Enforcing Appellate Waivers in Anders Appeals: Commentary on United States v. Fitzgerald Daliot‑Rios

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Third Circuit’s nonprecedential opinion in United States v. Fitzgerald Daliot‑Rios, No. 24‑3242 (3d Cir. Nov. 20, 2025), authored by Judge Shwartz. The case arises from a large-scale, violent drug-trafficking operation in Reading, Pennsylvania and presents the interaction of three central doctrines:

The effect of a guilty plea on the scope of appellate issues;
The enforceability of appellate waivers in plea agreements; and
The obligations of counsel and the appellate court in an Anders v. California proceeding.

Although designated “NOT PRECEDENTIAL” under the Third Circuit’s Internal Operating Procedure 5.7, the opinion is a clear, methodical application of the Circuit’s existing framework for:

Evaluating the adequacy of an Anders brief;
Determining whether a broadly worded appellate waiver forecloses the appeal; and
Assessing whether enforcing that waiver would create a “miscarriage of justice.”

The parties are:

United States of America – the Government, prosecuting a multi-count drug, firearms, and kidnapping case;
Fitzgerald Daliot‑Rios – a member of the drug-trafficking organization, who pled guilty to nearly all charges and received a 585‑month sentence.

On appeal, defense counsel concluded there were no nonfrivolous issues and moved to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The core question for the Third Circuit was whether, after a guilty plea and a comprehensive appellate waiver, any arguable issue remained that would justify continuing the appeal or denying counsel’s motion to withdraw.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit:

Reviewed defense counsel’s Anders brief and found that counsel had satisfied the requirements of Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a) and Anders itself.
Conducted its own independent review of the record, as required by Anders and follow-on cases such as United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2001), and United States v. Brookins, 132 F.4th 659 (3d Cir. 2025).
Concluded that the written appellate waiver in the plea agreement was valid, knowing, and voluntary; that none of the enumerated exceptions applied; and that enforcing the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice under United States v. Langley, 52 F.4th 564 (3d Cir. 2022) and United States v. Grimes, 739 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2014).
Found no jurisdictional defects, no infirmity in the plea colloquy under Rule 11, and no basis for challenging the within-Guidelines sentence as unreasonable.
Granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed the judgment of the District Court.

In short, the Court held that this was a textbook case where an appellate waiver barred nearly all potential claims, and no surviving issue rose above the level of frivolousness. Consequently, the appeal could not proceed.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Charges and Plea

Daliot‑Rios was a member of a drug-trafficking organization that distributed methamphetamine, heroin, cocaine, and crack cocaine in Reading, Pennsylvania. A federal grand jury charged him with an extensive list of offenses, including:

Drug conspiracies and distribution under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841 for heroin, cocaine, and crack cocaine (Count 1, among others);
Kidnapping and conspiracy to kidnap under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(c) and § 1201(a) (Counts 2, 3, and 13);
Firearms offenses tied to drug-trafficking crimes – including using, carrying, brandishing, and discharging a firearm, and a firearm-related murder count under 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 924(j) (Counts 4, 5, 10, 18);
Maintaining a drug-involved premises under 21 U.S.C. § 856 (Count 19);
Substantive drug trafficking (distribution and possession with intent) including heroin and fentanyl (Counts 15, 17).

He pled guilty to all counts except Count 3 (kidnapping), which the Government dismissed. The plea agreement included a broad appellate waiver, barring any direct appeal or collateral attack on his conviction or sentence except in four specific situations:

The Government itself appealed;
The sentence exceeded the statutory maximum;
The District Court departed upward or varied upward from the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range; or
He raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The District Court conducted a Rule 11 plea colloquy and specifically reviewed the waiver with Daliot‑Rios, finding that he understood it and was entering the plea knowingly and voluntarily.

B. Sentencing

At sentencing, the District Court:

Calculated a total offense level of 41;
Placed Daliot‑Rios in Criminal History Category I;
Resulted in an advisory Guidelines range of 504–585 months’ imprisonment.

No party requested, and the Court did not grant, any variance or departure from the Guidelines. The Court imposed:

A 585‑month sentence of imprisonment, at the top of the advisory range; and
Five years of supervised release thereafter.

