Enforcing Brady Obligations and Due-Process Limits on Single-Photo Show-Ups: Salter v. City of Detroit

Introduction

In Aaron Salter v. City of Detroit, Mich. (6th Cir. Mar. 21, 2025), the Sixth Circuit confronted competing civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising from a wrongful murder conviction. The plaintiff, Aaron Salter, served 15 years in prison based solely on an eyewitness identification conducted by Detroit Police Detective Donald Olsen. Salter alleged two constitutional violations: (1) a Brady‐type claim for withholding favorable evidence pointing to an alternate suspect, and (2) a due‐process claim for an unduly suggestive “show-up” identification using only Salter’s single mug shot. The district court denied Olsen qualified immunity, and Olsen appealed. The panel—Judge Bloomekatz writing for the majority—dismissed portions of the appeal for lack of interlocutory jurisdiction, but affirmed the denial of summary judgment on both the Brady and suggestive‐identification claims.

Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit’s opinion addressed three main issues:

Heck Doctrine: The court concluded it lacked interlocutory jurisdiction to decide Olsen’s challenge under Heck v. Humphrey and dismissed that portion of the appeal.
Brady Claim: Viewing all facts in Salter’s favor, the court held that a reasonable jury could find (a) Olsen withheld material, exculpatory evidence about another suspect (Earland Collins); (b) that evidence was favorable and material; and (c) Olsen is not entitled to qualified immunity on the Brady claim because the duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence was clearly established in this Circuit.
Suggestive Identification Claim: The court rejected Olsen’s collateral-estoppel defense and found that (a) the single-photo “show-up” was unduly suggestive, (b) the totality‐of‐circumstances factors demonstrated the resulting identification was unreliable, and (c) a reasonable officer in 2003 would have known the procedure violated due process. Qualified immunity did not apply.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963): Government’s duty to disclose materially favorable evidence.
Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351 (6th Cir. 2009): Police have a “Brady-derived” obligation to turn over clearly exculpatory evidence to prosecutors.
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994): § 1983 claims are barred when success would imply invalidity of a conviction unless the conviction has been favorably terminated.
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967): Courts must assess the “totality of the circumstances” when a single‐person show‐up is the only possible identification procedure.
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977): Five-factor reliability test (opportunity, attention, description, certainty, time lapse) for suggestive identifications.
Webb v. Havener, 549 F.2d 1081 (6th Cir. 1977): Single‐person show-ups absent exigency are unduly suggestive; in-court identification must have independent reliability.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009): Qualified immunity framework permits denial of summary judgment when material facts are in dispute.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court applied the two‐step qualified immunity inquiry: (1) Did Olsen violate clearly established constitutional rights? (2) Would a reasonable officer have known his conduct was unlawful?

Brady Claim:

Olsen’s pretrial file contained handwritten notes and a close-up photo of Collins—evidence Salter never received. A jury could find Olsen suppressed it.
The evidence pointed directly to Collins, matching Luster’s composite descriptions; its nondisclosure was material and prejudicial.
Sixth Circuit law clearly established by 2009 (Moldowan and earlier cases) that police must turn over material exculpatory evidence.

Suggestive Identification Claim:

Olsen showed Luster only Salter’s mug shot, contradicted departmental policy, and told Luster police “had already picked up one of the shooters.”
Applying Manson’s five‐factor test, the court found (a) poor viewing conditions, (b) compromised attention, (c) significant mismatch between Salter’s 6'4", 250-lb. stature and Luster’s 5'7" description, (d) Luster’s uncertainty, and (e) no reliable basis for in-court re-identification beyond the tainted show-up.
Webb and Stovall made it clearly established by 2003 that single-photo show-ups absent exigent circumstances violate due process.

3. Impact on Future Cases

Reaffirms that police officers (not only prosecutors) bear a Brady duty to disclose materially exculpatory evidence.
Clarifies that single-photo show-ups can expose officers to § 1983 liability if they produce unreliable identifications.
Limits the scope of collateral‐estoppel defenses in § 1983 suits when convictions have been vacated.
Guides investigators to follow departmental policies on photo arrays and to avoid suggestive tactics that risk civil liability.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Brady Material: Evidence favorable to the defense that, if suppressed by the government, violates due process.
Qualified Immunity: Protects government officials from lawsuits unless they violated a clearly established right that a reasonable official would know.
Heck Doctrine: Bars § 1983 suits that would imply the invalidity of a conviction, unless that conviction has already been overturned or invalidated.
Single-Photo Show-Up: Showing a witness just one suspect’s photo, which courts often find “unduly suggestive” absent exigent circumstances.
Reliability Factors (Manson): Includes witness’s view, attention, accuracy of description, certainty, and time between crime and identification.

Conclusion

Salter v. City of Detroit cements two critical principles in the Sixth Circuit: First, detectives are bound by Brady’s due‐process mandate to disclose all material, exculpatory evidence to prosecutors—failure to do so can defeat qualified immunity. Second, identification procedures must be free from undue suggestiveness; using a single photo when an array is feasible and conveying that police have “solved” the crime can render a resulting identification constitutionally unreliable and trigger officer liability under § 1983. Investigators, prosecutors, and courts must heed these lessons to safeguard fair trials and avoid civil‐rights exposure.