Enforceability of Collateral-Review Waivers Against Post-Davis § 924(c) Attacks

1. Introduction

The case of United States v. Jones (5th Cir. Apr. 21, 2025) arises from Cedric Ray Jones’s guilty plea to (1) conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) and (2) brandishing a firearm during that conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Jones’s plea agreement included a broad waiver of his rights to direct appeal and collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2255, with narrow exceptions. After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis (588 U.S. 445, 470 (2019)) invalidated § 924(c)’s “residual clause” as unconstitutionally vague, Jones moved under § 2255 to vacate his § 924(c) conviction. The district court held his challenge barred by the plea waiver; the 5th Circuit panel affirmed. This commentary examines the court’s reasoning, the precedents it relied on, and the decision’s implications for future § 924(c) litigation and plea-agreement jurisprudence.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Fifth Circuit unanimously held that:

Jones’s plea agreement contained a valid, knowing, and voluntary waiver of his rights to both direct appeal and collateral attack, including challenges under § 2255.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Davis—striking down § 924(c)’s residual clause—does not create an exception to that waiver, even though Jones’s predicate Hobbs Act robbery can no longer qualify as a “crime of violence.”
No “statutory-maximum” or “manifest injustice” exception to the waiver applied in these circumstances, and the court declined to recognize a broader “miscarriage-of-justice” exception.
The district court’s denial of Jones’s § 2255 motion was affirmed; the waiver was enforceable in full.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019): Held the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutionally vague, rendering Hobbs Act robbery an invalid predicate “crime of violence.”
United States v. Barnes, 953 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2020): Upheld a broad collateral-review waiver, emphasizing that defendants assume the risk of future legal developments.
United States v. Caldwell, 38 F.4th 1161 (5th Cir. 2022) (per curiam): Applied a similar waiver to a post-Davis § 924(c) challenge, holding that plea waivers preclude reliance on new caselaw.
United States v. Leal, 933 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 2019): Recognized a narrow “statutory-maximum” carve-out but upheld general waivers of appeal from illegal sentences.
United States v. White, 258 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2001): Ruled that a general waiver does not waive “an indictment’s failure to charge an offense,” leaving open whether such a fundamental right can ever be waived by boilerplate language.
Circuits in accord: 2d, 6th, 7th, 9th, and 11th Circuits have similarly enforced collateral-review waivers against Davis-based attacks.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The panel’s analysis proceeded in three steps:

Scope of the Waiver. Jones’s plea agreement contained broad language waiving “his right to contest his convictions and sentences in any collateral proceeding,” including § 2255 motions, subject only to specific carve-outs (excessive statutory maximum, arithmetic error, voluntariness of plea or waiver, ineffective assistance of counsel). The court held that this language unambiguously covered challenges under Davis, regardless of the general nature of the waiver.
Contract Interpretation. Jones argued a different provision (the judge’s discretion so long as within statutory maximum) showed the parties did not intend to waive all challenges to an “invalid” predicate. The panel disagreed, adopting the Sixth Circuit’s approach that the “statutory-maximum” exception refers only to challenges against sentences that exceeded the maximum at the time of sentencing—not to post-Davis voided predicates.
Knowing and Voluntary. The court rejected the claim that a waiver can never encompass future, as-yet-unknown rights. Citing Barnes and other binding precedent, the panel held a defendant need only knowingly waive existing statutory rights, even if future caselaw eliminates the basis of the conviction.

3.3. Exceptions to Enforceability

Under Fifth Circuit law, two narrow exceptions to collateral-review waivers exist:

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. A defendant may always raise a claim that counsel misled him about the waiver’s scope.
Sentence Exceeding Statutory Maximum. A waiver does not bar a challenge to a sentence that was unlawful when imposed.

Jones attempted to invoke both and a “miscarriage of justice” exception:

Illegal Sentence Exception. The panel held Jones’s sentence was lawful as initially imposed—§ 924(c) carried a valid maximum. Only subsequent caselaw nullified the predicate; it did not render the original sentence unlawful “at the time.”
Miscarriage of Justice Exception. The Fifth Circuit has not formally adopted this exception. The panel declined to do so here, finding no workable limiting principle and noting other circuits’ split views.

3.4. Impact on Future Cases

This decision underscores that:

Defendants who sign broad collateral-review waivers may foreclose nearly all post-conviction challenges—Davis-type or otherwise—unless they fit recognized exceptions.
Plea-bargain negotiations will increasingly emphasize careful drafting of waiver carve-outs when new challenges are anticipated.
Courts in the Fifth Circuit are unlikely to recognize new exceptions (e.g., a broad “miscarriage of justice” exception) without explicit en banc or Supreme Court direction.
The ruling aligns the Fifth Circuit with a majority of circuits enforcing plea waivers against post‐Davis § 924(c) claims.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Hobbs Act Robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)): A federal crime of interfering with interstate commerce by robbery or extortion.
§ 924(c) “Crime of Violence”: A prerequisite for enhanced penalties when a firearm is used in furtherance of certain felonies—originally defined by an “elements clause” and a now-invalidated “residual clause.”
Residual Clause: Language in § 924(c)(3)(B) that covered offenses “that by their nature involve a substantial risk that physical force . . . may be used.” Declared unconstitutionally vague in Davis.
Collateral-Review Waiver: A contractual term in a plea agreement where the defendant agrees not to challenge his conviction or sentence in post-conviction proceedings.
§ 2255 Motion: A federal habeas petition that allows prisoners to challenge their custody on constitutional or jurisdictional grounds.
Statutory Maximum Exception: A narrow waiver exception permitting challenges if the imposed sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by Congress at the time of sentencing.
Miscarriage-of-Justice Exception: A potential carve-out recognized by some circuits allowing relief when enforcing a waiver would produce an egregious unfairness; not adopted in the Fifth Circuit.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Jones reinforces the strong presumption in favor of enforcing broad collateral-review waivers in plea agreements, even when subsequent Supreme Court decisions nullify predicate offenses. The Fifth Circuit’s refusal to broaden exceptions—limited to ineffective assistance and sentences exceeding the statutory maximum at the time imposed—signals that defendants and defense counsel must carefully negotiate and draft waiver provisions if they wish to preserve rights to future legal developments. Absent explicit higher-court intervention, the decision cements the circuit’s alignment with other courts in curbing post-conviction § 924(c) challenges under Davis.