In explaining the sentence, the Court:

Emphasized the “extraordinarily serious” nature of the offenses;
Discussed Daliot‑Rios’s role in the organization and the violent conduct involved;
Considered the statutory sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including deterrence, protection of the public, and prospects for rehabilitation;
Confirmed that both parties agreed there had been sufficient discussion of the § 3553(a) factors on the record.

The Court also confirmed that Daliot‑Rios understood his “very narrow” remaining appellate rights.

C. The Appeal and Anders Motion

Daliot‑Rios filed a notice of appeal. His appellate counsel, however, after reviewing the record, concluded that the appeal presented “no issue of even arguable merit” and moved to withdraw under Anders. The Third Circuit, as required, examined both the adequacy of counsel’s submission and the merits of any potential issues independently.

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. The Anders Framework

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) – Establishes the procedure for appointed counsel who concludes that an indigent client’s appeal is frivolous. Counsel must:
- Conduct a conscientious examination of the case;
- File a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal; and
- Request permission to withdraw, while supplying a copy of the brief to the client and allowing the client to respond.
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988) – Clarifies that appellate courts must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the appeal is indeed wholly frivolous; also confirms that the appellate court maintains plenary authority in this review.
Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000) – Reaffirms the substance of Anders while allowing states some procedural flexibility; cited here for the proposition that counsel must thoroughly examine the record and identify issues that “arguably” support the appeal.
United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2001) – Sets out the Third Circuit’s two-step inquiry in an Anders case:
1. Has counsel adequately fulfilled the obligations imposed by Anders and the local rules?
2. Does the court’s own review reveal any nonfrivolous issues?
United States v. Brookins, 132 F.4th 659 (3d Cir. 2025) – Cited for the proposition that an Anders brief must explain why identified issues are frivolous and recognizing that if an issue is “arguable” on the merits, the appeal is not frivolous. The opinion relies on Brookins to underscore the need for reasoned explanation, not bare assertion.
McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429 (1988) – Supplies the definition of a “frivolous” issue as one that “lacks any basis in law or fact.” This standard is central in determining whether the court may allow counsel to withdraw.

B. Effect of a Guilty Plea on Appellate Issues

Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam) and United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989) – These cases stand for the principle that a valid guilty plea generally waives all non-jurisdictional defects occuring prior to the plea. After a guilty plea, appellate review is typically limited to:
- Whether the court had jurisdiction;
- Whether the plea was knowing and voluntary (and compliant with Rule 11); and
- Whether the sentence is lawful and reasonable (within the statutory and constitutional framework).

C. Appellate Waivers and Miscarriage-of-Justice Exception

Washington v. Sobina, 475 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) – Recognizes that appellate waivers embedded in plea agreements further restrict the issues available on appeal beyond those already limited by the guilty plea itself.
United States v. Langley, 52 F.4th 564 (3d Cir. 2022) – Articulates the now-standard three-part test for enforcing appellate waivers:
1. The issues raised on appeal must fall within the scope of the waiver;
2. The defendant must have knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the waiver; and
3. Enforcing the waiver must not work a “miscarriage of justice.”
United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921 (3d Cir. 2008) – Explains that the scope of the waiver is determined by closely examining and strictly construing the language of the plea agreement.
United States v. Grimes, 739 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2014) – Provides factors for the “miscarriage of justice” inquiry, including:
- Clarity of any alleged error;
- Gravity and character of that error;
- Whether enforcing the waiver would result in “manifest injustice.”
Grimes emphasizes that the miscarriage-of-justice exception is narrow and reserved for unusual cases.
United States v. James, 928 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2019) – Clarifies that an appellate waiver does not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction, but when the waiver is valid, the court will simply decline to exercise that jurisdiction and typically affirm the judgment.

D. Ineffective Assistance Claims and Direct Appeal

United States v. Jake, 281 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2002) – Recognizes that ineffective assistance of counsel claims are generally better suited to collateral review (e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2255) rather than direct appeal, because they often require factual development outside the trial record.

