.

The central legal question on appeal was whether the December 2022 settlement agreement barred these new claims. The Eleventh Circuit, applying Georgia contract law and federal bankruptcy principles, held that the settlement’s release unambiguously covered the claims at issue and that the carve‑out for claims “at issue” in a separate appeal did not preserve them. The court therefore affirmed summary judgment in BoNYM’s favor.

This commentary analyzes the opinion’s reasoning, its use of precedent, and its broader implications for bankruptcy practice, settlement drafting, and pro se litigants engaged in multi‑front litigation with institutional creditors.

II. Case Background and Procedural History

A. The Underlying Loan and Bankruptcy

• In 2005, White‑Lett borrowed $636,000, secured by a security deed on her home.
• The loan and security deed were later assigned to BoNYM, which used different servicers over time: Bank of America, SPS, and Shellpoint.
• In 2010, she filed a Chapter 7 case pro se. Bank of America was then the servicer and was listed as a secured creditor. She indicated an intent to reaffirm the debt, but no reaffirmation agreement was ever filed as required by 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(3).
• She received a discharge in 2011, and the bankruptcy case was closed in 2012.

After the discharge, SPS became the servicer in November 2013, followed by Shellpoint in December 2016. According to White‑Lett, efforts by SPS and Shellpoint to collect mortgage payments violated the discharge injunction.

B. Earlier Litigation: State Court, Federal District Court, and Adversary Proceedings

Over time, her disputes with BoNYM and its servicers generated multiple proceedings:

1. 2013 Georgia State Court Action – She argued, among other things, that BoNYM was never assigned the security deed. The state court dismissed the case on res judicata grounds, holding that her challenge to the deed’s validity was barred because she had already obtained a bankruptcy discharge. The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed.
2. 2017 Federal District Court Action – She sued BoNYM, SPS, Shellpoint, and others, asserting claims under:
   • Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),
   • Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA),
   • Truth in Lending Act, and
   • State law.
   By July 2019, only FDCPA and RESPA claims against Shellpoint remained.
3. Reopening of the Bankruptcy Case (2020) – She moved to reopen, claiming the mortgage debt had been discharged and servicers, as BoNYM’s agents, had violated the discharge injunction. The court reopened the case, reinstated a trustee, and BoNYM filed a proof of claim for $886,240.81.

C. First and Second Adversary Proceedings

1. First Adversary Proceeding (Against BoNYM’s Parent, SPS, Shellpoint)

In February 2020, White‑Lett filed the first adversary proceeding, naming:

• BoNYM’s parent company (but not BoNYM itself),
• SPS, and
• Shellpoint.

She alleged that SPS and Shellpoint violated the discharge injunction from December 2013 to July 2017 and sought:

• A declaration that she had not reaffirmed the mortgage debt, and
• Sanctions (over $1,000,000) and contempt findings for violations of the discharge injunction.

BoNYM’s parent argued it was not the proper party and suggested substituting BoNYM itself. Critically, White‑Lett refused to consent to that substitution and never added BoNYM as a defendant.

The bankruptcy court held:

• Some SPS communications violated the discharge injunction.
• Shellpoint’s communications did not.
• A trial was needed on SPS’s knowledge of the discharge (knowledge is essential for contempt sanctions).

Shortly before trial, in December 2022, the December 2022 settlement agreement was executed. As to the first adversary proceeding, White‑Lett agreed to dismiss with prejudice her claims against BoNYM’s parent company.

After the settlement, the remaining claims were against SPS alone. Following trial, the bankruptcy court found SPS lacked actual or constructive knowledge of the discharge injunction and therefore was not liable for contempt. The district court and then the Eleventh Circuit (in an unpublished decision) affirmed.

2. Second Adversary Proceeding (Against BoNYM)

In December 2020, she filed a second adversary proceeding, this time naming BoNYM and other entities. She:

• Objected to BoNYM’s proof of claim and sought a declaration that BoNYM could not enforce the security deed.
• Alleged Bank of America’s collection efforts and foreclosure activity from January 2010 to May 2013 violated the discharge injunction and that BoNYM, as principal, was liable.

