Enforcement of Loss Stipulations in Plea Agreements: Prohibition on Government’s Post-Plea Introduction of Uncharged Conduct

Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Isaac Camon clarifies the extent to which the government is bound by stipulations in a plea agreement regarding loss amounts for sentencing purposes. Isaac Camon, a federal supervised‐releasee convicted of wire fraud for unlawfully obtaining CARES Act unemployment benefits, entered into a written plea agreement with the United States. That agreement expressly stipulated a loss amount of $19,452 for sentencing calculations. At sentencing, however, the government provided the probation officer—and later the court—with evidence of additional uncharged fraud (Economic Injury Disaster Loan fraud) suggesting a greater loss. The district court, over defense objection, considered that evidence before imposing a 72-month total sentence. On appeal, Camon argued that the government’s conduct breached the plea agreement; the Eleventh Circuit agreed, vacating his sentence and remanding for resentencing before a different judge.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeals held that the government breached its material promise by introducing evidence of uncharged conduct that could have led the sentencing judge to conclude that Camon was responsible for a loss greater than the agreed‐upon $19,452. Citing United States v. Boatner, 966 F.2d 1575 (11th Cir. 1992), the court explained that once the government stipulates a specific loss amount in a plea agreement, it may not thereafter furnish evidence or argument suggesting a larger amount. Because the government had furnished the probation office—and through it the district court—with documentary and testimonial support for an additional $97,400 in EIDL fraud, the government’s actions were inconsistent with Camon’s reasonable understanding of the plea agreement. The panel vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing before a new judge.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

United States v. Boatner (966 F.2d 1575): Established that government breaches a plea agreement by introducing evidence that could lead to a greater stipulated quantity (or loss), even if it ultimately stands by its stipulation at sentencing.
United States v. Tripodis (94 F.4th 1257): Emphasized that plea agreements are interpreted like contracts, avoiding hyper-technical readings, and construing ambiguities against the government.
United States v. Copeland (381 F.3d 1101): Adopted an objective standard to determine whether the defendant’s reasonable understanding of the plea agreement was violated by government action.
United States v. Taylor (77 F.3d 368): Held the government bound by material promises made in a plea agreement that induced a guilty plea.
Santobello v. New York (404 U.S. 257): Outlined remedies for government breach of plea agreements, including vacatur and resentence or withdrawal of the plea.

Legal Reasoning

The court applied an objective‐interpretation standard, asking whether Camon reasonably understood that the government would not introduce any evidence suggesting a loss greater than $19,452. The plea agreement’s plain language stipulated that “for purposes of relevant conduct” Camon was accountable only for that amount. Further, the agreement contained a merger clause declaring it to be the entire understanding, with no other promises. Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, the government’s subsequent furnishing of documents and testimony about additional EIDL fraud to the probation officer—and its reliance on those materials at sentencing—constituted a breach, regardless of whether the government formally requested a larger loss calculation. Because the introduction of that evidence had the potential to influence the court’s guideline calculation, it was inconsistent with the stipulated cap on loss amount.

Impact

This decision reinforces that plea‐agreement stipulations on loss amounts are binding and cannot be undermined by indirect introduction of uncharged conduct.
Prosecutors must carefully tailor plea agreements and understand that furnishing factual materials to probation—beyond the stipulated facts—risks a breach.
Defense counsel can rely on loss stipulations to limit the scope of relevant conduct considered at sentencing, reducing sentencing uncertainty.
District courts must scrutinize probation reports for evidence of uncharged conduct that conflicts with plea stipulations and enforce the terms of the agreement.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Plea Agreement Stipulation: A written term in which the government and defendant agree on certain facts—e.g., a loss amount—that will govern sentencing calculations.
Relevant Conduct: All acts and omissions that are part of the offense of conviction or closely related to it, used to calculate the Sentencing Guidelines range.
Presentence Investigation Report (PSI): A report prepared by probation that summarizes offense conduct, criminal history, and guideline calculations, and often relies on evidence provided by the government or law enforcement.
Merger Clause: A contractual provision stating that the written agreement contains the entire understanding between the parties, precluding reliance on extrinsic promises.
Objective Standard: A legal test that measures a party’s reasonable expectations based on the agreement’s language and ordinary meaning.

Conclusion

United States v. Camon reaffirms the principle that when the government stipulates a loss amount in a plea agreement, it must not later furnish evidence of uncharged conduct that undermines that stipulation. The Eleventh Circuit’s enforcement of this rule—mirroring its earlier holding in Boatner—protects the integrity of plea bargains, ensures predictability in sentencing, and binds both prosecution and court to the agreed terms. Going forward, prosecutors and defense counsel must draft and interpret stipulations with care, and district courts must enforce them strictly, lest the government risk vacatur and remand for a new sentencing process.