E. Statutory Framework and Rules

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) – Sets forth the sentencing factors the District Court must consider, including the nature and circumstances of the offense, history and characteristics of the defendant, deterrence, protection of the public, and the need for rehabilitation.
18 U.S.C. § 3742 – Governs appellate review of federal sentences, generally limiting appeals to claims that a sentence was imposed in violation of law, as a result of an incorrect application of the Guidelines, is above a specified range, or is otherwise unreasonable.
21 U.S.C. § 841(b), 21 U.S.C. § 856, 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c), 924(j), 1201 – Provide the specific statutory maximum penalties for the individual counts, which the panel carefully compares against the imposed sentence to confirm it does not exceed any maximum and thus does not fit within an exception to the waiver.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 – Governs the acceptance of guilty pleas, requiring the court to ensure the plea is knowing, voluntary, and supported by a factual basis, and that the defendant understands the rights waived, including most appellate rights.

V. Legal Reasoning in Detail

A. Step One: Adequacy of Counsel’s Anders Submission

The Court first asks whether defense counsel’s Anders brief meets the procedural and substantive requirements.

Counsel’s brief did the following:

Recognized that both the guilty plea and the appellate waiver drastically limited potential issues;
Identified the categories of issues that remain after a guilty plea: jurisdiction, voluntariness of the plea, and sentencing reasonableness;
Addressed how the additional appellate waiver further restricted those categories (e.g., foreclosing most sentencing challenges);
Explained why each potential issue would be frivolous under existing law and given the record.

Citing Smith v. Robbins and Brookins, the panel emphasizes two requirements:

Counsel must “thoroughly examine” the record and identify issues that arguably support an appeal; and
Counsel must explain why those issues lack merit, rather than simply declaring the appeal frivolous.

The Court concludes that counsel “has fulfilled these obligations,” noting that even though the waiver “forecloses almost all appeals,” counsel still examined and explained:

The existence of jurisdiction;
The voluntariness and knowing nature of the plea; and
The reasonableness and legality of the sentence.

Because the Anders brief is adequate, the Court proceeds to its own independent review.

B. Step Two: Independent Review and the Appellate Waiver

The panel then applies the Langley three-part test to the appellate waiver.

1. Scope of the Waiver

Under Corso, the court interprets the plea agreement’s waiver language strictly, asking: Do the issues that might be raised on appeal fall within the written waiver?

The waiver in Daliot‑Rios’s plea agreement barred any appeal or collateral attack of his conviction or sentence, subject to four narrow exceptions:

If the Government appealed;
If the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum;
If the District Court upwardly departed or varied from the advisory range; or
If the defendant raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

None applied:

The Government did not appeal;
The aggregate sentence of 585 months (including mandatory components) did not exceed any statutory maximum for any individual count – the panel walks through each provision (e.g., life maximums for some counts, 20- or 40-year maximums for others);
The District Court did not vary or depart; it imposed a within-Guidelines sentence;
No ineffective assistance claim was raised on direct appeal, and in any event such claims are generally deferred to collateral review.

Thus, any conceivable issues that might be raised are squarely within the scope of the waiver.

2. Knowing and Voluntary Nature of the Waiver

The panel next examines whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary—which is crucial, because an involuntary or uninformed waiver is unenforceable.

The record shows:

During the plea hearing, the District Court extensively reviewed the waiver with Daliot‑Rios;
He affirmed that he understood he was limiting his right to appeal “in a significant way” and understood the “very narrow circumstances” in which an appeal could proceed;
He stated that he had no questions or reservations about the limited nature of his appellate and habeas rights;
He signed both the written plea agreement and a separate “Acknowledgement of Rights” form, confirming that counsel had explained these rights and the waiver.

On these facts, the panel decisively concludes that the waiver (and the plea itself) was knowing and voluntary.

3. Miscarriage-of-Justice Analysis

Even where a waiver is valid and applicable, the court will not enforce it if doing so would “work a miscarriage of justice.” This is a narrow safety valve.

Citing Grimes, the panel notes that this inquiry turns on factors including:

The clarity and gravity of any alleged error;
The character of the error (e.g., constitutional vs. technical);
The overall fairness of the proceeding and sentence.

Here, the Court identifies no error at all, let alone a grave one:

The District Court indisputably had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231;
The plea colloquy complied with constitutional standards and Rule 11, ensuring a knowing and voluntary plea;
The sentence was within the correctly calculated Guidelines range and well within statutory bounds;
The District Court explicitly and adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors, including seriousness of the crime, deterrence, and protection of the public;
Given the nature and severity of the crimes (drug trafficking, firearms, kidnapping, and firearm-related murder), a 585‑month sentence cannot be described as one that “no reasonable sentencing judge” would impose.