The bankruptcy court:

• Dismissed her objection to BoNYM’s proof of claim for lack of standing in her Chapter 7 case.
• Held that claim and issue preclusion barred her from relitigating the validity of the deed’s assignment (already rejected in the 2013 state case).
• Allowed her claim against BoNYM for alleged discharge violations between January 2010 and May 2013 to proceed.

She appealed the dismissal of her claim objection to the district court (case no. 1:22‑cv‑00082), which ultimately affirmed in April 2024.

Meanwhile, in May 2022, she sought leave to amend to add claims against BoNYM for discharge violations allegedly occurring after November 2013 (i.e., post‑SPS servicing period). The bankruptcy court denied this motion to amend.

In the December 2022 settlement, she agreed to dismiss with prejudice her discharge‑violation claims against BoNYM for conduct before November 2013, but she did not release the claims under appeal in 1:22‑cv‑00082.

D. Motion on the Automatic Stay and District Court Appeal (1:22‑cv‑03992)

In July 2022, BoNYM moved in the reopened bankruptcy case for a declaration that no automatic stay applied to her real property, arguing the stay had terminated when the original case closed in 2012 and did not revive upon reopening in 2020.

The bankruptcy court agreed and declared the automatic stay terminated as of 2012. White‑Lett appealed to the district court (case no. 1:22‑cv‑03992), contending, among other things, that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to grant relief from the automatic stay.

While that appeal was pending, she moved the district court for an emergency stay, asserting:

• If she prevailed on her adversary proceedings and obtained damages exceeding BoNYM’s claim, she would seek to set off BoNYM’s claim and extinguish its security interest.
• A stay was needed to prevent foreclosure.

The district court denied the stay after a hearing, reasoning:

• A state court injunction already protected the property, and
• She was unlikely to succeed on the merits.

In August 2024, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order. The issues in 1:22‑cv‑03992 thus centered on the status of the automatic stay and the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction, not on BoNYM’s liability for servicer conduct.

E. The December 2022 Settlement Agreement

The pivotal document is the December 2022 settlement agreement between BoNYM and White‑Lett. Key terms include:

• BoNYM agreed to pay $18,000.
• White‑Lett agreed to:
  • Release “all past and present claims” against BoNYM’s parent.
  • Dismiss with prejudice all claims against the parent in the first adversary proceeding.
  • Release “all past and present claims” against BoNYM that “relate[d] to violations of bankruptcy law occurring before January 1, 2017.”
• “All past and present claims” were defined broadly to include:

  all claims, counterclaims, actions, defenses, affirmative defenses, rights, causes of action, suits, [and] set‑offs … whether known or unknown or capable of being known … that arose from any alleged violations of bankruptcy law prior to January 1, 2017.

• The agreement carved out certain claims from the release. White‑Lett did not release BoNYM from:
  • Any claim she asserted against BoNYM in the 2017 district court FDCPA/RESPA action.
  • Claims in another pending state court action.
  • Any “rights, claims, or defenses at issue in”:
    • The appeal in 1:22‑cv‑00082 (her appeal of the proof‑of‑claim ruling in the second adversary proceeding), and
    • The appeal in 1:22‑cv‑03992 (her appeal of the order declaring no automatic stay).
• The $18,000 payment was declared “in full satisfaction” of the released claims.
• White‑Lett “expressly waived any right to assert hereafter that, because of ignorance, oversight, or error, her releases are not valid with respect to any particular claim.”
• The parties agreed the settlement would be interpreted and enforced under Georgia law.

F. The Third Adversary Proceeding

Less than a year later, White‑Lett filed the third adversary proceeding, naming BoNYM as the sole defendant. She alleged:

• SPS, while servicing the loan from November 2013 to December 2016, had violated the discharge injunction (as the bankruptcy court had earlier found in the first adversary proceeding).
• BoNYM was liable for those violations under an agency theory (SPS acting at BoNYM’s direction).
• The court should hold BoNYM in contempt and award damages.

BoNYM moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 2022 settlement’s release barred these claims. The bankruptcy court agreed, characterizing the settlement terms as “clear and unambiguous” and holding that claims based on 2013‑2016 violations were squarely within the release of all claims related to bankruptcy law violations prior to January 1, 2017.

