Enforceability of Defense Counsel’s Jury-Cost Commitment under UCRCCC 3.13

Introduction

In In Re: M. Zachary Jex, 2025‐SC‐00291‐SCT (Miss. Apr. 17, 2025), the Supreme Court of Mississippi confronted a novel issue at the intersection of plea negotiations, professional ethics, and court-cost rules. Attorney M. Zachary Jex, acting pro se on appeal, had promised during an in-chambers plea hearing to pay the appearance fees and mileage of jurors summoned for his client’s second trial. When the plea deal was struck only after the jury had been brought into the courthouse, Circuit Judge Tomika Harris Irving invoked Uniform Civil Rule 3.13—authorizing assessment of juror costs against “whichever party litigant or attorney it deems appropriate”—and ordered Jex to reimburse Claiborne County $4,141.00. On appeal, Jex challenged the enforceability of his oral commitment, argued duress, misapplication of Rule 3.13, and prosecutorial misconduct. In an opinion by Chief Justice Randolph (with a special concurrence by Justice Chamberlin and a dissent by Justice Sullivan), the Court affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court unanimously held that:

• Attorney Jex voluntarily and unambiguously agreed on the record to pay juror fees once plea negotiations were concluded after the jury was empaneled.
• Under Uniform Civil Rule of Circuit and County Court Practice 3.13, the trial court had discretion to assign juror appearance costs to an attorney who fails to notify the court of settlement before 5 p.m. the day prior to trial.
• Rule 3.13 applies equally in criminal proceedings, as established in Harris v. State and Crosby v. State.
• Jex’s duress argument failed because a lawful insistence on payment of court costs does not constitute legal duress.
• No prosecutorial misconduct or “pay-to-play” violation occurred when the District Attorney declined to have the State absorb juror costs.

Accordingly, the Circuit Court’s order requiring Jex to pay $4,141.00 in juror fees was affirmed.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The Court’s decision rests squarely on the intersection of three pillars:

• UCRCCC 3.13: “The court may assess all costs, including fees and mileage of jurors who have been required to be present for the trial, against whichever party litigant or attorney it deems appropriate, for failure of an attorney to try the case or for failure to notify the court of settlement of a case before 5:00 P.M. on the day before the trial.”
• Crosby v. State, 760 So. 2d 725 (Miss. 2000): Applied Rule 3.13 in a criminal context to uphold assessment of juror costs against defense counsel who “deliberately set out to delay” his client’s trial.
• Harris v. State, 224 So. 3d 76 (Miss. 2017): Held that Rule 3.13 may be applied in criminal matters to penalize an attorney whose contemptuous behavior forced a continuance.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis followed these steps:

1. Existence of a Binding Commitment. Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct (e.g., M.R.P.C. 3.3, 4.1, 8.4) require candor toward the tribunal and fulfillment of promises made in court. The transcript unambiguously shows Jex offering to pay juror costs “if the deal is going to come off the table,” and Judge Irving accepting that element as integral to the plea.
2. Authority under Rule 3.13. The plain language of UCRCCC 3.13 grants broad discretion to assess juror expenses against an attorney or party who fails to timely settle. The Court confirmed that nothing in the rule limits its application to civil matters—citing Harris’s express extension to criminal trials.
3. Rejection of Duress and Misapplication Arguments. Jex’s claim that he agreed under duress because the jury was already in place falls short of the legal definition of duress, which requires wrongful coercion or deprivation of free will beyond a legitimate insistence on payment of lawful court costs.
4. No Improper “Pay-to-Play.” The prosecutor’s refusal to have the State bear juror costs was part of the normal give-and-take of plea negotiations, not prosecutorial misconduct. The facilitation of plea bargains to conserve judicial resources necessarily contemplates cost allocations.

3. Impact

This decision clarifies and cements several important rules for Mississippi practitioners:

• Defense attorneys must be mindful that any explicit on-the-record commitment in plea negotiations—especially those tied to costs or fees—will be enforceable under UCRCCC 3.13.
• Trial courts retain broad discretion to apportion juror appearance costs wherever they see fit, regardless of whether the matter is civil or criminal.
• Plea-bargaining dynamics must anticipate cost apportionment as a legitimate term of agreement, lest counsel find themselves personally liable.
• Future litigants will look to In Re: Jex as a clear precedent when seeking cost assessments against attorneys who negotiate pleas post-empanelment.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Uniform Civil Rule 3.13: A blanket rule allowing a judge to bill jurors’ fees and travel expenses to any party or lawyer who fails to notify the court of settlement by 5 p.m. the day before trial.
• Ore Tenus Motion: An oral motion made in open court (as opposed to written), which the trial judge may treat as a formal request—for example, to reconsider a prior ruling.
• Duress: In contract law, duress requires wrongful or illegal pressure that overcomes a party’s free will. A legitimate insistence on court-provided fees does not constitute duress.
• Plea Hearing In Chambers: A private conference before a judge where parties can discuss plea terms outside the jury’s presence. Offers made there, when placed on the record, carry the full weight of judicial commitments.

Conclusion

In Re: M. Zachary Jex underscores that defense counsel must treat every oral promise in plea negotiations with the same gravity as formal orders. Under UCRCCC 3.13 and the Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer’s voluntary undertaking to bear juror appearance costs—once placed on the record—binds the attorney personally. This ruling not only affirms the trial court’s authority to allocate costs in criminal matters but also warns practitioners that cost considerations are now an integral dimension of plea-bargaining strategy. Moving forward, careful planning, early resolution, and clear record-keeping will be essential to avoid unintended personal liability.

Postscript: Concurrence and Dissent

Justice Chamberlin, joined by four colleagues, emphasized policy concerns about one-sided cost allocation and the fairness of imposing expenses on counsel when plea talks resume after jury empanelment. Justice Sullivan dissented, viewing the prosecutor’s ultimatum and the judge’s participation in negotiations as coercive. These separate writings highlight the tension between judicial efficiency and ethical safeguards in plea bargaining.