Enforcement of Plea Agreement Recommendations and Mitigating-Factor Weighing under § 3553(a): United States v. Meléndez-Rivera

Introduction

In United States v. Meléndez-Rivera, 22-1665 (1st Cir. 2025), the First Circuit addressed two recurring issues in federal criminal practice: when a prosecutor’s conduct at sentencing constitutes breach of a plea agreement, and how much explanation a district court must give when it declines a negotiated sentence in favor of a higher, “upwardly variant” term. José Luis Meléndez-Rivera, convicted by plea of carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury (Count 1), challenged on appeal both (1) the government’s alleged failure to “meaningfully advocate” for the 180-month sentence it had promised to recommend under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(B), and (2) the procedural reasonableness of the district court’s 198-month sentence, contending the judge overlooked or failed to explain rejection of his mitigating life history.

The panel—Judges Barron, Lipez, and Thompson—held that (A) the prosecutor’s simple statement, “The Government stands by the plea and requests a sentence of 180 months,” satisfied her obligation under the plea agreement and did not breach it; and (B) the district court’s reference to having considered the § 3553(a) factors, the presentence report, the plea accord, defense submissions, and argument sufficed, and the court need not recite or separately address each element of a defendant’s life story when it chooses to give more weight to recidivism, public protection, and deterrence.

Summary of the Judgment

1. Background. Meléndez-Rivera and an associate carjacked a Ford F-250 in Puerto Rico, shot one victim in the face, and fled. He pleaded guilty to Count 1 under an 11(c)(1)(B) agreement calling for a joint recommendation of 180 months (Counts 3 and 4 to be dismissed). At sentencing, the prosecutor “stood by” that recommendation but offered no further articulation. The court calculated a guidelines range of 135–168 months (Criminal History Category 4), considered the § 3553(a) factors, but imposed 198 months, explaining that 180 months “does not reflect the seriousness of the offense” or promote respect for the law or deterrence.

2. Appeal Issues. Meléndez challenged: (A) breach of the plea agreement by the government’s allegedly half-hearted advocacy for the 180-month recommendation; (B) procedural unreasonableness of the variance because the court failed to explain why it rejected his mitigation evidence.

3. Holdings. (A) Under the plain-error standard, there was no breach: the plea agreement required the government only to request 180 months, which it unambiguously did. No further “advocacy” or “explanation” was contractually mandated, even given the district judge’s reputation for upward variances. (B) Under abuse of discretion, the sentence was procedurally reasonable: the court expressly noted it had considered all § 3553(a) factors, the presentence report, the plea paperwork, and defense arguments. It weighed recidivism and public-safety concerns more heavily than mitigating life-history anecdotes— a core judicial discretion not subject to second-guessing.

Analysis

1. Plea-Agreement Performance

a. Standards and Precedents

• Contractual principles: Plea agreements are governed by ordinary contract law, with an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. United States v. Cortés-López, 101 F.4th 120, 128 (1st Cir. 2024).
• Explicit vs. implicit breach: A prosecutor may explicitly breach by doing what she promised not to do, or implicitly repudiate by “lip service” that undermines the bargain. Canada, 960 F.2d 263, 269–70 (1st Cir. 1992); Acevedo-Osorio, 118 F.4th 117, 128‒29 (1st Cir. 2024).
• No extra advocacy duty: Absent express terms, the government need not provide “ruffles and flourishes” or “any particular degree of enthusiasm.” Montañez-Quiñones, 911 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2018).
• Plain-error framework: Where no objection was lodged below, review requires showing a clear or obvious error that affected substantial rights and undermined public confidence. Acevedo-Osorio, 118 F.4th at 127.

b. Application to Meléndez-Rivera

The Rule 11(c)(1)(B) agreement obligated the government to “request a sentence of 180 months.” At sentencing, the prosecutor said exactly that—no more, no less. She made no comments suggesting reluctance or subversion. Under the totality-of-the-circumstances test, her conduct was fully “consistent with making the promised recommendation.” Canada, 960 F.2d at 269. Meléndez’s calls for more “genuine” advocacy fail because neither the agreement nor our precedents impose such a burden. No plain error occurred.

2. Procedural Reasonableness of the Variance

a. Standards and Precedents

• § 3553(a) inquiry: A sentencing court must engage in an “individualized assessment” of the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), but it need not repeat each factor or weight them equally. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50–51 (2007).
• Explanation requirement: A court’s express statement that it has considered the § 3553(a) factors, the presentence report, and counsel’s arguments is entitled to “some weight.” Clogston, 662 F.3d 588, 592 (1st Cir. 2011).
• No need to address every argument: A sentencing judge need not “address every argument that a defendant advances” or “engage in a rote incantation” of each mitigating point. Rivera-Morales, 961 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2020).
• Inference of consideration: When mitigation is fully presented in the PSR, briefs, and argument, the court’s higher‐level reasoning will suffice if it shows awareness of and countervailing response to that evidence. Carrasquillo-Sánchez, 9 F.4th 56, 62 (1st Cir. 2021).
• Review lens: Abuse of discretion governs, and will be found only if “no reasonable person could agree with the judge’s decision.” Maldonado-Peña, 4 F.4th 1, 56 (1st Cir. 2021).

b. Application to Meléndez-Rivera

The district court:

• Calculated the guidelines range (135–168 months, CHC 4).
• Recited that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors, the PSR, the plea agreement, the defense memorandum and arguments, and the allocution.
• Reviewed Meléndez’s criminal history, noting his rapid recidivism (“a mere three months” after release) and the similarity of past offenses.
• Emphasized public-safety, deterrence, respect for the law, and the victim’s ongoing injury in justifying the 198-month sentence.

Though the court did not itemize every hardship from Meléndez’s childhood, prison conditions, and fractured social background, those were fully before the judge. By choosing to weigh the aggravating factors more heavily—including a demonstrated pattern of violence and the need for greater punishment—the court exercised its wide discretion. No abuse of discretion appears in its mitigating-factor analysis or narrative explanation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Plea-agreement types:
  • Rule 11(c)(1)(B) – Government “recommends” a sentence or range; not binding on court.
  • Rule 11(c)(1)(C) – Government and defendant “agree” to a specific sentence or factor; binding if court accepts.
• Plain error vs. abuse of discretion:
  • Plain error: Needed where no trial-court objection was made; requires a clear mistake that affects substantial rights and public confidence.
  • Abuse of discretion: Standard for preserved sentencing claims; court’s decision stands unless no reasonable judge could have made it.
• § 3553(a) factors: Include nature of the offense, history of the defendant, need for deterrence, protection of the public, and consistency with similar cases.
• Implicit breach (“lip service”): When a prosecutor technically complies but appears to undercut a plea promise by tone, emphasis, or added reservations.

Conclusion

United States v. Meléndez-Rivera establishes two key principles:

1. In a Rule 11(c)(1)(B) plea agreement, the government satisfies its contractual duty—and commits no breach—by making the unambiguous, agreed-upon recommendation at sentencing, without any extra “enthusiasm” or detailed explanation, so long as it does not inject reservations or subvert the promise.
2. A district court’s statement that it has considered the § 3553(a) factors, the PSR, the plea accord, defense filings, and oral argument suffices procedurally when the judge decides, in the lawful exercise of discretion, to impose an upward variance. It need not engage in a line-by-line accounting of each piece of mitigating evidence once that evidence has been fully presented.

These holdings reinforce the contractual nature of plea deals—binding as written—and underscore the deference afforded sentencing courts in weighing complex factual and policy considerations.