The court also rejected White‑Lett’s contention that these claims fell within the settlement’s carve‑out for claims “at issue in” her appeal in 1:22‑cv‑03992, concluding that the automatic‑stay appeal did not put at issue BoNYM’s liability for SPS’s discharge‑injunction violations.

The district court, in a “careful and thorough” order, affirmed. White‑Lett then appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.

III. Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment ruling de novo and affirmed. The main holdings are:

1. Settlement Agreements as Contracts Under Georgia Law. A settlement containing a release is a contract and is governed by Georgia contract law. An unambiguous contract must be enforced as written.
2. The Release Unambiguously Covered the Third Adversary Claims. The settlement released BoNYM from “all past and present claims” relating to violations of bankruptcy law occurring before January 1, 2017. Claims that BoNYM was liable for SPS’s discharge‑injunction violations from 2013 to 2016 clearly fall within this scope.
3. The Carve‑Out Did Not Preserve Those Claims. The carve‑out allowed White‑Lett to continue asserting rights, claims, or defenses “at issue” in her appeal in 1:22‑cv‑03992. That appeal concerned whether the automatic stay remained in effect and the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction—not BoNYM’s liability for SPS’s conduct. A stay motion in that appeal referencing possible setoff based on the adversary proceedings did not itself put BoNYM’s agency liability for SPS’s 2013‑2016 conduct “at issue” there.
4. New Lack‑of‑Consideration Argument Forfeited. On appeal, for the first time, she argued that the release was unenforceable because she received no consideration. The court held this issue was forfeited because it was not raised before the bankruptcy court or district court, and no “extraordinary circumstances” justified considering it for the first time on appeal.
5. Alternative Preclusion Grounds Unnecessary. Because the settlement agreement alone sufficed to bar the claims, the court did not reach the bankruptcy court’s alternative holding based on preclusion principles (res judicata/issue preclusion).

IV. Precedents Cited and Their Role

A. Settlement Agreements as Contracts

• In re Managed Care, 756 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 2014) – Cited for the proposition that a settlement may include a release that bars a party from raising certain claims. This frames the entire analysis: enforcing the settlement’s release is not unusual but part of ordinary settlement practice.
• Norfolk S. Corp. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 371 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2004) – The court relies on this to state that a settlement agreement “is essentially a contract and is subject to the traditional rules of contract interpretation.” This positions the court squarely within standard contract doctrine rather than any special bankruptcy‑specific rule about settlements.
• Dodds v. Dabbs, Hickman, Hill & Cannon, LLP, 750 S.E.2d 410 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) – A Georgia case confirming that releases and settlement agreements are contracts governed by general state contract law.

B. Georgia Law on Unambiguous Contracts

• Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Winder Lab’ys, LLC, 73 F.4th 934 (11th Cir. 2023) – Quoted for the rule that “under Georgia law, an unambiguous contract must be enforced as written.” This underpins the court’s refusal to “rewrite” the settlement to carve out claims not expressly excluded.
• Atlanta Multispecialty Surgical Assocs., LLC v. DeKalb Med. Ctr., Inc., 615 S.E.2d 166 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) – Reinforces that, in Georgia, unambiguous terms are enforced literally even if one party claims a different subjective understanding.

Together, these cases demonstrate the court’s approach: determine whether the release and carve‑out language are ambiguous; if not, enforce according to their plain terms, regardless of what the debtor now says she intended or believed.

C. Appellate Forfeiture of Issues

• Gould v. Interface, Inc., 153 F.4th 1346 (11th Cir. 2025) – Used to distinguish between “arguments” (permissible to raise anew in support of a preserved position) and “issues” (generally forfeited if raised for the first time on appeal). The court treats the alleged lack of consideration for the release as a new “issue” rather than just a new argument, thus deeming it forfeited.

Gould also provides the framework for the “extraordinary circumstances” exception to forfeiture—an exception the court finds inapplicable here.

D. Other Authorities

• Sunz Ins. Co. v. United States, 125 F.4th 1035 (11th Cir. 2025) – Cited for the general summary judgment standard and the de novo standard of review for a bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment.

These precedents collectively anchor the opinion within well‑settled Eleventh Circuit and Georgia rules: courts enforce unambiguous settlement agreements as written, rely on state contract law for interpretation, and apply strict rules on preserving issues for appeal.