With no arguable error or unfairness identified, the panel holds that enforcing the waiver does not create a miscarriage of justice.

C. Substantive Issues Foreclosed or Rendered Frivolous

The Court’s reasoning clarifies the narrow set of issues that could have remained open absent the waiver, and why each is frivolous in this case.

1. Jurisdiction

Federal subject-matter jurisdiction over felony criminal cases is conferred by 18 U.S.C. § 3231. As the panel notes, there is no colorable argument that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over federal drug, firearms, and kidnapping offenses charged by indictment. Any jurisdictional challenge is frivolous.

2. Validity of the Guilty Plea

A defendant who has pled guilty can still challenge whether the plea was:

Knowing and voluntary; and
Supported by a factual basis.

However, the record shows that the District Court:

Carefully explained the charges;
Informed Daliot‑Rios of the rights he was waiving (trial rights, confrontation rights, right against self-incrimination, etc.);
Explained the penalties and the nature of the appellate waiver;
Obtained assurances that he had discussed the plea with counsel and understood it;
Received his express acknowledgment that he wished to plead guilty and accept the terms.

No irregularity or defect in the Rule 11 colloquy is identified, and none appears from the record. Any challenge to the plea’s validity would therefore be frivolous.

3. Sentencing Issues

Normally, a defendant may challenge:

Guidelines calculation errors;
The substantive reasonableness of the sentence under § 3553(a);
Procedural errors (e.g., failure to consider relevant factors, inadequate explanation).

Here, those challenges are heavily constrained by the appellate waiver. Even if the waiver did not exist, the panel’s observations make clear why any sentencing challenge would fail:

The Guidelines range of 504–585 months is accepted as correctly calculated; no argument is raised or evident to the contrary.
The sentence imposed—585 months—is at the top of the range but still within it, and within all statutory maximums.
The Court explicitly discussed the seriousness of the offense, Daliot‑Rios’s role, deterrence, protection of the community, and rehabilitation—the core § 3553(a) factors.

As a result, a substantive or procedural reasonableness challenge would have no legal footing, and in any event is foreclosed by the valid waiver.

4. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

While the plea agreement preserved the right to bring ineffective assistance claims, the opinion notes:

Daliot‑Rios did not raise such a claim on direct appeal; and
Under Jake and related cases, these claims typically require evidentiary development and are usually raised in collateral proceedings (e.g., a § 2255 motion), not on direct appeal.

Consequently, any attempt to raise ineffective assistance on the present record would either be procedurally inappropriate or frivolous.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. What is an Anders Brief?

An Anders brief is filed when appointed counsel believes an appeal is wholly frivolous but must not simply abandon the client. Counsel:

Reviews the entire record;
Identifies any issues that might arguably support the appeal;
Explains why those issues lack merit under existing law and the facts;
Asks the court for permission to withdraw.

The appellate court then independently examines the record. If the court agrees that there are no nonfrivolous issues, it allows counsel to withdraw and usually affirms. If the court finds any arguable issue, it denies the motion to withdraw and appoints new counsel or orders further briefing.

B. Appellate Waiver

An appellate waiver is a clause in a plea agreement by which a defendant agrees not to appeal his conviction or sentence, except under specifically listed conditions. These waivers:

Promote finality;
Save judicial and prosecutorial resources; and
Often form part of the bargained-for exchange in plea negotiations.

A court will enforce such a waiver if:

The issue is covered by the waiver’s language;
The defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed to it; and
Enforcement would not result in a miscarriage of justice.

C. Statutory Maximum vs. Guidelines Range

A key distinction:

Statutory maximum: The absolute upper limit set by Congress for a given offense (e.g., 20 years, 40 years, or life). A plea agreement might allow appeal if this absolute limit is exceeded.
Guidelines range: An advisory sentencing range calculated under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which judges must consider but are not strictly bound to follow. Courts may impose sentences within, above, or below this range, subject to reasonableness review.

In this case, the sentence remained under all statutory maximums but at the high end of the Guidelines range. Therefore, it did not trigger the “statutory maximum” exception to the waiver.

D. Upward Departures and Variances

An upward departure or upward variance occurs when the sentencing court intentionally chooses to impose a sentence above the calculated Guidelines range. Many plea agreements contain appeal waivers that specifically preserve a right to appeal if the court imposes such an above-range sentence.