V. Legal Reasoning in Depth

A. Contractual Interpretation of the Settlement Agreement

The court begins from a straightforward premise: the settlement is a contract governed by Georgia law, and the court’s task is to ascertain and give effect to the parties’ intent as expressed in the text. The essential steps are:

1. Identify the relevant contractual provisions: the release and the carve‑out.
2. Determine whether any ambiguity exists in their wording.
3. If unambiguous, apply the plain meaning, even if harsh to one party.

1. Scope of the Release

By its express terms, White‑Lett agreed to release BoNYM from:

“all past and present claims” that “relate[d] to violations of bankruptcy law occurring before January 1, 2017.”

The defined term swept broadly, encompassing all “claims, counterclaims, actions, defenses, affirmative defenses, rights, causes of action, suits, [and] set‑offs, whether known or unknown” arising from any alleged bankruptcy‑law violation before January 1, 2017.

The court holds that:

• Claims seeking contempt sanctions for discharge‑injunction violations by SPS between November 2013 and December 2016 are plainly “claims … that arose from alleged violations of bankruptcy law prior to January 1, 2017.”
• The fact that these claims had not yet been asserted against BoNYM when the settlement was signed does not matter; the release expressly covers “unknown” claims capable of being known.

2. The Carve‑Out for Appeals

The more nuanced question is whether these claims were nonetheless preserved by the carve‑out, which exempted:

“[a]ny rights, claims, or defenses at issue in” the appeal in case number 1:22‑cv‑03992 (and in 1:22‑cv‑00082).

The parties did not dispute that “at issue in” meant “disputed by the parties” in that appeal, and the Eleventh Circuit accepts that meaning for purposes of this case.

Thus, the key inquiry becomes: Were claims that BoNYM was liable for SPS’s 2013‑2016 discharge‑injunction violations actually disputed in the automatic‑stay appeal (1:22‑cv‑03992)? The court answers no, relying on:

• The nature of the order under review (declaring the automatic stay terminated and assessing the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction).
• The arguments made on appeal (focused on stay status and jurisdiction).
• The content of the emergency stay motion (discussing possible future setoff, but not litigating BoNYM’s agency liability for SPS’s conduct).

At most, the stay motion treated potential damages in the first and second adversary proceedings as background relevance to whether a stay should issue. But the merits dispute in 1:22‑cv‑03992 was not about SPS’s conduct or BoNYM’s liability under an agency theory.

Importantly, the court notes that:

• In the first adversary proceeding, White‑Lett asserted discharge‑violation claims against BoNYM’s parent, not BoNYM itself, and refused to substitute BoNYM as defendant.
• In the second adversary proceeding, she did not assert claims against BoNYM for SPS’s post‑2013 conduct; indeed, when she sought to amend to add such claims, the bankruptcy court denied the amendment.

This factual history undercuts her assertion that these specific claims were somehow folded into the automatic‑stay appeal merely because she referenced them in a stay motion as potential future grounds for setoff.

B. Application to the Third Adversary Proceeding

With the interpretive framework established, the application is simple:

• The third adversary proceeding sought sanctions against BoNYM for SPS’s alleged discharge‑injunction violations between 2013 and 2016.
• These are claims for violations of bankruptcy law occurring before January 1, 2017.
• They were not “at issue” in 1:22‑cv‑03992 and are therefore not within the carve‑out.
• They are thus squarely within the claims released in the settlement.

As there was no genuine dispute of material fact regarding the settlement terms or the timing and nature of the alleged violations, summary judgment for BoNYM was appropriate.

C. Forfeiture of the Lack‑of‑Consideration Challenge

Only on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit did White‑Lett argue that the release lacked consideration and was therefore unenforceable. The court treats this as a new “issue,” not just a new legal argument in support of a preserved position.

Applying Gould v. Interface, Inc., the court holds:

• Issues not raised before the bankruptcy court or district court are generally forfeited on appeal.
• While courts may in “extraordinary circumstances” consider forfeited issues, this case does not present such circumstances.

The court therefore refuses to consider the lack‑of‑consideration argument at all. It does not analyze whether $18,000 was adequate consideration or whether Georgia law would view the exchange as sufficient. The combination of the explicit contractual recitals that the consideration was “fair, adequate, and substantial” and the express waiver of challenges based on “ignorance, oversight, or error” makes it especially unlikely that such an argument would have succeeded even if preserved.

D. Non‑Reliance on Preclusion

The bankruptcy court had alternatively held that the claims were barred by “rules of preclusion” (claim and issue preclusion). The Eleventh Circuit, however, declines to address that ground because the settlement agreement is dispositive. This follows a familiar appellate practice of avoiding unnecessary resolution of additional legal questions when one issue resolves the case.

VI. Impact and Implications

A. For Bankruptcy Settlements and Releases

This decision reinforces several important points for bankruptcy practitioners:

1. Broad Release Language Has Real Consequences.
   Language releasing “all past and present claims … whether known or unknown” relating to “violations of bankruptcy law” will be enforced literally. Debtors and creditors alike must assume such language encompasses:
   • Claims not yet asserted,
   • Alternative theories of liability (e.g., agency liability), and
   • Contempt sanctions for discharge‑injunction or automatic‑stay violations.
2. Carve‑Outs for Pending Cases Must Be Precise.
   Parties often try to settle around ongoing appeals or suits by carving them out of a general release. This case shows:
   • Merely referencing a case number is not enough if the carve‑out is linked to “rights, claims, or defenses at issue in” that case.
   • If a party intends to preserve a specific factual claim (e.g., principal’s liability for agent’s conduct during a specified period), it is safer to describe that claim explicitly rather than relying on whether it might be deemed “at issue” in some pending appeal.
3. Repackaging Released Claims in New Proceedings Will Fail.
   Debtors cannot evade a release by:
   • Filing a new adversary proceeding post‑settlement,
   • Reframing the same basic allegations under a slightly different theory or time frame, or
   • Pointing to ancillary references in prior motions (like a motion to stay) as having put those claims “at issue” in another case.

B. For Pro Se Debtors and Consumer Litigants

The opinion is a cautionary tale for pro se debtors:

• Court‑approved or court‑referenced settlements in bankruptcy are binding contracts. The fact that a debtor is pro se does not relax the legal effect of clear language.
• Express waivers—such as the waiver of any right to later claim invalidity due to “ignorance, oversight, or error”—will be enforced.
• The structure of litigation strategies (for example, refusing to substitute the actual creditor as a defendant when given the chance) can later undercut attempts to attribute liability to that creditor on the same facts.

In practical terms, pro se parties entering settlements with institutional creditors should:

• Be wary of releases covering “all claims … whether known or unknown,” especially when they implicate statutory rights like the discharge injunction.
• Ensure that any claims they truly want to preserve are unambiguously set out as exceptions to the release.
• Recognize that later arguments about misunderstanding the legal effect of the language are unlikely to succeed.

C. For Mortgage Creditors and Servicers

For lenders and servicers, this decision:

• Validates the strategy of seeking comprehensive releases in global settlement agreements with debtors.
• Confirms that releases can encompass discharge‑injunction and other bankruptcy‑law claims, so long as the language is clear.
• Encourages careful drafting of carve‑outs limited to the specific claims a creditor is willing to leave unresolved (e.g., limited statutory claims in a non‑bankruptcy action or specific issues on appeal).

It also indirectly underscores the potential benefit, for creditors, of insisting that the correct entity (the actual creditor, not merely its parent) be named in adversary proceedings where discharge‑injunction or FDCPA‑type conduct is litigated, to avoid later agency‑liability issues.

D. Interplay with Automatic Stay and Discharge Injunction Litigation

Although the merits of the automatic‑stay issues are not decided here, the case illustrates:

• The difference between automatic stay litigation (usually involving § 362 and relief from stay/termination issues) and discharge injunction litigation (involving § 524 and post‑discharge collection efforts).
• How a party’s efforts to link potential setoff of claims (from adversary proceedings) to stay relief do not necessarily put the underlying liability issues “at issue” in the stay appeal.

This clear boundary helps prevent collateral expansion of what is “at issue” in a relatively narrow appeal about the status of the automatic stay into a wholesale re‑litigation of discharge‑injunction violations.