Here, the District Court did not depart or vary; it imposed a sentence within the range. Thus, the upward-departure/variance exception in the waiver did not apply.

E. Miscarriage of Justice

The “miscarriage of justice” exception is a judicial safety valve. Even if a waiver is technically valid, the court can refuse to enforce it if doing so would be grossly unfair—e.g., an illegal sentence or a serious constitutional violation not contemplated by the waiver.

In practice, this is a narrow exception. The Third Circuit applies it sparingly, usually where:

There is a clear and serious error; and
Enforcing the waiver would undermine the integrity of the judicial process.

Because no such error appeared here, the exception did not apply.

VII. Impact and Broader Significance

A. For Anders Practice in the Third Circuit

This opinion, alongside Brookins, illustrates the Third Circuit’s expectations in Anders cases:

Even when an appellate waiver seems to foreclose nearly all issues, counsel must still:
- Analyze jurisdiction, plea validity, and sentencing;
- Explain why each potential issue is frivolous;
- Address the validity, scope, and enforceability of the waiver itself.
The Court will independently verify these conclusions before allowing counsel to withdraw.

Future Anders briefs in the Third Circuit will continue to be evaluated under this rigorous two-step approach.

B. For Appellate Waivers

Although nonprecedential, the opinion reinforces existing appellate-waiver doctrine:

Broadly worded waivers will be enforced so long as they are knowing and voluntary and do not result in a miscarriage of justice;
Within-Guidelines, statutorily lawful sentences in serious criminal cases are particularly unlikely to escape enforcement of the waiver;
District judges who carefully explain the waiver during the plea colloquy, and obtain clear acknowledgment from the defendant, create a strong record for enforcement on appeal.

C. For Sentencing in Serious Drug and Violence Cases

The case illustrates that:

Very lengthy sentences—here nearly 49 years—will often be upheld when:
- They are within the Guidelines range;
- The underlying conduct includes drug trafficking, firearms, kidnapping, and homicide-related counts;
- The sentencing judge articulates a reasoned connection to § 3553(a) factors.
The presence of an appellate waiver reduces the likelihood of any meaningful appellate review of the sentence, absent a clear illegality or procedural failure.

D. For Ineffective Assistance Claims

The opinion quietly underscores the standard route for ineffective assistance of counsel claims:

They are generally preserved for collateral attacks (e.g., motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255);
They will rarely be adequately developed or suitable for resolution on a direct appeal record, especially in a case involving a guilty plea and strong appellate waiver.

E. Nonprecedential but Indicative

While explicitly “not binding precedent” under I.O.P. 5.7, the opinion reflects how current Third Circuit panels approach:

The synergy between guilty pleas and appeal waivers in constraining appellate review;
The meticulous application of Anders procedures;
The high threshold for setting aside a waiver on “miscarriage of justice” grounds.

Practitioners can reasonably view this decision as indicative of the Circuit’s continuing commitment to enforce valid plea-bargained appellate waivers in the absence of clear error or inequity.

VIII. Conclusion

United States v. Fitzgerald Daliot‑Rios is a careful application of established Third Circuit law at the intersection of guilty pleas, appellate waivers, and Anders practice. The Court:

Confirmed that counsel met the rigorous requirements of Anders and Local Rule 109.2(a);
Reaffirmed that a valid, knowing, and voluntary appellate waiver will be enforced where none of its express exceptions apply;
Applied a narrow “miscarriage of justice” standard, finding no error—jurisdictional, procedural, or substantive—that would justify relaxing the waiver; and
Ultimately granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed the 585‑month within-Guidelines sentence.

In the broader legal context, the opinion reinforces that:

Defendants who enter into plea agreements with robust appellate waivers should expect those waivers to be enforced;
When the record shows a thorough plea colloquy and a reasoned sentencing explanation, post-plea appeals are extremely constrained;
The Anders mechanism functions as a safeguard, ensuring that no nonfrivolous issues are overlooked, even in the presence of a waiver.

Though nonprecedential, Daliot‑Rios aligns seamlessly with the Third Circuit’s modern approach to appeal waivers and confirms that, absent unusual and compelling circumstances, such waivers will bar further review.