E. Appellate Practice: Preserving Issues

The court’s treatment of the lack‑of‑consideration argument reinforces standard appellate practice:

• Parties must raise challenges to the validity of a settlement (e.g., absence of consideration, fraud, duress) in the trial court; otherwise those issues are forfeited.
• Even pro se parties are expected to preserve issues; the court does not create an exception here.
• “Extraordinary circumstances” permitting review of forfeited issues remain narrow and were not found here, especially given the settlement’s express acknowledgment of adequate consideration.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

The opinion involves several technical bankruptcy and procedural concepts. The following brief explanations may assist non‑specialists.

A. Discharge and Discharge Injunction

• A Chapter 7 discharge is a court order wiping out a debtor’s personal liability for most pre‑petition debts.
• 11 U.S.C. § 524 creates a discharge injunction, which prohibits creditors from attempting to collect discharged debts from the debtor personally.
• If a creditor or its agent knowingly attempts to collect a discharged debt, the bankruptcy court can hold them in contempt and impose sanctions.

B. Automatic Stay

• The automatic stay (11 U.S.C. § 362) arises automatically when a bankruptcy petition is filed.
• It temporarily halts most collection actions, including foreclosure, lawsuits, and certain contacts with the debtor.
• Generally, the stay terminates when the case is closed, the debtor receives a discharge, or certain other events occur. Reopening a case does not ordinarily recreate the automatic stay.

C. Adversary Proceedings

• An adversary proceeding is essentially a lawsuit within the bankruptcy case, governed by Part VII of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
• It is used for disputes such as dischargeability, validity of liens, and contempt for stay/discharge violations.

D. Proof of Claim and Objection

• A proof of claim is the document a creditor files in a bankruptcy case stating the amount and nature of its claim.
• Debtors or trustees can object to proofs of claim, challenging their validity, amount, or secured status.
• In Chapter 7, a debtor may lack standing to object where there is no surplus estate benefitting the debtor directly; that was one basis for dismissal in the second adversary proceeding.

E. Res Judicata / Claim and Issue Preclusion

• Claim preclusion (res judicata) prevents parties from relitigating claims that were or could have been raised in a prior action that ended in a final judgment on the merits.
• Issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) prevents relitigation of specific factual or legal issues that were actually litigated and decided in a prior case.
• Here, earlier state‑court rulings precluded renewed challenges to the validity of the assignment of the security deed to BoNYM.

F. Release and Carve‑Out

• A release is a contractual provision where one party gives up rights or claims against another, often in exchange for payment or other consideration.
• A carve‑out is an exception to that release, preserving certain specified claims (by case, issue, or theory).
• Ambiguous carve‑outs can produce litigation; unambiguous ones, as here, are enforced according to their plain language.

G. Summary Judgment and De Novo Review

• Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
• On appeal from a district court’s review of a bankruptcy court’s summary judgment order, the court of appeals applies de novo review—meaning it performs the same summary judgment analysis the bankruptcy court should have performed, without deferring to that court’s conclusions of law.

VIII. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Shirley White‑Lett v. The Bank of New York Mellon underscores the binding power of unambiguous settlement agreements in bankruptcy litigation. By construing the December 2022 settlement according to Georgia contract law, the court concluded that:

• The broad release of all claims relating to violations of bankruptcy law before January 1, 2017 encompassed the debtor’s later attempt to hold BoNYM liable for SPS’s discharge‑injunction violations from 2013 to 2016.
• The carve‑out for claims “at issue” in an appeal concerning the automatic stay did not preserve claims that were never actually contested in that appeal.
• Attempts to challenge the settlement’s validity based on lack of consideration—raised for the first time on appeal—were forfeited and would not be considered.

In the broader legal landscape, the opinion affirms that:

• Bankruptcy settlements are ordinary contracts subject to strict enforcement where their terms are clear.
• Parties must be meticulous in drafting and reviewing releases and carve‑outs, particularly when multiple proceedings and complex claims are involved.
• Pro se status does not insulate a litigant from the consequences of entering into a broadly worded release, nor from the doctrines of issue preservation on appeal.

For practitioners, the decision serves both as a drafting guide and as a litigation warning: when resolving multifaceted bankruptcy disputes, the language of the settlement agreement—as much as the underlying merits—will determine what claims live on and what claims are gone for good.